Mind the Gap. Balancing design and global manufacturing in Dutch fashion by Köppchen, A.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/129879
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
Mind the Gap
Balancing design and gloBal 
manufacturing in dutch fashion
anja Köppchen
the research for this dissertation has been made possible by the financial support of:
nWo, the netherlands organization for scientific research
meester Koetsier foundation
stichting opleidings- en ontwikkelingsfonds voor de confectie-industrie (educational fund for the dutch 
clothing industry)
Premsela, the netherlands institute for design and fashion
arteZ institute of the arts, arnhem
saxion university of applied sciences, enschede
university of amsterdam
radboud university nijmegen
cover design and layout: studio nilsson, arnhem
Print: gVo drukkers & vormgevers BV, ede
isBn 978-90-6464-810-6
© anja Köppchen 2014
the author has made every reasonable endeavour to trace and acknowledge the copyright holders of the images 
included in this dissertation. if any proper acknowledgement has not been made, copyright holders are invited to 
contact the author.
Mind the Gap
 Balancing design and gloBal manufacturing   
in dutch fashion
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor 
aan de radboud universiteit nijmegen
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. mr. s.c.J.J. Kortmann, 
volgens besluit van het college van decanen 
in het openbaar te verdedigen op donderdag 2 oktober 2014 
om 10.30 uur precies
door
anja Köppchen
geboren op 6 oktober 1983
te leipzig, duitsland
promotor:  Prof. dr. a.m. smelik
Copromotor:  dr. m.r. scheffer (saxion, enschede)
Manuscriptcommissie:
Prof. dr. h. ernste 
Prof. dr. a. lagendijk
Prof. dr. o.a.l.c. atzema (universiteit utrecht)
	 “Infatuated	by	the	extensiveness	of	the	universe,	it’s	easy	to	forget	one	of	the	most	complex		
enigmas	of	this	world:	The	human	mind,	a	universe	of	its	own.”
the gathering1
1  the gathering (1999). gaya’s dream. on Always…	[cd]. eindhoven: Psychonaut records. (1992)

table of Contents
aCKnoWledGeMents
abbReViations and aCRonYMs
1.  dUtCh fashion identitY in a GlobaliZed WoRld
 1.1 dutch fashion identitY
 1.2 dutch fashion industrY: a Brief historY
 1.2.1 the spatial evolution of the dutch fashion and clothing industry
 1.2.2 dutch industrial policies and international trade regulations 
 1.2.3 from clothing to styling and fashion?
 1.3 aims and Questions: a geograPhical lens on dutch fashion
 1.4 structure of the thesis 
2.  defininG the field: fashion and GlobaliZation
 2.1 the fashion sYstem
 2.1.1 from fashion’s outcomes to its underlying principles
 2.1.2 change for the sake of change
 2.1.3 the production of fashion
 2.2 the gloBaliZed organiZation of fashion Production
 2.2.1 a fragmented industry
 2.2.2 chains and networks
 2.2.3 firm typologies and sourcing strategies
 2.2.4 dutch fashion brands in global production networks
 2.3 concluding remarKs
3.  fRoM Chains and netWoRKs to RoUtines and pRaCtiCes
 3.1 the sPaces of dutch fashion Production (or WhY distance matters)
 3.2 organiZational routines
 3.2.1 organizational routines in economic geography
 3.2.2 What routines are
 3.2.3 What routines do
 3.2.4 how routines work
 3.2.5 changing perspectives
 3.3 social Practices
 3.3.1 a variety of practice theories
11
15
17
45
79
 3.3.2 routinized practices
 3.3.3 spatialized knowledge practices
 3.3.4 making connections
 3.4 organiZational Practices
 3.5 concluding remarKs
4. ReseaRCh desiGn and MethodoloGY
 4.1 from identitY to organiZational Practices
 4.2 case studY design
 4.3 hoW to reVeal What is Being taKen for granted?
 4.4 conducting interVieWs to understand organiZational Practices
 4.5 concluding remarKs
5. oililY’s (Un)liMited CReatiVitY
 5.1 the different faces of the Brand: colour, innoVation, lifestYle, children
 5.2 from manufacturer to licenser
 5.2.1 olly’s B.V.: made in alkmaar
 5.2.2 oilily B.V.: produced in alkmaar
 5.2.3 oilily World B.V.: designed in alkmaar
 5.3 organiZational Practices: driVen BY creatiVitY
 5.3.1 design practice
 5.3.2 structured creativity?
 5.4 the structuring forces of oililY’s creatiVe Practices
 5.5 concluding remarKs
6. MeXX’ CooRdinated stYle
 6.1 a storY of entrePreneurshiP, gloBal identitY, and lifestYle Branding
 6.2 gloBal comPleXitY
 6.2.1 the amex group
 6.2.2 the mexx group
 6.2.3 the production of one brand in multiple markets
 6.3 organiZational Practices: driVen BY the schedule
 6.3.1 mexx, a deadline company
 6.3.2 design – Production coordination
 6.4 concluding remarKs
7. CoRa KeMpeRMan’s peRsonal bUYinG appRoaCh
107
135
169
201
 7.1 eXclusiVe Yet affordaBle design
 7.2 distant But staBle
 7.2.1 mac & maggie
 7.2.2 ¯coraKemperman
 7.3 organiZational Practices: creatiVe BuYing
 7.3.1 from design...
 7.3.2 ...via buying...
 7.3.3 ...to the whole package
 7.4 connecting distant Practices
 7.5 concluding remarKs
8. Van Gils’ CRafted Method
 8.1 strictlY for men
 8.2 tWo seParate Yet related traJectories
 8.2.1 how the manufacturer becomes a brand
 8.2.2 how the brand becomes detached from the manufacturer
 8.2.3 manufacturing continued
 8.3 organiZational Practices: from maKing suits to creating Van gils
 8.3.1 the brand’s perspective: creating Van gils...
 8.3.2 the manufacturer’s perspective: ...or making suits?
 8.4 concluding remarKs
9. the MaKinG of
 9.1 dutch fashion from design to manufacturing
 9.1.1 the spaces of dutch fashion production
 9.1.2 a practice lens on global production networks
 9.2 mind the gaP? dutch fashion Production reVisited
 9.3 mind the gaP! dutch fashion Production and BeYond...
RefeRenCes
saMenVattinG
CURRiCUlUM Vitae
227
257
279
305
317

11
Acknowledgements
the artist or designer often gets all the credits, but a piece of fashion is the product of many 
hands, thoughts, machines, encounters... fashion is produced by the designer who makes 
sketches as well as by the girl who sews sleeves into armholes, by the model on the catwalk, 
and by the consumer on the street. likewise, i am the sole author of this dissertation, but i 
am indebted to many people who have directly and indirectly contributed to accomplishing 
this piece of work. i would like to express my gratitude and appreciation to all of them.
first of all, i had the privilege of being part of a multi-disciplinary research team, working 
with seven researchers who all brought their own highly interesting perspectives to the nWo 
project Dutch	Fashion	 Identity	 in	a	Globalized	World: project leader and my supervisor Prof. 
anneke smelik, my co-supervisor dr michiel scheffer, Prof. dany Jacobs, José teunissen, 
ma, and my fellow Phd students maaike feitsma, daniëlle Bruggeman, and constantin von 
maltzahn.	it has been an honour and pleasure working with you. 
anneke, thank you for providing me with the opportunity to be part of this project in the 
first place. thank you for your trust and confidence in my abilities, for keeping the focus 
on progress, for teaching me how to write for the ‘lazy reader’, and for your insightful lessons 
concerning academic politics. michiel, thank you for your genuine interest and support. Your 
pragmatic approach helped me to see the bigger picture and put things into perspective. i 
could not have done it without you, your wide-ranging knowledge of the fashion and textile 
industries, and not in the last place your hospitality and your unbounded enthusiasm to 
discuss ideas and drafts. i am also grateful for the time and effort dany has put into reading 
several of my draft chapters; thank you for your critical and productive feedback. and thank 
you, José, for enriching my preliminary findings with insights from your extensive knowledge 
of (dutch) fashion. 
my fellow Phd students: not only did we share an office, but also the journey to achieving 
our doctorates. maaike, the fashion academic who has been declared the ‘dr on high heels’: 
thanks both for sharing your fashion knowledge and for just having a good time. it is always 
fun to work with you. daniëlle, thank you for your thorough and detailed reading of my 
drafts; you always come up with new inspiring questions and food for thought. and thank 
you, constantin, for your elaborate and thought-provoking comments and suggestions. 
i cannot thank enough all professionals related to the fashion industry, who made 
a generous effort to contribute to my research by sharing their knowledge. as i 
have anonymized my interviews, i cannot thank you all individually here. therefore, to all 
12
interviewees, whether we had a fifteen-minute chat in-between meetings or a two-hour 
conversation, whether we shared some information via e-mail or you provided me with 
written reports or other documents, without you none of this would have been possible. 
special thanks go to Willem and late marieke olsthoorn. i admire your courage and drive to 
go on revitalizing oilily, and i am sincerely grateful for the time you gave me and my fellow 
Phd students to discuss the brand and its history. cora Kemperman, i consider myself 
fortunate to have met such a strong, thought-provoking and successful business woman. 
thank you so much for sharing your knowledge, your time and even let me read parts of 
your personal archive. thanks also to you former mac & maggie buyers for so passionately 
initiating me into the way you were doing business in those days. thank you, Ben van gils, 
for your knowledge and genuine interest, and of course for the time in tangier. it was a 
wonderful and elevating experience. thanks also to Jacques van gils and the other ‘Van 
gils members’ whom i had the pleasure to meet and the chance to exchange ideas with. at 
mexx, i had the privilege to have long and inspiring conversations with some of the brand’s 
founders as well as	with highly knowledgeable managers working for the brand today. 
thank you all.
i shared an office with three; i shared the eleventh floor of the erasmus building with many 
more wonderful cultural scholars and art historians. i enjoyed being part of the team and 
working within such a comfortable, productive, and inspiring environment. thank you all 
for the good time both during and after office hours.  
Besides writing my dissertation in nijmegen, i spent some memorable time teaching at 
saxion university of applied sciences in enschede. thanks to the staff of the bachelor 
programme Textile	Engineering	&	Management,	i had the opportunity to develop and improve 
my teaching skills, while working with ‘the fashion professionals of the future’. thank you 
for this valuable experience. 
i also wish to say thank you to the fellow researchers at the human geography department 
at the radboud university, where i have attended some exciting lectures and seminars. it 
is highly inspiring to move in-between academic disciplines and to exchange ideas and 
experiences during lunch and coffee breaks. thank you to the scholars and students whom 
i have met during Phd courses and at fashion conferences around the world. change 
of scenery and academic discipline is important in many ways. Participating in several 
seminars and courses has not only taught me about such crucial skills as academic writing, 
teaching, or how to manage my career. it has above all widened my horizon on a personal 
and	professional level. therefore thanks to all those fellow Phd students, each and every 
one with his/her own story and own ways to deal with certain challenges; challenges that are 
13
remarkably similar, irrespective of academic background or subject of study.
thanks to Joy and her Writing	Support	Groups, i have met a couple of Phd students who deserve 
a special word of thanks. ans and maaike, our afternoon sessions were more than helpful; 
especially since they were not only about writing as such, but about sharing experiences and 
going through the final stages of finishing our Phd projects together. We gave each other 
strength by just listening and understanding. thank you for that.
i cannot thank individually all the people whom i have met and who inspired me during my 
study. anyone who has read and commented on pieces of my work in progress; anyone who 
helped me transcribing my interviews; anyone who gave me advice, who introduced me to 
someone else, or who just encouraged me to go on: thank you.
i also wish to thank majken for her wonderful design. thank you for ‘asking the question 
behind the question’ and translating my study into an originally designed and visually 
appealing book. 
and finally, where would i be without friends and family. nichts von alledem wäre möglich 
ohne meine eltern. mama und Papa, danke für eure unterstützung und dafür dass ihr 
einfach immer für mich da seid. und Jani, mein ‚kleiner‘ Bruder, ohne dich geht’s natürlich 
auch nicht.
moving from the city of nijmegen to former coal mining town heerlen during the last year 
of my study was, to say the least, ‘gewöhnungsbedürftig’. But my friends, especially ilona 
and my paranymph Patrick, made it much more enjoyable, encouraging me to take the 
necessary time off to clear my mind and just relax. some even say that the two of you were 
responsible for finding the love of my life nine years ago. 
floris. mijn lief. dankjewel dat jij er bent. er is niemand die mij beter begrijpt dan jij. 
anja Köppchen
July 2014

15
AbbreviAtions And Acronyms
¯CK ¯coraKemperman
atC agreement on textiles and clothing
Cee central and eastern europe
CMt                  cut-make-trim
Cops                  communities of Practice
eeC                  european economic community
eU european union
feneCon stichting federatie nederlandse confectie-industrie, Vereniging van     
confectie- en tricotage-ondernemingen
fta free trade arrangement
GCC global commodity chains
Gpn global Production networks
GVC global Value chains
Kbb                  Koninklijke Bijenkorf Beheer
Ksa                  Kurt salmon associates
KWW                  Krekel – Van der Woerd – Wouterse 
lta long-term arrangement regarding international trade in cotton textiles
Mfa multi-fibre arrangement
neVeC                  nederlandse economische Vereniging voor de confectie industrie
nWo                  the netherlands organization for scientific research
opt outward Processing trade
p&C                  Peek & cloppenburg
pta                           Preferential trade arrangement
stRUCon stichting structuurverbetering confectie-industrie (foundation for      
structural adjustment of the clothing industry)
V&d                  Vroom & dreesman
Wto World trade organization

17
ChapteR 1 
| dutch fashion identitY in a    
 gloBaliZed World
[i]t is precisely by focusing again on material and materialisation that a space 
is created to rethink fashion, design and the role of the designer. You [...] try 
to tempt me to issue statements about a look, about an image, but i find the 
question of how much more important! how was something created, under what 
conditions, and what role did the designer play in that?
alexander van slobbe (2010: 267-268) 2
2  this quote is selected from a conversation with Van slobbe’s business partner guus Beumer in a book    
 celebrating two decades of designing.
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We are living in a post-industrial society – in a dematerialized knowledge economy that 
seems to be characterized by “a shift away from dealing with raw materials and machines 
toward dealing with other minds” (Bryson, daniels, henry & Pollard, 2000a: 2-3). driven 
by creativity, symbolic knowledge, and aesthetic values, the creative industries of fashion 
fit right in with such conceptualizations of contemporary – supposedly dematerialized 
– Western economies. But disasters such as the collapse of the rana Plaza building in 
Bangladesh in april 2013, which housed five garment factories working for major european 
and north american fashion brands, abruptly confront us with industrial reality: we are 
still making things. it just takes place out of sight and therefore, often out of mind. in this 
dissertation i want to bring the	making	of back into our minds by exploring the relationship 
between design and manufacturing in the production of dutch fashion; or, in the words of 
dutch fashion designer alexander van slobbe, by focusing on how things are created.  
While high fashion designers like Van slobbe often emphasize the important role of the 
material and craftsmanship in their designs, high street fashion brands have to deal with 
a certain distance between the design process and its materialization in manufacturing, 
due to the current international division of labour. the central aim of my dissertation is 
to explore how the design and production of fashion is affected by such a distance. in one 
of the first, exploratory interviews that i conducted for this study, a product developer at 
tommy hilfiger explained that the whole process from first concept to the final product 
in the fashion industry sometimes resembles the game Chinese	whispers.3	every handover 
from one actor to the next entails the risk of misinterpretation, which potentially alters the 
original design idea. as i will argue in this study, the struggle described by this product 
developer is an example of a more widespread issue concerning the majority of fashion 
brands today: that is the transformation or translation of abstract design ideas into physical 
garments at	a	distance. 
my study aims to understand whether the relations between design and manufacturing 
in dutch fashion are subject to the frictions of distance – distance in space, but also in 
time, culture, or knowledge, for instance. does the design process benefit from being 
detached from manufacturing? or have fashion firms found new ways of connecting 
design and manufacturing at a distance? in other words: does distance matter, and if so, 
how? this geographical question of distance between design and manufacturing is of 
particular relevance to the organization of the dutch fashion industry. as i shall argue in this 
introductory chapter, dutch fashion is a relatively recent phenomenon that coincided with 
the massive 
3  in this game a message is passed through a line of people, in a whisper, until the last person   
 announces the final version of the message – which is usually highly distorted – to the entire group.
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breakdown of dutch clothing manufacturing since the 1960s. dutch fashion firms were 
among the first to delve into foreign sourcing and specialized in design, marketing, and 
sales, which indicates an early shift from material to immaterial value creation. in this study 
i discuss, analyse, and challenge dutch fashion industry’s apparent dematerialization.
recently, dutch fashion has become subject of a lively debate within the media, fashion 
journals, museums, art academies, sector institutes and industry associations (e.g. al et 
al., 2011; du mortier, Bloemberg & Van gelder, 2006; Kuijpers, 2009; rottenberg, 2009; 
struycken, 2009; teunissen, 2009; 2011; Van rossum, 2011). the focus of dutch cultural and 
economic policies on creative industries also reveals a mounting attention to stimulating 
and promoting dutch fashion on a global scale. this political attention manifests itself 
in the programmes of former Premsela, the netherlands institute for design and fashion 
(2002-2013), the dutch design fashion architecture programme (dutchdfa 2009-2012), 
and the creative industries fund (2013-2016). such debates and programmes reflect the 
function of fashion as “not just making clothes, but also an attribute that nations no longer 
seem to be able to do without” (segre reinach, 2011: 270). 
it is remarkable that the concept of dutch fashion has gained both national and international 
significance – especially since the 1990s (feitsma, 2014) – in a time when the majority of 
dutch clothing manufacturing has already disappeared. north-western european countries 
such as the netherlands have experienced an immense breakdown of the clothing 
manufacturing industry and, until not so long ago, were not recognized for maintaining a 
national fashion at all. distance between fashion design and clothing manufacturing has 
played a role in the industrial developments of virtually all of these ‘new’ fashion countries; 
for instance, skov (2011) discusses this with regard to danish fashion and hauge (2007) in 
his account of contemporary swedish fashion. however, it is of particular significance when 
considering the history of the dutch fashion industry. the sector’s deindustrialization had 
already started in the 1960s, which is why the dutch clothing industry can be called “an early 
mover into foreign outsourcing” (levelt, 2010: 99). 
due to the industry’s increasing relocation and outsourcing of manufacturing functions, the 
site of fashion design has become spatially separated from the site of clothing manufacture. 
this gap raises questions of how dutch fashion relates to its manufacturing heritage, and 
how dutch fashion design may be affected by its detachment from the manufacturing 
industries. after all, the majority of dutch fashion is being designed in the netherlands, 
yet manufactured abroad. rooted in the field of human geography, my study is concerned 
with the spatial organization of the dutch fashion industry – in particular with the relations 
between design and manufacturing. does it matter where dutch fashion is being made? and 
1
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does it affect dutch design aesthetics when it is no longer being made in the netherlands? i 
will argue that it does, but not in the obvious sense that dutch fashion should be considered 
less ‘dutch’ if it is being manufactured somewhere else. as i will argue in this study, it is 
less important where something is produced, than how manufacturing and design are 
connected.
the central aim of my dissertation is thus to explore the role of distance between design 
and manufacturing in the emergence of dutch fashion. as i will explain in much more detail 
below, the main research question is: How	 is	 Dutch	 fashion	 production	 affected	 by	 growing	
distance	between	design	and	manufacturing? 
in order to contextualize my research question and my approach, i will first explain in section 
1.1 how my study is embedded in the wider context of the collaborative research project dutch 
fashion identity in a globalized World. in section 1.2, i provide a short overview of the main 
developments in the history of the dutch fashion industry, in order to understand dutch 
fashion in the context of its early industrial movements as introduced above. combined 
with the ideas and questions concerning national fashions, this historical overview provides 
the starting point for my research. next, i present my research aims and questions in section 
1.3. i conclude this chapter with an outline of the structure of my dissertation.  
1.1 dUtCh fashion identitY
fashion does not play a prominent role in academic research in the netherlands. my study is 
one of the products of a multidisciplinary research project that aims to change the marginal 
position of fashion in academia. this project is called Dutch	Fashion	Identity	in	a	Globalized	
World	and was funded by the humanities division of the national research council nWo – 
The	Netherlands	Organization	for	Scientific	Research	– which falls under the responsibility of the 
dutch ministry of education, culture and science.4 the project is part of nWo humanities’ 
research programme Cultural	Dynamics.	this programme deals with current feelings of crisis 
and struggles with identities, while focusing explicitly on the role of culture in both sources 
and potential solutions for such crises:
the cultural dynamics programme attempts to locate the analysis of this feeling of 
crisis in cultural dynamics itself, implying that culture also is where the solution is 
to be looked for. indeed, virtually unnoticed, culture has not only become the heart 
of the problem, but emerges at the same time as the privileged instrument for its 
analysis. in this programme, culture is conceived as a multitude of interwoven social 
4  see colophon for a complete list of co-sponsors.
21
processes by which identities are formed and appropriated, whereas cultural 
dynamics can be defined as the interaction, over time, between cultural inheritance 
and collective identity (frijhoff, 2011: 5-6).
Within the project Dutch	 Fashion	 Identity	 in	 a	 Globalized	 World,	 we aim to contribute to 
understanding such cultural dynamics by concentrating on one particular cultural 
phenomenon – fashion. in a similar way as nWo places culture at the heart of current societal 
problems, we consider fashion and the fashion industries vital to understanding a variety 
of socio-economic and cultural issues. as Paulicelli and clark claim in their introduction 
to The	Fabric	of	Cultures	(2009: 2),	“[f ]ashion is [...] key to gaining an understanding of the 
current shifts in the global economy and markets, as well as to the projection of identity and 
aesthetics.” the question then is: how are issues of identity constructions in the netherlands 
related to the global world of fashion, and what can we gain from understanding such 
relationships?
the relationship between fashion and national identity may not seem straightforward at first, 
but on a closer look it fits well within recent international debates within fashion studies. 
globalization does not only manifest itself in the worldwide spread of fashion trends and 
continuous shifts in manufacturing locations, but it is also manifested in a proliferation 
of  fashion or style centres beyond the traditional capitals of Paris, london, milan, new 
York, and tokyo (e.g. Beard, 2011). these new centres of fashion are not necessarily cities; 
they increasingly include (small) Western european nations. as the contributions to a 
2011 special issue of Fashion	Theory	clearly indicate, it is no longer inconceivable if fashion 
is preceded by ‘danish’, ‘scandinavian’, ‘dutch’, ‘Belgian’, or ‘australian’ (e.g. melchior, 
2011b; skov, 2011). 
to a large extent, the search for such national fashion identities can be understood as a 
reaction to an increasingly globalized fashion system that is dominated by the traditional 
fashion capitals. By way of a commercial strategy, fashion brands and designers may use 
their national heritage or background to communicate a unique, distinctive image in the 
global world of fashion (melchior, 2011b). in this way, the nation becomes an instrument for 
product differentiation; as such, it functions as “a value-adding factor in the merchandising 
of clothes” (goodrum, 2005: 17; see also melchior, 2010). moreover, national governments 
increasingly are drawing attention to their creative industries, including fashion, and 
mobilize these industries to promote national economic development (cf. melchior, skov & 
csaba, 2011). especially in the case of scandinavian fashion,
[f ]ashion is perceived as a suitable means of making the nation stand out 
internationally by producing fashionable eye-catching clothes and images. it invites 
1
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and receives attention, which is highly valued by contemporary society on both 
personal and institutional levels. in the current perspective, fashion can make sense 
of place, and place branding is a key mission for the nation in a globalized age, in 
which cities, regions, and countries increasingly compete with one another to attract 
investors, employees, residents, and tourists (melchior, 2011b: 182).
studying national fashion industries can thus also help to understand constructions of 
national identities within the complex relationships between, on the one hand, commercial 
strategies of fashion brands and designers and, on the other, cultural and economic policies. 
it is important to acknowledge that such nation-branding and place-making is only possible 
if, in line with hobsbawm and ranger (1983), we conceive the nation “more like a renewable 
resource that can be reinvented in interaction with global changes”, rather than a given, 
“primordial, ancient, and unchanging” entity, which would be “the antithesis of fashion” 
(skov, 2011: 150). it thus makes sense to relate constructions of national identities to the 
world of fashion, because both are subject to processes of selection, as goodrum explains:
national identity may be conceived [...] as a confection of selective memories, 
generating traditions and rituals in order to reinforce ideas of permanence and 
longevity and also supplying the plebeian masses with a collection of codified 
emblems through which to foster national belonging and a sense of identification. 
the cultural intermediaries of the fashion industry are involved in a similar process 
of selection. they are continually delving into the past for convenient emblems to 
suit their corporate objectives, often using commodified notions of nationness to 
evoke these same sentiments of tradition, durability and earnest values in their own 
products (goodrum, 2005: 62).
it follows from this understanding of fashions and nations that there is no such thing as 
the	 national	 fashion	 identity. in the process of selection, this identity is constantly being 
rejuvenated and reinvented, while claiming a certain sense of permanence and durability. 
several authors have demonstrated that claims of national (fashion) identities are often full 
of paradoxes (e.g. goodrum, 2005 on Britishness; melchior, 2011a on danish fashion; segre 
reinach, 2009; 2010 on italian fashion), which may precisely be the reason why fashion 
has such a power “to portray and invent national and global identities, branding particular 
countries, lifestyles, and cities on a global scale” (Paulicelli & clark, 2009: 2); because 
fashion may represent the nation’s “supermarket of identities” (Bauman, 2000: 83). 
Within the research project Dutch	 Fashion	 Identity	 in	 a	Globalized	World,	 it is our ambition 
to gain a multifaceted understanding of the phenomenon of fashion in general, and the 
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concept of dutch fashion identity in particular. rather than aiming at an all-encompassing 
definition of dutch fashion identity, we pursue a multidisciplinary approach and focus on 
different sites of identity construction, including brand identities, consumer identities, 
identities as performance, and identity construction in the form of myths or narratives (cf. 
Bruggeman, 2014; feitsma, 2014; Von maltzahn, 2013). drawing on the disciplines of art 
history, cultural studies, sociology, and human geography, we explore dutch fashion’s 
historical, cultural, social, and economic foundations.
Figure	1.1:	Project	organization	Dutch	Fashion	Identity	in	a	Globalized	World
my dissertation offers a geographical perspective on the dutch fashion industry, in addition 
to the art historical, cultural, and social perspectives provided by the three other subprojects. 
in the words of segre reinach:
the intensification of production relocation has in fact changed not only the geography 
of fashion, but also the relations between “made in” and national creativity. in some 
cases it has made sartorial identities more fragile; in others it has strengthened them, 
granting greater freedom of expression (segre reinach, 2011: 269).
my study explores the effects of relocation and outsourcing manufacturing functions in 
terms of distance between design and manufacturing upon the organization of the dutch 
fashion industry. the following section further elaborates on the context of this study by 
discussing the history of the dutch fashion industry in more detail.    
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1.2 dUtCh fashion indUstRY: a bRief histoRY
Dutch fashion is a relatively recent phenomenon. up until the first half of the twentieth 
century, Parisian haute	 couture	 prescribed the standard. from the 1960s onward, Paris 
started to lose its supremacy, and dutch brands and designers were able to gain some 
international recognition (e.g. feitsma, 2014; teunissen, 2006; 2010). in those same years, 
however, the dutch clothing industry entered into a period of decline. that decline would 
eventually lead to a transformation from a primarily production-led clothing industry to a 
brand- and design-led fashion industry (cf. lury, 2004).
1.2.1 the sPatial eVolution of the dutch fashion and    
 clothing industrY
the foundations of industrialized clothing production in the netherlands were already 
laid in the nineteenth century. With the abolition of guild legislation in 1818 (Boot, 1983; 
Kornaat, 1992; raes, 2000) and the rise of the sewing machine during the second half of 
the century, garment manufacturing gradually changed from a high-skilled craft of tailors 
and dressmakers to an industrialized system of mass production. this was further enhanced 
by an increasing division of labour in tailors’ workshops in the big cities (Kornaat, 1992), 
especially in amsterdam (Boot, 1983). 
furthermore, german immigrant seasonal workers from Westphalia set up their own 
drapery businesses in the northern regions of the netherlands (simons, de Boer, Beekman, 
Konings & Van dooren, 1995a). By gradually starting to make and sell ready-made clothes 
to retailers, these german entrepreneurs also contributed to a strong wholesale industry 
(Boot, 1983; Kornaat, 1992). for the manufacturing of these ready-made garments, which 
were primarily made by home-based seamstresses and tailors, speed and price gained 
importance over quality and craftsmanship (ibid.). 
in this way, cheap clothing became accessible to a wider public, and simultaneously led to 
further skill-downgrading in garment manufacturing. Professional tailors became scarce; 
prospective tailors experienced more and more difficulties in getting apprenticeships in 
order to learn the required skills under the guidance of a qualified tailor (Van der steur, 
1989). for high-quality education, they had to go abroad, to such institutions as the 
renowned Tailor	&	Cutter	Academy in london or the Deutsche	Schneider	Akademie in hamburg 
(Kornaat, 1992).
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in addition to these developments in manufacturing, the second half of the nineteenth 
century marked the rise of a number of influential chain stores and department stores in 
the netherlands. Partly triggered by the same german merchants who introduced mass-
produced clothing, and partly inspired by french magasins	de	nouveautés, dutch chain stores 
such as lampe (1834), c&a (1841), and Peek & cloppenburg (1869), and department stores 
de Bijenkorf (1870)5 and Vroom & dreesman (1878)6 were founded in this period (Kornaat, 
1992; miellet, 1993; teunissen, 2010). 
While the origins of industrialized clothing manufacturing date back to the nineteenth 
century, the first larger clothing factories were primarily built from 1900 onward. under the 
influence of time and motion studies in the 1930s, which focused on establishing standard 
times and improving work methods, clothing manufacturing was further rationalized and 
divided into several small constituent processes:
the production of one item (for example a men’s suit) was divided into sub-processes, 
which in turn consisted of a number of operations. for instance, the sub-process ‘to 
stitch the seam of a sleeve’ consisted of the following subsequent operations: take the 
sleeve, put the sleeve on the table, unfold it, lay it flat, stitch, cut off the threads, pull 
it out under the needle, fold the sleeve, put the sleeve aside. the suit took about one 
hundred sub-processes to be finished. drawing on the required time of each and every 
single operation, one could determine the most suitable sequence of the operations 
and the speed of the assembly line (Kornaat, 1992: 71, my translation; see also Wolff-
gerzon, 1949).
through this increased division of labour, the work of the seamstress became a low-skilled 
profession without the need for prior qualifications, and tailors were no longer able to 
compete with the prices of mass-produced garments in the netherlands. the dutch textile 
and clothing industry – which focused on large production orders and limited variety in 
designs – became an important driver of the economy and had its main growth period 
shortly after World War ii; most clothing manufacturing firms were built between 1945 and 
1958 (Ksa, 1982). in this period, international competition remained low due to relatively 
high import duties and low wages for women (Boot, 1983; Kornaat, 1992). 
5  de Bijenkorf started as a haberdashery in 1870 and transformed into the netherlands’ first 
department store in the early twentieth century (montijn, 1995).
6  like de Bijenkorf, Vroom & dreesman (V&d) started as a haberdashery in 1878 and developed into a 
department store throughout the first half of the twentieth century.
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domestic competition, however, was fierce. While the main centres for clothing production 
were originally around the cities of amsterdam and rotterdam in the west and groningen in 
the north, in the 1950s many clothing firms started to relocate manufacturing to the dutch 
periphery in search of cheap, mostly female labour. this “runaway-movement” (ester & 
Van Klaveren, 1976: 105) led to an increase of clothing manufacturing in the south, east, 
and north of the netherlands and a decline of manufacturing in the west (levelt, 2010). 
this was an important development with regard to upcoming international relocation and 
outsourcing. after all, once commercial and industrial operations are spatially separated 
across the country, it is only a small step away from relocating manufacturing abroad (ester 
& Van Klaveren, 1976).
the post-war growth of the dutch clothing industry continued in the 1960s. as a consequence 
of increasing demand, the industry managed to double its production volume between 1959 
and 1966 (Ksa, 1982). due to the elimination of import restrictions between eec countries 
in 1958, however, the netherlands could no longer protect its market from cheaper products 
abroad (Boot, 1983; Kornaat, 1992; levelt, 2010). Wages started to increase, educational 
levels rose, and young women were consequently less willing to work in the underpaid sector 
of clothing manufacturing (ibid.). it was hence a combination of increasing international 
competition, labour shortages, and rising wages that led more and more clothing firms in 
the 1960s to relocate manufacturing abroad – first to Belgium, where wages were still lower 
and cheap female labour was available, and then in the 1970s to countries like tunisia, 
Portugal, and south-east asia (Boot, 1983). from 1967 onward, clothing imports rose 
rapidly, as did the number of company failures and closures (scheffer, 1992). 
although the decline of the clothing industry from the 1960s and 1970s onward was 
a european phenomenon, the netherlands underwent one of the most dramatic 
restructurings: “71% of jobs were lost between 1970 and 1980” (scheffer, 1992: 93). 
furthermore, the dutch clothing industry is considered an “early mover into foreign 
outsourcing” (levelt, 2010: 99) as dutch firms – together with german firms – were among 
the first in europe to relocate and outsource manufacturing to low-wage countries. as 
scheffer (1992: 90) explains in his doctoral research, “[t]he crisis [...] started around 1967 
in the netherlands, in 1973 in Belgium and it did not hit the u.K. and france until 1979.”
rising wages was one of several factors causing the massive breakdown of the dutch 
clothing manufacturing industry from the 1960s onward (cf. scheffer, 1992). huisman, Van 
leeuwen and Plantenga’s (1984) comparative study of the dutch and West german textile 
and clothing industries between 1955 and 1980 found that due to changing wage legislation 
in the netherlands, wage rates played a significant role only in a limited period between 
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1972 and 1975. thus it cannot exclusively account for the industry’s demise (ibid.; see also 
neVec, 1972). 
the netherlands’ powerful and highly concentrated retail landscape played a much more 
decisive role in the country’s early shift of manufacturing to low-wage countries (levelt, 
2010). more than half of all dutch clothing distribution in 1970 was controlled by c&a and 
four large buying associations (ester & Van Klaveren, 1976). in 1981, still 50% of clothing 
distribution in the netherlands was controlled by only seven organizations: Vendex, KBB, 
c&a, and four buying agencies (scheffer, 1992). according to ester and Van Klaveren (1976), 
these large retailers – c&a in particular – were the main drivers for increasing imports 
of cheap clothing into the netherlands. By claiming that in 1970 c&a was  not only the 
largest seller but also the largest manufacturer of clothing in Western europe, ester and 
Van Klaveren (1976) explain that this retailer possessed an extensive amount of production 
and pricing knowledge, and as such was able to command the shortest lead times within 
the sector. 
at the time, the mainly small and medium-sized dutch manufacturers were often late – also 
due to technical problems – in adapting to new fashion trends such as the introduction of 
jeans wear in the late 1960s (ester & Van Klaveren, 1976; neVec, 1976). While large retailers 
such as c&a and P&c sought more diversified collections for their stores in the netherlands, 
many dutch manufacturers continued to produce basic garments; they primarily focused 
on costs and speed by further rationalizing the production process. in this way, the dutch 
clothing industry became less capable of meeting large retailers’ requirements, which 
further contributed to the offshore buying strategies of retailers such as c&a and P&c. as 
ester and Van Klaveren explain:
in our country, this tendency of de-skilling has led to a situation in which – except 
for a small number of highly specialized firms – most manufacturers employ only a 
small ‘elite’ of ‘all-round’ seamstresses. this means that a declining number of dutch 
manufacturers are able to accept orders for high-quality and special products (ester & 
Van Klaveren, 1976: 74, my translation). 
manufacturers’ focus on a high division of labour and their placing of efficiency above 
flexibility, rendered domestic manufacturing no longer viable for large dutch retailers. By 
buying abroad, these retailers thus contributed to increasing international competition for 
dutch clothing manufacturers (Boot, 1983; miellet, 1993). 
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the combination of rising wage levels, labour shortages, a concentrated retail landscape, 
and manufacturers’ strategies of rationalizing and de-skilling the production process, 
resulted in a rapid decline of dutch clothing manufacturing. in her dissertation, levelt 
(2010) identifies yet another factor contributing to the dutch clothing industry’s eagerness 
to relocate and outsource manufacturing abroad: the dutch consumer. she argues that it is 
also the dutch home market’s sensibility to price-quality ratios that “serves as a good basis 
for the development of clothing production [...] in low-cost countries” (levelt, 2010: 118). 
it thus seems as if the rather reserved attitude of dutch consumers toward fashion (which 
is partly confirmed by Von maltzahn, 2013) provides a climate that supports and intensifies 
cost-reducing strategies, such as outsourcing to lower-wage countries.
as a result of all those factors, between 1966 and 1980 the number of dutch clothing firms 
more than halved: from 831 to 310 (Ksa, 1982). the number of jobs in the clothing industry 
declined from 64,700 in 1966 to a mere 17,400 in 1980 (ibid.). in 1985, employment had 
further dropped to 10,100 jobs (de Vijlder & Veraghtert, 1993). in a 1982 study on behalf of 
the ministry of economic affairs, Kurt salmon associates (Ksa) concluded that due to its 
relatively high level of wage rates and national insurance contributions, the netherlands 
did not offer a favourable business climate for labour-intensive sectors such as the clothing 
manufacturing industry. 
despite such unfavourable conditions for labour-intensive businesses, the mid-1980s 
marked the beginning of a more or less stable period in which employment levels and 
number of firms remained about the same (scheffer, 1992). raes (2000) even speaks of 
a slight recovery of the dutch clothing industry during the 1980s, primarily within the 
contract-clothing industry in amsterdam. however, the structure of the industry had 
changed drastically, as the majority of dutch clothing was no longer being manufactured in 
the netherlands (cf. Van antwerpen, ten Berge & scheffer, 1994). as scheffer and duineveld 
(2004: 343) point out, the industry’s “restructuring is more a change in structure than a 
change in size.” as subcontracting and outsourcing of manufacturing functions became 
common strategies for dutch firms, the dutch clothing industry underwent a transformation 
from a primarily production-led to a more design-led organization (scheffer & duineveld, 
2004). a substantial part of the industry changed from supplying garments to delivering 
fashionable collections (Van antwerpen et al., 1994) and increasingly focused on design and 
distribution instead of manufacturing. the dutch clothing industry had gradually developed 
into a dutch fashion	industry.7
7  albeit that already in the 1960s, changing fashions were considered an important issue within the 
organization of the clothing industry, as we can read in several articles in Texpress,	the Technical	and	
economical	weekly	for	the	textile	and	clothing	industry	in	the	Benelux	countries:	Kaufmann (1966, october 
29), Kaufmann (1966, november 12), “modeprognose” (1967, January 14), “fabrikanten verliezen 
greep” (1967, march 11), “Koopgewoonten wijzigen” (1967, april 22),“confectie-industrie reageert” 
(1967, July 29).
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the shift from manufacturing to design does not mean that garment manufacturing 
disappeared from the netherlands entirely. however, a variety of regulations on trade in 
textiles and clothing, such as import quota and preferential agreements, contributed to 
an increasing liberalization of trade and thus of international competition.8 as a consequence, 
the world has become a supplying market for dutch fashion firms; it is not uncommon for these 
firms to control a supplier base of more than 100 subcontractors in more than 20 countries 
(Van antwerpen et al., 1994). depending on a combination of their expertise and requirements 
regarding price, quality, and lead times, dutch fashion firms now often adopt a combination of 
sourcing strategies, combining sourcing in the far east with domestic or european manufacturing 
for quick response. Production is thus organized through 1) dutch firms’ own manufacturing 
plants in the netherlands or abroad, 2) by subcontracting parts of the manufacturing process 
to independent so-called cmt (cut-make-trim) suppliers in the netherlands and abroad, 3) by 
sourcing ready-made garments from independent suppliers abroad, or 4) through a combination 
of these strategies. 
in the 1980s, demand for short-cycle fashion production had also triggered the development of a 
domestic illegal sweatshop industry in amsterdam, mainly run by turkish immigrants (raes, 2000; 
scheffer, 1992).9 Between 1993 and 1997 most of these sweatshops were closed due to changing 
market conditions and trade regulations, including growing competition from subcontractors in 
eastern europe and much stricter law enforcement by the dutch government (raes et al., 2002). 
from the mid-1990s onward, clothing manufacturing virtually disappeared from the netherlands. 
domestic suppliers now account for only a marginal share of total clothing production and trade 
within the netherlands. the largest share of manufacturing is in eastern europe, north africa, and 
south-east asia (langenberg – Van der Klauw, Pleijster & reijmer, 1998). eastern european and 
mediterranean countries are primarily used for subcontracting through outward processing – i.e. 
the temporary export of fabric or parts of garments to be further processed in another customs 
area and subsequent re-import of garments into the parent country (levelt, 2010; scheffer, 1992) 
– while asian countries are mainly approached for buying ready-made garments (Van antwerpen 
et al., 1994). 
throughout the twenty-first century, the search for lower-cost countries continues. it is marked by 
shifts from hong Kong, indonesia, and india to china, Vietnam, and Bangladesh in the far east 
and from Poland, the czech republic, and hungary to romania, Bulgaria, and turkey in europe 
8  see section 1.2.2 for a more detailed discussion of dutch and international trade policies
9  see also Krikke & otten (1989) and Van Bakkum (1984), for discussions of this issue in dutch national   
press.
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(cf. levelt, 2010; nordås, 2004; roso, 2005; scheffer, 2012). the dutch fashion industry is now 
a design-led industry that can source raw materials, garments, and trims from virtually the 
entire world. since these developments are framed within specific (inter)national institutional 
environments, the next section discusses the main industrial and trade policies in textile and 
clothing.
1.2.2 dutch industrial Policies and international trade   
 regulations
the influence of international trade regulations on the evolution of the global textile and 
clothing industry cannot be over-estimated and has been well-documented (e.g. dicken, 
2007). although they aimed to protect developed countries’ industries from unrestricted 
competition and imports from developing countries, “[t]he unintended result of 
protectionist trade regulation has been the dispersion of clothing production around the 
world, as the hierarchy of low-wage supplier countries in the developing world has shifted in 
response to the various mechanisms regulating trade” (lane & Probert, 2009: 106). 
moreover, national industrial policies and institutions, or the lack thereof, are important 
in understanding how the dutch fashion industry has evolved in the last 50 years. in the 
following, i provide a short overview of the most relevant international regulations on 
trade, and the ways in which dutch government and trade organizations have dealt with the 
decline of the dutch clothing industry.
the main instruments to regulate international trade in textiles and clothing include 
quantitative restrictions on imports (i.e. quota) and import duties (i.e. tariffs) (lane & 
Probert, 2009). the first became institutionalized in 1961 in the form of the short term 
arrangement on cotton textiles, followed by the long term arrangement on cotton textiles 
(lta) in 1962, which was signed by north american and european countries (ibid.; scheffer, 
1992). the lta was extended twice and lasted until 1973. in 1974 the lta was revised to 
become the multi-fibre arrangement (mfa), which included also woollen and man-made 
fabrics and clothing. the mfa was extended five times and “provided for the imposition of 
quotas by each importing country on individual lines of clothing at a high level of detail, 
either by bilateral agreement or unilaterally if a surge of imports caused or threatened 
market disruption” (lane & Probert, 2009: 107). 
under pressure from developing countries and with the aim to liberalize trade, in 1995 
the mfa was replaced by the agreement on textiles and clothing (atc): “a 10-year plan 
commencing [...] to phase out the quota system in four stages and to bring textiles and 
clothing trade into line with regular World trade organization rules” (lane & Probert, 2009: 
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108). despite the dismantling of the mfa, however, worldwide trade in textiles and clothing 
is still not completely liberalized; both the united states and the european union introduced 
new trade restrictions against china by invoking Wto safeguards in 2005 (heron, 2012).
in addition to these quantitative restrictions on imports, the second main instrument 
to regulate international trade involves tariff regimes, guided by various free trade 
arrangements (fta) and preferential trade arrangements (Pta).10 especially during the 1970s, 
a number of large dutch textile and clothing firms went abroad through direct investments 
or joint ventures in countries such as tunisia, Portugal, and greece (ester & Van Klaveren, 
1976; evers, 1975). among them were macintosh, Vilenzo, and iduna, which benefited from 
preferential trade arrangements between the eec and countries in the mediterranean 
region. tunisia, in particular, became highly attractive for dutch manufacturers; it received 
“preferential treatment in the dutch development assistance programme, as it is considered 
a ‘concentration’ country” (evers, 1975: 160). under this programme, dutch manufacturers 
who invested in tunisia could count on additional government assistance in such forms as 
contributions to the training costs of seamstresses (ibid.). 
Within europe, outward processing trade (oPt) has been an important type of preferential 
agreement, regulated within the eec/eu since 1982 (lane & Probert, 2009). oPt is a type 
of production-sharing arrangement that allows for temporary export of fabric or ready-cut 
fabric to another customs area for further processing, after which finished garments may 
be re-imported into an eec/eu country (ibid.). import duties are paid only on value added 
(scheffer, 1992). this form of subcontracting has been especially practised between germany 
and central and eastern european (cee) countries from the 1970s onward (lane & Probert, 
2009). likewise, the netherlands have engaged in outward processing arrangements since 
the 1980s “as a way of providing for orderly adjustment to international trade and of giving 
domestic industry the chance to exploit lower-wage costs” (scheffer, 1992: 84). 
throughout the 1990s, association agreements with various cee countries were signed 
(lane & Probert, 2009); by 1998, trade with cee countries was almost entirely liberalized 
(lane & Probert, 2006). this means that the concept of oPt in terms of custom duties has 
become meaningless (lane & Probert, 2009; scheffer, 1992), but subcontracting aspects 
of the manufacturing process to cee and mediterranean countries continues to be an 
important way of organizing production abroad by dutch and german firms alike. 
10  see lane & Probert (2009: 117-118) for an overview of the main fta’s and Pta’s in force within the 
european union and the united states
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as abernathy, Volpe and Weil (2006), dicken (2007), gereffi and frederick (2010), lane 
and Probert (2009), scheffer (1992) and many others have argued, the complex systems 
of quota and tariff regimes have had significant effects on the allocation of production 
around the world. manufacturing has been continuously shifted to countries unaffected by 
quota. rather than preventing the decline of textile and clothing industries in developed 
countries, the unintended effect of quota systems and other protectionist policies was thus 
an increasing global dispersion of manufacturing to less competitive developing countries 
(cf. heron, 2012). in fact, as dicken (2007: 261) argues, “the entire clothing industry of some 
developing countries was [...] created by mfa quotas (nepal is a case in point).” 
Within the eec, and especially in the case of the dutch clothing industry, it can be argued 
that international trade regulations have been rather ineffective in protecting domestic 
manufacturing. this is due to the relatively late implementation of mfa trade restrictions 
by the eec (de Vijlder & Veraghtert, 1993; neVec, 1976), resulting in an effective regime of 
protectionism only between 1976 and 1986 (scheffer, 1992). By that time, the netherlands 
– and germany – already had a high import level (ibid.). as a result, “dutch industry had 
already been downsized by 30% when the mfa came into effect” and as “quotas for the 
netherlands were relatively large, trade restrictions proved to be relatively ineffective” 
(scheffer, 1992: 100). 
furthermore, until the 1960s and early 1970s, the dutch government primarily favoured an 
open trade policy, presenting itself as an ally of developing countries (de Vijlder, 1995). this 
liberal national policy, which was partly inspired by the ideas of economist Jan tinbergen 
concerning an international division of labour (ibid.; de Vijlder & Veraghtert, 1993; ester & 
Van Klaveren, 1976), was somewhat at odds with the aim to protect domestic employment 
(scheffer, 1992). to a certain extent, the dutch clothing industry’s early demise can be 
attributed to this paradoxical combination of protectionism and liberal trade policies.
from 1970 onward, initial attempts were made to investigate problems and prospects for 
the dutch clothing industry, but it would take another five years for the government to 
actively invest in the restructuring of the sector. the ministry of economic affairs financed 
a series of reports in which management consultancy Krekel – Van der Woerd – Wouterse 
(KWW) analysed the prospective role of the dutch clothing industry between 1971 and 1985.
the studies addressed the specific characteristics of the clothing industry compared to other 
industrial sectors, including strong seasonal fluctuations, slowly evolving technological 
innovations, and high labour intensity with a relatively large share of low-skilled labour. 
they concluded that a certain shift of the labour-intensive parts of manufacturing to lower-
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wage countries was inevitable. industrial restructuring in the netherlands should therefore 
focus on such aspects as forecasting, styling, and market research, as the prospects for 
growth lay primarily in the creative and commercial sector (KWW, 1971; 1972). 
in 1974, the steering committee clothing industry – represented by the sector’s main trade 
and labour unions – presented a policy issue paper to the ministries of economic and social 
affairs, requesting both short-term and long-term measures to mitigate the precarious 
situation of the dutch clothing industry (stuurgroep confectie-industrie, 1974). in 1975, 
strucon, the foundation for structural adjustment of the clothing industry, was founded 
with the aim of preserving domestic employment in as much of the clothing industry as 
possible (ester & Van Klaveren, 1976). during the second half of the 1970s, strucon 
facilitated restructuring of individual firms by granting state subsidies for investments 
worth millions of guilders in machinery and managerial reorganizations. 
still, the collapse of the industry continued; in 1981, the activities of strucon were ended 
(“strucon beëindigt”, 1981). once again, a study on behalf of the ministry of economic 
affairs was conducted to investigate how the dutch clothing industry could survive in 
the future (Ksa, 1982). as mentioned above, the report concluded that labour-intensive 
industries such as clothing are not suitable for location in the netherlands and that the 
industry should invest in creativity, productivity, service, and flexibility (Ksa, 1982).
as scheffer (1992) has demonstrated, compared to other eec countries, government 
intervention within the dutch clothing industry’s restructuring has been modest. 
Preferential trade arrangements and development policies moreover benefited dutch firms’ 
international sourcing strategies. furthermore, the recommendations of several reports 
investigating the industry’s prospects and challenges show that at least a considerable part 
of the industry had accepted, relatively early, its ‘fate’ of international sourcing (e.g. neVec, 
1974). Whereas this may lead us to conclude that national industrial policies were ineffective, 
we may also argue that the industry’s inevitable restructuring from a production-led to a 
design-led industry only took place more quickly. the spatial and organizational separation 
of manufacturing from creative and commercial activities was initiated by early movers such 
as macintosh and Vilenzo, which further restricted the viability of a dutch fashion industry 
based on domestic manufacturing. as evers (1975: 178) concluded in his analysis of the 
netherlands’ industrial adjustment policies in the 1970s, “[p]art of the dutch industry is 
actively participating in the internationalization process of industry and trade, other parts 
are feeling the impact of this process.”
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increased international competition was both source and consequence of dutch clothing 
firms’ early shift into lower-wage countries in the 1960s and 1970s. We may even suggest 
that due to increased international competition, the dutch clothing industry was forced 
to transform into a fashion industry, focusing on design and marketing in favour of 
manufacturing. this increasing emphasis on fashion	in favour of clothing is more than playing 
with words – it shifts the focus from a primarily industrial process to a more commercial, 
culturally embedded, and creativity-driven practice. 
in the last part of this section, i discuss how the principles of fashion, which were considered 
a threat to the dutch clothing industry in the 1960s and 1970s, became the main focus from 
the 1980s onward. By taking into account the role of fashion in the development of the dutch 
clothing industry, i demonstrate how industrial change is embedded in socio-cultural and 
institutional developments, and how aesthetic practices and values have become distanced 
from industrial ones. 
1.2.3 from clothing to stYling and fashion?
the 1960s marked the beginning of a dutch fashion climate that was no longer entirely 
dictated by Parisian haute couture. Before that, fashion in the netherlands merely involved 
simplified copies of french designs (feitsma, 2014; teunissen, 2006; 2010). the emergence 
of a distinct dutch fashion culture was not a smooth and straightforward development. as 
already seen in the previous section, during the 1960s ever-changing fashion trends were 
considered a serious challenge for the organization of dutch clothing manufacturers and 
retailers, as they needed to adapt more quickly to less predictable consumer preferences:
although, on the one hand, fashion changes stimulate the sales of clothing, they 
also bring about massive problems. many parts of the clothing industry already face 
the problem of substantial differences between the winter and summer collections, 
in addition to strong seasonal fluctuations. fashion changes add to these already 
destabilizing factors, even though they are partly stimulated by the clothing firms 
themselves (ester & Van Klaveren, 1976: 54, my translation).
fashion’s unpredictable nature and its increasing ephemerality and volatility became a 
particularly significant issue within the dutch clothing industry. according to de Vijlder 
(1995), the dutch clothing industry capitalized on emerging fashions in the 1960s and 1970s, 
albeit not with its own designs but with stylists who knew how to translate international 
fashion trends. 
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styling, as a way of translating trends and societal developments into creative concepts and 
guiding the work of fashion designers, was also a central concept within the 1971 study 
of consulting firm Krekel – Van der Woerd – Wouterse (KWW) on the future of the dutch 
clothing industry. fashion, they argued, should be converted from a risky threat into a 
decisive opportunity for the dutch clothing industry to gain a competitive advantage over 
cheap imports from low-wage countries (KWW, 1971). in this regard, styling was considered 
a crucial aspect of a more consumer-oriented marketing strategy (ibid.):
this concept is “translated” by a stylist, who – due to his creativity and his engagement 
with societal developments – is capable of sensing the future aesthetic ideal of one or 
more consumer groups. the translation into specific garment designs is then carried 
out by the [fashion] designer (KWW, 1971: 23, my translation).
in 1988, almost 17 years later, the foundation for Knowledge transfer in the clothing 
industry “mr. Koetsier”11 organized a seminar to analyse and discuss the profession of 
styling. While styling had become an important concept within the industry – it had even 
become a distinct track within dutch art academies – there were no clear-cut guidelines 
that defined the role of the stylist within an organization. the different contributors to 
the seminar agreed that stylists operate between the worlds of creativity and commerce, 
but were less unanimous about the degree to which stylists were merely trendwatchers, 
forecasters, buyers, or designers. 
cora Kemperman, at the time a buyer at retail chain mac & maggie and one of the 
contributors to the seminar, provides an interesting case in this regard; although she is 
a graduate fashion designer, she combined all the roles of stylist, designer, buyer, and 
product developer within her work (see also chapter 7). in the form of styling, a combination 
of creativity and	commerce gained a prominent position within the dutch fashion industry 
during the 1970s and 1980s.
the 1980s were also the period in which branding became an important marketing strategy 
among fashion firms and retailers (teunissen, 2006). Brands such as Van gils and oilily, 
which had their manufacturing roots in the 1960s and 1970s, were set up in this period 
and gained international recognition (Kornaat, 1992; teunissen, 2006). other successful 
brands included soap studio, nico Verhey, mexx, turnover, sandwich, and the People of 
the labyrinths in the 1980s and marlies dekkers, g-star, and gsus in the 1990s (teunissen, 
2006). Based on well-thought-out designs, combined with smart business sense, these 
11  in dutch: stichting Kennistransfer confectie “mr. Koetsier”
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brands succeeded in building flourishing international businesses with their own distinctive 
styles (ibid.). through branding, marketing, and styling, the dutch clothing industry had 
changed into an internationally-oriented fashion industry.
the emergence of dutch	fashion,	however, cannot entirely be understood within the context 
of a transformation of the dutch clothing industry. concurrent developments in the cultural 
sector contributed to increased international recognition of dutch fashion design. since 
1988, talented dutch fashion designers have been able to apply for incentive art grants, 
provided by the fund for Visual arts, design, and architecture.12 supported by this grant 
programme, in 1994 a number of dutch fashion designers, including Viktor horsting 
and rolf snoeren (Viktor&rolf ), showed their collections in Paris. their performances 
were chronicled by the international fashion press and contributed to the idea of a dutch 
modernistic and conceptual design tradition (cf. teunissen, 2011). remarkably, these 
fashion designers were trained and subsidized as independent artists, and presented 
themselves accordingly.13 this approach to fashion design presents a sharp contrast with 
the much more commercial approach of the internationally successful fashion and retail 
brands mentioned above.
this means that if there is something that we can call dutch fashion identity, it has “multiple 
ontological forms” (mol, 2002 cited in melchior, 2010: 32), which are produced differently 
in different contexts. in this regard, taking into account the institutional context and the 
way in which fashion is embedded in national policy-making, can reveal quite different 
perspectives on the relationship between fashion and national identity. for instance, 
melchior (2010: 34) shows how, in the case of denmark, defining a national fashion identity 
is first and foremost an issue of “governmental and institutional interest,” rather than being 
an explicit element of designers’ creative practices. the danish fashion industry has been 
enrolled in the nation’s cultural industries policy to become “the prime example of the 
cultural and experience economy” (melchior et al., 2011: 210). 
regarding the role of fashion in dutch policy, a comparison with Belgium provides an 
interesting case in point.14 Both Belgian and dutch fashion designers gained international 
recognition by showing their collections in fashion capitals abroad. Whereas dutch fashion 
designers became eligible for art grants, the Belgian government supported its fashion        
12  in dutch: fonds voor Beeldende Kunst, Vormgeving en Bouwkunst
13  Kloosterman (2008) observes a similar phenomenon in the field of dutch architecture as upcoming 
architects rely on the same grant system.
14  cf. teunissen (2001) for a compelling deconstruction of “Belgian and dutch fashion dreams” and 
gimeno martinez (2006) for an interesting analysis of the role of regional and national policies in 
promoting the creative and fashion industries of flanders/Belgium.
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designers through the so-called textile Plan15 (teunissen, 2011). adopted by the Belgian 
government in 1980, the textile Plan aimed at putting an end to the decline of the clothing 
and textile industry, which had set in two decades previously (Bataillie, 1989). With a total 
budget of 28 billion Belgian franc (approx. 700 million euro), the five-year plan provided 
for a number of government measures related to social benefits, capital investments, and 
industry services (Bataillie, 1989). 
these measures resulted in only a marginal recovery of the textile industry, and eventually 
could not prevent the sector’s further decline in favour of lower-wage countries (Bataillie, 
1989; de Voldere, maenhout & debruyne, 2007). the textile Plan succeeded, however, 
in promoting Belgian fashion design on an international level. the so-called service 
component of the plan, implemented by the new institute for textile and clothing of 
Belgium (i.t.c.B.),16 involved a number of programmes to support education, marketing, 
promotion, fashion, design, and research and development in the sector (Bataillie, 
1989). in particular, the national promotional campaign “fashion this is Belgian”,17 and 
the launch of the golden spindle award,18 contributed to an increased recognition of 
Belgian fashion design (de Voldere et al., 2007: 129; teunissen, 2011). 
the golden spindle, which was awarded six times between 1982 and 1991, provided 
financial support for talented designers to set up their own commercial businesses 
in cooperation with the domestic textile and clothing industry (ibid.). in this way, the 
textile Plan aimed at narrowing the gap between new, ambitious fashion designers and 
struggling domestic manufacturers (goyvaerts, 2003). 
it is not my aim to evaluate the effectiveness of dutch industrial policy in comparison 
to Belgian government support. Both dutch and Belgian approaches eventually could 
not prevent the clothing industry’s demise. instead, my argument addresses the 
relationship between fashion design and the manufacturing of clothing. if we compare 
dutch industrial policy with Belgian government support for the textile and clothing 
industries in the 1980s, we find that fashion design and clothing manufacturing were 
much more integrated in Belgium’s industrial policy, whereas fashion design in the 
netherlands was – and continues to be – stimulated as an art form. 
15  in dutch: het textielplan
16  in dutch: het instituut voor textiel en confectie van België (i.t.c.B.)
17  in dutch: mode dit is Belgisch
18  in dutch: de gouden spoel
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these differences in national policy are remarkable, because they raise questions 
about the position of fashion design within the clothing industry. to what extent do 
fashion design and clothing manufacturing benefit from being either separated and 
independent, or integrated and connected? as roso (2005) has demonstrated in a study 
on fashion design clusters in the netherlands, subsidizing fashion designers as artists 
is one of the reasons why the connection between design and commerce is often hard to 
make. furthermore, up-and-coming designers encounter problems in finding suitable 
production networks, which makes it more difficult for them to develop a marketable 
collection (ibid.). 
Yet, the Belgian fashion industry is facing similar problems: de Voldere et al. (2007) 
argue in their report Fashionate	 About	 Creativity that for flemish clothing firms, the 
worlds of design and manufacturing are still too much separated. although Belgian 
and dutch fashion have emerged in different institutional contexts, both industries 
appear to experience a problematic gap between design and manufacturing. the fact 
that dutch fashion designers are primarily embedded in the art world and in cultural 
policy cannot entirely account for current struggles of the sector. 
the history of dutch fashion as discussed in this section can be understood as one of 
both cultural and industrial emancipation: a liberation from Paris’ fashion dictate and a 
detachment from the technological constraints of garment manufacturing (cf. teunissen, 
2010). of course, this development was not accomplished without the struggles and crises 
of industrial restructuring. as we can read throughout the various policy and consultancy 
reports, as well as in several articles of national press and trade journals, it took some time 
for the industry to embrace fashion as a valuable asset rather than regarding it as a threat 
to domestic manufacturing. to use the illustrative words of the KWW report (1971: 52, my 
translation): “in a time when cars and central heating have almost eliminated clothing’s 
function of protection, thus shifting the focus toward expression more than ever, the dutch 
clothing industry needs to develop into a dutch fashion industry.”
this development into a fashion industry entailed increased relocation and outsourcing of 
manufacturing to lower-wage countries in favour of a stronger focus on design- and marketing-
related activities. now we know the sources of this deindustrialization, the question remains: 
is the detachment from manufacturing indeed beneficial for the performance of the dutch 
fashion industry? as i will explain in chapter 2, a confirmatory answer is in sharp contrast with 
the ideas of a number of contemporary fashion theorists, who have explicitly emphasized how 
inextricably linked creative and industrial practices are in the process of fashion production 
(e.g. entwistle, 2009; Kawamura, 2005; lipovetsky, 1987/1994; Weller, 2004). 
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in this study, therefore, i explore the apparent gap between design and manufacturing 
in the dutch fashion industry. the cultural and social emancipation of dutch fashion in 
terms of style and design aesthetics has been discussed by José teunissen (2010; 2011) 
and is further explored by the other subprojects of this nWo research (feitsma, 2014, in 
particular). taking on a geographical lens, i explore how industrial developments involving 
spatial and organizational distance between design and manufacturing have affected, and 
continue to affect, dutch fashion.
1.3 aiMs and qUestions: a GeoGRaphiCal lens on   
 dUtCh fashion
this study starts from the observation of two concurrent ‘liberations’. the development 
of dutch fashion entails, on the one hand, a stylistic liberation from “the strict Parisian 
dictatorship over fashion” (teunissen, 2010), and on the other hand an industrial liberation 
from technological limitations of a domestic manufacturing base. Both forms of ‘liberation’ 
may have contributed to the construction of a dutch fashion identity.
as i mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, my research is situated in the discipline 
of human geography. according to cultural geographer and fashion theorist goodrum 
(2005: 25), fashion is hardly considered a valuable subject in geographical research: “the 
boundaries of fashion are resolutely unclear and it is this inherent ambiguity that makes 
clothing an uneasy territory for a geographical discipline with a long history of scientific 
and rationalizing endeavour.” this means that i enter relatively under-researched terrain. 
crewe imputes the marginal position of fashion in geographical research to economic 
geographers’ personal disinterest in fashion and their lack of style:
it is undeniable that fashion has had a difficult time breaking into the discipline 
of geography. the icon of shabby non-style, the geography teacher in his (for 
traditionally, he was a man) corduroy jacket with patched elbows and ‘practical’ 
footwear, was always rather more rivers than river island, more meteorology than 
metrosexual. the preoccupation of a largely male collective of economic geographers 
with the ‘real’ business of industry and finance meant that the geographies of fashion 
and consumption were neglected, pushed to the intellectual margins and deemed 
trivial, superfluous or even wanton (crewe, 2008: 26). 
in spite of these prejudices, a few compelling geographical studies have contributed to a 
better understanding of dutch clothing and fashion industries. in 1992, scheffer dedicated 
his doctoral research to the study of the restructuring of european clothing industries. 
1
40
in a comparative study of Belgium, the netherlands, france, and the united Kingdom, 
he focused especially on the role of retailers in processes of delocation and relocation of 
production until the 1980s (scheffer, 1992). eight years later, raes (2000) published his 
doctoral research, which also deals with spatial changes in the organization of clothing 
production in the netherlands. it has a specific focus on the role of turkish immigrants 
in the upturn of dutch clothing manufacturing in amsterdam in the 1980s (raes, 2000). 
more recently, Wenting (2008) approached the fashion industry as a creative industry, and 
explored the locational behaviour and economic success of fashion design entrepreneurs 
in amsterdam. finally, levelt (2010) has analysed dutch trading roles in the international 
value chain of clothing. 
most of these studies, in one way or another, focus on the spatial organization of the clothing 
supply chain; they aim to explain particular spatial and socio-economic changes in this 
organization. these studies have highly improved our knowledge of industrial dynamics, 
international trade, and the economic driving forces of the globalization of textile and 
clothing industries. however, until now geographical research has paid less attention to the 
cultural and creative sides of fashion, which are – as i will argue throughout this dissertation 
– inextricably linked to the industries of fabric and garment manufacturing. 
in my research i intend to more explicitly link the practice of fashion design and the industry 
of clothing production. i follow Weller’s (2004: 173) claim that in the case of fashion 
production, “industrial development is not separate from aesthetic development.” my 
study aims for a better understanding of the qualitative changes in the organization of 
dutch fashion production by focusing on the outcomes of industrial change as analysed in 
earlier studies.
the most visible outcome of dutch fashion’s ‘industrial liberation’ involves, first and 
foremost, geographical and organizational distance between fashion design and garment 
manufacturing. distance – in this case the result of global competition, wage differences, 
and an increasing division of labour – is often conceptualized as something that needs to 
be overcome. in particular the literature on clusters and regional policies focuses explicitly 
on the role of proximity. Yet, economic geographers continue to disagree on how proximity 
affects processes of knowledge transfer, learning, and innovation. the arguments range from 
the idea that co-location and proximity are important for enabling mutual understanding, 
trust, and knowledge-sharing, to the idea that de-location enables change and flexibility 
(cf. Boschma, 2005; gertler, 2003; 2004; grabher, 1993; schoenberger, 1997). 
these arguments concerning distance and proximity raise questions about the ways in 
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which different types of knowledge and skills relate to and depend on each other. to what 
extent does distance in any form alter the relationship between what becomes separated, 
either positively or negatively? it is the age-old question of whether geography matters – 
and if so, how. 
the central aim of my study	 is to understand the production of dutch fashion within the 
context of an increasingly globalized and spatially fragmented industrial organization. 
in my research i explore the role of distance between design and manufacturing in the 
emergence of dutch fashion, and the strategies that dutch fashion firms pursue to manage 
this distance. this aim translates into the following main research question: 
How	is	Dutch	fashion	production	affected	by	growing	distance	between	design	and	manufacturing?
my research explores the relationships between design and manufacturing in terms of 
interdependencies between different types of creative and technical knowledge and skills in 
the globally dispersed processes of fashion production.  While several fashion researchers 
have argued that aesthetic and industrial knowledge and practices are inextricably linked 
in the process of fashion production, in spatial and organizational terms they are evidently 
separated. By drawing on a combination of insights from evolutionary and relational 
economic geography, my study aims to explain how the connections between design and 
manufacturing, as suggested in the literature, are accomplished within the globalized 
organization of the dutch fashion industry. 
analysing relationships between different types of distanciated knowledge is of particular 
relevance – not only in contemporary globalized economies, but also for understanding 
value creation and innovation in creative industries. as my dissertation aims to understand 
the dutch fashion industry in both industrial and creative terms, it contributes to ways 
of understanding the relative roles and values of creative and aesthetic knowledge in 
contemporary Western economies.
1.4 stRUCtURe of the thesis
my dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 offers an extensive review of the literature 
on fashion and fashion industries. the chapter provides a set of concepts and definitions 
that are required to analyse the dutch fashion industry. fashion is conceptualized as a 
multifaceted phenomenon; the international organization of fashion industries is explored 
in terms of global value chains and production networks. these chain- and network-
approaches connect globally dispersed yet interrelated economic actors and places within 
one analytical framework, which provides useful tools to map globalized fashion industries. 
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an important insight to gain from these theories is the role that the nature of knowledge 
exchange plays in the way value chains and production networks are coordinated. this is 
of particular relevance for understanding the organization of fashion production, because 
fashion involves considerable tacit and situated knowledge. 
Chapter 3 elaborates on the issue of knowledge exchange in global fashion production. 
it draws on a combination of evolutionary and relational economic geography to argue 
that knowledge resides in organizational routines and practices. conceptualized as ‘a 
way of doing things’ within and between organizations, routines and practices enable 
us to open up the ‘black box’ of the firm and explore organizational relationships and 
interdependencies that transcend spatial and organizational boundaries. chapter 3 thus 
proposes a practice-oriented approach in which organizational practices form the unit 
of analysis for understanding globalized organizations of production, beyond the idea of 
chains and networks. together, chapter 2 and chapter 3 form the theoretical framework for 
this study.
in order to gain a more in-depth understanding of the mechanisms that constitute the 
distanciated relationships between design and manufacturing, i have chosen a case study 
design. i examined the organizational practices of four dutch renowned fashion brands: 
oilily, mexx, ¯coraKemperman, and Van gils. these brands are considered to have had a 
significant role in the history of the dutch fashion industry; each case represents a different 
type of development in the spatial organization of fashion design and manufacturing. 
Chapter 4 details my methodological approach and explains how the theoretical concepts 
translate into the set-up of my empirical research. Particular attention is given to the 
assumed taken-for-grantedness of organizational practices and the implications for drawing 
on interviews as a research method.  
the results of the four case studies are presented in chapters 5-8. By focusing on specific, 
leading organizational practices, the case studies provide four different perspectives on the 
role of distance in the relationship between design and manufacturing. these organizational 
practices entail design	in the case of oilily, coordination	in the case of mexx, buying	in the case 
of ¯coraKemperman, and pattern	making	in the case of Van gils.
in chapter 9 i conclude by proposing a revised perspective on the production of dutch 
fashion. i reflect on how the concept of organizational practices can facilitate a multifaceted 
understanding of the distanciated relationships between design and manufacturing by 
comparing the variety of strategies that dutch fashion brands pursue to overcome the 
frictions of distance. this comparative analysis results in a conceptualization of fashion 
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production as the product of relations between design and manufacturing. such an 
understanding of fashion production has wider implications than the organizations of oilily, 
mexx, ¯coraKemperman, and Van gils, which i present as future research suggestions. 
With the results from my research i hope to encourage rethinking future developments in the 
creative industries of fashion; in particular in ways that account for the specific relationships 
between design and manufacturing – between creative and industrial developments, and 
between material value creation (manufacturing) and immaterial value creation (design and 
branding). to rephrase alexander van slobbe’s statement at the beginning of this chapter, 
i hope that by bringing manufacturing back into the spotlight, a space is created to rethink 
future developments of fashion industries in more inclusive and sustainable ways that look 
beyond production costs as the key drivers of globalization.
1
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ChapteR 2 
|  defining the field: fashion and     
    gloBaliZation
fashion is either one of the crowning achievements of western civilisation or it 
is incontrovertible evidence of consumer culture’s witless obsession with the 
trivial and the unreal. it is either creative to the point of being an ‘art’, enabling 
individuals and cultures to express their inner feelings and personalities, or it is 
exploitative to the point of criminality, forcing people to work and spend more 
than is healthy for them or society.
Malcolm barnard (2007: 2)
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the study of fashion can involve many different perspectives. the aim of this chapter 
is to frame my object of study and explain the key concepts that inform this research 
on the dutch fashion industry. this chapter consists of two main parts. in Part 1, i 
introduce and review fashion theories and explain how i conceive fashion and fashion 
industries in this dissertation. Part 2 focuses on the globalized organization of fashion 
and clothing industries and discusses the ways in which these industries and specific 
firm types have been conceptualized in the literature. here, i assess to what extent the 
concepts of global value chains and production networks provide a useful framework 
for analysing distance between design and manufacturing in the dutch fashion industry. 
 
2.1 the fashion sYsteM
fashion is a surprisingly vague term; at times a verb – to fashion – which can refer 
to almost anything, and at other times a short-hand for describing particularly 
modern dress.
Joanne entwistle (2009: 8)
although scholars in fashion keep emphasizing that studies of fashion and dress remain 
a marginal field within academia (e.g. Kawamura, 2011), the phenomenon of fashion has 
gained recognition from a variety of disciplines throughout the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries. ranging from philosophy to economics, fashion can and has been approached 
from several theoretical perspectives; to study fashion can mean many things. from my 
review of the literature, i conclude that fashion can roughly refer to either objects or a 
system. the fashion system consists of principles such as continuous change, that produce 
objects – mainly but not exclusively garments – which themselves are referred to as fashion. 
thus, fashion refers both to a process and to its outcomes. 
in order to position my dissertation within this heterogeneous field of research, in this part 
i address different perspectives on fashion in order to define my own conception of fashion 
and fashion industries. starting with fashion’s visual and material outcomes, i will move 
on to an industry perspective that requires an integrated understanding of the fashion 
system, which consists of both aesthetic and industrial elements, in addition to the system’s 
underlying principles – of which continuous change and marginal differentiation prove to 
be of major importance. 
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2.1.1 from fashion’s outcomes to its underlYing PrinciPles
[i]t is indispensable to study fashion as a process, and not, as is usually the case, as 
a result. it is not so important what	is fashionable as how	it has become fashionable: 
‘Why this?’ ‘Why here?’ ‘Why now?’
barbara Czarniawska (2008: 103)
from the late 1980s onward, there has been an increasing interest in the study of fashion 
and dress as cultural objects (see skov & melchior, 2008, for an overview of research 
approaches). studies on fashion as cultural objects consist of those that focus on the 
practices of dress and their implications for society and identity, and those that approach 
fashion as pieces of art, which can be the garments themselves or related artefacts such as 
fashion photography. the latter studies are mainly the work of art historians and museum 
curators; they are concerned with aesthetics and design in its own right. in contrast, the 
former address the ways in which the same notions of style, shape, colour, and silhouette 
are part of cultural practices in different societies (cf. Breward, 2003; Palmer, 1997; steele, 
1998). this is the domain of cultural studies and sociology, where dress and appearance are 
related to questions of identity, gender, class, and ethnicity (e.g. davis, 1992; Wilson, 2007). 
the main arguments of cultural and sociological accounts of fashion and dress are twofold. 
first, it is argued that practices of dress and images produced by influential media reinforce 
social differences – including some, excluding others. Veblen’s (1899/1994) conspicuous	
consumption, for instance, or Bourdieu’s 1980s concept of fields	 of	 cultural	 production and 
consumption, all stress fashion’s power of “status distinction and social differentiation” 
(rocamora, 2002: 355). in the words of Vinken (2005: 7): “[t]here has been a consistent 
– even a desperate – attempt to describe fashion as functioning to divide the classes and 
the sexes, and therefore to maintain the social order.” hence the emphasis is on fashion’s 
outcomes, rather than on its underlying principles (cf. crane, 2000; mcrobbie, 1999). 
the second type of argument is concerned with the ways in which fashion provides 
opportunities to blur social differences based on such principles as class, leading to more 
fluid conceptions of identity (cf. Bauman, 2000a). for example, in Adorned	in	Dreams	Wilson 
(2007: 9) explores dress as a symbolic system: “an aesthetic medium for the expression of 
ideas, desires and beliefs circulating in society.” in studying its expressive means, Wilson 
(2007) grants the practice of dress with the opportunity to actively create identities, rather 
than just reflecting fixed social divides.
as i search for a way to relate industrial and aesthetic developments, i need a conception of 
fashion that incorporates more than its visual, material, and socio-cultural outcomes. one 
of the most thought-provoking attempts to broaden the concept of fashion, and to move 
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beyond the idea of fashion and dress as signifying cultural and social differences, can be 
found in lipovetsky’s The	Empire	of	Fashion (1987/1994). through an “interpretative history 
of fashion” (lipovetsky, 1987/1994: 5), lipovetsky (1987/1994: 131, emphasis in original) 
reveals and explains the logic of fashion in terms of three major principles: “ephemerality,	
seduction,	and marginal	differentiation.” By demonstrating that this triple logic of fashion has 
become part of all aspects of contemporary capitalist societies, lipovetsky (1987/1994) 
draws attention to fashion’s potentially liberating and democratizing forces. such a 
conclusion is only possible when incorporating all aspects of the fashion system, meaning 
both consumption and production, and both	cultural and economic aspects. furthermore, 
his approach draws attention not only to fashion’s end products in the form of dress, but 
takes into account the organizing principles that underlie the fashion system as well. 
the logic of fashion has been subject to a variety of philosophical explorations, ranging 
from simmel’s (1919) claim that fashion simultaneously fulfils people’s need for social 
cohesion and distinction, to Benjamin’s argument “against the damnation of fashion as mere 
ephemeral flippancy” (lehmann, 2000: 302), and Barthes’ (1967/1990; see also svendsen, 
2006) semiotic analysis of the fashion system.19 a recurring theme within this variety of 
theories on the fashion system is the role of change, which i address later on in this chapter. 
But if change is one of the leading principles of fashion, then it is insufficient to focus 
solely on its outcomes. the very meaning of the word change implies a dynamic that cannot 
be explained by its (static) products, which derive their meaning only in relation to one 
another. instead, my concern is with the processes that produce this change, resulting in a 
system that we call fashion. in approaching the logic of fashion as a process, i concur with 
entwistle’s (2009: 8) suggestion that “fashion refers to a system of stylistic innovation, i.e. 
not to any specific product category (we can for example talk about fashion in architecture, 
design, even academic thought).” thus, although my empirical research is confined to the 
production of fashion garments, it is not the garments themselves that are analysed but the 
principles that guide their production.
it is beyond the scope of this chapter to give a comprehensive literature review that 
covers every single perspective on how to understand the logic of fashion. nevertheless, 
it is important to acknowledge the multidimensional nature of the fashion system (e.g. 
entwistle, 2009; Weller, 2007), as it helps to understand how fashion is a commercial 
industry and a cultural product at the same time. 
19  other foundational (philosophical) contributions include the works of Blumer (1939), Bourdieu 
(1984/1993), and Veblen (1899/1994). see also Johnson, torntore & eicher (2003) for a compelling 
collection of early writings on fashion and dress.
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an interesting exploration of fashion’s underlying principles can be found in Kawamura’s 
Fashion-ology	(2005: 1), in which she “treats fashion as a system of institutions that produces 
the concept as well as the phenomenon/practice of fashion.” drawing on theories of 
structural functionalism and symbolic interactionism, Kawamura (2005: 32) provides a 
sociological understanding of the fashion system as “a set of organizations, individuals 
and routine organizational activities that both materially and symbolically produce items 
of fashion culture.” however, while recognizing “an interplay among fashion as a concept, 
a practice and a system” (Kawamura, 2005: 52), she makes a strong argument for a clear 
distinction between clothing production and fashion production. Kawamura (2005) argues 
that clothing is a material product concerned with the actual manufacturing of garments, 
while fashion refers to a symbolic product, an idea, a myth, a belief. this distinction has led 
her to exclude the material production process from her analysis, as this is the domain of 
the study of clothing and dress (ibid.). 
Kawamura’s ‘fashion-ology’ presents an appealing and useful approach to the study of 
fashion as a system; it is a perspective that allows for an understanding of fashion beyond 
the study of mere appearance. to a large extent, Kawamura’s approach is in line with 
czarniawska (2005: 144) who claims that too much emphasis on fashion’s end products 
leads scholars to “reach the conclusion that fashion is fickle and ephemeral, [thereby 
missing] the stable character of the production process itself.” however, by conceptually 
separating the notion of fashion as an institutional concept from fashion as a cultural 
practice, Kawamura (2005) explicitly excludes material clothing production from the 
process of fashion production. 
czarniawska, on the other hand, argues that ideas need to materialize in order to travel 
(czarniawska & Joerges, 1996) and that fashion ideas need to travel in order to become 
part of the fashion system – which is, after all, a collective process. following czarniawska’s 
claim, i therefore argue that reducing the fashion system to the production of ideas results in 
a level of abstraction that cannot fully account for how fashion actually works. i subsequently 
suggest that the fashion industry, including the clothing manufacturing process, is equally 
produced by and (re)produces the system. conceptually, we may be able to – and probably 
even need to – separate fashion from clothing production. in practice, however, they are 
part of the same system and cannot be fully understood separately. 
the fashion system consists of both ideas and objects. it is a cultural, social, and economic 
phenomenon; it is reproduced by a network of actors including designers, buyers, 
manufacturers, retailers, consumers, and journalists. the logic according to which this 
system works has been thoroughly explored in lipovetsky’s aforementioned Empire	of	Fashion 
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(1987/1994). lipovetsky understands fashion as a process guided by the three principles 
of seduction, ephemerality, and marginal differentiation. instead of a binary social class 
differentiation, contemporary Western society is governed by the logic of individualism 
“in which seduction [prevails] over social representation” (lipovetsky, 1987/1994: 101). 
moreover, capitalist industries’ continuous drive to introduce new products has resulted in 
a “system made up of small distinctions and nuances” (lipovetsky, 1987/1994: 138). thus, 
while change is a prevalent aspect of fashion, it is mostly marginal by nature.
What makes lipovetsky’s (1987/1994: 134) account particularly interesting is that he 
extends the logic of fashion from luxury clothing to modern consumer society at large, 
shaping both demand and supply toward an “[e]conomic logic [that] has simply swept 
away any idea of permanence.” this economic logic – which is in line with ideas of flexible 
capitalism or accumulation – can also be found, albeit in a less optimistic fashion, in 
sennett’s Culture	of	the	New	Capitalism (2006). in this new capitalism, stability is considered 
to be “a sign of weakness, suggesting to the market that the firm could not innovate or find 
new opportunities or otherwise manage change” (sennett, 2006: 41). according to sennett 
(2006), such a society leaves no room for qualities such as craftsmanship: as soon as people 
become deeply involved with the matter of things, they risk becoming narrow-focused, 
hence giving up their required flexibility. in a similar fashion, Bauman (2000a: 14) speaks 
of liquid	 modernity, in which “it is the mind-boggling speed of circulation, of recycling, 
ageing, dumping and replacement which brings profit today – not the durability and lasting 
reliability of the product.”  
What lipovetsky, sennett, and Bauman demonstrate is that the “cult of the new” (lipovetsky, 
2005: 37), which has been consistently recognized as inherent in fashion, is part of a much 
broader development involving consumption and production in modern Western capitalist 
societies at large. therefore, understanding fashion’s underlying principles is a necessary 
precondition for analysing the sector’s industrial and organizational change. in the next 
section, fashion’s built-in obsolescence will be further explored, as it is a major driving force 
of the industry’s globalization strategies. 
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2.1.2        change for the saKe of change
ein eigentümlicher Zirkel also entsteht hier: je rascher die mode wechselt, 
desto billiger müssen die dinge werden; und je billiger sie werden, zu desto 
rascherem Wechsel der mode laden sie die Konsumenten ein und zwingen 
sie die Produzenten.
Georg simmel (1919)
one of the main principles of the fashion system concerns the role of novelty and change, 
which has been emphasized by philosophical, cultural, social, and economic scholars 
alike. svendsen (2006: 25), for instance, refers to Kant as being the first to define fashion 
not in terms of any aesthetic quality but rather emphasising “the	 new as [its] essential 
characteristic.”  “a fashion object”, so he argues, “does not in	principle need any particular 
qualities apart from being new. [rather, its principle] is to create an ever-increasing velocity, 
to make an object superfluous as fast as possible” (svendsen, 2006: 28). similarly, manlow 
(2007: 7), along with many others, argues that fashion “can change, just for the sake of 
change.” 
By emphasizing the new, and by defining fashion as an ever-changing phenomenon, fashion 
only exists in the here and now. at the same time, however, Benjamin has demonstrated that 
the newness that fashion epitomizes is always a relaunch of the old; a reinterpretation of 
the past (Brand & teunissen, 2006; see also lehmann, 2000; Vinken, 2005). fashion thus 
represents both a sense of timelessness and a particular way of dealing with the past. this 
dealing with the past has been conceptualized as either constantly replacing the old with 
the new or – as seems to be more in line with contemporary fashion changes – a constant 
recycling allowing for coexistence of old, new, and everything in between (cf. svendsen, 
2006).
Whereas no scholar seems to deny change as an inherent quality of fashion, there is less 
agreement on the actual nature of this change or its sources. davis (1992: 109-110), for 
instance, cites “boredom”, “sexual allure”, “economic conspiracies”, “Zeitgeist”, and 
“class differentiation” as possible explanations for change in fashion, found in a variety 
of fashion theories. entwistle (2009: 8) explains fashion’s built-in obsolescence “not for 
reasons	of necessity (not because things wear out or are replaced by better things) but 
simply because there is a desire (not of individuals but built within the system) for some 
movement or change.”
understanding this particular principle of fashion is important for this study, because 
endless change for the sake of change is what drives fashion as a system and fashion as 
an industry. concerning the latter, the value of novelty and change is usually referred to in 
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terms of innovation. however, fashion’s continuous drive for newness and novelty does not 
necessarily lead to innovation. as Jacobs explains by referring to lipovetsky’s concept of 
marginal differentiation:
‘marginal differentiation’ is a concept quite close to incremental innovation, but 
without the latter concept’s connotation of improvement. a new product is not 
necessarily better; it does not necessarily lead to a higher degree of wellbeing, except 
possibly the wellbeing found in the newness itself and a larger degree of choice 
(Jacobs, 2007: 58).
fashion is exemplary for new product development without improvement. most of the 
time, we cannot say that one particular style is better than its precursors, except for fitting 
better in the new Zeitgeist. still, the cyclical changes inherent in the logic of fashion have 
inspired some researchers to transfer ideas on creating newness in fashion to other fields of 
innovation (e.g. czarniawska, 2005), though often only to conclude that changing fashions 
and innovations rely on different mechanisms. in a critical analysis of schumpeter’s and 
Winter’s approach to the sources of novelty, for instance, Becker, Knudsen, and march 
argue that:
[while Winter recognizes a significant resemblance] between processes affecting the 
distribution of skirt lengths and processes affecting the distribution of production 
technologies, [there remains a] fundamental difference between theories of fashion 
and most theories of learning or evolution in economics, [namely] that there is no 
idea of progress in theories of fashion (Becker et al., 2006: 366-367). 
sociologist gronow (2009) goes even further by arguing that ‘real’ innovations challenge 
social and cultural routines, habits, and practices, whereas fashions do not. 
the production of newness in fashion thus becomes a goal in and of itself. as i have argued 
above, understanding fashion’s endless drive for change only for change’s sake is significant 
in understanding how the fashion industry works, because it reveals a remarkable temporal 
logic. Whether we agree on the idea of fashion as fickle and ephemeral or not, the industry 
works by a cyclic schedule, launching new products every season, following a fixed calendar. 
this means that the fashion industry is guided by principles of change and	continuity, as 
richardson explains:
the volatility in fashion apparel is almost entirely in the end market. assets and 
capabilities along the value chain are at low risk of obsolescence. even though 
innovative new product introductions and demand changes can be rapid and 
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somewhat unpredictable, new product introduction is routine in fashion apparel. all 
firms introduce new products on a regular seasonal basis. moreover, the product and 
manufacturing technologies are fairly stable. new products involve mainly styling or 
fabric changes that do not usually require new technology (richardson, 1996: 404).
even when new product introduction is ‘daily’ practice in fashion, increasing volatility in 
demand – caused by “product proliferation and shorter product cycles” – has left retailers 
and manufacturers alike with growing uncertainty, “thereby making demand forecasting 
and production planning harder every day” (abernathy, dunlop, hammond & Weil, 1999: 
9). in such a fast-moving market, fashion retailers and manufacturers are exposed to high 
risks in terms of inventory costs and forced markdowns. timing is decisive in managing 
fashion production when the market is characterized by “short life-cycles”, “high 
volatility”, “low predictability”, and “high impulse purchasing” (christopher, lowson & 
Peck, 2004: 367). 
the temporality of fashion thus incorporates a somewhat paradoxical logic. on the one 
hand, the managerial discourse on fashion retailing emphasizes speed and responsiveness, 
supported by market analyses that demonstrate the unpredictability and ephemerality of 
consumer preferences. on the other hand, apart from fast fashion chains such as Zara and 
h&m, fashion brands are still largely built around two seasons, trapped within “a fixed 
calendar of yarn and fabric shows” (tyler, heeley & Bhamra, 2006: 321). thus, while fashion 
in terms of concurrent styles of dress in today’s society of ‘hyperconsumption’ (lipovetsky, 
2005) is fickle and ephemeral, fashion in terms of brands’ and firms’ time-tables follows a 
recurrent logic of routine product development. 
the fashion industry produces newness within a routinized system of seasonal schedules. 
But fashion is also a creative and material product. in the next section, i discuss the 
production of fashion in the context of creative design and	garment manufacturing, leading 
to an understanding of fashion production as a form of knowledge (trans)formation. 
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2.1.3        the Production of fashion
as an outsider i know that i did not have it [i.e. fashion capital], or did not 
have it to the same degree as those i observed. indeed, i had to learn what 
designers and styles were most valued and my knowledge always lagged 
behind the buyers. this is not to say i do not understand fashion (indeed, i 
consider myself a fashionably dressed academic) but i lacked the precise, 
obscure, intricate knowledge of those i observed and the ability to put it 
together, not least because i could not afford it!
Joanne entwistle (2009: 144)
contemporary fashion cannot be unravelled irrespective of an industry operating in a 
capitalist consumer society. fashion is both a symbolic and creative product and an industrial 
and commercial process. fashion industries therefore share many characteristics with so-
called creative industries (cf. hauge, 2007). in his dissertation on the global fashion design 
industry, Wenting (2008: 13) for instance refers to howkins to situate the fashion industry 
under the umbrella of creative industries, which “have their origin in individual creativity, 
skill and talent and centre on the generation and exploitation of intellectual property and 
aesthetic originality.” 
creative industries, including design, architecture, and advertising, are characterized by 
products containing “a high degree of both expressive and functional value” (sunley, Pinch, 
reimer & macmillen, 2008: 683, my emphasis). Within the fashion industry, the central role of 
creativity coincides with an increasingly industrialized and labour-intensive manufacturing 
process, necessary to materialize ideas into mass-consumer goods. as we have seen, fashion 
is more than an art form; it is a business striving for profit through continuous product 
development. in the words of Weller (2004: 173), “fashion clothing production involves a set 
of processes that materialise abstract ideas, [which is why] industrial development is not 
separate from aesthetic development.” at the same time, however, in most cases industrial 
and aesthetic development are	spatially and/or organizationally separated as a consequence 
of the international division of labour and Western societies’ deindustrialization. to 
understand how this separation and distanciation affects the processes of materialization 
as suggested by Weller (2004), it is helpful to understand fashion production as a form of 
knowledge transformation.
since the 1990s, socio-economic researchers have increasingly emphasized the role of 
knowledge in understanding global economic developments. Post-industrial societies or 
“knowledge economies” are now commonly accepted terms to describe economies that are 
no longer primarily driven by manufacturing industries but have shifted toward knowledge-
intensive businesses and services, seemingly “characterized by the de-materialisation of 
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production” (Bryson et al., 2000a: 2). furthermore, “what is increasingly produced are not 
material objects, but signs”, due to the “aestheticization of material objects [that] takes 
place in the production, the circulation or the consumption of such goods” (lash & urry, 
1994: 4, emphasis in original).
the fashion industry fits well within these developments of aestheticization and de-
materialization of contemporary culture at large. What differentiates fashion from other 
sectors is that aesthetic qualities have become the core commodity, instead of mere 
decoration for something else (entwistle, 2009). i follow entwistle (2009: 10) in this regard 
and understand fashion as an “aesthetic market” in which “aesthetic quality – be it look or 
style – is commodified, that is, defined and calculated within a market and sold for profit.” 
such understanding of fashion as an aesthetic market requires a multifaceted 
conceptualization of economic knowledge that goes beyond the dominant discourse of 
“cognitive qualities of reason, abstraction and technical innovation” (allen, 2000: 31). 
in economic geography, knowledge has been considered as “crucial in helping to create 
innovation which in turn stimulates economic growth and development” (howells, 2002: 
871). more specifically, tacit	 knowledge has been put forward as a crucial element in 
explaining the geographies of innovation and value creation. inspired by michael Polanyi’s 
The	Tacit	Dimension	(1966), economic geographers have conceptualized tacit knowledge as 
“context-specific” and “spatially sticky” (gertler, 2003: 79).
in other words, the tacit component of the knowledge required for successful 
performance of a skill is that which defies codification or articulation – either because 
the performer herself is not fully conscious of all the ‘secrets’ of successful performance 
or because the codes of language are not well enough developed to permit clear 
explication. the best way to convey such knowledge is through demonstration and 
practice, such as in the classic master–apprentice relationship in which observation, 
imitation, correction and repetition are employed in the learning process (gertler, 
2003: 78).
it has become widely accepted in economic geography to argue that codified knowledge 
travels well and is easily transferred over distance, while tacit knowledge is more difficult 
to share over distance and therefore requires a certain extent of closeness or proximity. 
allen’s idea of a broader conceptualization of economic knowledge that includes both 
cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions is part of a more widespread critique on such 
binary understandings of the tacit-codified dimensions of knowledge (cf. allen, 2000; amin 
& cohendet, 2004). this has been taken up by entwistle (2009) in the form of aesthetic	
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knowledge, as well as by Weller (2007) in terms of fashion	knowledge and by aspers (2010b) as 
contextual	knowledge. i agree with all three of them that fashion industries are pre-eminently 
a field in which other modalities or dimensions of knowledge play such a prominent role 
that the tacit-codified distinction does not suffice. aesthetic knowledge, as entwistle 
(2009) defines it, is partly sensual and embodied, while indeed largely tacit, as it is hard 
to verbalize. fashion knowledge is a complex and multi-dimensional form of knowledge 
ranging from “localised dress practices” to the “semiotic content of material objects” 
(Weller, 2007: 44-45). With the concept of contextual knowledge aspers (2010b: 190) aims 
to catch “the ‘mysterious’ knowledge that people have to possess, often described in terms 
of ‘creativity’, ‘talent’, ‘gut-feeling’ or ‘genius’.”
What entwistle’s, Weller’s, and aspers’ accounts have in common is that they consider 
non-cognitive dimensions of knowledge as economically valuable. this is particularly 
relevant when examining the role of distance between design and manufacturing that this 
dissertation aims to address. it is a way to overcome, in allen’s (2000: 27) words, the “often 
taken-for-granted tendency to map the tacit-codified knowledge distinction on to the local-
global scale of economic activity.” 
While i will further discuss this spatial aspect of knowledge creation and distribution 
in chapter 3, what is significant here is the conceptualization of economic knowledge 
as comprising both cognitive and non-cognitive (e.g. aesthetic, expressive, symbolic) 
qualities that are not simply understood as either local or globally dispersed. this enables 
us to explore how globalized organizations of fashion industries – in which aesthetic and 
technical types of knowledge have become spatially separated – deal with, and are affected 
by, distanciated relationships.
in this study, i define fashion	industry as the collection of economic actors that are involved 
in the production of fashion garments. this implies a broad definition of production	that is 
not limited to the practices of physical manufacture. Fashion	production is conceptualized 
as the combined practices of aesthetic and industrial development, implying that fashion 
and clothing production are not treated as separate entities but as part of the same fashion	
system. this system is characterized by continuous change and incorporates both cognitive 
and non-cognitive types of economic knowledge. in the second part of this chapter, i further 
elaborate on fashion industries’ economic actors and concentrate on how globalized 
organizations of the industry have been conceptualized.
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2.2    the GlobaliZed oRGaniZation of fashion    
      pRodUCtion
less and less of a Benetton shirt is assembled in italy and more and more of it by 
independent external suppliers in south america, asia, and eastern europe. only 
the major strategic functions – design, cutting, quality control, and distribution 
– are still handled in-house in treviso. similarly, levi’s denim jeans are largely 
sewn in asia and in mexico, while marks & spencer sources its apparel items from 
a dozen developing countries. some members of the business community have 
even suggested that ‘made in italy’ or ‘made in the usa’ labels are obsolete and 
that one should rather stress the ‘italian style’ or the ‘american style’.
Giovanni Graziani (2001: 209)
in the previous chapter, i described the development of the dutch fashion industry in terms 
of increased relocation and outsourcing of manufacturing operations in favour of design- 
and marketing-related functions. in the first part of the current chapter, i have defined the 
fashion industry as a collection of economic actors that are involved in the production of 
fashion garments. this means that the dutch fashion industry must be understood within a 
global context, as the production of dutch fashion is not confined to national boundaries. 
the dutch fashion industry consists of a variety of interdependent types of firms, such as 
retailers, agents, wholesalers, and manufacturers. these firms are more often than not 
geographically dispersed among industrialized and industrializing countries around the 
world. 
if we want to study the relationship between design and manufacturing within the 
globalized organization of the dutch fashion industry, we need to identify the different 
economic actors involved and understand how they relate to each other in the production of 
fashion. this is not a straightforward task because “the boundaries between types of firms 
have become increasingly blurred and difficult to draw” (lane & Probert, 2009: 2; see also 
dicken, 2007; tyler, 2003). retailers can develop their own collections, and manufacturers 
tend to open their own outlets, rendering the distinction between buyers and suppliers a 
matter of degree.
in the following sections, i discuss the literature in which theories of value chains and 
production networks have been put forward to conceptualize firm typologies and sourcing 
strategies in the fashion and clothing industry. this will lead to an informed set of definitions 
that are both necessary and suitable for my own research.
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2.2.1         a fragmented industrY
the manufacture of clothing is an ideal candidate for international 
subcontracting. it is highly labour intensive; uses low-skill or easily trained 
labour; and the process can be fragmented and geographically separated, with 
design and often cutting being performed in one location (usually a developed 
country) and sewing and garments assembly in another location (usually a 
developing country).
peter dicken (2007: 276)
the production process of the fashion industry can be broken up into several operations, 
which in principle can be performed independently (e.g. Birnbaum, 2008). therefore, the 
nature of the clothing value chain enables geographical and organizational fragmentation, 
as the following quote by lane & Probert (2009) illustrates:
the value chain in the clothing industry embraces several different sets of activity, 
with associated roles and occupations. these steps can be separated from each other 
and performed in different locations, since they involve clearly identified costs, as well 
as different sets of capabilities and occupations. the more high value pre-production 
functions, as well as the post-production functions of marketing and distribution, 
stay mainly in developed countries. the actual manufacture of garments, in contrast, 
involves mainly semi-skilled sewing and assembly operations, using simple machines 
and requiring elementary skills. it has largely moved to developing low-wage countries 
(lane & Probert, 2009: 2).
the clothing production process makes the fashion industry highly eligible for fragmented 
production – geographically and organizationally separating different stages of the value 
chain that are not necessarily coordinated by one single firm (e.g. arndt & Kierzkowski, 
2001). such fragmentation occurs not only between the stages of yarn production, fabric 
production, garment manufacturing, and retailing/distribution respectively, but also within 
the garment manufacturing stage (see for instance taplin, 1994). although “assembly 
is usually the step in the manufacturing process that is farmed out to lower-cost firms” 
(abernathy et al., 1999: 152), firms can adopt a variety of sourcing strategies and perform 
more or less production functions in-house.  
figure 2.1 summarizes the main elements of the clothing production process. for the sake of 
readability, it is presented as a chain, suggesting a linear process from collection planning to 
retailing. however, it must be noted that the reality of fashion production is more a complex 
of concurrent practices than a chain of sequential stages. marketing, for instance, is not 
only concerned with the marketing of finished collections, but is often involved throughout 
earlier stages of collection planning and design as well. furthermore, marketing has gained 
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an all-pervasive position within the industry, from fabric manufacturers to retailers. also, 
retail is not necessarily preceded by wholesale, as many retailers nowadays develop their 
own collections. 
Figure	2.1:	The	fashion	production	chain.	Based	on	Eberle	et	al.	 (2008),	Faust	 (2005),	Lane	&	Probert	 (2006),	
Roso	(2005).
another factor adding to the complexity of the fashion production chain is related to 
fashion’s temporal logic. traditionally, fashion follows a seasonal rhythm of two major 
collections: spring/summer and fall/Winter. this two-seasonal schedule is still present in 
the organization of fabric and trade fairs, as well as in the organization of international 
fashion weeks. Yet many fashion brands today offer four to twelve collections a year in order 
to trigger demand and increase turnover. taking into account the different lead	 times of 
fabric and garment manufacturing – that is, the total time required from order to finished 
products that are ready for shipment – collection planning usually starts a year before the 
products arrive on the shop floor, while fabrics have to be produced and selected already 
during the design stage (cf. tyler et al., 2006). the more (sub-)collections a brand develops, 
the more it has to manage several stages of the production process simultaneously. 
the identification of economic actors and their specific roles within the globalized 
organization of fashion production critically depends on how the value chain is 
conceptualized and on how many different steps are involved in the process. different 
types of firms can then be identified based on the combination of functions they perform. 
in addition to what a firm does,	firm types can also be differentiated on the basis of their 
position within the chain. 
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several studies have assessed the different ways in which fashion firms focus on particular 
core competences and select organizational strategies accordingly. these different 
strategies not only determine which parts of the manufacturing process are being performed 
in-house, they also concern the modes of coordination and ownership throughout the entire 
value chain. in the next section, i discuss the concepts of global commodity/Value chains 
(gcc/gVc) and global Production networks (gPn), as these have become accepted ways 
to understand such modes of coordination and control (cf. gereffi, humphrey & sturgeon, 
2005; hess & Yeung, 2006).
2.2.2 chains and netWorKs
in today’s world economy, processes of production and consumption are not confined to 
national and firm boundaries. the spatial organization of production and consumption needs 
to be analysed in a way that allows for a relational understanding of cross-border firm activities. 
especially since the 1980s, a variety of scholars have used the metaphor of chains	or the concept 
of networks	to reveal “the concrete actors in the global economy as well as the linkages that bind 
them into a larger whole” (sturgeon, 2001: 9). as the clothing industries were “the first to take 
on a global dimension” (dicken, 2007: 249), these concepts of chains and networks provide a 
useful starting point for my own analysis of the globalized dutch fashion industry.
one of the most widespread conceptual frameworks in this regard is the global commodity 
chains (gcc) approach, developed in the 1990s by gereffi in particular (cf. gereffi & 
Korzeniewicz, 1994; henderson, dicken, hess, coe & Yeung, 2002). gereffi’s seminal 
approach to the way production is organized in a globalized economy transcends national 
boundaries, as gccs are clustered around one commodity or product and show “how 
production, distribution, and consumption are shaped by the social relations […] that 
characterize the sequential stages of input acquisition, manufacturing, distribution, 
marketing, and consumption” (gereffi, Korzeniewicz, m. & Korzeniewicz, r., 1994: 2). 
in particular, his focus on different forms of governance structures – which can be either 
producer- or buyer-driven – gives us more insight into the power relationships that determine 
the allocation and flow of financial, material, and human resources within the chain (e.g. 
gereffi, 1994). gereffi (1994: 99) put forward the apparel industry as an exemplary case of 
so-called buyer-driven chains, in which the majority of lead firms – the firms that govern 
the chain – are not manufacturers but “merchandisers that design and/or market, but 
do not make, the branded products they sell.” the difference between buyer-driven and 
producer-driven chains lies in the focus of the lead firm: “Whereas in producer-driven forms 
of capitalist industrialization, production patterns shape the character of demand, in buyer-
driven commodity chains the organization of consumption is a major determinant of where 
and how global manufacturing takes place” (gereffi, 1994: 99).
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While this distinction has been an important step in understanding global industrial 
structures and power relations between buyers and suppliers within different types of 
industries, it is limited in understanding the complex variety of inter-firm relationships 
that exist in today’s global economy. more recently, gereffi et al. (2005) among others have 
developed a more comprehensive model of governance structures in global Value chains 
(gVc). this model includes relational interactions based on mutual dependencies, which 
they increasingly recognize within the apparel industry (ibid.). Between the traditionally 
distinguished ‘arm’s length’ market relationships on the one hand and vertically integrated 
hierarchical organizations on the other, gereffi et al. (2005) identify three types of network 
organizations: modular, relational, and captive value chains. in developing an analytical 
framework that consists of five types of value chain governance, gereffi et al. (2005) 
thus aim to do more justice to the variety of network forms that constitute contemporary 
globalized industries: 
§	 in modular value chains, ‘turn-key’ suppliers typically make products or provide 
services according to the lead firm’s specifications. this is the most market-like 
network organization in which costs of switching to new partners for both buyers 
and suppliers are relatively low (gereffi et al., 2005: 83-87). 
§	 Relational value chains are networks consisting of complex interactions between 
the lead firm and its suppliers, based on trust and mutual dependencies, often 
associated with spatial proximity. in this type of value chain governance, thick 
relationships between buyers and suppliers prevail, resulting in high switching 
costs (ibid.). 
§	 Whereas relational value chains are characterized by mutual dependence, power 
relations in captive value chains tend to be more asymmetrical in favour of the 
lead firm. small suppliers are usually confined to a narrow range of tasks and are 
transactionally dependent on the larger, dominant lead firm (ibid.).
an important insight to gain from this framework of governance structures is the role of knowledge 
exchange between lead firm and suppliers. gereffi et al. (2005) argue that each particular type of 
governance structure is largely determined by the complexity and codifiability of the knowledge 
transferred in inter-firm transactions, in addition to suppliers’ required capabilities. the higher 
the complexity of knowledge and capabilities and the lower the ability to codify transactions, the 
higher the degree of explicit coordination and control, and the more the governance structure 
will tend towards hierarchical and asymmetrical power relations (ibid.). 
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as we have seen in the first part of this chapter, taking different types of knowledge into 
account is essential in understanding the multifaceted phenomenon of fashion production. 
considering the spatial separation of aesthetic and technical types of knowledge within the 
organization of the dutch fashion industry, the gVc framework of governance structures 
implies that the degree and nature of exchange of these distanciated knowledge sets 
determines whether buyer-supplier relations are more captive, relational, or modular. in 
their research of apparel industries, gereffi et al. suggest that due to suppliers’ growing 
capabilities, governance structures have rapidly moved from captive to relational value 
chains:
Whereas the assembly-oriented captive model required explicit coordination in the 
form of cut fabric and detailed instructions, full package production involved the 
more complex forms of coordination, knowledge exchange, and supplier autonomy 
typical of relational value chains. unlike captive networks, in which foreign firms take 
responsibility for supplying all the component parts used by local contractors, full 
package production requires offshore contractors develop the capability to interpret 
designs, make samples, source the needed inputs, monitor product quality, meet 
the buyer’s price, and guarantee on-time delivery (gereffi et al., 2005: 91-92).
instead of arguing that global value or commodity chains are either buyer- or supplier-
driven, the gVc approach provides a more nuanced explanation of how different actors 
within the globally dispersed organization of fashion production relate to each other. still, 
the problem remains that the concept of chains	and its primary focus on governance structures	
suggest an “essentially vertical and linear” organization of production and distribution 
(henderson et al., 2002: 442). 
to overcome this essentially linear logic of chains, a number of economic geographers 
and sociologists have proposed an alternative framework: global Production networks 
(gPn) (coe, dicken & hess, 2008a; 2008b; henderson et al., 2002; hess & Yeung, 2006; 
Johns, 2006). defined as “the nexus of interconnected functions and operations through 
which goods and services are produced, distributed and consumed”, the gPn framework 
“builds upon the work of gereffi and his collaborators” regarding global commodity and 
value chains (henderson et al., 2002: 444-445). despite their commonalities, however, 
gPns differ from previous chain concepts in terms of complexity and inclusiveness. three 
differences in particular are worth highlighting: 
1) the concept of networks allows for a more relational and multi-directional 
understanding of how goods, materials, capital, people, knowledge, and ideas 
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circulate between different actors and places than the structural and uni-directional 
logic of chains suggests (henderson et al., 2002). instead of conceptualizing 
networks as a hybrid form of economic organization between the ideal types of 
markets and hierarchies, the gPn framework considers network configurations 
to “reflect the fundamental structural	 and relational nature of how production, 
distribution and consumption of goods and services are – indeed always have been 
– organized” (coe et al., 2008b: 272, emphasis in original). 
2) the second major difference concerns the types of actors and nature of 
relationships that constitute global production networks. Whereas gccs/gVcs are 
primarily concerned with buyer-supplier relations, gPns focus on heterogeneous 
relationships between both firms and non-firm institutions such as the state or 
nongovernmental organizations (e.g. hess & Yeung, 2006). 
3) finally, the inclusion of other economic and non-economic actors within gPns is 
closely related to the third element that distinguishes the gPn framework from 
gccs/gVcs: the recognition of “concrete socio-spatial contexts in which [gPns] 
are embedded” (coe et al., 2008b: 289). 
 
While gereffi et al. (2005: 99) acknowledge that institutional and geographical environments 
matter, they argue that the shape and evolution of gVcs can be explained “regardless of the 
institutional context within which they are situated.” in contrast, the gPn framework pays 
specific attention to the complex spatialities in which production networks are shaped and 
formed:
every element in a gPn – every firm, every function – is, quite literally, grounded in 
specific locations. such grounding is both material (the fixed assets of production), 
and also less tangible (localized social relationships and distinctive institutions and 
cultural practices). hence, the precise nature and articulation of gPns are deeply 
influenced by the concrete socio-political, institutional and cultural ‘places’ within 
which they are embedded, produced and reproduced (coe et al., 2008b: 279, 
emphasis in original).
the argument that gPns are embedded in and shaped by institutional and geographical 
contexts has important implications for the study of the dutch	 fashion industry in terms 
of distanciated relationships between design and manufacturing. it suggests that even 
within increasingly globalized economic organizations, national and regional contexts 
and institutions continue to influence firm behaviour and competences: “in the case of a 
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dominant firm within a gPn, the country of origin remains an important influence on how 
it operates both across the network as a whole and in those specific locations where its 
operations are situated” (coe et al., 2008b: 280).
in this way the gPn framework is in line with dicken’s (2003: 41) argument that “place 
and geography”, including “the cognitive, cultural, social, political, and economic 
characteristics of the national home base, [...] still matter fundamentally in the ways in 
which firms are produced and how they behave.” firms may operate globally, but they are 
always “anchored in different places and multiple scales” (hess & Yeung, 2006: 1196).
the literature on gPns aims to provide a heuristic framework that focuses simultaneously 
on the creation, enhancement and capture of value, the creation and maintenance of power	
within the production network, and the embeddedness	of agents and structures in particular 
territories. it offers a multi-actor and multi-scalar approach in which firms and non-firm 
institutions act in a global space-economy (coe et al., 2008a; hess & Yeung, 2006). 
a compelling example of how the gPn approach can guide research of fashion industries is 
lane & Probert’s (2009) comparative study of firms in British, american and german clothing 
industries. lane & Probert (2009: 3) adopted the gPn framework to “study the strategies 
of clothing ‘manufacturers’ in global production networks, their activities within these 
networks, and the way they govern them.” in addition, they aim “to comprehend how flows 
of capital, knowledge, and power influence supplier firms and countries in both negative 
and positive ways” (lane & Probert, 2009: 4). an important insight from their research is 
that national institutions indeed have a role in shaping firm competences and sourcing 
strategies, while simultaneously emphasizing the firm as a strategic actor with distinctive 
competences and capabilities (lane & Probert, 2006; 2009). firms in global production 
networks “extend their value chains across national borders in order to escape institutional 
constraints in their home countries, or to seek alternative institutional arrangements more 
compatible with changed strategic objectives” (lane & Probert, 2009: 12).
By focusing on firm-specific capabilities and strategies, lane & Probert (2006; 2009) 
demonstrate that buyer-supplier relationships are far more complex and diversified than 
the distinction between captive and relational governance structures, as suggested by 
gereffi et al. (2005), can account for. they found a “contradictory mixture of relational and 
‘market-type’ arm’s length contracting” among different clothing firms (lane & Probert, 
2006: 64), while simultaneously facing difficulties in determining firm boundaries. in 
the same way as nations are problematic entities when global economies are concerned, 
firm boundaries between manufacturers and marketers have become blurred, since it is 
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increasingly difficult to distinguish between core and non-core activities (lane & Probert, 
2009). agents that build up their own stock, for instance, are essentially functioning as 
importers, and independent retailers have taken over wholesalers’ jobs by organizing 
themselves in buyer combines (Boudeguer & Van leeuwen, 1994). it therefore remains a 
methodological challenge to unambiguously identify the prominent actors within global 
production networks. 
Within the literature on global production and fragmentation, scholars continue to debate 
this matter. harris (2001: 53), for example, states that “the firm is too narrow a unit of analysis 
for the problem of global fragmentation.” in contrast, dicken and thrift (1992) argue for 
a mere re-conception of the firm, instead of a dismissal, as a coordination entity which 
does not necessarily need to coincide with a legal firm. in one of the latest contributions 
to gPn analysis, coe et al. (2008b: 277-278) bemoan “the almost total neglect of intra-firm 
relationships”, which is one of the reasons why gVc and gPn analyses tend “to assume that 
firms occupying similar positions in production networks will respond in a similar fashion.” 
since the present study of the dutch fashion industry aims to understand the spatially 
distanciated relationships between design and manufacturing and how dutch fashion firms 
organize and coordinate this distance, it is important to focus on both inter-firm and intra-
firm relationships. i partly adopt the concept of global production networks in order to 
1) comprehend the global arena in which the production of dutch fashion takes place, 2) 
to take into account the variety of actors and heterogeneous power relations within such 
networks, and 3) to be sensitive to the role of different spatial and institutional contexts in 
shaping these production networks. 
however, due to my specific concern with design-manufacturing relationships, i do not 
follow gPn’s general aim to understand unequal economic development throughout 
the entire network of fashion production or the socio-economic impact on developing 
countries. my study is in need of a smaller unit of analysis than the network in its entirety. 
indeed, the firm plays a significant role in my analysis, because design and manufacturing 
are presumably value-adding functions within	the organizations of firms. i also agree with 
dicken, Kelly, olds and Yeung (2001: 93) that “the structure of a network tells us little about 
the qualitative nature of the relationships, which is far more important than structure per	
se.” By drawing on insights from actor-network theory (ant) dicken et al. (2001: 101) argue 
for a more relational perspective, wherein “actions or practices, rather than structures, 
form the focus of analysis.”  
following the argument of dicken et al. (2001), rather than excluding one unit of analysis 
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in favour of another, i intend to adopt a more practice-oriented approach, focusing on what 
actually happens where.	actors involved can thus be people, firms, brands, artefacts, or ideas, 
as long as they are concerned with the relationship between design and manufacturing. 
however, since firms obviously still form a crucial part of the fashion industry, it remains 
important to define what we mean when discussing manufacturers, retailers, or wholesalers. 
in the next section, i provide a review of firm typologies and sourcing strategies in fashion 
and clothing production.
2.2.3 firm tYPologies and sourcing strategies
in order to analyse spatial and organizational distance between design and manufacturing 
in the globalized organization of the dutch fashion industry, we need to identify the 
different types of firms that are involved in the practices of design and manufacturing. in the 
literature on global value and commodity chains, global production networks, and sourcing 
strategies of fashion and clothing industries, we can find different typologies of firms based 
on either what firms do (design, manufacture, sales), their position within the value chain 
(buyer, supplier, intermediary), or a combination of both.
as i have explained in the first part of this chapter, i understand the production of fashion as 
the combined practices of aesthetic and industrial development. this means that producers 
of fashion need not necessarily be manufacturers in the sense that they actually make the 
garments, as long as they “arrange for the design and production of clothing” that they 
then sell “wholesale or retail” (richardson, 1996: 405).
fundamentally, three basic types of fashion producers can be identified, as Jenkyn Jones 
(2011: 74) explains in her guide to the fashion industry:
1. Manufacturers handle all operations such as buying the fabric, designing or 
buying in designs, making the garments and selling and delivering the finished 
garments.
2. Wholesalers produce the designs, buy materials and plan the cutting, selling and 
delivery, while they do not actually make the clothing.
3. Contractors vary in size from well-established large-scale operators through 
medium cut, make and trim (cmt) workshops to the lone outworker.
this typology provides a simple distinction between vertically integrated firms, those 
that subcontract the manufacturing part, and those that make the clothes for the second 
type of firms. dunford (2004; 2006) makes a similar distinction between integrated firms, 
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enterprises concentrating on design and marketing, and manufacturing subcontractors 
(cmt). although authors vary in their use of terminology, one could argue that all clothing 
firms more or less fit into one of these three categories. however, as i will demonstrate 
below, there are a variety of subcategories rendering the distinctions between these three 
less definite. 
in my review of the literature, i identified several authors who proposed different firm 
typologies based on a specific conceptualization of the clothing value chain. lane & Probert 
(2005: 39-40), for instance, compared german and British clothing firms’ strategies by 
identifying seven steps in the clothing value chain:
1. Planning & development of collection
2. design & prototyping of models
3. Production design
4. manufacture & assembly of garments
5. marketing
6. distribution
7. retailing
that lead to five types of clothing enterprises:
i. Branded/high fashion ‘manufacturers’ [steps 1-3, 5-7]
ii. Branded/high fashion marketers [steps 1-2, 5-7]
iii. domestic suppliers to large retailers [same as type 1, but steps 1, 2, and 5 receive 
low emphasis
iv. ‘Cut, Make and trim’ firms [step 4]
v. Retailers, with backward integration into design and supply chain organization 
[steps 1, 2, and 7]
in focusing on the italian textiles and clothing chain, dunford (2006) adds steps for collection 
presentation, collection of orders, fabric purchasing, and quality control, and identifies 
three main types of clothing firms based on eleven different steps. to a certain extent, these 
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differences in firm typologies can be explained by the different national contexts to which 
they apply – in this case, the difference between British and german firms on the one hand, 
and italian industrial districts on the other. it also illustrates that, as faust (2005: 5) has 
argued, “a value chain approach cannot be immediately translated into a firm typology.” 
the same function – for instance, marketing – can mean different things for different firms 
(e.g. producers and retailers), and the strategic value of a particular step of the chain can 
vary considerably between firms, “even if the steps of a chain integrated within different 
firms amount to the same configuration” (faust, 2005: 6). identifying ideal types of firms 
based on a combination of steps of the value chain does not resolve the issue of blurring 
boundaries between firms. depending on how many steps are discerned, a wide range of 
combinations is conceivable. 
lane & Probert’s typology provides a starting point to differentiate between different 
economic actors based on their competences. it is important to note that none of types, 
except for the cmt firms, actually manufacture garments. the term branded ‘manufacturer’ 
refers to the firm’s manufacturing competences. the firm is highly involved in the 
organization of manufacturing, including fabric buying and pattern making, subcontracting 
only the actual assembly of garments. as such terminology can be misleading in the 
analysis, faust’s typology of clothing firms provides a useful alternative. instead of branded 
‘manufacturer’, he suggests the term branded producer, and instead of domestic supplier, 
he speaks of private label producer (faust, 2005). here, producer means that a firm controls 
the production process without necessarily owning any manufacturing facilities. 
since most dutch fashion firms are no longer involved in garment assembly, it may be useful 
to shift the analytical focus away from firm typologies based on the steps of the value chain, 
and toward the ways in which the production processes are organized. as gereffi explains 
in reference to the american fashion industry, lead firms in buyer-driven value chains, such 
as liz claiborne, gap, or nike, “generally design and/or market – but do not make – the 
branded products they order. they are ‘manufacturers without factories’, with the physical 
production of goods separated from their design and marketing” (gereffi & memedovic, 
2003: 70). for gereffi, it is not a question of whether a clothing firm manufactures or not 
– as the majority does not – but how the lead firm governs the value chain and what this 
means for the supplying manufacturers. this brings us to the different sourcing strategies 
that fashion firms employ in organizing the production process.
in this regard, both faust (2005) and lane & Probert (2009: 156-158) explain how producers 
of fashion control the manufacturing process through:
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1) own manufacturing locally and abroad
2) manufacturing subcontracting to a CM(t) type foreign company
leaving the buying of fabric and trim in the hands of the coordinating 
firms, together with other pre-assembly operations such as producing 
sample products and managing the technical aspects of constructing the 
garment.
3) full-package (fp) supplier networks
indicating the assumption of a variety of manufacturing and buying 
functions by the supplier. at a crucial minimum, it means that the 
coordinating company no longer buys the fabric and trim, although it 
may retain a greater or lesser degree of influence over its purchasing.
4) Purchase of commodities or full service (fs) sourcing
involving direct buying of the finished product without any, or with greatly 
reduced, prior input by the lead firm.
drawing on these firm typologies and sourcing strategies found in the literature, we are 
equipped with a number of useful ideal types that take into account what firms do and how 
they relate to other firms within the production process:
a) clothing firms can be categorized based on their focus within the value chain, 
ranging from integrated firms managing the entire chain, through firms focusing 
only on higher value-added operations such as design and marketing, to 
manufacturing firms. 
B) coordinating firms that subcontract manufacturing can choose from a variety 
of third-party sourcing strategies; this leads to different types of suppliers and 
manufacturers ranging from cmt – through full-package – to full-service sourcing. 
most lead firms apply a mixture of strategies, rather than falling exclusively into one of these 
categories. as faust (2005: 29) argues, these ways of organizing production are not exclusive 
alternatives: “all apparel producers, both brand name and private label, apply all these alternatives 
together, although in a different mix.” While faust (2005) bases his arguments on empirical data 
from the german fashion industry, similar kinds of mixtures can be found in dutch fashion firms’ 
sourcing strategies. for example, Vanilia, a branded retailer that owns a manufacturing facility 
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in turkey, complements its products with third-party sourcing. likewise, Van gils, as a branded 
producer, engages in both cmt-type relationships in eastern europe and full-package sourcing in 
china.
the mixture of sourcing strategies that contemporary dutch and other Western european 
fashion firms pursue is a manifestation of the sometimes contradictory criteria and 
requirements that lead firms apply in their selection of suppliers. costs may be the main 
reason why most fashion firms initially relocated manufacturing abroad. But the nature of 
the fashion system, as described in the first part of this chapter, means that other factors 
such as speed, reliability, flexibility, quality, and product type have become equally 
important. the volatility of the fashion market renders it extremely important to have the 
right products at the right time for the right price. geographical spread of suppliers is one 
way to retain flexibility in product differentiation, as supplier countries and firms specialize 
in fabric and garment types. 
lead times – “the total time required in the apparel production process, from the time 
fabrics are ordered to when finished products are ready for shipment” (abernathy et al., 
1999: 177) – further determine the temporal constraints that fashion firms encounter in 
planning their collections. Both sources and consequences of distance between design 
and manufacturing are thus far more diversified than cost advantages through lower-wage 
labour. as lane & Probert explain,
in the fashion industry, buyer-supplier interaction is not concerned with standardized 
goods and highly codified information. garments, particularly in the fashion segment, 
are continually changing in both form and appearance. [...] the competences 
externalized by coordinating firms may be described as fairly standard. in principle, 
they facilitate the easy substitution of one supplier by another. But [...] the quantitative 
coordination of output volume and the qualitative coordination of product features, 
all under intense time pressure, could not take place purely through market links. 
they require a degree of cooperation. But as mutual commitment between buyers and 
suppliers is not high in this industry, technical coordination requirements and quality 
of buyer-supplier relationships stand in constant tension (lane & Probert, 2009: 155-
156).
the constant trade-off between price, product features, and speed thus results in profound 
challenges for fashion firms regarding how to organize production networks abroad.
as we have seen in this section, several scholars have argued and demonstrated that national 
contexts matter in the ways in which this global production is organized (e.g. dicken, 2003; 
djelic & ainamo, 1999; faust, Voskamp & Wittke, 2004; lane & Probert, 2006; 2009; Wark, 
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1991). in the next section, i focus on the particularities of the dutch fashion industry to 
determine how the abovementioned typologies of firms and sourcing strategies translate 
into the dutch context.
2.2.4 dutch fashion Brands in gloBal Production netWorKs
in studying the role of the netherlands within international clothing trade, levelt (2010) 
proposed yet another list of ideal types of clothing firms, based on the seven steps of 
the clothing value chain of lane & Probert (2009). these include manufacturers, brands, 
wholesalers, private label companies, and retailers (levelt, 2010). like faust, levelt (2010: 
106) also recognizes that “in practice many hybrid forms are possible and there is continuous 
flexibility in activities that firms integrate and outsource.” While her typology, in principle, 
follows the same logic as the typologies i have discussed above and only slightly differs in 
terminology, it is remarkable that levelt only identifies manufacturing abroad. 
the absence of domestic manufacturing in levelt’s (2010) typology can be explained by 
her explicit focus on companies that generate re-exports of clothing in the netherlands. 
however, it is also a reflection of how dutch fashion industry in general is organized: 
domestic manufacturing is of minor importance to the dutch fashion industry and is 
generally restricted to sample production and small production runs. compared to other 
Western european countries, the netherlands was an ‘early mover’ into foreign sourcing 
(levelt, 2010), as the outsourcing of clothing manufacturing by dutch firms started as early 
as the 1960s, as we have seen in chapter 1. 
the offshoring and outsourcing strategies of dutch clothing firms have led to “the 
dominance of a type of firm that is neither strictly manufacturing nor wholesaler” (scheffer 
& duineveld, 2004: 344). this type of firm, often called kopstaartbedrijf (head-and-tail 
company), subcontracts the assembly function of the production process (the rump), but 
maintains design and product development (the head) and sales and marketing (the tail), 
as well as quality control and logistics (Braaksma, 2009). the head-and-tail metaphor refers 
to the process of outsourcing and offshoring of lower-value, labour-intensive operations 
by a formerly integrated firm. however, the concept of managing the production process 
without actually manufacturing has been adopted by many wholesalers as well. furthermore, 
new companies have emerged adopting the head-and-tail model, having never owned any 
production facilities. one could even say that this concept has almost become the standard 
within the dutch fashion industry (ibid.).
the concept of head-and-tail firms resembles lane & Probert’s branded ‘manufacturers’ or 
faust’s branded producers. in a similar vein, melchior (2010: 17) discusses the emergence 
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of “concept houses” in denmark in the early 1990s: former manufacturers which have 
converted their companies into “wholesalers of clothing focusing on design, distribution, 
marketing, and retail, rather than manufacturing.” however, the dutch concept of head-
and-tail companies is not confined to brand owners, which means that it can be a supplier 
or a retailer as well. the question thus remains which concepts and typologies are most 
useful to analyse the dutch fashion industry. Based on the literature review in this chapter, 
i propose the following definitions for this study.
to begin with, it is important to define fashion industry.	 in the first part of this chapter, 
i defined fashion industry as the collection of economic actors that are involved in the 
production of fashion garments. especially when trying to draw the boundaries of the 
Dutch fashion industry, we are faced with a highly fragmented organization, both spatially 
and organizationally. designers, marketers, and manufacturers operate in complex 
relationships with each other, which is why dutch firms and brands cannot be conceived 
as independent from overseas suppliers. dutch fashion firms and brands are part of global 
production networks that transcend national boundaries. furthermore, fashion conceived 
as a process means that it depends on a variety of knowledge flows deriving from design, 
production, and consumption. therefore, i have adopted a broad definition of production, 
which is not limited to the practices of physical manufacture. in line with entwistle (2009) 
and Weller (2004), fashion production in this study is conceptualized as the combined 
practices of aesthetic and industrial development. 
in defining fashion industry, it is also important to discuss the distinction between 
fashion, clothing, garment, and apparel. as explained in section 2.1, i follow entwistle 
(2009) and lipovetsky (1987/1994) in understanding fashion as a system of stylistic 
innovation; of change and marginal differentiation. this means that, in principle, the 
concept of fashion extends beyond garments to include photography, modelling and 
other related industries. however, as the fashion system in its entirety is beyond the scope 
of this research, in this study i confine myself to the production of fashion garments only. 
i use the terms clothing, apparel, and garments interchangeably to refer to the material 
product without the aesthetic aspect of fashion (cf. Jones, 2006). 
having defined the fashion industry as the economic actors involved in the production of 
fashion garments, the next step concerns the identification of these economic actors in the 
form of particular firm types. in this chapter, we have come across a variety of definitions 
and typologies of fashion and clothing firms. these definitions differ not only in terms of 
terminology, but also in terms of their approach to the value chain – as well as the national 
contexts to which they apply. 
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despite these admittedly minor differences, all typologies emphasize the fragmented nature 
of the fashion and clothing industries and the consequent difficulties when applying these 
ideal types to concrete situations. as the boundaries between different types of firms have 
become blurred, one might ask whether a consistent and unambiguous typology is required 
at all, or even possible. except for legal and statistical purposes, it is a legitimate question 
to ask whether we need to classify firms in order to be able to analyse their organization. 
i consider such typologies useful for the analysis of the dutch fashion industry insofar as it 
is important to be explicit about what we mean when we discuss manufacturers, clothing 
firms, retailers, etc. despite the suggested fluidity of firm boundaries and the messy and 
complicated reality of global production networks, it is still firms and organizations that are 
the observable economic outcomes of organizational practices, which cannot be ignored as 
existing entities. as argued above, there are two complementary ways to define firm types. 
one can define a firm by referring to its position within the production network (i.e. supplier 
or buyer) and/or one can base it on the firm’s competences (i.e. manufacturing, designing, 
etc.). the former definition means that a firm’s identity is a relational one, defined by its 
relationships to other firms. contrary to the latter, there is no direct translation to what a 
firm does.
i will take a pragmatic approach in order to analyse firms in both relational and absolute 
terms, without the restrictions of pre-defined ideal types. to do so, one final dimension 
of fashion production has to be taken into account: the brand. of course, there can be no 
fashion industry without the making and selling of garments. however, since the 1980s, 
core competences of fashion firms have increasingly shifted from the production of clothes 
to marketing brands. Brands have become a central organizing principle within the fashion 
industry. they “unify commodities, ideas and organisations” (Weller, 2004: 160) as they 
organize both “the exchange between producers and consumers [and the] relations within 
the company itself, between employers and employees” (lury, 2004: 33). more than “simply 
an add-on, a mark to identify an origin that is fixed,” explains lury (2004: 27), “[t]he brand 
is thus a mechanism – or medium – for the co-construction of supply and demand.” 
in a similar vein, Power and hauge (2008: 125) speak of brands as institutions; “as ongoing 
processes of negotiation and interaction between various economic actors.” Brands have 
become important in virtually all sectors of today’s economy, but especially in the volatile 
and competitive market of the fashion industry. in fashion, brands play a decisive role in 
providing stability and recognition in a system that is driven by continuous change:
in the fashion industries, brands stabilise the otherwise slippery over-determined 
and under-coded meanings of garments and provide continuity across the rhythmic 
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changes in fashion seasons. in this respect, fashion brands function to moderate the 
uncertainty of fashion over time by facilitating control and stability over consumer 
valuations (Weller, 2004: 153).
Brands and fashion are thus closely related, but serve different purposes:
Both brand and fashion serve individual’s desire for expression of aesthetic taste and 
distinction from others. Both combine in a complex manner conformity to trends, 
to satisfy an urge for belonging, with desire for individualization and differentiation 
[...]. at the same time both brands and fashion, in different ways, maintain/create 
market demand [...]. But whereas fashion, created in a collusive manner between 
producer and consumer, involves constant change to overcome conformity by further 
differentiation and individualization, brands guarantee a constancy of highly regarded 
product features (lane & Probert, 2009: 38-39).
in their mediating role between supply and demand, brand narratives have the power 
to both connect and distanciate tangible and intangible aspects of fashion production, 
“often romanticising craft-based production forms such as hand-sewing” (Weller, 2004: 
155). Brands are therefore an important factor in my aim to understand how design and 
manufacturing relate to each other. Brands transcend firm boundaries both in space and 
time.  as Weller (2004: 144) explains, “[b]rands exist in a different dimension to firms – 
one firm may control many brands, but the reproduction of each brand involves a range of 
specialised tasks that are rarely contained within a single firm.” furthermore, while firms 
go bankrupt regularly, brands often survive through mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers. 
Brands are often the only common denominator when studying organizational change over 
a longer period of time. 
therefore, the starting point for my analysis in every case study is the dutch brand of the co-
ordinating firm or lead firm. these two terms are used interchangeably and do not specify 
which operations the firm has integrated or outsourced. What the firm does and how it 
works will be further explicated in the analysis of the practices of design and manufacturing. 
it then depends on the context and the exact place within the analysis as to whether i 
define firms in more relational or absolute terms. in relation to a brand, firms that qualify 
as supplier can be further specified as fabric supplier, ready-made garment supplier, or 
subcontractor (cm(t)). i adopt the typology of third-party sourcing strategies as explained 
by faust (2005) and lane & Probert (2009), including cut-make-trim, full-package, and 
full-service sourcing. 
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When addressing a supplying firm not as part of the chain, but as an entity in its own right, i 
use the term clothing firm or producer: a firm that is involved in the supply of clothing which 
it either manufactures itself or subcontracts the manufacturing part. for such a clothing 
firm to qualify as a manufacturer, it must own a manufacturing plant in the netherlands or 
abroad. Producer	is a general term that refers to any firm that arranges for the production 
of fashion garments, while a manufacturer actually assembles the garments.  although 
this distinction might seem straightforward, in the netherlands there is still a category of 
clothing firms that do not actually assemble the clothes but are highly involved in the entire 
production process (i.e. pattern making, fabric buying, and production preparation) and 
possess the same knowledge and skills as manufacturers. scheffer and duineveld (2004) 
have described such firms as co-makers. “these start with designs supplied by clients, but 
organize all preparation and offshore subcontracting of manufacturing as well as logistics 
and custom clearance” (scheffer & duineveld, 2004: 346). in a way, it is a concept that 
addresses both what the firm does and its position within the chain. more importantly, 
however, it illustrates once more the fluidity of boundaries between different firm types (cf. 
tyler, 2003). that is why i adopt a flexible analytical approach that starts with a dutch brand, 
and includes firms and other economic actors insofar as they appear to play a significant 
role within the relationship between design and manufacturing. 
Table	2.1:	Defining	the	field	from	global	production	networks	to	firm	types
2
Global Production 
Networks 
The nexus of interconnected 
functions and operations 
through which goods and 
services are produced, 
distributed and consumed 
(Henderson et al., 2002: 
444). 
Including textile manufacturers, fabric and trim 
suppliers, agents, subcontractors, and 
international trade regulations. 
Dutch fashion industry All socio-economic actors 
involved in the production of 
fashion garments in the 
Netherlands. 
Including retailers, consumers, trade 
associations, art academies, fashion institutes, 
media, trade journals, fashion weeks, 
museums, and cultural and economic policy. 
Dutch fashion brands + 
associated firm types 
that pertain to the 
relationship between 
design and 
manufacturing 
Lead firm/ co-ordinating firm Brand owner that governs the chain 
Suppliers Fabric suppliers, ready-made garments 
suppliers, and subcontractors (CMT) 
Producer Firm that arranges for the production of fashion 
garments 
Manufacturer Producer that also assembles the garments 
through own production plants 
Co-maker Producer highly involved in the entire 
production process, but without the actual 
assembly 
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Based on the literature review in this chapter, my analysis of dutch fashion production is 
thus centred around dutch fashion brands and their relationships with other actors in the 
wider context of global production networks. this is summarized in table 2.1. the focal 
point of my analysis, however, is not the production network in its entirety. instead, the 
emphasis is on the distance between design (i.e. usually incorporated by the co-ordinating 
firm of the brand), and manufacturing (i.e. usually operated abroad by a variety of supplier 
firms and countries), which is represented by the bottom row of table 2.1. having defined 
fashion, industry, networks, brands, firms, and sourcing strategies in this chapter, the next 
step in building a conceptual framework for this study is to further operationalize both the 
observed distance between design and manufacturing and ways to understand distanciated 
relations. in proposing a practice-oriented approach, the next chapter aims at providing 
such understanding.
2.3 ConClUdinG ReMaRKs
the reviewed literature in this chapter provided a variety of theories to conceptually frame 
my study of the dutch fashion industry: from fashion as a system, to its production within 
industries, to the ways in which these industries are shaped in the form of chains and 
networks, to the firms and brands that constitute these networks, and the specific strategies 
and competences that these firms pursue in organizing the production networks of which 
they are a part.
fashion can be understood in a multifaceted way: as a “system of stylistic innovation” 
(entwistle, 2009: 8); a system that is guided by the principles of seduction, ephemerality, and 
marginal differentiation (lipovetsky, 1994); a “system of institutions” (Kawamura, 2005: 1), 
and a “set of organizations, individuals and routine organizational activities” (Kawamura, 
2005: 32) that produce both ideas and objects. Within its aim to produce newness, and its 
routinized logic of seasonal schedules, fashion can be understood as an institution in the 
sense that it guides and regulates the behaviour of economic actors (gertler, 2004) – almost 
as if it issued corporate rules to follow. these rules and norms of the fashion system are 
virtually universal throughout capitalist consumer societies; fashion production around the 
globe is subject to the same rules of seasonal change and marginal differentiation.
fashion, in other words, is a global phenomenon. however, as we have seen in chapter 1, 
fashion is also an instrument for nation-branding, which implies that the aesthetic, visual, 
and material outcomes of the global fashion system are subject to national differences. 
furthermore, the literature in the current chapter suggests that national and regional 
institutions also affect fashion’s organization of production. the concept of global 
production networks helps 1) to comprehend the global arena in which the production of 
dutch fashion takes place, 2) to take into account the variety of actors and heterogeneous 
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power relations within such networks, and 3) to be sensitive to the role of different spatial 
and institutional contexts in shaping these production networks.
the spatial organization of dutch fashion industry’s global production networks is marked by 
geographical distance between design and manufacturing. in this chapter, the relationship 
between design and manufacturing has been primarily discussed in terms of buyer-supplier 
relations, governance structures, and coordinating firms’ sourcing strategies. the nature 
and complexity of knowledge exchange has been put forward as an important element in 
understanding these buyer-supplier relationships. this idea requires further scrutiny, as 
fashion production is concerned with different types of aesthetic and technical knowledge 
and skills that are inextricably linked in the process, yet spatially separated due to a 
fragmented organizational structure. 
in the next chapter, i further elaborate on the role of knowledge in defining the relationship 
between design and manufacturing at a distance. in aiming to develop a conceptual 
framework for a more in-depth analysis of how such distanciated relations may work, and 
how distance may affect these relationships, the focus shifts from networks and firms to 
actual practices and routines.
2
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ChapteR 3 
|  from chains and netWorKs to   
 routines and Practices
creativity, and the flexibility that it requires, nevertheless can and does reside 
within relatively inflexible structures, namely, within bureaucratic organizations 
with clearly defined rules, job descriptions, and so on. [...] the fashion industry 
requires that creativity occurs within definite boundaries insofar as merchandise 
must be designed, produced, presented, and delivered according to schedule. 
Within each of these steps we find a clear division of labor, standards that have to 
be met, budgetary constraints, and complex networks through which information 
must flow and services are provided.
Veronica Manlow (2007: 130)
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in the previous two chapters, i defined the fashion industry as a creative industry in which 
aesthetic and industrial developments are inextricably linked through the materialization 
of abstract ideas (Weller, 2004). furthermore, i drew on the logic of the fashion system as 
explained by gilles lipovetsky (1987/1994; 2005) to emphasize its somewhat paradoxical 
temporality. the ephemeral nature of fashion, driven by continuous change, is built on a 
rather stable (two) seasonal system with a rather stable complex of routines and practices, 
producing mostly marginal differentiations and novelty without radical technological 
change (see also Becker et al., 2006).
By discussing the geographies of the dutch fashion industry in the second half of the 
twentieth century, i addressed the apparent spatial distance between fashion design and 
clothing manufacture as a consequence of relocation and outsourcing strategies. the dutch 
fashion industry has evolved from a variety of domestic clothing manufacturing firms, 
retailers, and wholesalers, into globalized networks comprised of dutch brands that are 
connected with globally dispersed buyers, suppliers, and (sub)contractors. in the literature, 
this fragmentation of fashion and clothing production has been conceptualized in terms 
of global commodity/Value chains (gcc/gVc) and global Production networks (gPn). 
these conceptualizations enabled me to define different types of fashion firms and the 
power relations between them, while simultaneously confronting me with the difficulties of 
drawing unambiguous firm boundaries.
the aim of this chapter is to develop a conceptual framework that facilitates an understanding 
of the relationships between aesthetic and industrial developments at a distance. to 
understand how such distanciated relationships work, it is required to open the ‘black box’ 
of firms as they are treated in chain and network approaches. While chains and networks 
are valuable ways to map the geographies of organizational change and uneven economic 
development, they are less effective in understanding the distanciated relations between 
different types of knowledge and skills that are not confined to particular firms. thus far i 
treated distance as a ‘given’; as a natural consequence of dutch fashion firms’ outsourcing 
strategies in search of cheaper labour. this leaves us with a paradox: an organizational 
structure marked by spatial distance and a fashion system that relies on connecting design 
and manufacturing, which seems to imply proximity.
in order to further explore this paradox, i intend to develop an analytical framework that 
helps to integrate the spatialities of organizational change in terms of distance between 
design and manufacturing on the one hand, and relations between different types of 
economic knowledge, skills, and practices on the other. i develop my argument in four 
stages. first, i explore how distance matters in the organization of dutch fashion production 
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and how distance has been conceptualized in the literature on organizational and industrial 
dynamics. this leads to an understanding of distance as a relational	 product that is not 
necessarily a matter of physical space. the frictions of distance, so the argument goes, can 
be overcome by shared practices and routines that enhance the exchange and creation of 
knowledge within and between firms. 
to understand how such routines and practices work, the second and third sections of this 
chapter discuss two different concepts that have much in common, yet belong to different 
theoretical traditions: organizational	 routines, drawn from evolutionary economics, and 
social	practices, drawn from social sciences and relational strands of economic geography. 
fourth and finally, i aim to provide a dialogue between these two strands of literature by 
assessing what both concepts can contribute to understanding distanciated relationships 
between design and manufacturing in the dutch fashion industry. i conclude with a re-
conceptualization of what i have called organizational	practices to be the main unit of analysis 
in this study of dutch fashion brands.
3.1 the spaCes of dUtCh fashion pRodUCtion (oR   
 WhY distanCe MatteRs)
the aim of this study is to explore how dutch fashion firms coordinate and organize the 
relationship between design and manufacturing at a distance. While the organization 
of fashion industries in general, and the dutch fashion industry in particular, have been 
discussed in great detail in the previous two chapters, thus far the concept of distance has 
remained more or less unspecified. What is distance, and why is it important at all?
to understand distance starts with understanding space. drawing on relational approaches 
in economic geography, i follow massey (2005: 9) and conceive “space as the product of 
interrelations; as constituted through interactions.” space is not a given, but something 
that is produced. as developed within post-structuralist geographies, murdoch summarizes 
this idea of relational space as follows:
[s]paces are made of complex sets of relations so that any spatial ‘solidity’ must be 
seen as an accomplishment, something that has to be achieved in the face of flux and 
instability. space is made and it is made relationally. this means that space and place 
have no determining structure; rather, structure is an effect of relations. moreover, 
spatial relations reach across spatial scales, indicating that geographical scale is also 
an outcome of relational processes and actions (murdoch, 2006: 23).
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i agree with massey (2005: 91) that such a relational conceptualization means that space 
“is not anyway reducible to distance.” the explicit focus on distance in this study is due to 
the way in which fashion firms relate to the organization of production. Within fashion 
industries, managing distance is a crucial element of outsourcing strategies. a failure to 
manage distance can result in being too late, too expensive, or ending up with the wrong 
product – all of which mean severe risks for a fashion firm’s performance. apparently, 
distance matters. But how?
a relational conceptualization of space asks for a relational conception of distance as well. 
although my research starts with the ‘given fact’ that there is spatial distance between 
design and manufacturing practices, it implies that this distance is constantly being made by 
the way the fashion industries work and the consequent organization of these distanciated 
practices. 
Yet what does it mean that space is constructed or made, instead of a given? how can the 
role of distance be understood in this regard? law and hetherington (2000: 40) provide a 
useful explanation by arguing that “distance demands communication and interaction.” 
thus, distance or proximity between places, things, or people can only be perceived as a 
relational effect. Without relations, there is no such thing as distance, since both ends are 
simply non-existent to each other. this implies that we cannot take for granted that design 
and manufacturing have become distanciated through outsourcing and relocation. We 
have to analyse their relationship in order to understand whether (spatial) distance matters 
at all, and if so, how. 
in economic geography, distance and proximity are considered key to understanding 
relationships between firms in terms of knowledge exchange. distance between related 
firms and economic functions has been addressed in a variety of ways and there continues 
to be disagreement on the impact of distance or proximity on knowledge transfer and 
innovation (e.g. amin & cohendet, 2004; amin & roberts, 2008; Bathelt, malmberg & 
maskell, 2004; Boschma, 2005; Knoben & oerlemans, 2006; lorentzen, 2007; torre & gilly, 
2000). the issue has been addressed in basically two ways. first, there is one strand of 
literature that emphasizes the benefits of face-to-face contact in building trust and sharing 
and creating (tacit) knowledge through close (daily) interactions. this focus on proximity is 
strongly related to communities of Practice (coP) approaches, which are concerned with 
how learning and innovation are enhanced by shared (local) socio-economic practices (e.g. 
Brown & duguid, 2000a; Wenger 1998; 2006). gertler summarizes the basic underlying 
ideas as follows:
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at the very foundation of the contemporary literature in economic geography is the 
idea that proximity matters. according to the widely accepted view, the geographical 
clustering of economic actors facilitates the exchange of knowledge between them, 
through both traded and untraded means. the interaction that supports this – planned 
and unplanned, formal and informal – is said to be enabled by spatial concentration. 
[...] the geographical clustering of firms in the same industries also accentuates 
competition – and the innovative dynamism arising from it – by enhancing firms’ 
ability to learn from one another through observation and monitoring [...]. in short, 
‘being there’ underpins the joint production, circulation, and sharing of knowledge 
(gertler, 2008: 203).
Proximity or ‘being there’ is thus assumed as relevant to “reduce uncertainty and solve 
the problem of coordination, and, thus, facilitate interactive learning and innovation” 
(Boschma, 2005: 62). as a concept, proximity is therefore central to the study of clusters 
and regional dynamics.
the second strand of literature, which draws on insights from institutional and evolutionary 
economics, focuses not only on the benefits of these types of closeness, but addresses the 
ways in which too much proximity may lead to lock-in, “meaning a lack of openness and 
flexibility” (Boschma, 2005: 62). as grabher (1993: 17-18) has demonstrated in his study 
of the coal, iron, and steel industry in the german ruhr area, drawing on granovetter’s 
(1985) notion of embeddedness, “too much commitment can reduce innovative activity and 
lock customers and suppliers into a specific technological trajectory.” 
from a slightly different perspective that focuses on the role of corporate culture in 
understanding corporate change, schoenberger (1997: 129) has shown how “organizational 
and geographical distance may be important (perhaps necessary) conditions for the 
emergence of the alternative culture within the firm,” and thus enhancing innovation and 
competitiveness. at the same time, she demonstrates the paradoxical role such distances 
play: “[t]his distance also allows the rest of the firm to remain uncontaminated by the new 
practices and understandings being produced within it” (ibid.). contrary to the studies 
focusing on proximity, studies like those of grabher and schoenberger deal with industrial 
stability and change and suggest that de-location of firms, departments, or operations 
can enhance, rather than weaken, innovation as a consequence of breaking with existing 
routines and structures. 
to summarize both ends of the spectrum in a simplified way, economic geographers have 
argued that:
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a) co-location and proximity enable mutual understanding, trust, knowledge 
sharing, and therefore innovation; or
b) de-location and distance enable change, flexibility, and therefore innovation.
the value of proximity in explaining economic performance depends to a large extent on 
how it is defined. the assumption that proximity matters has been the subject of lively 
debates within economic geography and organization studies that call for “a deeper and 
more nuanced understanding of distance and its significance for economic phenomena 
such as the flow of knowledge between economic actors” (gertler, 2004: 15). in aiming to 
explore “how close is close” and “what kinds of proximity matter anyway” (ibid.) several 
authors have drawn attention to other types of distance or proximity beyond mere physical 
space (e.g. amin & cohendet, 2004; Boschma, 2005; torre & rallet, 2005). in an extensive 
literature review, Knoben and oerlemans (2006), for instance, identify organizational, 
cognitive, institutional, cultural, social, and technological proximity as additional 
dimensions to geographical proximity – all of which are assumed to be relevant in inter-
organizational collaboration. Based on a critical assessment of the different meanings of 
these dimensions, they argue that this variety of concepts can be reduced to organizational, 
technological, and geographical proximity (Knoben & oerlemans, 2006). 
organizational proximity in particular offers one way to understand how geographically 
distant actors can achieve a form of closeness without actually ‘being there’, as it assumes 
“that shared routines, values, norms, cultures and relations facilitate interactions” (ibid.). 
in a similar vein, gertler and others have discussed the role of relational proximity as “a 
social-quality underpinning interaction between economic partners, which may or may 
not coincide with geographical proximity” (gertler, 2008: 204; see also amin & cohendet, 
2004; allen, 2000; 2002; gertler, 2003; 2004). relational proximity can be achieved 
“through translation, travel, shared routines, talk, common passions, base standards, 
brokers, epistemic and community bonding, and the ordering and orientation provided 
by files, documents, codes, common software, and so on” (amin & cohendet, 2004: 99). 
correspondingly, allen (2000: 16) argues for “a relational conception of knowledge based on 
distanciated relations”; “as a process of translation which involves stretched knowledges, 
that is both proximate and distanciated forms of social interaction” (allen, 2000: 27).
these ideas about the spatial dimensions of knowledge dynamics challenge pervasive 
conceptualizations of tacit knowledge as localized and ‘sticky’, as opposed to codified 
knowledge as easily traded and distributed across time and space. Building on the idea 
of non-cognitive, embodied, and aesthetic knowledges as a prominent quality of fashion 
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design practices, the question then is not if and how this knowledge is transferred over 
distance, but how it is translated to materialize into commercial garments. how is the 
translation of fashion design ideas into physical products accomplished at a distance?
relational proximity “involves much more than ‘being there’ in terms of physical proximity” 
(amin & cohendet, 2004: 93). however, this does not mean that co-location or face-to-face 
contact has ceased to play a role at all. in that sense, torre (2008) provides an interesting 
account of how geographical proximity continues to matter for the transfer of knowledge. 
instead of arguing for clustering and co-location of interrelated firms, he demonstrates that 
“the needs for geographical proximity can be fulfilled temporarily through travelling”, which 
“generates opportunities for moments of geographical proximity, which vary in duration, 
but which are always limited in time” (torre, 2008: 881). since interaction and cooperation 
is often only required at certain stages within the production process, temporary	geographical	
proximity is arguably sufficient to make the necessary connections, which can be further 
facilitated by temporary meeting spaces such as trade fairs and conferences (ibid.).  
in addition to geographical proximity, organized	or organizational	proximity is of particular 
relevance to understand the effects of outsourcing. sometimes conceptualized as the 
equivalent of relational	proximity,	organizational proximity refers to a shared organizational 
context that facilitates interactions (cf. Boschma, 2005; Knoben & oerlemans, 2006). the 
more that functions are outsourced to independent suppliers and agents, the more difficult 
it becomes to accomplish such shared organizational context. organizational proximity is 
assumed to facilitate interaction due to what torre and rallet (2005) have called the logic	
of	belonging	and the logic	of	similarity. Belonging to the same organization implies shared 
rules and routines, while being ‘alike’ involves shared systems of representation and 
interpretation – all of which are assumed to facilitate the ability to interact (ibid.). “While 
organizational proximity deals with economic separation and relations in terms of the 
organization of production, geographical proximity deals with the separation in space and 
relations in terms of distance” (torre & gilly, 2000: 174).
it can thus be argued that distance is important due to the need of knowledge exchange, but 
that there are other ways to overcome the frictions of distance than permanent co-location. 
regardless of a certain conceptual ambiguity derived from the different types of proximity 
discussed in the literature, most scholars stress that some common frame of reference 
is required for interaction and knowledge exchange to take place. Vissers and dankbaar 
(2013) suggest the notion of repertoire, while aspers (2010b) speaks of lifeworld and province	of	
meaning. such common frames of reference include both ways of understanding and doing 
that cannot be fully understood by studying locations and organizational structures alone. 
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to understand how distance between design and manufacturing within the dutch fashion 
industry is produced and possibly overcome, we thus need a unit of analysis that allows for 
an understanding of how and where interaction takes place and shared understanding is 
accomplished. 
one promising concept that economic geographers have adopted from evolutionary 
economics, and which is widely accepted within organization studies, is the idea of 
organizational routines. organizational routines provide a way to open the ‘black box’ of 
the firm by addressing ‘ways of doing things’ within and across organizations.
Whereas organizational	 routines is primarily an economic concept, several parallels can be 
drawn between the economic concept of routines and the sociological and philosophical 
concept of (social)	practices. Yet, apart from a few recent exceptions (cf. feldman & orlikowski, 
2011; Jones & murphy, 2011), i have found only minor attempts to accomplish a dialogue 
between these two approaches. such a lack of dialogue may be a missed opportunity. 
Potential shortcomings of one approach might be revealed or even resolved by another, 
thereby enabling us to strengthen the initial concept. considering the fashion industry in 
particular, it seems worthwhile to combine the temporal dimension which appears to be 
prominent within the concept of routines, with spatial and social dimensions developed 
within the practice concept.
i therefore intend to contribute to such a dialogue by comparing two strands of literature 
that both deal with routinized practices, yet from different theoretical perspectives. the 
aim is to understand where these approaches differ and where they resemble each other, 
in order to decide what either of these concepts can contribute to understanding distant 
relationships between fashion design and manufacturing.
3.2 oRGaniZational RoUtines 
 
3.2.1  organiZational routines in economic geograPhY
the ways in which economic geographers have adopted the concept of organizational 
routines fit in with what has recently been called an ‘evolutionary turn’ – adding up to the 
‘cultural’, ‘institutional’, and ‘relational’ ones (coe, 2011; grabher, 2009) – and coheres with 
“an increasing tendency for economic geographers to employ ‘evolutionary’ metaphors, 
concepts and terminology – such as ‘learning’, ‘path dependence’, ‘selection’ and ‘novelty’ 
– in their writings” (martin & sunley, 2006: 396). 
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evolutionary economics is concerned with economic change and dynamics, and as such 
is oriented toward innovation as the main source of variation within and between firms 
(Boschma, frenken & lambooy, 2002). innovation in evolutionary economics is understood 
as change in organizational routines, primarily through selecting new ones and combining 
existing routines in novel ways. the source for this change is sought mainly in a changing 
environment that forces firms to adopt ‘fitter’ routines in their struggle for competition and 
survival. economic geographers have further developed these evolutionary theories of the 
economy by focusing on the spatialities of innovation and economic change (Boschma & 
martin, 2007). as Boschma and martin explain in their introduction to a special issue of 
the Journal	of	Economic	Geography, “the basic concern of evolutionary economic geography 
is with the	 processes	 by	 which	 the	 economic	 landscape	 –	 the	 spatial	 organization	 of	 economic	
production,	distribution	and	consumption	–	is	transformed	over	time” (Boschma & martin, 2007: 
539, emphasis in original). 
organizational routines are considered one of the main building blocks of the transformation 
of the economic landscape. this transformation is, however, treated in a somewhat narrow 
sense. economic geographers have been mainly interested in the spatial spread and 
distribution of (successful) organizational routines through processes such as selection, 
replication, imitation and inheritance (cf. Wenting, 2008). Within these often quantitative 
analyses, organizational routines are supposed to have explanatory value for the spatial 
evolution of specific industries in clusters or regions, based on data of the locations of firm 
entries, exits, spin-offs, mergers and acquisitions (cf. Boschma & Wenting, 2007). in this 
way, organizational routines are mainly treated as a given entity – a ‘black box’ – within 
firms. as such, they are part of economic geographers’ explanations for successful spin-
off firms or regional lock-ins (e.g. Boschma & frenken, 2006; Boschma & martin, 2007; 
essletzbichler & rigby, 2007; grabher, 2009; macKinnon, 2008; martin & sunley, 2006). 
such analyses of organizational routines within economic geography have indeed improved 
our understanding of economic development through spatiotemporal firm dynamics. 
however, organizational routines have been much less analysed as ways of organizing in 
spatially dispersed value chains, let alone their specific role in overcoming the frictions 
of distance. an understanding of the role of organizational routines within distanciated 
design-manufacturing relationships requires a more in-depth analysis of routines’ internal 
dynamics, which can be found outside the domain of geography.
When crossing disciplinary boundaries, we can find an immense variety of ways in 
which the concept of organizational routines has been conceived. rules, norms, skills, 
behaviour, memory, genes, and knowledge, to name a few, are all aspects that have been 
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considered as part of organizational routines. conceptual debates on the ontological 
status of organizational routines have been primarily held within organization studies. i 
therefore draw on these contributions to advance a deeper understanding of the nature of 
organizational routines.
3.2.2 What routines are
An	Evolutionary	Theory	of	Economic	Change (nelson & Winter, 1982) provides a highly influential 
contribution to evolutionary economic theories.	in their seminal work, nelson and Winter 
(1982: 14) propose that “all regular and predictable behavioural patterns of firms” are 
routine. this idea of regular	and	predictable	behavioural	patterns	 is often taken as a starting 
point for further conceptual and theoretical development (e.g. Becker, 2005; hales & tidd, 
2009). however, since nelson and Winter (1982: 97) themselves have used the concept “in a 
highly flexible way,” ranging from genes and organizational memory to truce and individual 
skills, the debates around organizational routines have led to very different outcomes. a 
particularly profound and inspiring discussion can be found in a 1996 paper in Industrial	and	
Corporate	Change, which presents the results of a workshop held at the santa fe institute in 
new mexico that “was devoted to exploring the difficulties and promise of current research 
on organizational routines and related concepts” (cohen et al., 1996: 653). 
one of the main discussions at the santa fe workshop still remains an important source of 
debate within current contributions (e.g. Becker, 2004; hodgson, 2003; 2008). it involves 
the question of whether organizational routines should be conceptualized as capacities and 
dispositions, the actual observable behaviour, or both. although no consensus was reached, 
cohen et al. (1996: 684) acknowledge “the duality of representation and expression,” as 
it is important to take into account that representations of routines (e.g. rules, standard 
operating procedures) are not identical to the observable “action patterns […] that occur 
when those representations are expressed” (1996: 672). 
acknowledging the difference and shifting the theoretical lens toward either one of these 
two aspects does not only have methodological implications (e.g. observation of actual 
behaviour requires labour-intensive and time-consuming ethnographic field studies), but 
also affects the quintessential question of what the concept of organizational routines 
can actually contribute to understanding economic phenomena. What is it in economic 
evolution that can be selected and inherited?  to quote Warglien (in: cohen et al., 1996: 
673-674) in this regard: “[W]hat is often reproduced is not the routine itself, but some kind 
of “coded knowledge” which usually implies a mix of linguistic representation, rules and 
artifacts.” the definition proposed by Burkhart in the same article reflects this tendency 
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to focus more on the capability than on the performance itself: “a routine is an executable 
capability for repeated performance in some context that been learned by an organization in 
response to selective	pressures” (in: cohen et al., 1996: 683, emphasis in original).
the santa fe workshop did not result in a clear-cut conceptualization of organizational 
routines, and the concept’s ambiguity continues to be an important source of debate. the 
focal point of more recent debates has shifted from what routines are to what routines do.
3.2.3 What routines do
hodgson (2003; 2008) has made a strong and convincing argument for treating 
organizational routines as dispositions or as “stored behavioural capacities or capabilities” 
(hodgson, 2008: 19). ontologically, according to hodgson (2008: 19), one term can never 
represent “both generative structures and outcomes of such structures”; it cannot “denote 
both potentiality and actuality” (ibid.). hodgson (2008: 15; 2009: 26) treats routines as 
dispositions and capacities, because they are “the organizational analogue of individual 
habits”; nelson and Winter (2002) do so in their later work as well. he argues that the 
routine – like the habit – does not cease to exist when it is not performed: “if we acquire 
a habit we do not necessarily use it all the time. it is a propensity to behave in a particular 
way in a particular class of situations” (hodgson, 2008: 16). hodgson (2008: 21) defines 
organizational routines as “organizational dispositions to energize conditional patterns 
of behaviour within an organized group of individuals, involving sequential responses to 
cues.”
an important advantage of hodgson’s (2008; 2009) way to conceptualize organizational 
routines is his emphasis on knowledge, skills, and memory as being carried by routines. 
after all, the propensity to behave in a certain way (e.g. to outsource manufacturing or not) 
depends on an actor’s knowledge and understanding of the situation and the potential 
effects of his behaviour. one comprehensive contribution to the role of knowledge is 
Becker’s 2004 article in Industrial	and	Corporate	Change. Becker (2004) draws attention to the 
ambiguity and inconsistency in the literature on organizational routines by providing an 
overview of this literature so far. While addressing both routines’ characteristics and their 
effects on organizations, he also draws explicit attention to “the fact that for some authors, 
the term ‘routines’ refers to cognitive regularities (rules) and for others, to behavioural 
patterns (recurrent interaction patterns)” (Becker, 2004: 663; see also Becker, 2005). 
While this gap between cognitive regularities and behavioural patterns is still present in 
current debates, Becker (2004: 645) emphasizes that both concepts involve regularities, 
albeit on different levels: “cognition and activity.” Based on his reading, Becker (2004) defines 
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the nature of organizational routines as recurrent, collective, processual, context- and path-
dependent, embedded, specific, and triggered. despite these common characteristics, 
however, there is still disagreement on whether these recurrent regularities (either on the 
level of cognition or activity) are mindless actions or “effortful accomplishments” (Pentland 
& rueter, 1994: 488).
this discussion is important to take into account because it is strongly related to what 
organizational routines do within and for organizations. organizational routines arguably 
resemble individual skills and habits and are, consequently, ‘a way of doing things’ 
within the organization (e.g. Becker, lazaric, nelson & Winter, 2005). this means that a 
great deal of tacit knowledge is involved. the knowledge that is embodied within these 
routines is also referred to as organizational memory and as such relieves people from the 
necessity of carefully deliberating over every single organizational decision. organizational 
routines reduce uncertainty (Becker, 2004). they store knowledge about what actions are 
appropriate in certain contexts and why, and how to react to specific challenges. moreover, 
routines enable coordination and control, economize on limited cognitive resources, 
and provide a certain degree of stability (Becker, 2004). together, these characteristics 
express the significance of organizational routines in understanding organizations, as the 
following quote from Becker’s introduction to the Handbook	of	Organizational	Routines	clearly 
summarizes: 
to understand routines is to understand organizations. routines are ubiquitous in 
organizations, and an integral part of organizations. one is hard put to identify an 
organization where no routines are present. a large part of the tasks carried out in 
organizations, such as manufacturing, marketing and selling goods and services, are 
accomplished in routinized ways. this is not only true for trivial operations, such as 
manufacturing, but also pervades processes such as decision making, strategizing 
or even change and innovation. organizational routines are the building blocks of 
organizations: they capture the typical ways in which organizations accomplish their 
tasks (Becker, 2008a: 3).
organizational routines thus hold promises for understanding organizational behaviour 
and organizational change. however, the conceptual disagreements, as discussed above, 
also present some challenges for how to study routines and how to interpret their actual 
effects on organizations. the differences between cognition and behaviour on the one 
hand, and between potentiality and actuality on the other, led Becker (2004: 664) to identify 
three different dimensions on which routines can and have been studied: “behavioural 
regularities, cognitive regularities and propensities” (Becker, 2004: 664). 
91
Becker (2004) further notices a gap between two streams of literature – conceptual and 
empirical oriented approaches. such a gap is also addressed in a recent literature review 
by Parmigiani and howard-grenville (2011). they compared two streams of work on 
organizational routines that base their arguments on the same foundations (such as nelson 
and Winter’s evolutionary theory) but emphasize different questions and levels of analysis:
the capabilities	perspective, grounded in organizational economics, views routines as a 
“black box”: it is mainly interested in what routines accomplish toward organizational 
goals. the practice	 perspective, grounded in organization theory, emphasizes the 
processes inside the “black box”: it focuses on how routines are enacted in the day-
to-day and with what consequences (Parmigiani & howard-grenville, 2011: 417, 
emphasis added).
By further unravelling the internal dynamics of organizational routines, the practice 
perspective thus enables a shift from what routines do to how they work.
3.2.4 hoW routines WorK
one of the most advanced contributions to the practice perspective of organizational 
routines emanates from a number of (co-authored) articles and book chapters published 
by Pentland and feldman. Based on extensive ethnographic field research, they have 
developed a comprehensive understanding of the relations between cognitive, behavioural, 
and material dimensions of organizational routines. 
drawing on latour’s (1986) distinction between society in	 principle	 (i.e. the ostensive 
definition)	and society in	practice	(i.e. the performative definition), Pentland and feldman 
(2005; 2008b; see also feldman & Pentland, 2003) conceptualized organizational routines 
as consisting of two mutually constitutive elements: ostensive and performative aspects of 
routines. the ostensive aspects refer to the organizational routines “in principle”: it “is 
the ideal or schematic form” or “the abstract, generalized idea of the routine” (feldman 
& Pentland, 2003: 101). the “specific actions, by specific people, in specific places and 
times” are part of the performative aspects or “the routine in practice” (ibid.). ostensive 
and performative aspects are mutually constitutive; the “abstract, cognitive regularities and 
expectations” both constrain and “enable participants to guide, account for and refer to 
specific performances of a routine”, while simultaneously these actual performances create 
and recreate the ostensive part of the routine (Pentland & feldman, 2008b: 286). 
as a third element in their conceptual model, various artefacts can represent, but also 
influence organizational routines in principle and/or practice (e.g. Pentland & feldman, 
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2008a). such artefacts can be indicators of either the ostensive or the performative aspect: 
they “are the physical manifestations of the organizational routine” (Pentland & feldman, 
2008b: 289). such artefacts can include written procedures, handbooks, manuals, job 
descriptions, or planning software, and play a role in institutionalizing organizations’ 
particular ways of working (cf. sunley et al., 2008). By focusing on the interactions between 
these different aspects of organizational routines, Pentland and feldman have been able to 
explain both stability and change:
We argue that the relationship between ostensive and performative aspects of 
routines creates an on-going opportunity for variation, selection, and retention of 
new practices and patterns of action within routines and allows routines to generate 
a wide range of outcomes, from apparent stability to considerable change (feldman 
& Pentland, 2003: 94).
the most important contribution feldman and Pentland (2003: 112) have made to the theory of 
organizational routines involves the idea that due to their “dual nature,” the internal dynamics 
of routines themselves can be sources of change. that is, change is often not the result of 
exogenous forces, but part of the routine itself (ibid.). in their definition, organizational 
routines are “generative systems” (Pentland & feldman, 2005; 2008b: 286) that produce 
“repetitive, recognizable pattern[s] of interdependent actions, involving multiple actors” 
(feldman & Pentland, 2003: 96). “organizational routines depend on the connections, the 
stitching together of multiple participants and their actions to form a pattern that people can 
recognize and talk about as a routine” (Pentland & feldman, 2005: 795).
as a consequence, the same organizational routine can be conceived and performed 
differently by its participants:
in particular, they are produced by many people with different information, preferences, 
and interpretation, they are enacted over time and space, and they interact with other 
streams of action in such a way that it is not always clear where one organizational 
routine ends and another begins. for these reasons, organizational routines always 
have the potential for change (feldman & Pentland, 2003: 115).
organizational change, consequently, cannot entirely be explained through the selection 
and combination of new routines; it is partly inherent in the practice of multiple 
interdependent actors. Becker et al. (2005: 776) adopted this argument about routines as 
sources of endogenous flexibility and change and perceive them as “periodically, or even 
almost always, in flux.” furthermore, routines’ collective nature raises questions about 
their firm-specific character. routines can transcend organizational boundaries and can 
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therefore be useful ways to understand both intra- and inter-firm relations. in this way, 
the practice perspective of organizational routines sheds new light on the question of 
how to conceptualize distance, as it touches upon the inherent spatiality of organizational 
routines. if routines make connections and create collective understandings (feldman & 
rafaeli, 2002), they may also be able to either shrink or widen the distance between globally 
dispersed organizations – such as those of the dutch fashion industry.
3.2.5 changing PersPectiVes
from the discussions so far, it appears that economic geographers have adopted 
a somewhat narrow definition of organizational routines. evolutionary economic 
geography’s approach to organizational routines approximates the capabilities perspective 
as described by Parmigiani and howard-grenville (2011). the spatialities of economic and 
organizational change through organizational routines are primarily understood as the 
spread and selection of (un)successful routines. Yet, the conceptual ambiguities discussed 
in organization studies show that different understandings of routine dynamics can lead 
to different explanations of economic change. conceptualizing organizational routines as 
either dispositions, behavioural patterns, or generative systems does not only involve far-
reaching empirical consequences, which i will further elaborate on in chapter 4. there is also 
an ontological claim to be made about what routines are. Particularly in light of Pentland 
and feldman’s theory, it appears that opening up the ‘black box’ of routines can enable us 
to shed a different light on how routines evolve, but also on how they might interact either 
within or between organizations (Parmigiani & howard-grenville, 2011 raised this issue as 
well). 
despite hodgson’s convincing argument that, ontologically, a concept cannot simultaneously 
refer to both potentiality and actuality, Pentland and feldman’s empirically sustained claim 
that representations and expressions mutually constitute each other in practice implies that 
they should be separated conceptually, but that they become meaningful in their relationship 
with each other. instead of selecting one aspect in favour of the other, Pentland and feldman 
argue for a more relational approach. this has steered me toward a different stream of 
economic geographies that seem to relate more to a practice-oriented understanding of 
the economy and which, at a closer look, are not necessarily inconsistent with evolutionary 
perspectives. drawing on theories of social practice, the next section provides an insight into 
such practice-oriented perspectives. the goal is to eventually enable a constructive dialogue 
with the above-reviewed conceptualizations of organizational routines.
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3.3 soCial pRaCtiCes
3.3.1 a VarietY of Practice theories
initially, when comparing organizational routines with social practices, it is tempting to 
argue that the first refer to organizations while the latter deal with society. drawing on a 
relational perspective, however, such a comparison does not hold if organizations are 
treated as outcomes of socio-economic practices (see for instance schatzki, 2005). in other 
words, organizations are no less social than society. conversely, society can be defined as a 
type of organization, as it is based on certain norms, rules, and customs, and is organized 
around a common goal (e.g. social (re)production). differentiating organizational routines 
from social practices on the basis of the distinction between organizations and societies 
would thus be a non-argument, as they are not fundamentally different from each other.
in his Theory	of	Social	Practices,	reckwitz (2002: 250; see also Wenger, 1998) demonstrates 
that all practices, in fact, are social, “as it is a ‘type’ of behaving and understanding that 
appears at different locales and at different points of time and is carried out by different 
body/minds.” depending on the context, authors have further referred to economic (e.g. 
Jones, 2008), knowledge (e.g. amin & cohendet, 2004), cultural (e.g. swidler, 2001), 
or spatial practices (e.g. lefebvre, 1974/1991). the range of literature that deals with 
practices in one way or another is immense, and does not provide an all-encompassing 
and consistent definition that covers all types of practices. for the purpose of this study, it 
would be unproductive to provide a comprehensive overview. i draw on others’ attempts to 
sketch the basic principles that most practice theories have in common. i will then focus on 
those approaches that seem most relevant to understand globalized industries through a 
practice-lens.
in addressing the theoretical attention to practices as a central concept within social theory 
and philosophy, rouse (2007) brings together a variety of practice-oriented perspectives; 
he reveals commonalities, as well as diversity and theoretical challenges. its diversity makes 
it particularly difficult to speak of “practice theory” in general, since “[p]ractices range from 
ephemeral doings to stable long-term patterns of activity” (rouse, 2007: 639). despite this 
diversity, many authors working on practices in one way or another refer to Wittgenstein’s 
later work on rule-following (i.e.	Philosophische	Untersuchungen) and heidegger’s early work 
on understanding and interpretation (i.e. Sein	und	Zeit) (cf. reckwitz, 2002; rouse, 2007; 
schatzki, 1996; turner, 1994). other influential contributions to contemporary practice 
theories include Bourdieu’s praxeology, giddens’ structuration	theory, and foucault’s works 
on discourse,	knowledge,	and	power. 
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While it is both impossible and beyond the scope of this study to do justice to the 
particularities and nuances of all these highly influential scholars, the general promise 
of practice concepts lies in understanding the world beyond binary conceptions such as 
society/individual, structure/agency, local/global. as such, they do more justice to the 
complexity of socio-economic phenomena. 
3.3.2 routiniZed Practices
although he presents it mainly as an alternative to three forms of cultural theories – culturalist 
mentalism, textualism, and intersubjectivism – reckwitz’s (2002) ‘routinized’ conception of 
practices seems to provide a valuable contribution to understanding organizations. in his 
definition,
[a] ‘practice’ […] is a routinized type of behaviour which consists of several elements, 
interconnected to one other: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, 
‘things’ and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-
how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge (reckwitz, 2002: 249).
reckwitz (2002: 251) argues that practices are both bodily and mental activities: “they 
necessarily imply certain routinized ways of understanding the world, of desiring something, 
of knowing how to do something,” and therefore presuppose “a collective, shared 
knowledge” (2002: 253). this routinization is central to understanding social structure and	
sources of change:
for practice theory, then, the ‘breaking’ and ‘shifting’ of structures must take place 
in everyday crises of routines, in constellations of interpretative interdeterminacy 
and of the inadequacy of knowledge with which the agent, carrying out a practice, is 
confronted in the face of a ‘situation’ (reckwitz, 2002: 255).
Practices are thus routinized, interconnected ways of behaving and understanding that 
are both constitutive of, and constituted by, social structures. schatzki (2005) takes this 
mutual constitution one step further by arguing that practices are enmeshed in material 
arrangements, thereby adding a spatial dimension to the concept of practice:
By practices, i mean organized human activities. examples are political practices, cooking 
practices, educational practices, management practices, shop floor practices, and design 
practices. any practice is an organized, open-ended spatial-temporal manifold of actions. the 
set of actions that composes a practice is organized by three phenomena: understandings of 
how to do things, rules, and teleoaffective structure (schatzki, 2005: 471).
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like reckwitz, schatzki (1996: 89) argues that practices are both about a way of doing 
and its understanding; “a temporally unfolding and spatially dispersed nexus of doings 
and sayings.” By practices’ “teleoaffective” structures, he means that all practices pursue 
certain ends, purposes, and beliefs (schatzki, 1996; 2005). 
schatzki’s conceptualization of practices is explicitly based on and inspired by his reading of 
Wittgenstein’s work which, he argues, provides insights into at least one trait that all practice 
theories share: “[t]he idea that practices are the site where understanding is structured 
and intelligibility articulated” (schatzki, 1996: 12). as spatio-temporal connections of 
doings, understandings, and things, the concept of practices seems a promising way of 
comprehending not only social structures, but organizational development as well. 
the theories discussed above focus not only on practices’ routinized nature, but draw 
explicit attention to the role of knowledge. in the words of gherardi (2000: 215) – who 
defines organizations as systems of practices – “practice is a system of activities in which 
knowing is not separate from doing.” this means that knowledge – which is generally 
assumed to be one of the main drivers of innovation in contemporary economies – is not 
understood as an asset that can be owned and shared, but as intimately linked with and 
part of a practice (see amin & cohendet, 2004 for the distinction between ‘possessed’ and 
‘practised’ knowledge). this has explicit consequences for understanding the spatialities of 
knowledge creation and transfer, which is central to understand the relationship between 
design and manufacturing at a distance.
3.3.3 sPatialiZed KnoWledge Practices
economic geographers continue to be highly interested in the relations between knowledge, 
innovation, and the spatialities of economic development (e.g. Bryson et al., 2000b). the 
relationships between knowledge formation and innovation are naturally linked to theories 
of learning, which is where we can find one of the most influential conceptualizations of 
practice in economic geographies: communities of Practice (coPs). this concept, developed 
by lave and Wenger (1991; Wenger 1998) as a social theory of learning emphasizes “the role 
of situated practice in the process of learning and knowledge generation” (amin & roberts, 
2008: 353). in this perspective, knowledge generation requires shared practices not only 
in the sense of people working together, but in mutual engagement, feelings of belonging 
and social participation (Wenger, 1998). coPs are defined as “groups of people who share 
a concern or a passion for something they do and learn how to do it better as they interact 
regularly” (Wenger, 2006: 1).
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coPs serve to emphasize teamwork, face-to-face interaction, negotiation, and coordination, 
since they are “relatively tight-knit groups of people who know each other and work together 
directly” (Brown & duguid, 2000b: 143). lave & Wenger’s (1991: 98) initial argument, 
however, states that communities of practice do not “imply necessarily co-presence, a well-
defined, identifiable group, or socially visible boundaries.” 
this means that we may also consider the dutch fashion industry as a community of practice 
that thrives on a shared labour market and a relatively small number of shared organizations 
such as art academies, fashion institutes and trade associations. moreover, it opens the way 
for connecting spatially separated practices, such as design and manufacturing, through 
mutual engagement and shared understandings. a crucial question for this study would 
then be whether dutch fashion firms create some form of communities of practice to 
connect design and manufacturing at a distance. 
a connection with different types of proximity (see section 3.1) is easily made, as the success 
of communities is found in enabling organizational and relational proximity due to “shared 
experience, expertise, and commitment to a joint enterprise” (gertler, 2003: 86). the 
question remains, then, whether such shared experience and expertise can be achieved 
between two spatially and organizationally separated practices that seem to rely on 
fundamentally distinct types of knowledge and skills. in the production of fashion garments, 
aesthetic, abstract ideas need to be transformed into physical, concrete products; aesthetic 
knowledge needs to be transformed into technical knowledge. 
since knowledge transformation in fashion production needs to be accomplished at a 
distance, practices could be the common frame of reference that connects designers with 
manufacturers; or the ‘thinkers’ with the ‘makers’ (schoenberger, 1997). the relevance of 
shared practices in this regard lies in the relation between knowing and doing: “in practice, 
so-called manual activity is not thoughtless, and mental activity is not disembodied” 
(Wenger, 1998: 48).
more specifically, by highlighting coPs’ social and negotiated character as well as their 
explicit and tacit dimensions, Wenger (1998: 47) argues against “traditional dichotomies 
that divide acting from knowing.” the concept of practice as developed within communities 
of Practice brings us back to the interrelations between knowing and doing – between 
cognitive and material activities – which might remind us of dewey’s and michael Polanyi’s 
ideas of “knowledge as an embodied practice” (amin & cohendet, 2004: 64). 
While shared practices seem to imply a certain closeness and proximity – and are often 
discussed at the level of regions – the spatiality of communities of Practice is not explicitly 
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defined within the concept itself (cf. coe & Bunnell, 2003). arguably, distant actors can be 
close to each other without being co-located, namely through shared practices. in this way, 
practices can provide an understanding of distanciated knowledge-sharing and creation, 
which is why i consider the concept of practices to be a useful unit of analysis for this study. 
a recent contribution within economic geography further encourages the development 
of practices as a unit of analysis for globally dispersed industries such as fashion. in 
a critical review of the concept of embeddedness, Jones (2008: 79) seeks “a better 
conceptual language for understanding transnational economic activity” and argues for the 
replacement of static entities such as firms and institutions – which he considers symptoms 
of economic action – with more dynamic concepts of practices and relational associations. 
Jones (2008) draws partly on recent developments in actor-network theory to argue for a 
practice-based understanding of economic development. in that understanding, practices 
are never purely economic, social, or cultural, and economic entities are conceived as 
outcomes of such collective practices (ibid.). in his 2008 article, practices are proposed in 
an explorative way to overcome the shortcomings of the concept of embeddedness within 
economic geography. in his more recent work together with murphy, Jones further develops 
the concept of practice as an “epistemological tool that can create conceptual space for the 
study of a wide range of socioeconomic and geographical phenomena” (Jones & murphy, 
2011: 366). Jones and murphy (2011: 367) define what they call “socioeconomic practices” 
as “the stabilized, routinized, or improvised social actions that constitute and reproduce 
economic space, and through and within which diverse actors […] and communities […] 
organize materials, produce, consume, and/or derive meaning from the economic world.”
one of Jones & murphy’s (2011: 382, emphasis added) contributions to the analysis 
of practice is their suggestion to demarcate practices “with respect to their intentions, 
consequences, and sociospatial	dimensions.” such a social, temporal, and spatial demarcation 
of practices by no means implies clear and static boundaries that are less fuzzy than those 
of firms and organizations. however, such an identification of intentions and regularities, 
as well as their temporal and spatial contexts, provides an analytical perspective that might 
enable economic geographers to “demonstrate how higher-order phenomena such as 
institutions, networks, class structures, and gender inequalities are enacted, reproduced, 
and/or transformed through the everyday actions embedded within them” (Jones & murphy, 
2011: 367). 
in terms of the current study, the focus on different dimensions of routinized and spatially 
dispersed practices can reveal how globally organized structures relate to these practices. 
this leads to the question: how are the global production networks of dutch fashion both 
99
constituted by and constitutive of distanciated creative and industrial practices?
it is important to note that Jones and murphy (2011) do not view a practice-oriented 
perspective as a completely new paradigm that breaks with existing institutional, cultural, 
evolutionary, or relational economic geographies. they rather consider a practice-oriented 
epistemology “as a constructive complement to existing theories” and hope for a continuing 
dialogue, for which their paper might be a starting point (Jones & murphy, 2011: 386). it is 
in this light that i intend to incorporate their insights into my own understanding of distant 
relationships between design and manufacturing practices and combine insights from 
theories of social practices with those of organizational routines.
3.3.4 maKing connections
drawing on the above definitions and explorations of the concepts of practices and routines, 
it should not come as a surprise that feldman, in a recent article authored with orlikowski 
(2011), explains how her research on organizational routines (see section 3.2) is highly 
informed by theories of social practice. in my view, it is remarkable that this publication 
is an exceptional case where the relationship between these two strands of literature is 
made explicit. in a critical evaluation of relational economic geographies, sunley (2008: 19) 
likewise advocates a combination of network and evolutionary approaches “to recognize the 
durability of economic habits and routines and to examine the consequent path dependence 
of institutional change.” 
in the next section, i aim to contribute to such a combined understanding. i bring together 
insights from organizational routines and social practices by addressing the ways in which 
both concepts explain and deal with the spatio-temporal organization of economic activity. 
i intend to develop a conceptualization of routinized practices that allows for an advanced 
understanding of the relationships between spatially separated yet interdependent business 
activities. 
3.4 oRGaniZational pRaCtiCes
in aiming to achieve a conceptual dialogue between the theories of organizational routines 
and social practices as discussed above, i adopt insights from both theories and propose 
the term organizational	practices to denote the main unit of analysis in this research. table 3.1 
summarizes this conceptual dialogue. 
it is important to note that by proposing the term organizational	practices, i do not aim to 
define a completely new concept that renders the concepts of organizational routines and 
social practices obsolete. instead, by using a contraction of the two terms, i emphasize the 
value of both strands of theories.
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Table	3.1:	A	conceptual	dialogue	between	organizational	routines	and	social	practices
to begin with, i adopt both organizational routines’ and social practices’ multifaceted 
conceptualization of knowledge. organizational routines have been conceptualized as 
context dependent repositories of knowledge and as the equivalent of individual habits 
and skills. they therefore involve tacit knowledge, which refers to knowledge that “defies 
codification and articulation” (gertler, 2004: 134). 
as i explained in chapter 2, by focusing on different types of knowledge and skills that 
are involved in the production of dutch fashion, i take up recent critiques on binary 
understandings of the tacit-codified dimensions of knowledge (e.g. allen, 2000; amin & 
cohendet, 2004; Bathelt et al., 2004; howells, 2000). for one thing, i agree with howells 
(2000: 53), who cites michael Polanyi, that “all knowledge is either	 tacit	 or	 rooted	 in	 tacit 
knowledge.” moreover, i agree with Weller (2007) and entwistle (2009) that fashion 
industries are pre-eminently a field in which other modalities or dimensions of knowledge 
play such a prominent role that the tacit-codified distinction does not suffice. 
the concepts of routines and practices both resemble and complement each other by placing 
knowledge within the performance of the routine or practice. Knowledge is not a ‘thing’ or a 
property, but is “residing across a range of actors, tools, objects and locations” (entwistle, 
 Organizational routines Social Practices Re-conceptualization 
Knowledge 
 
Routines are repositories 
of (tacit) knowledge, 
memory, and skills 
Knowledge as embodied 
practice 
Knowing is not separate from 
doing 
Practised as opposed to 
possessed knowledge 
CoP: knowledge generation 
requires shared practices 
Routines and practices 
resemble and complement 
each other by placing 
knowledge within 
performance  
The multifaceted nature of 
fashion knowledge includes 
aesthetic and technical, 
immaterial and material 
dimensions 
Space 
 
Evolution of economic 
landscape through 
distribution and replication 
of routines across space 
Practices constitute and 
(re)produce (economic) space 
Practices are enmeshed in 
material arrangements 
Routines and practices can 
constitute, reproduce, and 
overcome distance between 
design and manufacturing 
Time 
 
Routines are sources of 
stability and change 
Different levels on which 
change can occur 
Change inherent to 
routines or through 
selection mechanisms 
Practices range from 
ephemeral doings to stable 
long-term patterns of activity 
Acknowledge different levels 
of change and include other 
sources of permanence to 
understand organizational 
change in context of Dutch 
industry and global fashion 
system 
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2009: 108). the knowledge residing in routines and practices is of a collective and shared 
nature in which knowing is not separate from doing (e.g. reckwitz, 2002; gherardi, 2000). 
this fits in with amin and cohendet’s (2004) (also spatial) understanding of knowledge as a 
situated, embodied practice. We may even evoke sennett’s (2008: 9) idea of craftsmanship, 
which involves “the intimate connection between hand and head” or “a dialogue between 
concrete practices and thinking.”  
thus both organizational routines and social practices argue for a multi-faceted account 
of knowledge – involving cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions – and	for an integrated 
understanding of knowledge and action. in my research i aim to reveal how different 
types of knowledge that are physically and/or organizationally separated (e.g. aesthetic 
and manufacturing knowledge) relate to each other, how they manifest themselves in 
creative and industrial routines and practices, and how distance plays a role within these 
relationships. 
in a paper discussing the conceptual differences between relational and evolutionary 
economic geography, hassink and Klaerding (2009: 2) argue that both paradigms perceive 
“space as being socially constructed instead of a pre-given entity with causal powers.” 
however, the spatial dimension of organizational routines as conceived by evolutionary 
economic geographers seems ‘confined’ to the distribution of routines through space (and 
time). as a consequence, the spatiality of routines themselves is not explored as such. 
the spatiality of organizational routines has mainly been conceived in terms of replication 
and distribution. this means that the spatial question within evolutionary economic 
geography addresses identical or similar routines as they are performed by different – either 
proximate or distant – organizations. regarding the spatial organization of the fashion 
industry, however, we are dealing with the question of how different types of knowledge are 
translated over distance through organizational routines and practices (cf. aspers, 2010b). 
We hence have to consider the spatial dimensions of routines and practices themselves. 
since organizational routines and practices are performed by multiple interconnected 
actors – as feldman and Pentland, for instance, have explained extensively – they are 
embodied, inherently spatial and not fixed in space. organizational routines and practices 
can extend across organizational and physical boundaries. this spatial dimension appears 
to have gained more attention within practice theories, for instance in schatzki’s (2005) 
‘material arrangements’ and ‘spatio-temporal manifolds of actions’, as well as in Jones and 
murphy’s (2011) socio-spatial dimensions and their conceptualization of economic space as 
constituted and reproduced by socioeconomic practices. 
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it is in this spatial dimension that the concept of practices can offer a more enhanced 
understanding of how the frictions of distance can be overcome. While organizational 
routines and evolutionary economic geographies have enhanced our understanding of 
the economic landscape as evolving through the spatio-temporal distribution of routines 
between firms, practice theories and relational economic geographies further elaborate on 
how practices make space, and translate distanciated and embodied knowledges. in my re-
conceptualization of organizational practices, i therefore adopt the spatial dimension of 
practices as suggested by Jones and murphy; it allows for an understanding of practices to 
transcend organizational and spatial boundaries. 
finally, i draw on Pentland and feldman’s conceptualization of organizational routines 
to differentiate between representations, performances and artefacts, to understand 
both organizational change and stability. organizational routines are not only a source 
of competitive advantage, but provide stability and are an important source of rigidity. 
similar to institutions, norms, and rules, organizational routines are one way to explain 
why firms operating in a particular environment are unable or struggle to adapt to changing 
conditions. at the same time, organizational routines can explain organizational change 
and innovation. Yet, how exactly change is accomplished remains a source of debate among 
different perspectives on organizational routines. at one end of the spectrum, theorists 
argue that change arises out of selection mechanisms, while the routines themselves remain 
largely the same. at the other end, it is argued that change originates in the performance of 
routines. in a similar vein, practice theories differ in terms of the degree of permanence they 
ascribe to practices; some of them explicitly speak of routinized	practices. 
it seems reasonable to argue that there are simply different levels on which change can 
occur (e.g. cohen et al., 1996; Pentland & feldman, 2008b). a practice or routine might 
be called differently (cf. product development or product management), but still entail the 
same actions and responsibilities. or the apparently same function (e.g. design) might 
change through its performance, even though it is still referred to as design. Pentland 
and feldman’s distinction between representations and performances is an important 
contribution that enables us to account for such different levels of change.
in addition to the question of what it is exactly that changes or remains the same within 
organizational routines and practices, an important aspect to consider is routines/
practices’ collective nature (which is indeed closely related to the spatialities discussed 
above). this collectivity refers to the fact that organizational routines and practices 
are performed by multiple actors; they are not individual habits. What makes both the 
concepts of organizational routines and practices particularly interesting is that they 
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provide an analytical and observable unit at the level of the organization, while promising 
explanations on a larger scale – i.e. the industry. as a concept of order, organizational 
routines and practices are taken for granted ‘ways of doing things’ not only within individual 
organizations but also among a ‘field’ of organizations. Both intra- and inter-firm practices 
can thus help to “identify, interpret, and explain the dynamic nature of the relationships 
that shape production and retailing activities, knowledge transfer and learning processes, 
value chains and global production networks, and industrial clusters” (Jones & murphy, 
2011: 375).
this also means that routines and practices do not emerge or develop within a vacuum. the 
sources of rigidity are not only to be found within the routines and practices themselves; 
there are other ‘permanences’ (harvey, 1996) to take into account. two approaches in 
particular are worthwhile to take into consideration. first, following schoenberger (1997), 
corporate culture provides a potential explanation for why certain routines or practices 
are considered appropriate within the organization or not.  in her view, “culture is about 
what we do and how we do it” (schoenberger, 1997: 120) and involves “practices, relations, 
and ideas [that] are mutually constitutive” (1997: 123). second, beyond the organization, 
gertler (2004: 7) has made a convincing argument for the role of institutions by exploring 
the “institutional framing of industrial practices”:
[t]he internal and interfirm organization of production, the technologies employed, and 
the usable industrial knowledge underpinning these practices are shown to be strongly 
shaped by their social and institutional context. the collection of industrial practices we 
observe in any one country or region may indeed resemble distinctive, recognizable, 
stable constellations that we often characterize as ‘industrial cultures’. [...] [t]hese 
routine forms of behaviour are not simply inherited from past practice, according to 
some mysterious and inexplicable process. instead, they are shaped and constrained – 
though not wholly determined – by a set of institutions that govern the way that work 
is organized, workers are trained and deployed, industrial relations are structured, and 
technology is implemented (gertler, 2004: 5)
gertler relates organizational practices and routines to an institutional context that, to some 
extent, shapes the practices in question. Wenting (2008: 33) takes a similar position by 
recognizing “that we cannot see organizational routines as separate from the institutional 
environment in which they were formed.” this implies that institutional differences can 
partly account for different national ways of organizing if we consider institutions’ spatial 
(i.e. national) dimensions. We may even consider the fashion system as a globally dispersed 
institution that involves a particular set of rules and conventions, such as its two-seasonal, 
cyclic structure, as explained in chapter 2. this enables us to interpret the results of the 
3
104
following case studies both within the context of the dutch fashion industry and within the 
global fashion system, as organizational practices are arguably affected by these different 
levels of institutions.
organizational practices are thus (re-)conceptualized as routinized, collective, and partly 
taken-for-granted ways of organizing that both shape and are affected by social, material, 
and institutional arrangements.
3.5 ConClUdinG ReMaRKs
in this chapter i have brought together the concepts of organizational routines and social 
practices in order to develop an analytical framework for a practice-oriented understanding 
of the spatially fragmented organization of the dutch fashion industry. the literature is 
diverse, partly overlapping and sometimes contradictory. in bringing some of the main 
arguments together, i have opted for a dialogue between different strands of literature in 
order to develop a useful framework for my study. 
Based on a combination of evolutionary, institutional, and relational economic geographies, 
i have developed the argument that:
1) distance between design and manufacturing needs to be understood in a multi-
faceted, relational way; 
2) the globally dispersed organization of fashion production requires the translation 
of different types of knowledge at a distance;
3) shared practices and routines are assumed to have the potential to overcome the 
frictions of distance;
4) this ability is due to the assumption that knowledge resides in these routines 
and practices and that due to their collective nature, routines and practices can 
transcend organizational and spatial boundaries; and
5) sources of stability and change are found both within practices and routines and in 
the institutional environments that partly shape these practices.
By combining insights from organizational routines and social practices, i have proposed 
organizational	 practices	 as my main unit of analysis to emphasize a practice-oriented 
understanding of organizational development. Based on the assumption that organizational 
practices have the capacity to overcome the frictions of distance by providing a form of 
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relational proximity, in this study i examine to what extent this is the case in dutch fashion 
brands’ organization of production – and if so, how this interaction over distance works. in 
the next chapter, i discuss the design of this study and the methodological implications that 
my perspective on organizational practices brings about.
3
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ChapteR 4 
|  research design and      
 methodologY
more methods talk, we hope, will enable new kinds of conversations and new 
practices.
tickell et al. (2007: xv)
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“methods matter.” that is the main message that Barnes, Peck, sheppard and tickell (2007: 
3) convey in their introductory chapter to Politics	and	Practice	in	Economic	Geography. although 
it may seem a rather drastic statement to depict economic geography as methodologically 
opaque, i agree with their plea for methodological reflexivity and transparency, in order 
to allow for “an enriched and ‘thicker’ disciplinary conversation, in which research 
practices and processes are taken seriously” (Barnes et al., 2007: 23). reflecting on and 
being explicit about the questions that guide our research – descriptions, explanations, 
and understandings (cf. massey & meegan, 1985) – and the resulting methodological 
implications and limitations, are key in establishing and demonstrating ‘rigour’ (Baxter & 
eyles, 1997; James, 2006) in our research accounts. this concerns not only conventional 
criteria of validity, reliability, and objectivity, but in particular within qualitative studies 
the requirement to take into account principles of academic integrity and trustworthiness 
(Baxter & eyles, 1997).  
in this chapter, i reflect on my research practice in order to provide the required transparency 
that allows for methodological and conceptual evaluation, and to stimulate both inter- and 
intra-disciplinary debate on how research on fashion industries can or should be practised. 
i first elaborate on the development of my research aims and questions that i introduced 
in chapter 1, as these are the product of continuous reflection and re-evaluation of aims, 
theories, concepts, and methods. next, i explain how and why a research design based on 
case studies provides a useful methodology for this study. finally, in discussing my methods 
for data collection and analysis, i reflect on both the prospects and limitations of using 
interviews for understanding organizational practices. this allows me to not only explain 
my research process, but to also reflect on the implications of my particular methods and 
methodology for my final results.
Before proceeding to my methodological reflection, it needs to be emphasized that the 
research process by no means has been a linear undertaking that logically leads from 
questions a and B to results c and d. doing research is an iterative practice that requires a 
constant back-and-forth between questions, theories, methods, and data. in a lecture on 
what	methods	do, mol (2009) even argued that in order to establish a reflexive methodology, 
the methodological chapter of a dissertation can never be chapter 1: “methods need 
to be invented [and adapted] along the way while struggling with the object”; in other 
words, the methodology needs to be “tailor-made.” likewise, my theoretical concepts 
and methodologies have developed and evolved throughout the research process. still, i 
consider it important to explain the research process before elaborating on my empirical 
analyses and results, as it may help the reader to understand the choices that led to these 
results. 
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4.1 fRoM identitY to oRGaniZational pRaCtiCes
in the previous three chapters, i developed a conceptual and theoretical framework that 
guides my empirical exploration of how dutch fashion brands deal with distanciated 
relationships between design and manufacturing. this framework, including the concept 
of organizational practices, is the result of an iterative process in search of a way to study 
dutch fashion production in a globalized market. in order to achieve the above advocated 
transparency and reflexivity, i shall reflect on this process and demonstrate how my 
research questions were shaped and sharpened in conjunction with certain theoretical and 
epistemological claims and assumptions, conceptual and methodological implications and 
challenges, and within a particular political and academic context. 
as explained in chapter 1, my study is part of a larger research project within the Cultural	
Dynamics	 programme funded by the national research council nWo (the netherlands 
organization for scientific research). Cultural	Dynamics, part of nWo’s humanities division, 
aims at the study of cultural heritage, including customs, rituals, and cultural expressions 
such as stories, fashion, and photography. consequently, the research project Dutch	Fashion	
Identity	in	a	Globalized	World	aims at understanding the cultural and economic roots of dutch 
fashion and the construction of identities by consumers, designers, and fashion firms. While 
the project is clearly embedded in the humanities, the bringing together of researchers 
from different disciplines highlights its ambition to gain a multifaceted understanding of 
the phenomenon of dutch fashion.
from a geographical perspective, my contribution to this project lies in understanding 
dutch fashion within the context of an increasingly globalized and spatially fragmented 
industrial organization. i intended to relate the globalization of dutch fashion industry’s 
particular organization of production – i.e. the disappearance of manufacturing firms in the 
netherlands in the second half of the twentieth century – to the development of a distinct 
fashion identity, as studied by my fellow Phd researchers. 
however, as we have seen in chapter 1, Dutch	 fashion	 identity as a concept is filled with 
ambiguity; it is a ‘fuzzy concept’ (markusen, 1999). this simply means that it lacks conceptual 
clarity, which makes it difficult to operationalize and even more difficult to observe and 
produce relevant and valid data on the subject. although i would not go as far as Brubaker 
& cooper (2000) to argue that, due to its ambiguity, the concept of identity can better be 
replaced by alternative terms, they do make an interestingly strong case for conceptual 
clarity. the concept of identity has come to mean too many different – and contradicting – 
things: 
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it is used to highlight non-instrumental modes of action; to focus on self-understanding 
rather than  self-interest; to designate sameness across persons or sameness over 
time; to capture allegedly core, foundational aspects of selfhood; to deny that such 
core, foundational aspects exist; to highlight the processual, interactive development 
of solidarity and collective self-understanding; and to stress the fragmented quality 
of the contemporary experience of ``self,’’a self unstably patched together through 
shards of discourse and contingently ``activated’’ in differing contexts (Brubaker & 
cooper, 2000: 8). 
of course, ‘fuzziness’ alone should not be a reason to abandon a concept, since clarifying 
and sharpening a concept can be an important research aim in and of itself. Within our 
research team, we have therefore spent dozens of meetings and hours of discussions to 
explore how Dutch	fashion	identity	can be conceptualized and how it can be studied. apart 
from our disciplinary debates regarding the levels of permanence and fluidity of identity, it 
is especially the relationship between national, fashion,	and identity	that proved problematic 
for the current study. identity construction takes place at different levels, from the individual 
to the national and maybe even the global. But the larger and more diverse the group of 
people that is supposed to share a sense of commonality that can be defined as identity, the 
more difficult it becomes to indicate where identity construction actually takes place. such 
groups become imagined	communities (anderson, 1983). 
We have come to specify different aspects of the concept of national fashion identity by 
including particular sites of identity construction, such as brand identities, consumer 
identities, identities as performance, and identity construction in narratives (cf. Bruggeman, 
2014; feitsma, 2014; Von maltzahn, 2013). this is by no means an exhaustive list, but it 
illustrates the complexity and multifaceted nature of the concept of fashion identity. this 
complexity can be found on the conceptual level, but also in relation to specific methods and 
methodologies: are we looking for dress behaviour, stereotypes, visual aspects of fashion 
designs shared by dutch brands and designers, attitudes and beliefs of what counts as Dutch	
fashion, or reception of dutch brands and designers abroad? each one of these aspects can 
be relevant and thus a potential subject for research – some of which our research team 
has covered. as the research progressed, i gradually came to understand the concept of 
fashion in its specific industrial context and, as a result, the concept of identity became 
less prominent; i became more concerned with dutch fashion industry’s organization of 
production as such.
during the first year of my study, i immersed myself in the widespread literature on global 
commodity chains, value chains, and production networks, while simultaneously studying 
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dutch policy reports, specialist journals, and newspapers to gain a deeper understanding 
of how dutch fashion industry had developed since the 1960s, and how such industrial 
change can be conceptualized. from this literature review, which resulted in chapters 1 and 
2, i came to understand the history of the dutch fashion industry as marked by a certain 
qualitative change that goes beyond conventional economic performance measures such as 
gross margins, turnover, or employment rates. the change in the industry’s organization of 
production did indeed change the nature of dutch fashion. it therefore seemed productive 
to aim at defining what actually changed due to dutch fashion industry’s deindustrialization. 
i decided to concentrate on the particularities of dutch fashion industry’s organizational 
changes and to focus on what actually changed once dutch fashion firms ceased to make 
garments themselves in the 1960s and 1970s. 
drawing on the vast body of literature on global commodity/value chains and production 
networks, i gradually realized that if i intended to go beyond the sheer mapping of dutch 
fashion industry’s chains and networks20, and to make a fruitful contribution to these 
theories, it would require much more work than an individual Western european Phd 
researcher with limited financial means can achieve. as coe et al. have demonstrated, it is 
especially in 
the empirical	sphere that most needs to be done if the concept [i.e. global production 
networks] is to be more than an interesting abstraction. We need carefully designed 
and constructed but essentially grounded research into the entire structure of gPns. 
this implies that a ‘lone researcher’ approach will not get us very far. the very nature 
of gPns – their organizational complexity, their multi-actor composition, their spatial 
extent and geographical diversity – necessitates multi-national team research (coe et 
al., 2008b: 290, emphasis in original).
as shown in chapter 2, these concepts of chains and networks provided an initial theoretical 
framework upon which to conceptually explore the complexities of dutch fashion industry 
within a globalized context. furthermore, the concept of global production networks 
channelled my research toward a more relational perspective of dutch fashion industry’s 
globalized organization, which “emphasizes the role of human agency and the ongoing 
formation of networks that produce empirical outcomes” (dicken et al., 2001: 105). instead 
20  Which unexpectedly appeared an entire challenge in and of itself, due to a general reluctance within 
the industry to reveal (good) suppliers. i would welcome the chance to devote one of my future 
research projects to execute a network analysis and reveal and visualize the complex ties of the 
globalized dutch fashion industry in its entirety.
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of only reconstructing the observable, structural outcomes of dutch fashion industry’s 
deindustrialization, my aim became to understand how these networks actually work. 
Because the focus on relations has significant consequences for my methods of data 
collection and analysis, some explanation is required here regarding the theoretical 
foundations of relational approaches in economic geography. since the 1980s, economic 
geography has gone through a number of so-called cultural, institutional, and relational 
‘turns’ (e.g. Barnes et al., 2007; cf. amin & thrift, 2000; Boggs & rantisi, 2003), involving 
readjustments, in the words of grabher (2009: 120), of the subdiscipline’s “paradigmatic 
coordinates.” these ‘turns’ not only broadened economic geography’s theoretical 
perspectives, but simultaneously entailed an increasing use of qualitative methods to 
understand socio-economic phenomena. 
case study research – including a wide range of qualitative methods and methodologies 
such as in-depth interviews, ethnography, discourse analysis, participant observation, 
oral histories, and focus groups – have gained a respectable position within economic 
geographers’ research practices (Barnes et al., 2007; crang, 2002). Yet, this increased 
attention to social, institutional and cultural dimensions of economic phenomena and 
the associated – often uncontested – preference for qualitative research methods and 
methodologies, has been criticized for its “ambiguity, fuzziness, and vagueness”, typified by 
“thin empirical description” (martin & sunley, 2001: 154-155; see also markusen, 1999). in 
response to the abovementioned call for more transparency and methodological reflexivity, 
i shall explain why i think qualitative methods and methodologies are appropriate within 
the context of my research aims. 
according to Yeung, relational economic geographies
focus on the complex nexus of relations among actors and structures that effect 
dynamic changes in the spatial organization of economic activities, [and are thus] 
concerned primarily with the ways in which socio-spatial relations of actors are 
intertwined with broader structures and processes of economic change at various 
geographical scales (Yeung, 2005: 37).
considering the globalized organization of the dutch fashion industry and the increased 
interconnectedness of economic actors that incorporates it, a relational perspective offers 
an analytical lens that goes beyond the structural mapping of firms and their production 
networks. in terms of dutch fashion’s deindustrialization, the most prominent outcome of 
this industrial change seems to be an increased distanciation between design and aesthetic 
development in the netherlands, and manufacturing and industrial development abroad. 
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as i came to understand fashion production as both aesthetic and industrial development 
(see chapter 2), it became clear that focusing on the relationship between design and 
manufacturing would be crucial in exploring the qualitative outcomes of dutch fashion 
industry’s globalized organization. 
my central aim thus became to understand the production of dutch fashion within the 
context of an increasingly globalized and spatially fragmented industrial organization 
since the 1960s. Fashion	production	is understood as a process of knowledge transformation 
in which aesthetic ideas are translated into physical garments (see chapter 2). this implies 
a certain interconnectedness between design and manufacturing. Spatial	 fragmentation	
of the industry refers to an increasing distance between design and manufacturing as a 
consequence of relocation and outsourcing practices of dutch fashion firms since the 1960s. 
the main research question is therefore: 
How	is	Dutch	fashion	production	affected	by	growing	distance	between	design	and	manufacturing?
the question remains, then, how to conceptualize and operationalize such distanciated 
relations in order to develop appropriate methods for data collection and analysis. 
as explained in chapter 3, i have found such conceptualizations in practice-oriented 
understandings of the economy that view firms, structures, and networks as the outcomes 
of socio-economic practices: “such an approach replaces the static conception of entities 
(firms, institutions, regional clusters) with concepts generated around the dynamic 
practices and relational associations that constitute action and produce	these entities” (Jones, 
2008: 73).
to be clear, i do not mean to claim that structures, firms, and other economic entities do 
not exist or are irrelevant for a thorough understanding of socio-economic and spatial 
developments. rather, in accordance with practice-based approaches and relational 
economic geographies, i propose to shift the analytical lens toward concrete actions, 
practices, and performances in order to understand the (re)production of more abstract 
structures (cf. hudson, 2005). 
this leads me to the following set of sub-questions:
# How	are	design	and	manufacturing	related	in	the	production	of	fashion?
first, it is required to gain a comprehensive understanding of the process of 
fashion production and the specific roles of design and manufacturing within the 
process. this is primarily a theoretical exploration, which i discussed in chapter 2, 
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and which i will further specify within the case studies. it addresses the questions 
of what  types of knowledge and skills are involved; how these types of knowledge 
and skills depend on, inform, and influence each other; and how design ideas are 
translated into physical garments.
# To	what	extent	does	distance	affect	the	relationship	between	design	and	manufacturing?
secondly, we need to understand the concept of distance: does it matter at all, and 
if so how? What types of distance matter in the relationship between design and 
manufacturing? and how can the frictions of distance be overcome?
# How	do	Dutch	fashion	brands	organize	the	relationship	between	design	and	manufacturing	
at	a	distance?
Based on the assumption that organizational practices can enhance knowledge 
(trans)formation at a distance (see chapter 3), organizational practices are then 
studied to explore how dutch fashion brands deal with such distance. Which 
organizational practices are dominant in determining the relationship between 
design and manufacturing? Which (new) organizational practices are pursued to 
overcome the frictions of distance? to what extent do design-related organizational 
practices (need to) change due to increased distance? and, to what extent are 
shared practices between brand and manufacturers created to overcome the 
frictions of distance?
in the previous chapter, i defined organizational	 practices as my main unit of analysis to 
understand the spatially fragmented organization of the dutch fashion industry. in the next 
sections, i explain the design of this study and elaborate on the methodological implications 
of its practice-oriented approach.
4.2  Case stUdY desiGn
my empirical research starts from the observation that dutch fashion industry’s development 
during the last 50 years has been shaped by increasing distance between design and 
manufacturing, as more and more fashion firms have relocated or outsourced manufacturing 
abroad. i aim to understand the effects of distance between design and manufacturing 
practices based on the assumption that they manifest themselves in the relationship between 
these practices. i intend to explore how design and manufacturing relate to each other; how 
aesthetic and technical aspects of the fashion business influence and depend on each other, 
and how distance affects this relation. in other words: what happens to this relationship 
once design and manufacturing become spatially and/or organizationally separated? how 
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do dutch fashion firms organize this relationship at a distance? 
to gain such in-depth understanding of organizational practices and the qualitative nature 
of relationships between these practices, a certain closeness to real-life situations (or ‘being 
there’ in the words of gertler, 2003; 2004) is called for. this allows researchers to develop 
context-dependent knowledge of particular studied realities (flyvbjerg, 2006). a case study 
design can provide such a way of understanding, as it “is especially well suited to produce 
[concrete, context-dependent] knowledge” (flyvbjerg, 2006: 223). case studies draw 
attention to the unique, the specific, “the particularity and complexity of [...] its activity 
within important circumstances” (stake, 1995: xi). as such, they are not primarily aimed at 
providing generalizable accounts. 
as i explained in chapters 1 and 2, there is no universal way of outsourcing practice within 
the dutch fashion industry. instead, there are various hybrid forms of organizing production 
abroad within the complex constellations of dutch fashion’s global production networks. 
i therefore assume that organizational practices also differ considerably from firm to 
firm. considering the aim of understanding organizational practices, the diversity and 
complexity of organizational structures in dutch fashion, and the practical limitations of 
conducting research, i have chosen to focus on a limited number of specific cases rather 
than giving a general analysis of the dutch fashion industry in its entirety. i thus pursue an 
explorative approach in which i intend to provide a nuanced and in-depth understanding of 
how fashion brands deal with the apparent distance between design and manufacturing – 
and what this actually means for the organization of dutch fashion design and production. 
Before turning to the process of case selection, i want to address the issue of generalizability 
in case study research (cf. markusen, 1999). traditionally, generalizability in the social 
sciences refers to the degree to which a sample in a quantitative study is statistically 
representative: the results of the sample are thus generalizable to the entire population. for 
a sample to be representative, it needs to have a certain size and cases need to be selected 
randomly. Both criteria are almost never met in case study research, which is often based on 
a single or limited number of theoretically informed cases. however, criteria for evaluating 
quantitative research are not necessarily transferable on a one-to-one basis to criteria for 
the evaluation of qualitative analyses. Baxter and eyles (1997: 515, drawing on lincoln & 
guba, 1985), for instance, argue for qualitative researchers to strive for transferability,	
which – analogous to the traditional term of generalizability – refers to the degree to 
which “elements of research produced in one context may be transferred to others.” Being 
reflexive and transparent about one’s methodology can enhance transferability, as it allows 
other researchers to move beyond the specific cases studied. more importantly, i agree with 
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BOX 4.1: The Grand SeiGneur
the grand seigneur is an annual award that has been established in 1984 by the association 
for the dutch fashion fair (Vereniging nederlandse modebeurs) and is considered the 
highest award for the fashion industry in the netherlands (costin & grotenhuis, 1989; 
Vnm, 1987). initially, the award aimed at supporting individual performances in the fashion 
and clothing industry; persons who for a considerable amount of time had positively 
contributed to the dutch fashion world in the broadest sense of the word (ibid.). gradually, 
the aim of the grand seigneur has been redefined to include individuals or	organizations 
in the netherlands that have shown long-term contribution to the fashion sense or 
fashion consciousness of the dutch public, thereby focusing more on the awareness of the 
consumer. since 2001 modint – the dutch trade association of manufacturers, importers, 
agents, and wholesalers of clothing, fashion accessories, carpet and (interior) textiles – has 
taken over the award.
Between 1984 and 2013, the grand seigneur has been awarded to the following fashion 
professionals, firms, and institutions:
1984 cecile Kanteman (fashion counsellor and marketer)
1985 günther frank (colour specialist)
1986 Jacques van gils (menswear)
1987 cora Kemperman/mac & maggie (retail)
1988 louki Boin/avenue (fashion journalism)
1989 marieke and Willem olsthoorn/oilily (children’s wear)
1990 Bros. Van den Kommer/agu sport (sports and cycling fashion)
1991 hans de Vries (allround)
1992 arnold van geuns and clemens raemeckers/ravage (design and styling)
1993 John de greef (journalist and lecturer)
1994 Piet Zoomers (retail)
BOX 4.1 cOnTinued
1995 hennes & mauritz (retail)
1996 Jan Jansen (shoe designer)
1997 arie Vervelde (fashion illustrator)
1998* Jan van Born/claudia sträter (retail)
2002 marjan Wigger/turnover (womenswear)
2003 lidewij edelkoort (trendwatcher)
2004 rattan chadha/mexx (women’s/men’s/children’s wear)
2005  marlies dekkers (lingerie)
2006 Jos van tilburg/g-star (jeans wear)
2008 Piet Paris (fashion illustrator)
2009 Viktor horsting and rolf snoeren/Viktor & rolf (high fashion designers)
2010 inez van lamsweerde and Vinoodh matadin (fashion photographers)
2011 arteZ institute of the arts (fashion academy)
2012 fiona hering (fashion journalist)
2013 han Bekke (chairman modint)
2014 Jan taminiau (high fashion designer)
*awarded in 2001
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stake, who explains that
[t]he real business of case study is particularization, not generalization. We take a 
particular case and come to know it well, not primarily as to how it is different from 
others but what it is, what it does. there is emphasis on uniqueness, and that implies 
knowledge of others that the case is different from, but the first emphasis is on 
understanding the case itself (stake, 1995: 8).
although results of case study research are not meant to be representative and generalizable, 
they do in fact produce valuable knowledge that contributes to more general theory 
development. insights from different case studies can challenge or question existing theories 
or raise new questions for the study of a phenomenon that has been under-researched so 
far. the point is that case study research starts from a specific issue or phenomenon that 
we wish to understand, while generalizing its results is not the primary aim. i therefore also 
concur with flyvbjerg (2006: 227): “that knowledge cannot be formally generalized does 
not mean that it cannot enter into the collective process of knowledge accumulation in a 
given field or in a society.” as long as we provide sufficient evidence for the relevance of the 
case and the trustworthiness of our results, it is up to other researchers to give their own 
interpretation and possibly transfer it to other cases as well. 
Part of the quality of a case study design thus depends on the way in which the cases are 
selected. i conceive of cases not just as given entities that are randomly selected, but as made 
(cf. ragin, 1992) in accordance to theoretical assumptions and specific research questions 
(Platt, 1992). ‘What is this research subject a case of?’ is indeed a relevant question to ask 
but “may not be known until after most of the empirical part of the project is completed” 
(ragin, 1992: 8-9). the scope and nature of a case develops throughout the research 
process as key actors are identified, concepts are refined, and questions are sharpened. 
this means that in the practice of doing research, it is not uncommon to “adapt and adjust 
our methodological practices in view of changing research contexts” (Yeung, 2003: 446). 
cases should first and foremost be selected with the aim to maximize the intended learning 
effect: “[W]hich cases are likely to lead us to understandings, to assertions, perhaps even 
to modifying of generalizations?” while taking into account which cases are attainable 
considering the researcher’s time and access for fieldwork (stake, 1995: 4). correspondingly, 
my selection of case studies has been guided by theoretical and conceptual arguments on 
the one hand, while being subject to practical limitations on the other; i shall address both 
in more detail below.
Based on my research aims and questions, my literature reviews, and the wider context of 
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my study as part of the research project on dutch fashion identity, i defined a number of 
basic criteria that potential cases had to meet in order to be considered for inclusion. this 
resulted in the selection of four dutch fashion brands – oilily, mexx, ¯ coraKemperman, and 
Van gils – which are summarized in table 4.1 at the end of this section. in the following, i 
explain how this selection of case studies has been achieved.
1. dutch fashion
first of all, the cases had to be part of the dutch fashion industry. firms that were set up 
and continued to have their headquarters in the netherlands were considered as dutch. 
Whereas this was a relatively straightforward criterion, a related but less unambiguous 
element was the relevance of the case for understanding the particularities of dutch 
fashion or dutch fashion identity. the question of which cases are representative 
and thus considered key to understanding dutch fashion was approached differently 
among the members of our research team. for instance, all four cases in my research 
(see table 4.1) are positioned within the mid- to higher mid-market segment, whereas 
a different theoretical approach might ask for cases of high fashion designers as well. it 
is therefore important to acknowledge that my case studies do not represent the entire 
range of dutch fashion, and that it is indeed possible to add numerous other cases to 
cover more elements of dutch fashion. 
nonetheless, all four case firms played a significant role in dutch fashion industry’s 
history at some point in time. Van gils and oilily are mentioned in almost every historical 
overview of the dutch fashion industry as pioneers in terms of both outsourcing and 
marketing strategies. mexx can be considered as one of the first truly multinational 
dutch fashion brands and was one of the biggest fashion firms in the netherlands. 
¯coraKemperman is the current outcome of a new development in retailing in the 
1970s, when Peek & cloppenburg started a subsidiary to provide affordable high-
end fashion for youth. moreover, all four cases include one or more people who have 
acquired a Grand	Seigneur,	the highest award of the dutch fashion industry (see box 4.1)
2. relocation and/or outsourcing of manufacturing
since the aim of my study is to understand the effects of distance between design and 
manufacturing, it was required that all cases in some way were confronted with the 
issue of relocation and/or outsourcing of manufacturing. this is the main reason why 
high fashion designers were not part of my study, as they compete in a different market 
where cheap labour is considered less important and outsourcing less pervasive. 
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furthermore, i strove for a certain variety in types of organization, in order to study 
relationships between design and manufacturing in different organizational contexts. i 
aimed to include, for instance, both former manufacturers that developed into brands 
and outsourced manufacturing (i.e. oilily and Van gils), and brands that never owned 
any production facilities from the start (i.e. mexx and ¯coraKemperman). 
the issue of relocation and outsourcing also had implications for the cases’ boundaries. 
if understanding relationships between design and manufacturing in globalized 
organizations is the aim, limiting cases to single firms would not be a valid strategy 
for demarcation. my focus is on practices and relationships that take place in certain 
organizational contexts and thus in specific firms at specific times and places, but they 
are not confined to them. i needed a flexible way of demarcation that would guide, yet 
not obstruct, my perspective. 
in today’s ‘economy of signs’ (lash & urry, 1994), brands have become one of the main 
principles of organizing (cf. lury, 2004), especially in fashion (cf. Weller, 2004). i thus 
decided to focus on specific brands as a starting point. Yet, the eventual scope of the 
cases developed along the way as i included people, firms, and other economic actors 
whenever they appeared relevant for the case and accessible for research. in the case 
of ¯coraKemperman, for instance, it turned out that Kemperman had developed a 
specific way of styling as a buyer for mac & maggie in the 1970s and 1980s, which is 
why retailer Peek & cloppenburg and its subsidiary mac & maggie were added to this 
case study. likewise, in the case of Van gils, menswear manufacturer the makers was 
included, as the brand’s manufacturing heritage appeared to have a significant role in 
this company’s organizational practice.
3. firm age and organizational change
in order to draw comparisons between different types of firms as well as over a longer 
period of time, another criterion for case selection involved the period of time a brand 
or firm had existed and the type of organizational development it had gone through. 
this criterion is related to the previous one concerning outsourcing, as it allows for 
an explicit focus on what exactly changes in the relationship between design and 
manufacturing when the latter is being hived off. 
since outsourcing and relocation of manufacturing started in the 1960s, i aimed to 
select cases that cover most of the period between the 1960s and the first decade of 
the twenty-first century. this is another reason why most of my case studies consist of 
more than one firm. Van gils started right after World War ii. oilily started in the mid-
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1960s and mexx and ¯coraKemperman both have their origins in the 1970s. in all four 
cases, however, brands and firms had to deal with bankruptcies or takeovers at some 
point in history, and none of the organizations maintained its form for more than three 
decades. 
4. accessibility
the final criterion for selection pertains to accessibility (cf. crang & cook, 2007). cases 
had to be accessible in the sense of availability of (historical) information and the 
willingness to cooperate of people involved. regarding the selection process, i did not 
generate a random sample; i aimed for empirically rich cases. i utilized professional 
networking site LinkedIn	to trace (former) employees through their past careers and i 
used the snow-ball method to gradually identify and approach key actors. 
due to inevitable time constraints and issues concerning accessibility, i ended up with four 
case studies. i started on some cases – i.e. collected background information and planned 
or conducted first interviews – which i had to cancel as they reached a dead end (i.e. marlies 
dekkers, Van Winkel fashion, Vanilia, Veldhovengroup). in most of these cases, although 
people were in principle interested in contributing to the research project, their available 
time was often too limited to provide a rich case for the current study. to some extent, this 
seemed related to certain organizational changes and resultant uncertainties that these 
firms were dealing with at the moment of inquiry, which coincided with a strong economic 
crisis. internal reorganizations are always time-consuming and external inquiries for an 
academic study are then given lower priority. 
as a case in point, marlies dekkers went bankrupt in august 2013, which indicates that the 
company had more demanding issues to deal with than cooperating with an independent 
Phd researcher. Vanilia – a case that would have provided an interesting example of a brand 
with its own manufacturing plant – has invested considerable time and effort to contribute 
to the research of Von maltzahn (2013), which may explain why contribution to my study 
was more difficult. furthermore, g-star did not become a case because the brand refused 
cooperation altogether. 
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Table	4.1:	Overview	of	case	studies
from the selection of case studies, in the next section i turn to my main unit of analysis: 
organizational practices.
4.3 hoW to ReVeal What is beinG taKen foR GRanted?
i have conceptualized organizational practices as routinized, interconnected ways of 
behaving and understanding within and across organizations. Basically, they are ‘a way of 
doing things’ and, as such, embody a considerable amount of tacit knowledge. since they 
constitute the guiding principle in my study of design-manufacturing relationships in the 
dutch fashion industry, appropriate methods to identify and understand organizational 
practices are required. methodological challenges regarding the study of different types 
of organizational and social practices and routines have been explored by a number of 
organizational and social scientists. these concern the identification of relevant practices 
with respect to the research aim, demarcation of practices’ boundaries, and interpretation 
of their meanings for explaining the socio-economic phenomena in question (cf. Jones & 
murphy, 2011). 
in each case study, i started by researching the entire process of fashion production from 
first sketch to final product, and selected and elaborated on specific practices that appeared 
significant for connecting or disconnecting design and manufacturing. depending on 
the type of organization, different practices appeared to play a more or less prominent 
role. it could be the design practice in itself, but it could also be product development, 
pattern making, buying, and so forth. throughout the fieldwork, certain practices gained 
significance over others, as they contributed more to understanding design-manufacturing 
relationships. 
 Oilily Mexx Cora Kemperman Van Gils 
Product types Children/ women/ 
lifestyle 
Men/ women/ 
children/ lifestyle 
Women Men/ lifestyle 
Start of business 
[brand name] 
1963 [1980] 1970 [1986] 1976 [1995] 1946 [1980] 
Grand Seigneur Willem & Marieke 
Olsthoorn [1989] 
Rattan Chadha 
[2004] 
Cora Kemperman 
[1987] 
Jacques van Gils 
[1986] 
Main change in 
organization of 
production 
Manufacturer  
brand  licenser 
Own production 
centre  buying 
agency  
independent 
suppliers 
Buying  co-
designing/ 
development/ styling 
Branded 
manufacturer  
separate brand 
and manufacturer 
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the issue of demarcation is related to organizational practices’ collective nature. as Pentland 
& feldman (2005) demonstrated in their research on organizational routines, it is difficult 
to define the boundaries of a routine: where does a routine start and end in terms of time, 
actors, and actions involved? this challenge is not confined to academics as being outsiders, 
but involves the routine participants as well. multiple actors carry multiple perspectives, 
and all of them provide “only a partial representation of the true scope and complexity of 
the routine” (Pentland & feldman, 2008b: 296). the fact that organizational routines and 
practices “involve more than one person in more than one interaction” (feldman & rafaeli, 
2002: 311) makes them particularly difficult to observe and identify.
adding to this difficulty of demarcation and identification, the ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of 
organizational practices renders their plausible interpretation even more difficult; people 
are not always conscious of what they are doing and the reasons for doing it. to ideally 
understand how complex and context-dependent organizational practices work requires 
intensive, in-depth ethnographic fieldwork such as participant observation. 
Within the limitations of a Phd project and the high costs that go into such methods (see 
for instance cohen et al., 1996), in my case it was also a matter of accessibility. due to a 
combination of time constraints and fear of competition, fashion firms are not eager to let 
outsiders look behind the scenes. as aspers (2010a: 96) has also experienced in his research 
on branded garment retailers, the design process especially is “shrouded in secrecy”. 
clearly, asking commercial enterprises for permission to observe their daily routines and 
then write about them requires an immense amount of trust, mutual understanding and 
shared interests – which i, being an academic outsider, was not always able to successfully 
create.21 Yet, being ‘too close’ to the researched practice, or becoming part of the practice 
yourself, also entails the risk of losing academic objectivity. an academic researcher will 
therefore always need to be close enough to the research subject to understand it (cf. 
entwistle, 2009), yet distant enough to keep an open and critical mind and draw unbiased 
conclusions. 
in view of these constraints and challenges, i had to find ways of ‘getting at’ the kind of 
knowledge i was looking for (latham, 2003). if i cannot observe practices directly, i logically 
have to ask people what they do. Yet, to what extent are people able to talk about their 
mostly taken-for-granted practices (cf. hitchings, 2012)? interviews can only give a partial 
account, as “narratives produced through the reflections and memories of the corporate 
21  in this context, i must express my special gratitude to the time and interest Ben van gils has given me, 
as he allowed me to visit his factory in tangier, and the effort cora Kemperman has put into providing 
me with reports and notes from her personal archive.
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actors themselves are not necessarily	the best representations of the business practices in 
which the researcher is interested” (hughes, 1999: 365, referring to useem, 1995). if you 
ask an experienced driver to explain what actions he/she subsequently performs when 
driving, the answer would probably resemble something like “start the motor, put it in first 
gear, and ‘drive’”. But with this kind of knowledge alone, no one would be able to drive 
for himself. What does ‘drive’ really involve? it is a complex set of partly simultaneously 
performed actions that one learns mostly by doing. although in principle it is possible to 
codify this knowledge and describe it in great detail, this is not what experienced drivers 
do, because they do not need to think about the distinct actions anymore. they just do it.
the methodological question, then, is how to elicit narratives about practices that are being 
taken for granted. Practices and routines – and the principles guiding them – are taken for 
granted only by those who are part of the routines themselves. to use the words of latour:
[e]ven the most routine, traditional, and silent implements stop being taken for 
granted when they are approached by users rendered ignorant and clumsy by distance 
– distance in time as in archaeology, distance in space as in ethnology, distance in 
skills as in learning (latour, 2005: 80).
although latour (2005: 79) here is discussing objects and not practices in relation to how 
we can “make them talk”, his argument can be easily transferred to the experience of a 
‘stranger’ or ‘outsider’ who is entering a new area, trying to make sense of what people are 
doing and why they are doing it. this is obviously what ethnographic field research is about. 
in this case it would entail me as the ‘researcher’ or ‘academic’, entering the organization 
and observing and inquiring about work practices. 
another moment when practices might stop being taken for granted is when they stop 
being useful or successful, when problems arise that cannot be solved by existing practices 
anymore, or when people are being confronted with alternatives – in other words, when 
people have to think about what they are doing. this need for explication may be created 
by the organizational context itself (e.g. increased competition, bankruptcy, expansion) or 
by the researcher. We can find an example of the latter in ambrosini & Bowman’s Mapping	
Successful	Organizational	Routines	(2002). through a causal mapping system, they managed 
to elicit what they called ‘tacit routines’ by asking for stories about what causes success 
in the studied organization. from these stories, ambrosini & Bowman (2002) were able 
to articulate knowledge that used to be tacit for (some) organizational members. this 
assumes that, in principle, it is possible to make tacit knowledge (more) explicit. likewise, 
czarniawska considers interviews a useful way to elicit narratives of taken-for-granted 
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practices:
a research interview is a staged situation where, by mutual consent, the recognition 
of a given behavior as ‘routine and common sense’ is suspended. the researchers 
play the role of ‘foreigners’ or ‘visitors from another planet’, whereas the practitioners 
agree to explain their behavior as if it were not routine and commonsensical, thus 
making it into ‘action’ (czarniawska, 2004: 54).
if we accept that sometimes “interviews are [...] the ‘closest’ we can get to our research 
subjects and their corporate worlds” (hughes, 1999: 365), it is important to understand 
what kind of knowledge we can derive from such methods. regarding organizational 
practices, it is useful to take into account Pentland and feldman’s (2008b: 286) conceptual 
distinction between the narratives about the routine and “actual performances by specific 
people, at specific times, in specific places.” By using interviews, i automatically focused 
primarily on narratives: the “abstract, cognitive regularities and expectations that enable 
participants to guide, account for and refer to specific performances of a routine” (Pentland 
& feldman, 2008b: 286). 
furthermore, i have studied any available artefacts as “physical manifestations” or 
“indicators” (Pentland & feldman, 2008b: 289) of organizational practices, as they are 
often the only thing left when trying to understand practices of the past. the following quote 
by Warglien nicely illustrates the value of focusing on artefacts or representations instead of 
observing actual performances:
Patterns of action and their diffusion are hardly trackable and measurable over long-
term horizons, while at least some kind of representations are usually recorded 
in organizational archives. they may not tell us all the story about routines, but 
like fossil evidence, they supply important cues for understanding organizational 
evolution [...]. this point is further reinforced if we embrace the point of view that 
representations (like artifacts), rather than expressions, are what actually get 
reproduced in organizational processes – in this case, representations might not 
be just a convenient substitute for closer observations of actual behaviors, but 
rather a more appropriate object of observation (in: cohen et al., 1996: 682).
the artefacts that i studied include written procedures of buying practices, annual schedules, 
personal notes, e-mail communications between buyer and suppliers, minutes of a buyers’ 
meeting, manufacturing instructions, country-of-origin lists, organization charts, size 
specifications, company profiles, reorganization plans, annual reports, vacancies and 
job descriptions. additionally, whenever i had an interview arrangement at a particular 
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workplace, i often had the opportunity to take a look around and observe the environment 
in which certain – mostly creative – practices take place. moreover, as part of the Van gils 
case study, i spent one week in tangier, morocco, to visit one of the makers’ production 
units and get an on-site experience of the factory’s organizational practices. 
4.4 CondUCtinG inteRVieWs to UndeRstand    
 oRGaniZational pRaCtiCes
as the main part of my empirical data consists of interview transcripts, i will discuss this 
method in more detail. to evaluate and reflect on my specific methods of data collection 
and analysis, i apply the criteria of credibility, dependability, and confirmability, in 
addition to the already-discussed criterion of transferability. these are considered feasible, 
qualitative alternatives for the conventional criteria of validity, reliability, objectivity, and 
generalizability in mostly quantitative studies (Baxter & eyles, 1997; crang & cook, 2007). 
Based on the assumption that there is no one true reality to be discovered by the researcher, 
in qualitative research it is argued that “interpretations are more credible if they are 
meaningful for both academia and the group studied” (Baxter & eyles, 1997: 515). hence, 
the notion of credibility “refers to the connection between the experiences of groups 
and the concepts which the social scientist uses to recreate and simplify them through 
interpretation” (Baxter & eyles, 1997: 512). 
next, dependability refers to “the researcher-as-instrument and the degree to which 
interpretation is made in a consistent manner” (Baxter & eyles, 1997: 517). it is closely 
related to credibility and concerns the plausibility of accounts. the ways in which researchers 
account for their own biases, motivations, and interests as they affect interpretations and 
decisions throughout the research process is covered by the principle of confirmability (ibid.). 
in the following, i explain how i have planned, conducted, and analysed my interviews, and 
i simultaneously reflect on and explain the strategies i used to enhance the credibility, 
dependability, and confirmability of this study.
first of all, in accordance with Kvale (2007: 21), i consider interviews as a “construction site 
of knowledge”; thus “literally an inter-view, an inter-change of views between two persons 
conversing about a common theme” (ibid.; see also crang & cook, 2007). this means that 
i, the researcher and interviewer, consider myself as having an active and reflexive role in 
the process of knowledge construction (cf. cloke et al., 2004). rather than conducting 
interviews to gain neutral information by means of standardized questions, i opted for 
a more flexible approach that allowed for discussion, and let questions unfold as they 
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appeared relevant throughout the conversation (cf. schoenberger, 1991). 
i interviewed a total of 66 people, which resulted in 67 interviews, taking into account 
some people who were interviewed more than once and some interviews that involved two 
people at the same time. most of the interviews were conducted face-to-face, except for 
three telephone interviews and two interviews that took place via e-mail conversations. 
the interviews varied in length from 30 minutes to almost three hours. the majority of the 
interviews were conducted in 2010 and 2011. 
as aforementioned, i drew on social media and snowball methods to identify and approach 
potential interviewees. in order to find people who had the highest potential to enhance 
my understanding of organizational practices in terms of relations between design and 
manufacturing, it was important to get beyond the level of corporate	image as represented 
by the public relations department. at marlies dekkers, for instance, it appeared extremely 
difficult to bypass the public relations department and speak directly with people actually 
involved in the practices of design and manufacturing. this shows how the company tries to 
retain strict control over the kind of information being published. it is also one of the main 
reasons why this proposed case study had to be left out. 
in order to gain multiple perspectives on how the relationship between design and 
manufacturing actually worked, for each case study i aimed for a diverse group of 
interviewees who worked at different stages in the design and production of fashion. again, 
LinkedIn turned out an important instrument in this regard, as it enabled me to identify not 
only people currently working at the companies of the case studies in question, but also 
former employees who were important for understanding past practices and organizational 
change. of the 66 interviewees, 13 fulfilled higher management functions such as ceos and 
cfos, 13 were designers or creative consultants, 10 worked in the field of production and 
supply chain management, and 17 worked in-between the creative and technical side of the 
fashion industry as product developers or buyers. also, 2 pattern makers, 3 agents, and 4 
marketing and sales professionals were part of my selection. finally, 4 interviewees were 
not affiliated directly with a fashion firm but are highly knowledgeable about the industry, 
due to their work as independent researchers or as managers in related organizations such 
as trade associations.22
22  this categorization of interviewees’ functions is less straightforward than it may appear. head 
designers, for instance, are often also managing director and the distinction between design, product 
development, and production is not always clear-cut. i have based this categorization on the foci of 
the interviews, the ways in which interviewees presented themselves, and the elements of their career 
that appeared most prominent in their stories.
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the selection of interviewees included people who were not directly related to any of my case 
studies. Particularly during the early stages of this research, i conducted interviews with 
professionals in the broad field of (dutch) fashion production in order to get accustomed to 
the industry-specific vocabulary and to provisionally determine (aspects of ) organizational 
practices that pertain to the relation between design and manufacturing. throughout my 
research, i also approached professionals with specific expertise who are knowledgeable in 
a particular field that appeared significant, such as pattern making. i also selected people 
with longstanding careers within the dutch fashion industry who could provide me with an 
overview of the industry’s development and helped me put the cases into a wider perspective. 
these types of interviews helped to enhance both the credibility and transferability of my 
study. furthermore, a considerable number of my interviews contributed to more than one 
case study, as many people have worked for different brands or firms at different stages in 
their careers (cf. figure 4.1).  
Figure	4.1:	Career	paths	of	interviewees
this last point is methodologically interesting, because it allowed for a way of data-
triangulation; the practices of different firms could be compared within the interviews 
themselves. at the same time, the fact that many people have worked for several brands 
Mexx 
Oilily 
Van Gils 
Mac & Maggie 
The Makers 
Tommy Hilfiger 
Nike 
Cora Kemperman 
Veldhoven 
Vanilia 
McGregor 
Jurk/X-As 
G-Star 
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is conceptually interesting. it gives insight into the ways in which knowledge and practices 
can move within and across firms through labour mobility. mexx, for instance, turned out to 
be an important learning environment, as almost one-third of my interviewees had worked 
for this brand at some point in their careers.
as i opted for a flexible approach, i did not work with standardized questions. i used a semi-
structured interview guide containing a list of questions and topics that could be easily 
adjusted to the specific functions of the interviewees and	the ways in which the interviews 
worked out in practice. interviews with ceos, for instance, focused more on questions 
of strategic decision-making, while questions for product developers were much more 
targeted at detailed descriptions of daily work practices. 
the primary aim of the interviews was to unravel the organizational practices that define the 
relationship between design and manufacturing. the main part of each interview therefore 
consisted of encouraging the respondent to take me step by step through his/her daily 
work practices. as my knowledge of such organizational practices gradually increased with 
each interview, the nature of the interviews changed from exploration and identification 
of relevant practices, to demarcation and finally interpretation of these organizational 
practices’ roles. the focus of my interviews gradually narrowed from the entire production 
process to specific organizational practices. in this way – within the limitations of time and 
accessibility – i strived for theoretical saturation in deciding how many interviews were 
required to analyse and understand the organizational practices in question.
throughout the conversations, i aimed to differentiate between higher levels of abstraction 
– ‘this is how it is supposed to work’ or ‘this is how the fashion industry works’ – and the 
level of personal experience – ‘this is what i do’ – but people differed considerably in their 
ability or willingness to explain their practices. What turned out to be exceptionally helpful – 
albeit by mere coincidence – was simultaneously interviewing two people who work closely 
together. through their interaction, it became much clearer how different practices relate to 
each other, which brought me a little bit closer to an actual work situation. moreover, it was 
a way of enhancing the credibility of my accounts, as people in discussion also corrected 
each other and openly questioned each other’s ideas.
concerning my interview practice, understanding what kinds of strategies and questions 
work or do not work in what kinds of situations is something one needs to learn through 
experience. interviewing is, as Kvale (2007: Preface) said, “a craft, which is learned through 
practising.” it takes some time to acquire the right kind of vocabulary to constructively 
talk to people within a certain type of business. as schoenberger (1991: 183) explains in 
4
130
her discussion of the corporate	 interview,	“[t]he accuracy and validity of both open-ended 
interviews and standardized surveys depend on knowing how the respondents use language 
and what they mean by the way they use it.” i acquired this kind of understanding along the 
way, as i became accustomed to how people working in the dutch fashion industry talk 
about and reflect on their business. 
acquiring such a vocabulary is important, because it is related to unequal power relations, 
as addressed by several studies on so-called elite	interviewing	(e.g. morris, 2009; richards, 
1996; smith, 2006). elite interviewing refers to the situation “in which the [power] balance 
is in favour of the respondent” (Burnham et al., 2004 cited in morris, 2009: 209) due to his 
corporate, political, or societal position, or to his particular expertise. this is important, 
because it “can lead to additional challenges in gaining access and the respondents’ 
tendency to seek to control the agenda” (ibid; see also rice, 2009 who documents similar 
challenges in interviewing retailers and senior planners). the issues concerning accessibility 
that i discussed earlier can, to a large extent, be understood within this context of elites. the 
main point is that interviewees can have their own (hidden) agendas, which may not only 
influence whether or not they are willing to participate in the research project in the first 
place, but also what kind of information they will share. 
in his research on financial markets, clark (1998) identified several roles that interviewees 
can adopt over the course of an interview; these can range from friendly and cooperative to 
hostile or extraordinarily devious. regarding the confirmability of my research, i therefore 
have to acknowledge that there is always the possibility that my role as interviewer and 
how i relate to the interviewees in some way or another affect my interpretations of their 
accounts. it is, for example, sometimes difficult to discriminate between a sympathetic	
personality	and a credible	account.	
furthermore, the location where the interview is conducted can have an impact on what 
kind of information is shared or not. i deliberately chose to let the interviewees decide 
where the conversation would take place. as a result, some of the interviews were held in 
a more professional environment, which often allowed me to have a glance at where the 
organizational practices in question actually took place. other interviews were conducted 
in a more private setting, e.g. at people’s homes, or in a public place like a grand café or 
hotel lobby. these settings might have encouraged people to speak more openly about their 
opinions and beliefs, as they are then less inclined to represent a particular firm or brand. 
in order to leave my personal interests and predispositions out of the analysis as much as 
possible, and to enhance both dependability and confirmability of my accounts, i recorded 
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and fully transcribed all except nine face-to-face interviews, to enable a more critical 
analysis later on. one of the nine non-recorded interviewees did not want me to record the 
conversation. in the other eight cases it was my own decision to leave the memo recorder 
out of sight, because the situation did not allow for such an approach – either because it felt 
inappropriate or it would hamper the flow of the conversation.
finally, in order to make sense of the large amount of unstructured qualitative data, 
i used the Qsr nVivo software to digitally organize, structure, and prepare the data for 
analysis. this enabled me to store different types of data (i.e. audio, transcripts, pictures, 
documents) and classify and recollect them in the ways that were useful for my analysis. in 
this way, i have produced a valuable archive that i will store and keep available for checks 
and future research opportunities. however, as the nature of the data does not allow for full 
anonymization, i cannot provide these data for open access. 
my methods for working through the interview material come close to what Kvale (2007) 
has termed theoretical	reading. it basically involves a continuous and theoretically reflected 
reading and re-reading in order to derive “an extensive and theoretically reflected 
knowledge of the subject matter” (Kvale, 2007: 117). since i was interested in practices of 
design and manufacturing and their relationship over distance, my analysis both aimed 
at what these practices actually entailed and at identifying the moments where distance 
between them somehow influenced their relationship. this means that i tried to understand 
specific organizational practices in specific organizational structures and contexts. 
unfortunately, due to an often-encountered unavailability or inaccessibility of company 
archives, i recurrently had to rely on interviewees’ possibly unreliable, selective, and partial 
memories to reconstruct organizational histories (cf. schoenberger, 1997). i thus used 
interviews not only to construct knowledge of organizational practices, but i also had to use 
them more informatively when documentary sources were unavailable. as a consequence, 
it was often a difficult task to ‘get the story right’, because personal memories frequently 
contradicted each other. to increase the credibility of my accounts, i applied some form of 
member	checking (Baxter & eyles, 1997; crang & cook, 2007); to see whether respondents 
agreed with my conclusions, i sent a concept version of each case study to the respective 
director, or another knowledgeable and influential senior manager, for revision. this enabled 
me to verify the facts, while simultaneously receiving some feedback on my concepts and 
ideas and checking the plausibility of my accounts. 
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the feedback i received from respondents was mainly positive and complimentary.23  their 
comments resulted in only minor adjustments of the original texts. these adjustments were 
due to either contradictory accounts of interviewees concerning such things as travelling 
times or number of suppliers – indicating how memory is always selective and partial – or to 
the fact that interviewees left out parts of the story because i did not specifically ask about 
them – which points to the taken-for-grantedness of organizational practices. overall, 
respondents could relate to and identify themselves with my conclusions, which enhances 
both credibility and confirmability of my accounts. 
4.5 ConClUdinG ReMaRKs
[t]heories and methods are protocols for modes of questioning or interacting 
which also produce	realities as they interact with other kinds of interactions. this 
means that we are not	saying that reality is arbitrary. [...] instead, it is that the 
real is produced in thoroughly non-arbitrary ways, in dense and extended sets of 
relations. it is produced with considerable effort, and it is much easier to produce 
some realities than others.
John law and John Urry (2004: 395-396) 
the aim of this chapter was to reflect on the choices i made with regard to the design and 
methodologies of this study. i explained how my research aims and questions gradually evolved 
in conjunction with my theoretical and conceptual explorations. i have further introduced the 
case studies that form my empirical research and explained how my methods of conducting 
interviews serve to gain an understanding of organizational practices. 
in the following four chapters, i present the results of my case studies. in order to stay as close 
to the studied reality as possible, i have included verbatim quotations from my interviews 
to illustrate, clarify, and develop my arguments. as there were some interviewees who 
requested full confidentiality, i decided to only insert anonymized interview references. in the 
few instances where i do refer to the actual name of a respondent, it is either a quote from 
a published source, or it turned out to be both impossible and unnecessary to exclude the 
respondent’s name. for instance, when paraphrasing the head designer of ¯ coraKemperman, 
it is clear that the quote refers to cora Kemperman.
as i have further explained in this chapter, the case studies unfolded throughout the research. 
this means that different types of organizational practices are emphasized in each case study. 
the main goal is always, however, to understand changing practices in view of changing 
23  i have received feedback for all case studies except oilily. this is highly understandable, because my 
request for feedback coincided with the unfortunate event of marieke olsthoorn passing away.
constellations of global production networks. thus, the following four chapters are similarly 
structured. after introducing the brand’s position within the dutch fashion industry, i start 
every case with as comprehensive a description as possible of how the organization of 
production has changed in terms of outsourcing and/or relocation of manufacturing; i.e. its 
organizational structure. then i focus on those particular practices that help to understand 
the distanciated relations between design and manufacturing; i.e. organizational practices. 
i conclude with an analysis of how particular organizational practices facilitate or limit the 
brand in organizing the relationship between design and manufacturing at a distance.
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tiMeline 
1961 olsthoorn’s Konfektie: Willem olsthoorn starts a business in housecoats
1963 collection extended with children’s coats
1966 marieke olsthoorn starts designing children’s wear for olly’s
1973 organizational growth: increase of creative team
1977 graphic designer Jean Philipse joins the company
1978 takeover of production facility c&a
1980 launch of brand name oilily
deCeMbeR 5, 1980 banKRUptCY
1981 restart oilily b.V.
1983 first oilily magazine
1986 first womenswear collection
1992 nico Verhey becomes head designer women
1999 Withdrawal marieke olsthoorn
2003 aBn amro Participates and h2 equity Partners acquire controlling interest.
 Withdrawal Willem olsthoorn; various changes of management follow
apRil 6, 2009 banKRUptCY
2009 restart oilily World
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ChapteR 5 
|  oililY’s (un)limited creatiVitY
      from manufacturing firm to lifestyle brand
the dutch fashion house oilily has been a hallmark for creativity in the cupboard 
of children and women since 1963. Virtuoso combinations of color, mixes of 
cultural influences, humorous details, unexpected combinations of unusual 
materials and very high quality has brought oilily a large number of fans that 
include michael Jackson, John travolta, lauren hill, uma thurman, Julia roberts, 
madonna and the obamas.
oilily World b.V. (2012a)
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the 1960s marked the beginning of an industry of dutch fashion brands that succeeded in 
sweeping through the international market with their own distinctive styles (teunissen, 2006). 
oilily, like Van gils, is acknowledged as one of the first dutch fashion brands originating in the 
1960s and 1970s that would experience its heyday in the 1980s with the emergence of commercial 
branding (Kornaat, 1992; teunissen, 2006). the history of oilily is a story of successful 
entrepreneurs who introduced new approaches to children’s wear, marketing, and lifestyle 
branding, both in the netherlands and abroad. in addition to the brand’s acclaimed unique and 
innovative aesthetic signature, oilily can thus be considered to have had a significant role in the 
history of dutch fashion.
What makes oilily interesting for this study in particular is its organizational transformation from a 
manufacturing firm to a lifestyle brand. considering the company’s nearly fifty years of existence 
– albeit in different organizational constellations and brand names – oilily’s development can 
be well understood as part of dutch fashion’s history and industrial change. With origins in 
the manufacturing and sales of children’s clothes in the 1960s, oilily has experienced different 
stages of outsourcing from the 1980s onward. this organizational transformation makes it an 
exemplary case study of the dutch fashion industry’s gradual shift from a production-led to a 
brand- and design-led industry, as described in chapter 1.
as a case study of increased outsourcing of manufacturing functions, oilily can help us to 
understand the effects of distanciation between design and manufacturing practices. through 
different stages of outsourcing – from in-house manufacturing, to cmt, fP, and licensing – 
and the growth of the organization, oilily’s production network widened and geographical 
distance between design and manufacturing increased. the question, then, is to what extent 
this geographical distance affects relational distance. What types of organizational practices has 
oilily developed to overcome the frictions of distance? and to what extent are shared practices 
between the brand and its suppliers created? 
the analysis of this case study is divided into four main parts. the chapter starts with a 
description of the brand’s specific aesthetic characteristics to provide an explanation of oilily’s 
unique position in the history of dutch fashion, as well as to provide the brand-specific context 
for the organizational analysis to follow. i proceed to analyse the transformation of oilily’s 
organizational structure and the configuration of the brand’s global production network to 
assess how its organizational development led to geographical distance between design and 
manufacturing. i then focus on the organizational practices that constitute the relationship 
between design and manufacturing. in the last part, i will demonstrate how, in this case, design	
practices play a leading role in structuring oilily’s spatial organization of production and, as 
such, largely determine how oilily manages the distance between design and manufacturing.
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first a few methodological remarks are required. Whereas this entire study is primarily based 
on qualitative interview accounts – as i explained in chapter 4 – in the case of oilily no internal 
corporate documents were available for triangulation apart from the latest bankruptcy files. 
this means that the company’s organizational structure had to be reconstructed mainly 
based on memories sollicited from interviews with former managers and employees, leading 
to accounts that are by necessity partial and sometimes contradictory. consequently, exact 
figures about such measures as turnover rates, points of sales, and supplier base could only 
be collected through a number of newspaper articles (“Kinderkledingmerk oilily”, 1999; 
gremmen, 2003; Pen, 1992; tiedemann, 2003) and the first oilily magazine (de graaf, 
1984a). since these figures are occasionally inconsistent, incomplete, and mostly without 
reference, they can only provide an impression of the company’s growth and scope, rather 
than enabling a valid evaluation of its organizational performance. considering the aims 
of this research, which are neither historical nor quantitative, this is not too problematic 
as long as historical and numerical data are treated with caution, representing a plausible 
context for the unit of analysis – i.e. organizational practices – instead of verifiable facts. 
arts’ monograph Oilily	(2010) provides an important source for this context, in addition to the 
transcripts of his interviews, which he has kindly provided for analysis within this research 
project. his work gives a rich description of oilily’s history and the brand’s unique place 
within the dutch fashion industry. as such, arts’ book has served as the most comprehensive 
secondary source for this case study, albeit that, even within his detailed story, quantitative 
facts are remarkably scarce. according to the author himself, this is partly due to his own 
intent to present the creative and personal side of the oilily brand – but it is also a result of 
the actual absence of such data (interview 100714). 
While the advantages and disadvantages of drawing on oral accounts for the analysis of 
organizational practices have already been discussed in chapter 4, this case in particular 
demonstrates that radical organizational changes, such as bankruptcies, can render 
routine practices less tacit and less implicit, due to the need to explicate successful and 
unsuccessful practices. during the last fifty years, oilily has gone bankrupt twice, as can 
be seen in the timeline. throughout my analysis, it turned out that accounts that aim to 
clarify possible causes for the company’s failure can be useful ways to elucidate common 
sense practices. i have brought these accounts together in box 5.1. i regularly refer to them 
in the remainder of this chapter, as they both implicitly and explicitly run through my entire 
analysis.
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5.1 the diffeRent faCes of the bRand: ColoUR,   
 innoVation, lifestYle, ChildRen
oilily was founded by Willem and marieke olsthoorn, who aimed to offer children’s clothing 
that was different from what was typical in the 1960s and 1970s. in particular, marieke 
olsthoorn’s personal approach to children’s wear defined oilily’s distinctiveness: children 
should be able to be children and not dress as little grown-ups. she was particularly 
concerned with the ways in which children think and play. their clothes should therefore 
be playful and refreshing, while at the same time have a proper fit and be easy to wash 
(interview 100903). this meant that, for instance, pockets had to be large enough to collect 
chestnuts and pebbles, and buttons should not be situated on the back of a dress, because 
girls should be able to dress and undress all by themselves (interview 101029). oilily’s 
clothes are also known for their little surprises, such as a hidden badge or a pocket on the 
inside of a garment. 
in addition to the focus on children, marieke olsthoorn’s role in defining the brand manifests 
itself in the colourful style for which oilily has become widely known. combining different 
shades of pink and red, as well as stripes, checks, and flowers, were no exception. oilily’s 
unique print designs, which were often inspired by folklore from the netherlands to india 
(Bruggeman, 2014; feitsma, 2014; olsthoorn-roosen & michielsen, 1992), came to define 
the brand’s most prominent aesthetic signature. although marieke olsthoorn emphasized 
that these colour combinations were not her primary focus (interview 100903), these print 
designs contributed to oilily’s colourful image – noticeable not only in children’s wear, but 
especially in oilily’s bags and scarves. as can be read on oilily’s website: 
the brand distinguished itself through amazing color combinations, a mixture of 
influences from every corner of the world, humorous details, a combination of unlikely 
fabrics, and very high quality. these elements became its signature, and it came from 
placing the child’s world and experiences at the centre of its creative process (oilily 
World B.V., 2012b).
While the influence of marieke olsthoorn in defining the brand’s signature aesthetics was 
immense, it is also due to the marketing work of graphic designer Jean Philipse that oilily 
became an internationally recognized and successful brand. running the graphic design studio 
“studio Jean Philipse” since 1974, in 1977 Philipse was assigned to develop a new brand name 
for olly’s, as the company was called at the time. Philipse invented the name oilily, which was 
launched in 1980. he also wrote a decisive marketing plan for the company a few years later. 
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one of the strategies proposed in this marketing plan was a corporate magazine.24 as 
Philipse and Willem olsthoorn explain, although olly/oilily had already become a popular 
brand among consumers and a couple of trendy boutiques, many retailers were still not 
eager to buy the most innovative and outspoken items of the oilily collections. the idea 
of the magazine was to display the entire range of the collection to consumers in order to 
trigger their demand, which had not been possible due to retailers’ conservative buying 
practices (arts, 2010; interviews 100903; 110421). 
Figure	5.1:	Cover	of	fi	rst	Oilily	Magazine	(1984).	From	Oilily	
World,	Alkmaar.	Retrieved	from	http://oilily50years.com/
en#downloads
convinced by its potential, Willem olsthoorn 
invited Philipse to implement the marketing 
plan himself, and the studio25 assumed a central 
position within the visual creation of oilily. the 
studio was responsible for the graphic design 
and photography of the magazine – which turned 
out to be a highly successful marketing tool – 
and was also in charge of the brand’s widely 
known artworks and print designs.
oilily experienced its heyday from the 1980s until 
the mid-1990s. it became a global brand with its 
own shops around europe and the united states, 
a women’s collection since 1986, 
and numerous brand extensions such as cosmetics, shoes, accessories, bags, and stationery. 
oilily transformed from a brand for exclusive children’s wear into a lifestyle brand. it even had 
24  a wide selection of oilily magazines from the years 1984 until 2005 was kindly provided for this study 
by Jean Philipse and Willem olsthoorn.
25  studio Jean Philipse started as an independent graphic design studio, but was incorporated by oilily 
at the end of the 1980s. since Jean Philipse preferred his legal independence, “the studio” became an 
in-house department of oilily and Philipse remained involved on a freelance basis. today, studio Jean 
Philipse still operates as a graphic design studio that works for a variety of companies and non-profi t 
organizations. 
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a fan club of more than 80,000 members, creating a close relationship with its consumers 
(arts, 2010). moreover, the company gained a rapid growth of turnover from 6 million dutch 
guilders in 1981 (approx. 2.7 million euro26) to more than 180 million guilders (approx. 82 
million euro) by the end of the 1990s. 
this growth was accompanied by a worldwide expansion of points of sales in more than 40 
countries in europe, the middle east, the far east and the united states.27 according to a 
report in a 2001 issue of Textilwirtschaft, oilily had 2,500 retail customers in 45 countries, 
which included 25 own stores in europe and 40 in the united states, as well as 30 shop-
in-shops in south Korea, 12 in Japan, and 25 in europe (sieper, 2001). oilily employed 750 
people worldwide and produced 2.5 million garments annually in 20 countries (ibid.). 
in 1989, oilily’s success was rewarded with a grand seigneur, the highest award for the 
fashion industry in the netherlands (costin & grotenhuis, 1989; see also box 4.1). according 
to the jury’s report, olly’s B.V. and its brand oilily had succeeded in gaining a unique 
position in the world of dutch children’s wear: 
indeed, never before has a small company [...] been able to create unique children’s 
fashion that not only turned into quite a cult, including a fan club receiving more than 
60,000 letters every day from children all over the world, but also became an export 
success story, as it currently sells to 35 countries and achieved a turnover growth from 
7 million to 140 million during the last eight years (Vnm, 1989, my translation). 
While oilily can be well described in terms of the visual aspects of its unique products, 
the company is also characterized by a certain mentality that – especially in its heyday – 
ran through the entire organization and co-defined the brand’s identity. oilily operated in 
the higher market segment because “Willem didn’t want to engage in price competition, 
and marieke refused to make any concessions to quality (or at least as few as possible)” 
(arts, 2010: 79). a major focus on design, expensive high-quality fabrics, and relatively small 
series resulted in high production costs per item (ibid.). in order to be successful, Willem 
olsthoorn was convinced that the brand must remain exclusive and not sell to all potential 
stores in the netherlands (ibid.). 
26  all conversions from dutch guilders to euro are calculated by means of data from statistics 
netherlands (cBs).
27  these figures could only be recollected through newspaper articles and the first oilily magazine (de 
graaf, 1984a), which are occasionally inconsistent (cf. “Kinderkledingmerk oilily”, 1999; gremmen, 
2003; Pen, 1992; tiedemann, 2003). the figures presented here are the most plausible ones by way of 
data and source triangulation.
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in addition to this emphasis on exclusivity, in my interviews (former) oilily employees 
unanimously stressed the fact that oilily was averse to fashion. terms such as recalcitrance 
and arrogance were repeatedly dropped by the founding fathers in interviews to describe 
how they differed – not only in terms of how they worked and their attitude toward fashion, 
but also in how they were being approached by their ‘colleagues’ from the fashion industry. 
of course, if we draw on the definition of fashion as proposed in chapter 2, oilily is indeed 
part of the fashion system – it designs, makes, and sells clothing that is subject to seasonal 
stylistic changes. in explaining why oilily is different from conventional fashion brands, 
(former) employees refer to oilily’s creative process. 
according to one of the company’s current product managers, oilily does not follow fashion 
trends but draws inspiration from other sources, such as fairy tales or foreign cultures, 
thus deviating from ordinary fashion (interview 101029). many fashion brands extract their 
children’s collections from the womenswear collections, but oilily works the other way 
around. also, according to Willem and marieke olsthoorn, they make beautiful, timeless 
items that are not subject to the ephemerality of fashion (interview 100903): 
Well, in general, it is obviously the case that there are huge differences between 
our company and what you call the fashion industry. We are glad to reside here [i.e. 
alkmaar] instead of amsterdam and do not have anything to do with that fashion 
world. the fashion world is a priori ephemeral and fashionable, you know, swayed by 
the issues of the day, and we didn’t want that. one of our slogans always was: ‘a thing 
of beauty is a joy forever’ (interview 100903, my translation).
oilily’s brand identity is thus marked by a combination of a distinctive look in terms of 
colourful and innovative designs, a particular approach to children’s wear, and a somewhat 
different attitude toward the rules of the fashion system. the current organization of oilily 
World, run by the second generation of olsthoorns after oilily’s bankruptcy in 2009 (see Box 
5.1), has redefined the brand’s core values as magic, vibrancy, craftsmanship, eclecticism, guts, 
and playfulness (interview 100714). these values are meant to be a contemporary articulation 
of what the brand has become since its foundation – its roots, so to speak (interviews 110903; 
100714). they are reflected in the new slogan – ‘make new things happen’ – which aims to 
emphasize the brand’s permanent focus on innovation (see also gallegos ruiz, 2010). 
remarkably, this emphasis on oilily’s roots and heritage seems to be primarily aimed at the 
brand’s identity and products. in terms of the company’s organization of production, oilily 
has changed considerably; it is now outsourcing everything except design and marketing. 
in the next section, i focus on the organizational development of oilily’s global production 
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network and analyse the ways in which increased outsourcing has geographically and 
organizationally separated design from manufacturing.
5.2 fRoM ManUfaCtUReR to liCenseR
in 1963 there lived two rebels in the netherlands. their names: Willem ‘olly’ 
olsthoorn (a textile engineer) and his wife marieke (a textile design teacher). 
they looked everywhere for fun and fantasy in children’s clothing. But they 
couldn’t find it. one night on the beach in Bergen, a tiny seaside village in 
holland, they wrote their vow in the sand: When	You	Can’t	Find	Imagination	Around	
You...-Invent	It. Before the tide came in, oilily was born. since that day our 
philosophy waves like a flag over the world: be very curious, develop your full 
capacity for joy, indulge a passion for originality and celebrate the magic of life 
during every available second.
oilily World b.V. (2003: 2)
the organizational development of oilily can be described as a transformation from a 
production-led to a brand-led company (cf. lury, 2004). throughout this development, the 
company has experienced different stages of outsourcing. as can be seen in the timeline, 
oilily’s history is marked by two bankruptcies: one at the end of 1980 and one more recently 
in 2009. these bankruptcies demarcate three periods in oilily’s history in which we can 
observe three different types of organizational structures. it needs no clarification that 
these structures are never fixed. however, in contrast with the radical change caused by 
the two bankruptcies, the organizational change within one particular period is rather 
incremental. therefore, the three periods (i.e. 1963-1980, 1981-2009, and 2009-present) 
can be conceptualized as relatively stable organizational constellations and are analysed as 
such in this chapter: as a manufacturer of children’s clothing in the 1960s, as a brand that 
subcontracts manufacturing abroad between 1981 and 2009, and as a licenser of the brand 
oilily from 2009 onward. 
5.2.1 ollY’s B.V.: made in alKmaar
Before Willem and marieke joined their commercial and creative forces to develop the brand 
for which they have become widely known, Willem olsthoorn had already run a number of 
small but successful clothing businesses. the history of olsthoorn’s Konfektie (olsthoorn’s 
apparel), which is vividly described by arts (2010)28, starts with olsthoorn’s internship in 
1961-1962 at a drapery business in amsterdam, run by alex meijer. during his study at the 
college of textile technology (hts) in tilburg, olsthoorn set up his own business in 
28  unless stated otherwise, the historical information in this paragraph is drawn from arts (2010) and Jos 
arts’ interviews with Willem and marieke olsthoorn, Jean Philipse, and annet Pellikaan.
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housecoats made of cortina poplin, one of meijer’s dutch fabrics. olsthoorn’s mother 
made the patterns, manufacturing was subcontracted to home-based seamstresses, and 
olsthoorn himself was in charge of sales. since meijer’s fabrics were always in stock, it was 
a relatively risk-free business for olsthoorn, who only purchased as much fabric as needed 
for already-sold coats. 
the same organizational set-up guided olsthoorn’s next business: the manufacture of 
children’s coats using a newly developed brushed nylon fabric – an opportunity that he 
obtained through a former fellow student. due to the functionality of the fabric, these coats 
were considered revolutionary and highly successful at the time. Yet, after one of olsthoorn’s 
competitors cut its prices considerably by relocating its production from amsterdam in the 
west to the province of friesland in the north of the netherlands, olsthoorn started to look 
for an alternative (arts, 2010). 
considering olsthoorn’s previous history, one could argue that this was his first experience 
with the transformation of the dutch fashion industry in terms of increasing offshoring and 
outsourcing of production – what ester and Van Klaveren called the domestic “runaway-
movement” (1976: 105; see chapter 1). in fact, the relocation of olsthoorn’s competitor 
toward the dutch periphery was a precursor of the industrial change oilily had to cope with 
during its subsequent development. instead of partaking in price competition, olsthoorn 
sought to compete by means of a unique product (arts, 2010). this was when Willem 
olsthoorn’s wife marieke – a textile design teacher who already made clothes for their own 
children – became involved in the business. olly’s B.V. was born and in 1966, “the first real 
collection of children’s wear was designed in alkmaar” (de graaf, 1984a). 
olly’s B.V. can be understood as a manufacturer of children’s wear in the upper mid-market 
segment. Within this small family-run business, marieke was in charge of design, fabrics, 
and prints, while Willem was responsible for the organization of sales and production. the 
clothes were made in or near alkmaar, through a combination of home-based seamstresses 
and family-owned small production units from the 1970s onward. their own production 
facility – containing a storeroom and cutting and sewing machines – was first located in 
a former theatre; it relocated to a larger property in 1973. from that time, the company 
started to grow, and the couple hired a creative team of pattern makers and designers. a 
friend of Willem olsthoorn, who worked at dutch chain store c&a, managed the technical 
aspects of production, of which the olsthoorns lacked knowledge and skills. 
trained in textile technology, Willem olsthoorn had zero knowledge of clothing manufacture. 
marieke olsthoorn had a great sense of colour and shape and was in charge of inspecting 
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BOX 5.1: TWO BanKruPTcieS, ManY PerSPecTiVeS…
 
 
“trying to pinpoint the reasons for the company’s demise is just as impossible as coming up with an 
unambiguous explanation for its success” (arts, 2010: 133).
Bankruptcies are disruptive organizational events that, with the aim of continuing the business, often 
demand a redefinition of organizational strategies and, consequently, have a massive impact on the 
organization’s structure and practices. likewise, oilily’s organization changed significantly after the 
subsequent bankruptcies in 1980 and 2009. Yet, the complexity of organizations in general, and of oilily 
in particular, renders it often difficult – if not impossible – to determine the exact factors that caused 
the company’s failure. despite this complexity, it is clear that oilily’s organizational development 
was affected substantially by both financial limitations as a direct result of the bankruptcies and 
by managerial decision-making, based on prior experience and personal reflections on ‘what went 
wrong’. the following collection of narratives explaining oilily’s failure are drawn from media reports, 
interviewees’ accounts, and bankruptcy files.
domestic vs. offshore production
the first bankruptcy occurred when olly’s B.V. was still a manufacturer with its own production facilities 
in the netherlands. unsurprisingly, the organization of production is considered to be the main cause 
of olly’s demise in 1980, albeit that two interrelated explanatory narratives exist alongside each other. 
the first and most widespread explanation refers to the fact that rising wages and a general decline 
of domestic workforce had made manufacturing in the netherlands too expensive an undertaking. 
Willem olsthoorn took over a production unit of c&a in 1978 while c&a was already relocating its 
production to lower-wage countries, and could no longer sustain a profitable business. 
i have always proclaimed that we were a dutch company: [...] ‘olly, the netherlands’; a little 
stubbornness to show that nice things are not only made in france. and that is how i thought 
about production as well. completely irrational, but i was actually quite attached to the dutch 
image. and i thought dutch manufacturing should be part of that, though at one point this 
appeared unattainable (interview 100903, my translation).
apparently, this was the reason why oilily started producing abroad after its bankruptcy. the second 
explanation, however, as proposed mainly by olly’s (former) clients, recalls a number of failed 
deliveries from india as early as the late 1970s. this implies that oilily started manufacturing abroad 
even before its bankruptcy, but was not yet able to organize it properly.  it may therefore be argued 
that olly’s struggle with both domestic and offshore production contributed to an unsustainable 
situation in 1980. Yet, since these problems had not affected the strength of the brand, a restart was 
readily accomplished.
What the files state
regarding oilily’s latest bankruptcy in 2009, the first place to look for possible explanations are 
the official bankruptcy files, composed by trustee mr. c.m. molhuysen. although several possible 
explanations are mentioned, the bankruptcy trustee has not been able to declare one definitive 
cause for oilily’s demise. the explanations given are fourfold: 1) inconsistent design resulting in a 
loss of brand recognition, 2) high production costs, 3) high retail prices, and 4) a general drop of 
consumer spending at the beginning of 2009. While it was probably a combination of these factors, 
these explanations should not be treated as ‘objective’ or ‘neutral’ as opposed to the ‘subjective’ 
accounts from the interviews in this study. the bankruptcy files recall a number of plausible causes, 
as proposed by oilily’s former management team. as such, they provide an overview of all plausible 
factors. 
BOX 5.1 cOnTinued
the strength of oilily’s roots (and how it got lost)
“inconsistent design resulting in a loss of brand recognition”, the second of four explanations stated 
by the bankruptcy files, is most directly related to the nature of the brand – its creative quality and 
its signature aesthetics. it is therefore also the most emotionally charged explanation and appears 
in the interviewees’ accounts in various ways. one of the most widespread arguments states that 
the company slipped through Willem olsthoorn’s fingers and the creative spirit was overlooked by 
the commercial business (interview 100714). due to the ‘new managers’’ strong focus on costs and 
efficiency, oilily lost its creativity and signature:
in their [i.e. former oilily employees’] eyes it was ‘the neckties’, as they are invariably called, 
that were the ruination of oilily. While creativity was always the most important driving force, 
the axis on which everything turned, now the financial department played more and more of a 
decisive role. this was possible because olsthoorn’s managerial style was not well-honed, and 
he gave the financial people a great deal of responsibility and elbow room. Back when oilily was 
still a tightly-knit club of kindred spirits that wasn’t a problem; now it was tearing them apart. 
the increasing emphasis on cost control was more than a shift of accent. it led to a failure to 
understand oilily’s strength, and the essence of the company was thereby affected (arts, 2010: 
134-135).
the inability to adapt
oilily’s unsuccessful organizational change can also be explained from the opposite perspective:
[marieke] had a strong vision and signature that determined the entire collection. once she 
left, that signature was gone and a number of designers all thought ‘we have to do it this way’. 
the results were seven collections instead of one (interview 080910, my translation).
oilily’s organizational culture – which to newcomers appeared chaotic – was driven by marieke 
olsthoorn’s vision, which had worked for decades. But throughout the 1990s, more and more fashion 
brands developed colourful collections for children; creativity alone was no longer sufficient to 
compete with these often cheaper enterprises. according to the new managers, many of whom drew 
their knowledge from experience at fashion companies such as nike, We, and the society shop, new 
market demands required a more structured business approach that apparently clashed with the 
creative spirit of the ‘old’ oilily. designers felt that they were no longer allowed to work in their own 
ways, while they used to have creative freedom (interview 110805). from this perspective oilily was 
unable to adapt to the changing market of increasing competition.
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the sample collections, but did not know how to organize large-scale production. since they 
also lacked the financial means to hire a professional in this matter, the olsthoorns had 
to acquire the knowledge and skills themselves through trial and error (arts, 2010). this 
affected the quality of the garments, which – especially in the early years – often suffered 
from a poor ‘make’ (interview 080911). however, the fact that the clothes were different and 
exclusive at the time apparently compensated for this shortcoming. 
regarding distribution, initially the collections were mainly sold to small, trendy boutiques 
in the netherlands and Belgium. from the mid-1970s onward, olly’s B.V. worked with a sales 
agent – Jos de Jong mode B.V. – which nowadays is one of the main agents for children’s 
wear in the Benelux (interview 100303). according to the first oilily magazine, export was 
seriously considered for the first time in 1974 (de graaf, 1984a).
two changes to the company’s organization of production during the second half of the 
1970s are important to note in oilily’s subsequent development. first of all, in 1974, the 
olsthoorns started to collaborate with some friends in india who wanted to start up a 
clothing manufacturing business (interview 120314). eventually, this would become oilily’s 
main indian manufacturer, but in the 1970s olly’s suffered from the poor quality of the 
clothes made in india (interviews 080911; 100303; see also Box 5.1). 
the second major organizational change occurred in 1978, when Willem olsthoorn took 
over a production unit of c&a, including its equipment and workforce of around 125 
seamstresses. in retrospect, olsthoorn considers this to be one of his greatest mistakes. 
at the time, he was mistakenly convinced that it should be possible to continue domestic 
manufacturing for the expensive type of garments they made.  adding to the fact that Willem 
olsthoorn was not highly skilled in organizing production, rising wages in the netherlands 
forced him to close down the company in december 1980, shortly after the launch of the 
new brand name oilily (interview 100903).
5.2.2 oililY B.V.: Produced in alKmaar
While the initial move into india can be considered a coincidence, after oilily’s bankruptcy 
the olsthoorns realized that offshore manufacturing was a necessary precondition to 
continue their business. according to Willem olsthoorn, this was not only due to the high 
costs involved in domestic manufacturing, but also because the available workforce in 
clothing manufacture had declined dramatically in the netherlands (interview 100903):
it is not only a matter of [...] wage regulations; there was also a lack of capacity. two 
years after 1980 you could no longer find any seamstress who was able to properly 
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make a garment. hence it is also a matter of physical quality, or the facility to make 
things; the craftsmanship (interview 100903, my translation).
oilily’s restart in 1981 was facilitated by its considerable customer base built during the 
1970s, its consequently full order portfolio, and the olsthoorns’ good relationship with their 
fabric suppliers. since they lacked the financial means to purchase fabrics, the olsthoorns 
decided to approach their fabric suppliers and beg them for cooperation in production: 
’listen’, they said in their pitch to the textile manufacturers, ‘we have a full order 
portfolio and a popular brand that sells well. We really want to continue with oilily, 
but because the banks won’t come through with the financing we can’t purchase any 
fabrics. are you prepared to supply us anyway, even though we won’t be able to pay 
you until later on, when the clothing is delivered? We can’t do anything without you – 
we realise that. to reciprocate for your good will, and if all goes well, we’ll pay a certain 
percentage extra on every bill. that way we can keep oilily going and keep you as 
our suppliers, and by paying the extra percentage we can eventually settle our debts’ 
(arts, 2010: 76).
apparently, these suppliers were convinced of oilily’s potential; they agreed to deliver 
fabrics without payment in advance and no guarantee of payment at all (arts, 2010). 
manufacturing was outsourced abroad and oilily B.V. became a head-and-tail firm, or a 
branded producer (faust, 2005), organizing everything from design and sample making to 
logistics and distribution, while subcontracting garment assembly. 
due to the absence of corporate documents such as organization charts, an exact 
reconstruction of oilily’s production network is impossible. therefore, i mainly focus 
on the organization of production in terms of supplier countries, types of suppliers and 
buyer-supplier relations, as these are important indicators of distance between design and 
manufacturing. these data are primarily based on interviews with Willem olsthoorn and 
former management staff, in addition to the interviews conducted by Jos arts.  a number of 
dutch newspaper articles also provided some information in this regard.
apart from oilily’s growth in terms of turnover rates and points of sales, the main difference 
between the organization of oilily before its bankruptcy in 1980 and its restart a few months 
later is in terms of production. oilily subcontracted manufacturing and gradually moved 
production from the netherlands to Belgium, italy, and india, then to eastern european 
countries such as Poland, Yugoslavia, and hungary, and to Portugal, morocco, and the far 
east (hong Kong, china). figures from the early years are not available, but in the late 1990s, 
the most important supplier countries in terms of production volume were india (27%) and 
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Portugal (25%) (interview 110712). turkey (13%), morocco (10%), and china (10%) were 
also significant, after which came hungary (8%) and italy (6%) (ibid.). 
oilily’s head office remained in alkmaar but moved from the city centre to a larger modern 
property in an industrial estate in 1991. it accommodated not only general and financial 
management, but the entire preproduction process, including design, artworks, graphic 
design, pattern and sample making, storage rooms for fabrics, trimmings, and ready-made 
garments, as well as marketing, sales, and logistics (e.g. Pen, 1992). the oilily holding also 
ran several subsidiary companies for sales in Belgium, france, italy, spain, united Kingdom, 
germany, switzerland, the united states, and Japan, as well as buying/production offices in 
hong Kong and india (based on molhuysen, 2009). 
oilily’s general buying policy was to preferably source directly from suppliers, without 
intervention of agents. the policy was based on the argument that agents can raise the 
company’s costs considerably and do not always act entirely according to the company’s 
own interest (interviews 110427; 110712; 111205; 120105). nonetheless, various interviewees 
explain that agents often have valuable local knowledge and can make offshore business 
much easier, as it is not necessary to negotiate with every single subcontractor. Yet, my 
interviewees’ accounts differ in recalling whether oilily worked with agents at all – and if 
so, in which countries (interviews 110427; 110712; 111205; 120105). a plausible explanation 
might be that although oilily preferred to buy from suppliers directly, this was not always 
possible and the exact organization of the production network and sourcing strategies was 
altered throughout the years. 
oilily’s offshore sourcing strategy has always been a combination of cut-make-trim (cmt) 
and full-package (fP) production, with an increasing tendency toward the latter, especially 
in india, turkey, italy, and china. however, the shift from cmt to fP sourcing strategies 
was more a reallocation of financial risks, rather than a change in the organization of 
production as such. full-package suppliers purchased the fabrics and trimmings, but made 
the garments according to oilily’s detailed specifications (interviews 111205; 120105). 
criteria for the selection of suppliers varied slightly across subsequent production directors 
and managers. While price levels have always played a significant role – as it was one of the 
main drivers for outsourcing manufacturing in the first place – the type of product a supplier 
is able to make was considered equally important. marieke, in particular, had strong 
preferences for certain suppliers based on their creative and aesthetic quality (interview 
111205). in order to create durable partnerships, however, one of oilily’s former supply 
chain managers tended to select suppliers whose capabilities were slightly beneath his 
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own requirements, but were willing and able to learn (interview 110427). in his view, buyer-
supplier relationships should be a two-way investment, because it arguably can enhance 
the durability of the relationship. 
many interviewees emphasized the importance of durable relationships, due to the specific 
nature of the oilily product with its many details and complex designs; it takes a while (i.e. 
several seasons) to understand each other’s way of working (e.g. interview 100923). as one 
of oilily’s former product developers explained:
for both sides [i.e. buyer and supplier] it is a matter of building trust. i prefer [long-
term relationships], because you won’t benefit from switching all the time. every time 
you will experience all the growing pains you had before, and you have to explain all 
over again that ‘we do not work that way’. that, for instance, we always apply things in 
the middle, and not somewhere left or right. […] and once they get that, it is perfect, 
because you never have to explain it again (interview 100825, my translation).
this clearly illustrates how the organizational structure of the brand’s production network 
relates to specific practices that define the company’s way of working. the phrase ‘we do 
not work that way’ implies that different types of creative practices require different types of 
manufacturing practices, which affect the relationship between buyer and supplier as well. 
i will elaborate on these organizational practices in more detail in section 5.3. first, a closer 
look at oilily’s organizational development since the 1990s in the remainder of this section 
reveals the emergence of a widening gap between design and manufacturing.
as mentioned above, throughout oilily B.V.’s existence – from 1981 to 2009 – the organization 
of production has always been based on a head-and-tail type structure. in the last decade 
and especially after 2003, however, a number of organizational changes affected oilily’s 
performance in different ways.
oilily’s growth resulted in an increasing focus on costs and sales, which led marieke 
olsthoorn and Jean Philipse – two major drivers of oilily’s creativity – to withdraw from 
the company in the 1990s (arts, 2010; see also Box 5.1). Between 1985 and 1995, oilily’s 
turnover rates grew annually. But this growth came to a halt and the company suffered 
losses from 1998 onward (tiedemann, 2003; see Box 5.1 for possible explanations). in 2003, 
Willem olsthoorn sold a controlling interest to investment companies h2 equity Partners 
and aBn amro Participates. although he remained shareholder, olsthoorn withdrew from 
his position as director, thereby losing formal control of his company (arts, 2010). several 
changes of management followed, which had also consequences for the structure of the 
creative development and organization of production. 
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the personal reflections of former production managers, product developers and buyers 
on the organizational change in the last ten years of oilily B.V.’s existence reveal that the 
main issue in this period was the implementation of a more structured and cost-effective 
organization. for one thing, this meant that suppliers could no longer be selected based 
solely on the aesthetics of their product. efficiency and reliability became more important 
requirements. for another, a reorganization of the design and development process 
resulted in the closure of oilily’s own sample room and storage facilities; sample making 
and purchasing materials were outsourced to full package suppliers (interview 120105). 
Figure	5.2:	Development	of	production	network	Oilily	1981-2009
figure 5.2 schematically summarizes oilily’s organizational transformation in terms of 
increased outsourcing. this model represents a process of change, rather than two distinct 
organizational structures. oilily never fully fit within either one of the two models; it always 
had a hybrid form, combining different sourcing strategies in different countries. through 
increased outsourcing of production functions, the focus clearly shifted toward full package 
sourcing strategies and the company’s structure thus increasingly resembled the model on 
the right part of figure 5.2.
oilily’s organizational restructuring at the beginning of the twenty-first century resulted 
in a certain financial stability in some years. But, according to the bankruptcy files, the 
company’s losses increased rapidly from 2005 onward and liquidation became inevitable 
halfway through 2008. the bankruptcy trustee was not able to determine one explicit cause 
for oilily’s failure; he concluded that it was due to a combination of factors, including a loss 
of brand recognition and high production costs (molhuysen, 2009; see Box 5.1). 
 
Design 
Including pattern 
making, sampling, 
purchase of fabric 
and trims Increased outsourcing 
 
Marketing & 
Sales 
Assembly 
CMT suppliers 
Design 
Marketing & 
Sales 
Manufacturing 
Including pattern 
making, sampling, 
purchase of fabric 
and trims 
FP suppliers 
Oilily B.V. Oilily B.V. 
Buying 
agents 
Sales 
agents 
Head-and-tail: from CMT to FP 
151
5.2.3 oililY World B.V.: designed in alKmaar
in may 2009, shortly after oilily’s bankruptcy, Willem and marieke olsthoorn decided to 
repurchase the trademark rights – partly out of fear of what might happen to ‘their’ brand if 
other people ran away with it:
it was a professional decision, because they both believed in the strength of the brand. 
it was an emotional decision, because now their life’s work could rise from the ashes. 
and it was a joyous decision, because ever since they had set foot in the old office, they 
noticed how much they had missed the work. the clothing business was just plain fun 
(arts, 2010: 140).
a new company with a different organizational structure was set up by the second generation 
of the olsthoorn family: oilily World B.V. together, Willem and marieke olsthoorn now 
owned 10% of oilily’s shares, while the other 90% were equally distributed among their 
four children (Van soest, 2011). since the bankruptcy of oilily B.V. involved the closure of all 
oilily stores, as well as the discontinuation of all subsidiary companies, the business could 
not continue as before:
a restart also means to continue the business as it used to be, and we did not want that. 
oilily had a huge organization, with subsidiaries for production, distribution, sales, 
and administration. that is out of date. therefore, we want to stick to the three things 
we are really good at: design, design, and design (interview with geert olsthoorn, one 
of olsthoorn’s children cited in Voormolen, 2009, my translation).
the new approach of the olsthoorn family had consequences for the size of the company 
as well:
We no longer wanted to be a traditional wholesale business. We aimed for a 
small team and only do what we are good at: design, marketing, licensing, and 
franchising. no longer 350 employees at the head office, no own manufacturing, 
no own stores around the world or 2,000 customers… for god’s sake, leave that to 
the experts (interview with geert olsthoorn cited in Van soest, 2011, my translation).
Whereas in the past, oilily sought to control almost the entire supply chain from design to 
retailing, oilily World focuses on its brand identity and consists of only two departments: 
a creative and a marketing/sales department (gallegos ruiz, 2010). the emphasis lies on 
preserving the image and appearance of the brand. 
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for the production and distribution of oilily’s children’s wear, the company entered into a 
licensing contract with room seven B.V., the business of daughter Brecht olsthoorn. room 
seven, which started as a shop for linen and furnishing textiles in 1994, is now a head-and-
tail company and produces both furnishings and children’s wear. the products are sold on a 
retail basis in the netherlands and through wholesale abroad. manufacturing is outsourced 
to mainly india and china, but also to Portugal and denmark (“room seven”, 2007). 
for the production of bags and accessories, oilily has had a licencing contract with colorful 
licenses international B.V. since the late 1990s. according to the bankruptcy files, the latest 
contract was concluded in march 2008, which gives colorful licenses the right to use oilily’s 
trade mark for the development and marketing of cosmetics, stationery, watches, and bags 
until september 31, 2019 (molhuysen, 2009). since the business of colorful licenses was not 
affected by the bankruptcy, oilily World continued the licensing contract, which generated 
a helpful cash flow for setting up the new company (Van soest, 2011). other licensing 
contracts of oilily World include stationery team europe B.V. for stationery, douwe egberts 
for tableware, and sparta Young for bicycles.
during my research, oilily World was still in its start-up phase, which means that the exact 
organizational set-up could not be provided. it is, however, a remarkable development, as 
it represents almost the ultimate form of outsourcing – shifting the emphasis completely 
toward the intangible values of the brand and its visual appearance. Back in the 1990s, the 
gradual outsourcing of preproduction functions was part of a strategy to relocate financial 
risks to the company’s suppliers. By operating as a licensing company, oilily World has 
further pursued this strategy, although it is arguably also a consequence of the financial 
limitations that naturally followed from the bankruptcy. moreover, the new licensing 
organization generates new challenges in terms of how the relationship between design and 
manufacturing can be managed at (increasing) distance. in the words of Willem olsthoorn, 
oilily World needs “to drill” its partners in such a way that they are able to make ‘oilily-
worthy’ products (interview 100903). how these relationships actually work and how they 
are affected by the different organizational structures and sourcing strategies, as discussed 
above, will be explored through the analysis of organizational practices in the next section.
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5.3 oRGaniZational pRaCtiCes: dRiVen bY CReatiVitY
in my view, the fabric choice determines fifty per cent of the design – and thus of 
the outcome. it is quite common to start with an existing design or pattern and 
then search for an appropriate fabric. however, the difficulty with this approach 
is that the ‘ideal’ fabric (i.e. one that resembles the one of the design as  much 
as possible) is not always available and a compromise is made. [...] it is much 
easier to reverse the process: first choose a fabric, and then think about a suitable 
design.
Marieke olsthoorn-Roosen (1992: 105, my translation)
the difficulty encountered in reconstructing a detailed and comprehensive picture of the 
development of oilily’s global production network in the previous section is not just a 
consequence of unreliable human memories. to some extent, it is also a sign of an ‘absence 
of structure’. the organization of oilily was primarily driven by creativity; design was leading 
and its consequences for costs and lead times were often considered of minor importance:
nowadays, those other things – lead times and price – have become far more 
important within many companies. these were things we never cared about. Price was 
unimportant, because they [i.e. retailers] bought it anyway. and lead times... Well, 
they had to accept it or otherwise they would not receive anything at all (interview 
100903, my translation).
in such a creative environment, rational choice and organizational structure may be difficult 
to find. in this section, i focus on design as a leading organizational practice that largely 
determined how oilily coordinated the distanciated relationship between design and 
manufacturing. i will demonstrate how, due to a changing way of organizing the creative 
process, distance between design and manufacturing gradually gained significance.
5.3.1 design Practice
until she left the company in 1999, marieke olsthoorn had always been the main driving 
force behind the creative designs of oilily’s children’s wear. she had been praised for her 
unique level of taste (interview 111012), an excess of creativity (interview 110427), for being 
full of ideas and for only being concerned with the aesthetics and quality of the product 
(interview 100903). she was not interested in fashion, had a clear view on the brand and 
apparently inspected every garment from first prototype to final product (interview 101029). 
even with a growing team, working together with four or more designers, she closely 
supervised the entire design and development. as a result, the children’s wear collections 
of oilily drew heavily on the aesthetic knowledge and skills of one individual, which made 
her role valuable and vulnerable at the same time.
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the businessman Willem olsthoorn was marieke’s exact opposite; they could have 
heated discussions about whether or not a particular design was suitable for production 
(de gruyter, 2010). despite these battles between the perfectionist designer and the 
commercial salesman, earning money was never a point of discussion, as it was not their 
primary goal. the olsthoorns based their creative decisions on their own taste, not on what 
was fashionable or demanded by retailers (ibid.). in a newspaper article in 1992, Willem 
olsthoorn argued that “the clothes must not be too fashionable. the most beautiful things 
are timeless. […] aesthetics and quality come first. We do not prioritize efficiency” (Pen, 
1992, my translation). although Willem olsthoorn was more business-driven than his wife, 
he always gave marieke the freedom to work in her own way: “the designers have a carte 
blanche. they do not only get artistic freedom, but do also not have to cope with price or 
technical limitations” (ibid.). 
the result of this design approach was an exclusive and unique – but above all, expensive 
– product:
the fact that our price level was this high was not without reason. We had 15 designers 
supported by pattern makers; there were probably 30-40 people working on the 
designs in addition to the fact that they bought approximately 5,000 metres of fabric 
every season for sample making only. […] We also sold relatively small orders, which 
was difficult in production as well (interview 080208, my translation).
in addition to the size of the creative team, the designers’ way of working further contributed 
to a unique product:
they [i.e. the designers] are free in the choice of materials. fabrics are dyed or printed 
especially to oilily requirements with prints created by the designers. the creation 
of every collection goes together with constant deliberation between the designers 
and the production people. the creative team of oilily works in an atmosphere 
characterized by freedom and spontaneity on one side, and confrontation with reality 
and technical limitations on the other side (de graaf, 1984b).
to understand how this specific design approach relates to the organization of production, 
we need to take a closer look at how oilily’s creative practice was organized. the creative 
freedom that marieke and her designers experienced was not only manifested in the choice 
of the most exclusive fabrics and trimmings, but also in the fact that a style or a collection 
was never really finished.  it could always be improved, be made more beautiful or be of 
better quality. design was driven by creativity and emotion, not by something one could 
actually plan (e.g. interviews 110427; 110805; 111012). 
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it is probably an inherent characteristic of ambitious designers in general to always strive 
for the best and the most beautiful. But in this case marieke and her fellow designers were 
particularly enabled to work in this way due to the availability of their own sample room. 
due to this facility, designers had the luxury to literally take an idea or a sketch to the 
pattern makers and seamstresses and try it out immediately. in this way, the design process 
was based on a natural interaction between the designers and the makers. an idea did not 
remain a picture until the first prototype arrived, but materialized whenever the designer 
wanted it to. 
the actual design practice itself was a rather tangible activity as well. marieke did not work 
with a computer, even when the company started to use computer-aided design systems 
(cad). more than that, she was convinced of the added value when the craft of drawing and 
pattern making was an inherent component of the design process. under her supervision, 
all designs – both garments and prints – were therefore drawn by hand and designers had 
to manually make the first patterns for their own creations. using existing patterns or styles 
was prohibited; in principle, the designers were supposed to create something new every 
season (interview 120314). 
this way of working is closely related to the organization of production. making one’s 
own patterns and samples is a necessary precondition for working with cmt-suppliers. 
Particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, marieke olsthoorn and her team developed their own 
print designs and patterns, made their own samples, and then sent the whole package of 
patterns, fabric, trimmings, and instructions to their suppliers for assembly. as can be read 
in the first oilily magazine:
materials for oilily clothes are often specially made, dyed or printed with oilily 
partners. Purchasing is done in england, germany, france and italy. all materials 
and haberdashery are checked by oilily in alkmaar and sent on to reputable ready-
made clothing establishments in holland and abroad, which often work exclusively 
for oilily. oilily people are continually involved in the production process. delivery is 
made from alkmaar (de graaf, 1984a).
in this situation, manufacturers only had to lay out the patterns, cut the fabric, assemble the 
parts and send the garments back to oilily. later on, as explained in section 5.2, pattern and 
sample making were gradually outsourced to oilily’s suppliers (interviews 110923; 120105). 
this means that both technical and financial capabilities of suppliers had to increase. in 
an ideal situation, suppliers who were willing and able to change according to oilily’s new 
requirements took over the pattern making process, since they were already familiar with 
oilily’s aesthetic signature (interview 120105). such familiarity with the brand’s aesthetic 
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signature is considered important for a consistent product quality and brand image. in the 
cases where suppliers could not transform into full-package suppliers, new manufacturers 
were selected, which then needed to be able to translate oilily’s sketches, style sheets, and 
size specifications –basically excel sheets with measurements – into patterns and prototypes 
of the designs. this is typically how fashion brands work today if they have outsourced 
manufacturing to ready-made garment suppliers. 
Working with style sheets and size specifications – often abbreviated to size specs – can 
have significant consequences for both the creative practice and its outcomes. depending 
on how one interprets the size specs, different types of patterns can be the outcome; 
there is no straightforward way of translation (interviews 100923; 101029; 120404). this 
is an important point to take into account; besides colour, oilily was also known for its 
shapes created through a particular way of pattern making. as a former product developer 
explained, designs from for instance chinese manufacturers are mostly ‘flat’, because the 
shape of the designs is being drawn solely from the side seams, whereas oilily’s designs got 
their shapes from all over the garment (interview 100923). 
in the past, oilily’s designers made their own patterns and could regularly experiment in 
their in-house sample room. now designers had to transfer a considerable part of their 
practice to the suppliers. to explain their different approach to suppliers was a laborious 
process, which required much visual aid and could take up to three seasons before buyer 
and supplier truly understood each other’s way of working. Buyers or product developers 
had to literally show their suppliers that laying out patterns differently results in a different 
garment (ibid.). it was a learning process that needed much face-to-face contact, especially 
since the brand differed in its approach from most other brands. a long-term relationship 
based on trust and mutual understanding became extremely important.
a striking example of such a long-lasting partnership is oilily’s main supplier in india. 
now a multi-product factory, it manufactures woven and knitted garments for a variety of 
customers in mainly the united states and europe (including gap, ralph lauren, h&m, 
Zara, esprit, debenhams). according to its public company profile, the company was 
founded in 1974, together with dutch partners: “our special thanks to “oilily”, a brand that 
we have been associated with over 30 years paternered [sic] us to develop these specialties” 
(exotique exports, n.d.). every season, twice a year, once colours, prints, and fabrics had 
been agreed on, marieke olsthoorn and one of her designers travelled to india to finalize 
the collection (interview 120314). marieke presented their patterns and prototypes, which 
were made in alkmaar, to their indian makers and stayed there for about ten days, during 
which the supplier had to make the final samples (ibid.). While this way of working was 
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practiced in most of oilily’s major supplier countries (interview 120314), the particularly 
close face-to-face interaction between marieke and her indian makers was enhanced by 
oilily’s own office in india, where marieke had access to an entire team ready to transform 
her ideas into samples (interview 110427). 
interestingly, this close cooperation did not only benefit oilily’s creative process, but resulted 
in an important learning process for the indian supplier as well. throughout its long-term 
relationship with oilily, the supplier developed specific skills and knowledge required to 
manufacture the complicated oilily designs, and made them its core competences: “We 
specialize in complicated, high fashion, value added merchandise. handling different 
fabrics in one garment, i.e. knit and woven combo’s, multi fabric patchworks, woven 
and sweater combo’s etc.” (exotique exports, n.d.). this case thus illustrates how the 
relationship between buyer and supplier, and a particular way of working, can facilitate 
knowledge transfer and upgrading of suppliers. 
oilily’s particular way of organizing the creative process affected the organization of the 
entire production network in several ways. the designers’ creative freedom also involved 
the absence of a strict collection plan, which led to regular exceeding of deadlines. it was 
never considered a problem if designers developed more items than initially planned. and 
since production was usually not planned before the collection was finalized and the sales 
period was closed, late and incorrect deliveries to retailers happened on a regular basis 
(interview 120105). the exclusivity and popularity of the oilily brand allowed for such a 
truancy; retailers never complained if, for instance, they had ordered a blouse and received 
a dress. for a long time, oilily did not have much competition, and the garments were being 
sold anyway. however, competition eventually grew, offering a more diversified range of 
children’s clothing in terms of price and	creative content. the market gradually changed, 
including more critical consumer demands, which made it more difficult to run a fashion 
brand solely on the basis of unlimited creative freedom.
5.3.2 structured creatiVitY?
the organizational problems that oilily encountered since the late 1990s eventually led to 
its demise in 2009. they are a manifestation of the inherent paradox of fashion as both 
a work of art and a commercial commodity, both emotion and reason. on the one hand, 
marieke olsthoorn, Jean Philipse, and other members of oilily’s creative team could not 
get accustomed to the emergent managerial culture and left the company. on the other 
hand, Willem olsthoorn recognized that because creativity had always been placed 
above everything else, other aspects such as production and delivery schedules had been 
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given insufficient priority (gremmen, 2003). everyone acknowledged the value of oilily’s 
creativity, including the new managers who were blamed for destroying oilily’s soul, as 
can be read in several media reports and is summarized in box 5.1 (e.g. tiedemann, 2003; 
gremmen, 2003; tromp, 2008). But the changing market demanded that this creativity be 
put into an organizational framework (interview 120105). oilily’s new management aimed 
at achieving such a framework by changing organizational practices, which – as i will 
explain in the remainder of this section – are related to a widening gap between design and 
manufacturing.
the implementation of new organizational practices met with considerable resistance from 
oilily’s creative team, which reflected an ingrained organizational culture that had been 
effective for decades: “oilily had always been an emotional company at all levels. We were 
all very attached to each other, despite or probably due to our contradictions. it was nice to 
be part of it” (Willem olsthoorn cited in tromp, 2008, my translation). 
the emotional component of oilily’s organizational culture seemed to clash with the 
new management’s more formal approach. stylist margot Vos, who was responsible for 
oilily’s photography and the visual representations of the collections explains: “’i am very 
emotional. i work intuitively, based on feelings and instincts. now i have to be patient.’ 
in the last years, the atmosphere within the company has become more formal. ‘We were 
not used to suits and hierarchy’” (Vos cited in tiedemann, 2003: 76, my translation). one 
of oilily’s later production directors even described it as a ‘culture shock’ for the creative 
team when new managers tried to implement a different organizational structure (interview 
111012).
What changes in creative practice did this new organizational approach, adopted at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, involve? first of all, it remained important to express 
the typical oilily style. even when taking into account the loss of oilily’s distinctive style 
and signature as one potential explanation for the company’s demise, the ‘new managers’ 
were all determined to retain the core values of quality and creativity, and to not follow 
fashion trends (tiedemann, 2003). however, the focus shifted toward a more market-driven 
approach. this approach included smaller, differentially priced collections, and more 
deliveries throughout the year – from two collections delivered twice a year, to four or five 
deliveries per season, leading to almost monthly deliveries (tiedemann, 2003; interview 
120105). this was in contrast to oilily’s former supply-driven approach, whereby oilily 
delivered what it produced (interview 120105). 
oilily’s more structured creative process started with a collection plan that determined 
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the number of items per product category and their price ranges. this collection plan is an 
instrument based on the commercial insights of the product group manager and the sales 
department (interview 120105). a collection plan, also called a line plan, is a well-known 
and widely used tool in the fashion industry. But in this case, it demanded a completely 
different way of working from the designers who used to have unlimited freedom. since the 
collection plan did not only determine the number of items, but also presented a thematic 
structure of the collection’s deliveries, designers no longer designed from scratch. they had 
to have a framework in mind that determined when they had to finish which types of styles. 
it was therefore not only a more market-driven, but also a more calendar-driven approach 
(interview 120105). the traditional two-season fashion calendar involving spring/summer 
and fall/Winter (see also tyler et al., 2006), transformed into a rhythm of up to ten annual 
‘seasons’. 
this way of structuring the creative process further involved a different way of organizing 
the relation between design and manufacturing. the new structure included a product 
development department, led by three product group managers: kids, baby, and 
women (interviews 101029; 120105). Production and buying managers were in charge 
of communicating with the suppliers, performing price-negotiations and monitoring 
deliveries and quality control, while the product development department was established 
to bridge the gap between the creative minds of the designers and the rational minds of 
the production managers (interview 120105). that gap had widened geographically and 
organizationally, due to further outsourcing of preproduction functions such as sample 
making, as explained in section 5.2.2. 
to a considerable extent, this gap was the result of changing power relations. the 
relationship between design and manufacturing used to be unbalanced; design used to 
overpower manufacturing, which resulted in an expensive product. But ever since the late 
1990s, production and sales began to restrict designers’ creativity. the aim of product 
developers and product group managers was, therefore, to keep in mind both the creative 
and commercial needs of the collection and to communicate with designers about what 
was possible in terms of sales and	production – and what was not. as one of oilily’s former 
product developers explains,
in fact, you [i.e. the product developer] are the connection who has to make sure that 
the designer’s nice drawings on paper and ideas in their head are technically executable. 
so, you are involved in the design process and simultaneously have to control its 
feasibility. after all, one can make beautiful drawings, but if it cannot be realized or when 
it becomes extremely expensive, then it does not make much sense of course (interview 
100923, my translation).
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the question then is why this ‘gap’ between design and manufacturing suddenly became 
an issue, and, whether it had ever been an issue at all. after all, oilily had been working with 
spatially distant suppliers since the 1970s and apparently was capable of managing these 
distant relationships fairly well. What changes in the organization or the industry might 
have caused an increase in that distance’s significance? i would argue that the geographical 
distance between design and production was never considered problematic due to a 
particular way of working, especially in terms of the creative practice. as we can read in 
oilily’s second magazine:
oftentimes a sketch is made first, or the designer makes a new pattern altogether, 
although it also happens that, while improvising in cooperation with the sewing 
crew, something new is created. the designers are of course always busy to create 
designs that are technically feasible. a designer has to be able to draw patterns and 
needs to know and be aware of the possibilities of the production technique. in such 
a design department it becomes clear what “talent” really means: a combination of 
sensitivity, intuition, technique and knowledge of production problems (de graaf, 
1984b, emphasis in original).
since (print) design and pattern and sample making were so closely related in practice, the 
gap between this creative practice and the actual manufacturing did not really exist – the 
garment was already physically made by the time it was sent to the supplier for assembly. 
thus, while distance played a role in terms of geography and organizational separation, it 
did not play a significant role relationally. once pattern making and sampling became the 
suppliers’ responsibilities, the relational distance between the practice of design and the 
practice of making garments increased, and the coordination between the two consequently 
required more attention. oilily had to develop new organizational practices to coordinate 
the relationship between design and manufacturing at a distance, and find ways to create 
shared understandings between the creative team and the brand’s suppliers. 
the relationship between design and manufacturing, and between oilily and its suppliers, 
was also strongly affected by the more calendar-driven approach, including the collection 
plan and its strict deadlines. once the number of deliveries per year increased, and 
prototypes and samples were to be made by the suppliers, it became impossible to plan 
production after the sales period had been closed; by then, the final deliveries would have 
always been too late. indeed, the market changed in such a way that customers were no 
longer accepting late deliveries and designers could not continue changing their designs 
all the time. more importantly, designers had to change their way of working and find a way 
of visualizing their ideas in such a way that suppliers could translate these ideas into actual 
garments. next, they had to wait for the prototypes, which could either exceed expectations 
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or turn out disappointing. in this way, by shifting responsibilities of pattern making and 
sampling from the coordinating firm to the suppliers, oilily and its designers became more 
dependent on the capabilities and reliability of their suppliers. 
for oilily, it was a matter of balancing between keeping control over the creative process 
on the one hand, and making use of the knowledge and skills of the suppliers as much 
as possible, on the other. suppliers, however, due to their knowledge and skills, appeared 
to have their own ideas of how to organize production and, consequently, their own 
preferences of what kind of design information to receive. 
a recent occurrence during the development of one of the first collections of oilily World is 
a good illustration of this situation. apparently, marieke olsthoorn insisted on using oilily’s 
own paper patterns, like in the old days, and sent them to the supplier (interview 101029). 
however, when the prototypes arrived, it was clear that the manufacturer had not used 
these patterns at all (ibid.). many garment manufacturers do not work with paper patterns 
anymore, since cad/cam systems are much more efficient and widespread. despite marieke 
olsthoorn’s conviction that pattern and sample making should ideally be part of the design 
practice, she eventually had to acknowledge that their indian manufacturers were highly 
equipped for pattern making (interview 120314). 
again, this example illustrates how the long-term relationship between oilily and its indian 
supplier, as discussed in section 5.3.1, was not only a case of trust and mutual understanding, 
but did also involve an important learning process through which the manufacturer could 
acquire and further develop knowledge and skills.
the above analysis of oilily’s ways of organizing design and production shows that the 
creative practice of the brand needs to be compatible with the organizational structure of 
the supplier, and that it is not sufficient to select suppliers based on the aesthetics of their 
product alone. this may seem obvious, but i consider it a key issue in the development 
of oilily and its struggles to successfully transform its organization. Without aiming to 
determine a definite cause for the company’s failure, it seems that oilily’s creative freedom 
– one of the brand’s main strengths – became its main weakness, once it was no longer 
compatible with the organization of production and the changing practices in the dutch 
and global fashion industry. 
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5.4 the stRUCtURinG foRCes of oililY’s CReatiVe   
 pRaCtiCes
the development of oilily from a manufacturer to a licenser is an exemplary case of 
increasing distance between design and manufacturing. the main question is how this 
distanciation affects the relationship between the two and how organizational practices are 
key in understanding this relationship. in the final part of this chapter, i will argue that in 
the case of oilily, the relationship between design and manufacturing is manifested in the 
ways in which creative practices have structured the entire organization for a long time.  
the observation of former product and production managers that oilily B.V. was marked by 
an ‘absence of structure’ perhaps tells us more about oilily’s organizational practices than 
its structure. one way to explain this point is by recalling my research process. in analysing 
oilily’s organizational structure and the development of its global production network, 
i focused on ownership, partnerships, and sourcing strategies. at first, this seemed a 
rather straightforward way to determine what type of firm oilily was in specific periods in 
history, and how the production network was organized accordingly. however, throughout 
the research process, mapping these structures turned out to be a complex exercise. 
the absence of corporate documents such as organization charts, and my consequent 
reliance on human memory in this regard, is just one reason why reconstructing oilily’s 
organizational structures has been complicated. 
another reason is related to the apparent blurring boundaries between retail, wholesale, and 
manufacturing, as discussed in chapter 2. in its heyday in the 1980s and early 1990s, oilily 
engaged in both retail and wholesale, controlled manufacturing without actually owning 
factories, and combined a variety of cmt and fP based sourcing strategies. depending 
on the product and the location of the garment supplier, fabrics were either developed in-
house, sourced by oilily’s fabric buyers, or developed/sourced by the ready-made garment 
suppliers. more and more functions were being outsourced, but there was no clear-cut 
distinction between keeping capabilities in-house or sourcing them out. except for the 
two bankruptcies, it was a gradual transformation that usually involved a combination of 
different organizational structures.
While this difficulty in determining definite, clear-cut organizational structures and 
boundaries can be conceived as problematic in the research process, my argument points 
in another direction: the distinction between structure and practice. in this case, this 
distinction seems more of an analytical construction than an observable reality. asking 
designers, product developers and production managers about what they do, how they 
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work, and how their work relates to other practices, revealed structuring principles that can, 
but not necessarily do, relate to the organizational structures, as discussed above. as the 
case of oilily clearly illustrates, organizational practices can be more rigid and structuring 
than organizational structures. this case thus demonstrates how analysing organizational 
practices, as a source of both stability and change, can sometimes better account for the 
organization’s development than the structure of a global production network alone.
as discussed in the previous section, one of the problems that oilily encountered was its 
inability to successfully adapt its creative practices to the new organizational structure and 
industrial requirements without losing its creative strengths. oilily’s organizational structure 
constantly changed during its growth from the 1960s to the 1990s, but the design practice 
remained driven by unlimited creativity. organizational change thus had to be compatible 
with the creative practice – not the other way around. When the new management tried to 
change oilily’s organizational structure in such a way that it had a significant impact on the 
company’s creative practice, the emergent resistance was a consequence of a practice that 
had become the structuring principle of the entire company.
for a long time, oilily was literally driven by creativity; design was the leading organizational 
practice within the company. from a capabilities perspective, it thus seemed a logical 
decision for oilily to outsource manufacturing more and more. after all, the company was 
founded by a salesman (Willem olsthoorn) and a textile design teacher (marieke olsthoorn), 
so in-house knowledge of large-scale industrial production was never fully developed. in 
the 1960s and 1970s, as more and more dutch clothing firms relocated their production 
facilities to lower-wage countries, many domestic manufacturers were confronted with 
rising competition and thus focused on ways to organize production as cost-effectively as 
possible. 
although olly’s in the 1960s and 1970s can also be defined as a manufacturer, the main 
driving force was always the development and sales of a unique product. manufacturing was 
a means to an end, not the goal itself. it thus represents a different case from companies 
with manufacturing legacies of many decades that started to add ‘fashion content’ to 
their products in the second half of the twentieth century. in the case of olly’s, the point 
of departure was the creative content, to be supported by the location and organization of 
manufacturing. since domestic production was common practice in the 1960s, organizing 
its own manufacturing in the netherlands was a logical choice for oilily at the time. 
once domestic manufacturing was no longer sustainable, it may be argued that oilily, to 
some extent, benefited from the fact that the main strengths of the founding fathers were 
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not organizing manufacturing, but design and sales – the core business of a head-and-tail 
type organization. to reiterate, oilily’s creative practice worked as a structuring principle 
for the entire organization: as long as the design practice and its creative freedom could be 
fully achieved, it was not that important whether manufacturing took place in alkmaar or 
delhi. the structure of the production network had to facilitate the design practice, and, in 
that way, the design practice ‘structured’ the way production was organized.
the role of oilily’s specific way of organizing the creative process is also crucial in 
understanding how design became detached from manufacturing. taking into account 
the role of oilily’s own sample room, its in-house development of fabric designs, and its 
integrated practice of design and pattern making, we see that working with physical garments 
constituted a substantial part of its creative practice for a long time. oilily’s strong control 
of a large part of the supply chain was the result of its conviction that design is a tangible 
practice. once this design practice had to change – due to organizational changes such as 
the closure of the sample room, but also because of the development of technological tools 
such as computer-aided design – the relationship between design and manufacturing was 
also bound to change. hence, it was not the geographical and organizational separation of 
design from manufacturing as such, but the eventual change of the creative practice itself 
that resulted in a greater detachment. 
as mentioned, marieke olsthoorn preferred to design and create without the help of 
computers because she was strongly convinced of the added value of handcrafted designs. 
this way of working requires specifically educated designers who have thorough knowledge 
of pattern making and sewing techniques. according to marieke, these qualities have 
become difficult to find; oilily World now has to rely on a woman in her late seventies when 
they want to physically try out things (interview 100903). this indicates that design	within the 
dutch fashion industry of the twenty-first century is less concerned with the actual practice 
of constructing a garment in the way that marieke olsthoorn understood it.
this finally brings me to another set of structuring principles that goes beyond oilily’s 
organizational boundaries: the fashion system. even though oilily’s founders and their 
successors claim they do not make fashion, their business is situated within an industry 
that follows the cyclical nature of the fashion system. in the early years, oilily’s novelty and 
exclusivity allowed the company to pay less attention to lead times and price issues. But the 
growing number of fashion brands offering ‘different’ children’s wear collections, and the 
consequent growing competition among brands and retailers, led to a situation in which it 
seems impossible to entirely escape the rules of the fashion industry. When retailers buy 
according to particular schedules based on seasonal change, late or incomplete deliveries 
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are no longer acceptable. now retailers also compete on the basis of having the right 
products at the right time for the right price. more and more retailers and brands moved 
toward more than two collections a year, in order to entice consumers to spend their money 
on clothing more often. copying styles became common practice, especially among fast 
fashion retailers, and ‘being the first’ became even more important for a brand to avoid 
becoming the victim of cheap(er) knock-offs. even if a company makes ‘timeless’ items that 
can be worn by subsequent generations, it has to present new designs on a regular basis. 
these temporal ‘rules’ of the fashion system are, of course, not a top-down declaration 
of some industry organization, but the result of institutionalized, common organizational 
practices of wholesalers, retailers, and consumers within the industry. oilily initially became 
successful by withdrawing from the established order of clothing manufacturers and being 
one of the first to offer a distinctive children’s wear collection. But the fashion industry 
changed in such a way that other structuring practices became the norm – practices that 
were difficult to adapt to and eventually led to the more radical change from ‘producer’ to 
‘licenser’. 
5.5 ConClUdinG ReMaRKs
the case of oilily represents both a pioneering role in creating an innovative brand freed from 
the constraints of the dutch clothing industry, and the challenges that come along with an 
increasingly fragmented production network. Based on the configuration of oilily’s global 
production network, the brand faced increasing geographical distance between design 
and manufacturing. in this chapter i have demonstrated how focusing on organizational 
practices can provide a more nuanced understanding of the effects of this distance. more 
specifically, i argued that oilily’s particular way of organizing the design practice explains 
how the firm has been able to overcome the apparent friction of distance.
under supervision of lead designer marieke olsthoorn, design was a highly personalized and 
tangible practice, comprised of handcrafted drawings and pattern making. as such, both 
aesthetic and technical knowledge and skills resided in this practice, and manufacturing 
was virtually embedded in the design practice. in the face of changing market conditions 
and the institutionalized rules of the fashion system that demanded more frequent and 
on-time deliveries, this specific design practice seemed to have reached its limits. the 
organization had to change in such a way that it no longer allowed for a design practice 
to be the	structuring principle for the entire organization. for oilily to remain successful 
in developing a marketable product, it became more dependent on the way distant 
manufacturers would execute the designers’ ideas, based on the information provided by 
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oilily’s product developers. this involved a radical change of organizational practices that 
met with considerable resistance; design and manufacturing were disconnected in such a 
way that oilily’s creativity no longer determined the organization of production. 
By analysing this apparent detachment from manufacturing, this chapter has also 
demonstrated how organizational practices – in this case, oilily’s design practice – proved 
to be an important source of stability. as such, the organizational practice of design largely 
determined the organization’s identity and performance.

tiMeline 
1970  rattan chadha travels to nl and starts selling indian garments to boutiques,   
  made in his sister’s factory
1970s  shäfferson shads: import/wholesale business
  Private label for department stores and specialty chain stores in nl; distribution  
  for esprit
late 1970s own fabric and garment buying office new delhi
1979  liquidation of the business due to quality and delivery problems
1980  amex fashion b.V. 
  design, production and sales of two own brands emanuelle and Moustache;  
  international growth
1981  sales office leiden
1983  amex international b.V.
  design office Wassenaar
1985  own production centre hong Kong
1986  launch Mexx
  mexx corporate centre in Voorschoten
1990  add ‘citywear’ (formal) to casual wear; set up european production
1990  mexx Youth collection
1992  minimexx collection; start own retail
1996  Babymexx collection
1997  mexxsport collection; XX by mexx collection and several other brand extensions
  first flagship store in antwerp
2001  liz Claiborne inc. acquires controlling interest
2004  design centre to amsterdam
2006  chadha withdraws; Jeff fardell new ceo
2008  tom fitzgerald interim ceo
  li & fung ltd. main sourcing agent
2009  thomas grote ceo
2011  the Gores Group acquires controlling interest
2012  thomas grote resigns
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ChapteR 6 
|  meXX’ coordinated stYle
 from importing clothes to marketing a lifestyle
recognised as a truly international brand, based in the netherlands, some people 
are surprised to discover that mexx’s founders are indian. for me, and the friends 
with whom i started this company, the combination could not be more ideal. a 
truly global brand needs its leaders to be global thinkers. We’ve never considered 
ourselves to be strictly indian, dutch or english. We are citizens of the world, with 
an international perspective and a contemporary lifestyle. this is the dna of our 
brand, and it was this attitude we aimed to convey when we set out to build this 
company from scratch.
Rattan Chadha (Chadha, 2006: 19)
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the brand name mexx was launched in 1986, but the company’s history dates back to the 
early 1970s when rattan chadha travelled from india to the netherlands to set up his first 
fashion business. unlike oilily in the previous chapter and Van gils in chapter 8, mexx did 
not emerge out of a dutch manufacturer specializing in a particular product category such 
as children’s wear or men’s suits. instead, mexx was created as a lifestyle brand that offered 
a ‘total look’. Production was organized according to the needs of particular styles (e.g. 
casual, fashionable, affordable, urban). accordingly, mexx never owned any production 
plants, but outsourced manufacturing to india and the far east from the start. later on, 
the company started to source from manufacturers in the netherlands and europe as well, 
albeit not primarily to reduce costs, but in search of different styles and qualities. 
mexx played an important role in the development of the dutch fashion industry as a 
forerunner of a number of organizational strategies that are now considered the standard 
within the industry. these include the development of coordinated collections and a lifestyle 
approach to branding, geographical spread of manufacturing as a sourcing strategy in 
general, subcontracting of manufacturing to the far east in particular, multiple delivery 
systems, and the introduction of the pre-selling or forward ordering formula (Boudeguer & 
Van leeuwen, 1994). 
i will elaborate on each of these aspects in more detail later in this chapter. first, it is 
important to take into account that mexx’ organization is marked by geographical distance 
between design and manufacturing right from the start of the business. Based on my 
practice-oriented conceptual framework, it is therefore expected that mexx has developed 
specific organizational practices to manage production at a distance. this chapter aims to 
reveal these organizational practices and assess to what extent these practices – and the 
relationship between design and manufacturing – differ from brands such as oilily that 
started as manufacturers and outsourced manufacturing later on. 
in the following three sections, i explore how mexx succeeded in managing the distanciated 
relationship between design and manufacturing without ever owning any manufacturing 
plants. i will also demonstrate that mexx’ organizational practices were facilitated by 
a specific organizational structure, which proved difficult to adapt once the structure 
changed. i develop my argument as follows. first, to understand mexx’ position in the dutch 
fashion market, section 6.1 discusses how mexx has developed into a dutch lifestyle brand 
with global reach. second, through an analysis of the company’s organizational structure, 
section 6.2 reveals the complexity of mexx’ global production network as a consequence of 
spatially dispersed sourcing and distribution strategies. third, section 6.3 elaborates on 
how mexx manages this complexity by aiming at an alignment of all	organizational practices 
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of the corporation. here, the emphasis is on practices of coordination and the codification 
of these practices in the form of an integrated planning tool. the chapter concludes by 
demonstrating how this strong focus on coordination	and	planning affects the relationship 
between design and manufacturing at a distance. 
6.1 a stoRY of entRepReneURship, Global identitY,  
 and lifestYle bRandinG
the story of mexx goes back to 1970, when rattan chadha travelled from india to the 
netherlands and set up his first fashion business.29 as the story of mexx has been told several 
times (e.g. chadha, 2006; land, 1999), i only briefly discuss the company’s history in order 
to understand the position of mexx within the dutch fashion industry and to introduce the 
main themes that define the relationship between design and manufacturing within mexx’ 
organizational development.
in the 1970s, together with a couple of close friends, chadha set up a company called 
shäfferson shads. it started as an agent for retailers – mainly boutiques – and gradually 
became a profitable wholesale business, developing and importing private label collections 
specially designed for, and carrying the label of, dutch department stores such as V&d and 
c&a, and specialty chain stores like foxy fashion. as it was the time of the hippie movement 
in the netherlands, the company thrived on the popularity of typical indian styles and took 
advantage of the cheaper production opportunities the indian apparel industry had to 
offer. the first collections were made in the factory of chadha’s sister Prabha. By the late 
1970s, chadha had his own buying office in new delhi and production was spread to various 
factories in india and sri lanka. 
in 1979 a combination of quality issues, changing fashions, late deliveries, and order 
cancellations forced chadha to liquidate his first business. in retrospect, this ‘failure’ 
turned out to be an important learning experience for chadha that would largely shape the 
way he built his future fashion empire. in his own words: 
29  for the following reconstruction of mexx’ history and figures i have drawn on my interview data and 
a number of secondary sources including research reports, commercial publications, and newspaper 
articles (abcouwer, 2004; andriesse & holzhauer, 1994; Bomers & Boudeguer, 1990; Bosveld, 2008; 
Brinks et al., 2000; chadha, 2006; couzy & lampe, 2010; diepenbrock & Van der Zant, 2001; dohmen, 
1999; frolke, 2003; hooimeijer, 2001; Kosterman, 2005; land, 1999; mangat, 2006; mexx, 1991; mexx 
international B.V., 1987; “mexx verkoopt zichzelf”, 2001; Probe & Wollenschläger, 2009; reijngoud, 
2008; rolvink, 2011; schouten, 2009; simons et al., 1995b; staps, 2007; Van dijk, 2007; Van lent, 
2003; Van maurik, 2012; Van roosmalen, 1996; Voormolen, 2010; Vos, 1999; Washburn et al., 2009; 
Weeda, 2001). for the sake of readability, i only include references in the text where quotations or 
exact figures are involved.
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i have made all the mistakes that one can possibly make. But from each and every 
mistake i have learned something. my first experience in the fashion business taught 
me how one should not go about setting up a successful organization (rattan chadha 
in Bomers & Boudeguer, 1990: 6).
two issues in particular are relevant to emphasize here. first of all, while chadha understood 
that design and sales are important aspects of the fashion business, the problems he 
encountered in the mid-1970s made him realize that production is an essential factor as 
well. although production costs in india were low, the company’s indian suppliers “were 
not always prompt when it came to production schedules [and] garments were often late 
and had quality control issues” (chadha, 2006: 33). furthermore, chadha and his partners 
realized that the specific styles of indian garment manufacturers might limit the company’s 
fashion sense once the hippie movement would come to an end. 
in order to diversify their collections and	to improve the performance of their production 
network, they decided to set up a new company. they searched for other production facilities 
in the far east, i.e. hong Kong: “[a] place known for its unrivalled capacity for speed, 
efficiency and accuracy” (chadha, 2006: 9). the second important change that chadha 
implemented in his next business involved the switch from private labels to the creation of 
his own brands. as department stores and specialty chains refused late deliveries, shäfferson 
shads had to deal with unwanted stock that was impossible to sell to other customers, due 
to the original labels attached to the garments. 
Based on the lessons learned from the failure of shäfferson shads, rattan chadha 
thoroughly rethought his business and established a different company in 1980, called 
amex fashion B.V. the corporate strategy of this new, fast-growing business was based on a 
number of key principles – such as the Concept	Cycle and pre-selling – to avoid inventory risks 
and the dependence on only a few customers (Bomers & Boudeguer, 1990). in other words, 
to ensure a more reliable and flexible organization, chadha implemented new branding, 
sales, and sourcing strategies that would alter the company’s entire way of doing business in 
the next decades. these principles and the resulting organizational structure are discussed 
in more detail in section 6.2. in the remainder of this section, i confine myself to the general 
development and performance of the company and its brand(s). 
in 1980, amex launched two brands: emanuelle for women and moustache for men. the 
collections offered what they called a total	 look: “articles and accessories with matching 
colours, fabrics, styling and gimmicks which can be bought separately allowing the 
customer to ‘assemble’ his/her own outfit” (Bomers & Boudeguer, 1990: 7). the collections 
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consisted of “fully coordinated, cheerful designs with bright primary colours and creative 
prints like polka dots and florals” (chadha, 2006: 40). they appealed to young, fashion-
minded people who were looking for “clothing that was fun, comfortable and affordable but 
also easy to understand and to combine” (chadha, 2006: 45). 
Figure	6.1:	Emanuelle	&	Moustache	catalogues	in	the	1980s.	
From	It	Started	with	a	Kiss:	Twenty	Years	of	Mexx	(p.	41),	by	
N.	Chadha,	2006,	Amsterdam,	BIS	Publishers.
the concept was a successful approach to fashion 
in the 1980s. the company quickly expanded 
sales beyond the Benelux countries to include 
sweden, finland, norway, denmark, france, 
the united Kingdom, switzerland, greece, and 
canada (chadha, 2006). this resulted in a rapid 
increase of turnover as well: from approximately 
36 million euro in 1980 to over 200 million euro at 
the end of the 1990s (Boudeguer & Van leeuwen, 
1994; dutch chamber of commerce). however, 
whereas in 1980 the company faced only two or 
three serious competitors within the mid-price 
segment (i.e. esprit, inWear and Benetton), five 
years later there were over a hundred: “imitation 
had become rampant and it was more and more 
difficult to distinguish oneself” (Bomers & 
Boudeguer, 1990: 4). 
determined to turn amex into a worldwide corporation, chadha decided to build a lifestyle 
brand with a global image. in 1986, the company launched a new brand name – mexx – 
marketed as a marriage between moustache and emanuelle, sealed with two kisses: “We 
are not selling pieces of cloth any longer, we are selling a concept to customers who have a 
young, optimistic, modern, urban, international, and self-assured approach to life” (rattan 
chadha in Boudeguer & Van leeuwen, 1994: 116).
the brand concept was still based on the idea of a “total coordinated look”; a “casual 
coordinated design concept” (chadha, 2006: 66) that enables one to wear the clothes on 
different occasions, whether it be “a student, office worker, housewife, office executive or 
anybody else regardless of age who cares about his or her personal image” (chadha, 2006: 
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64). focusing on one coordinated brand concept enabled the company to develop several 
brand extensions to further facilitate its international growth. 
the first major diversification of the mexx collections was realized in the early 1990s, when 
competition grew and the casual coordinated look was no longer sufficient to satisfy an 
increasingly critical consumer. mexx decided to complement its casual wear with a more 
formal collection called Citywear. interestingly, this change of style involved a change in 
the company’s organization of production as well. citywear included constructed garments 
such as suits and blazers, which required different production skills; suppliers in the far 
east appeared unable to attain the right quality level. therefore, mexx set up a european 
production centre to complement production in the far east and india. in addition, mexx 
was able to reposition the brand because the “city line had set a new quality standard for 
[the] casual line” (chadha, 2006: 95). 
more brand extensions followed, including mexx Kids and mexx Junior in 1990, minimexx 
(babies and toddlers) in 1992, Babymexx (newborns) in 1996, mexxsport and XX by mexx 
in 1997, and a variety of licensed fashion-related products such as shoes, sunglasses, 
swimwear, watches, lingerie, fragrances, towels, bed linen, stationary, hair accessories and 
jewellery. moreover, the number of annual collections increased from two to six, spread over 
ten to twelve deliveries. 
as the variety of products increased, in the early 1990s mexx came to understand that 
the presentation of a lifestyle brand would benefit from a fully controlled and “uniquely 
mexx-designed environment” (chadha, 2006: 218). therefore, mexx started its own retail 
organization in 1992:
at first, our wholesale customers objected to our new strategy, arguing that opening 
our own mexx stores would compete with their established department store and 
boutiques store business. our sales managers, however, convinced customers that 
opening our own mexx stores would only strengthen people’s awareness of the mexx 
brand, something from which everyone could benefit (chadha, 2006: 220).
Back in the 1980s, the company had already made some attempts to engage in retail, 
including the set-up of specialty chain store didi (sold to coltex in 1984) and the takeover 
of the dutch retail chain fooks (sold in 1989) (Boudeguer & Van leeuwen, 1994). While 
these earlier attempts resulted in greater brand awareness in some countries, the labour- 
and inventory-intensive retail business was not compatible with the company’s wholesale-
driven sales and distribution system (ibid.). through a reorganization in the early 1990s, 
mexx managed to develop a retail network of its own brand stores and franchises, which 
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made mexx one of the first dutch fashion brands that became successful in both retail and 
wholesale. it started with a few stores in some smaller european cities and was followed by 
more and more flagship stores around the globe. 
Both retail and wholesale continued to grow during the 1990s, and at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, chadha planned to go public to raise capital for the company’s 
continuing international expansion. due to an unfavourable stock market climate, these 
plans were postponed, and in 2001 new York-based fashion group liz claiborne inc. 
acquired a controlling interest in mexx (hooimeijer, 2001). the aim of this takeover was 
to benefit both companies: “mexx could exploit liz claiborne’s deep pockets to write off 
its debt, generate capital for continued growth and take advantage of existing contract 
manufacturing deals in the far east” while “liz claiborne could capitalize on mexx’s capable 
management team, european style, global presence and specialty chain experience” 
(Washburn, hemant & dearth, 2009: 90). the takeover was seen as an opportunity for 
mexx to expand its business into the american market, while liz claiborne could expand 
in europe (hooimeijer, 2001). mexx launched its first flagship store in the united states in 
2003 on new York’s fifth avenue. 
after liz claiborne’s takeover, mexx’ founders stayed on as managing directors until 
2006. after that, several changes of management and corporate strategy seemed to turn 
the tide for the company. its growth stagnated, sales figures dropped and more and more 
unprofitable outlets had to be closed, including all u.s.-based stores by 2007 (staps, 2007).
in 2004, modint – the dutch trade association for fashion and textiles – had awarded rattan 
chadha with the grand seigneur, praising his vision, guts, drive, style, and a tremendous 
sense of organization, marketing and Pr (modint, 2004). although it is hard to determine 
the exact causes for the company’s recent struggles, many sources, including press 
and (former) managers and employees, refer to chadha’s departure as a loss of mexx’ 
‘spirit’. When chadha withdrew in 2006, followed by some 25 more managers (Probe & 
Wollenschläger, 2009), mexx is said to have lost its ‘heart and soul’. chadha’s successors – 
australian Jeff fardell (nike), american tom fitzgerald (liz claiborne), and german thomas 
grote (esprit) – appeared unable to effectively cope with mexx’ growing competition 
and to continue its former success. in the company’s 2011 annual report, the focus is on 
restructuring and future challenges and risk factors (mexx lifestyle B.V., 2012). grote, who 
has put considerable effort into (re-)building mexx’ brand image – in terms of marketing 
and in terms of quality by investing in product development – resigned in 2012, (e.g. Van 
maurik, 2012). 
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What makes mexx’ development of particular interest for this study is the role that the 
organization of production played within this development. the company’s focus on 
geographical spread of manufacturing, its combination of retail and wholesale, and 
especially its coordinated system of design, marketing, production, and sales, all contribute 
to mexx’ corporate identity and brand image, which are based on a lifestyle concept instead 
of a specific product category. in the remainder of this chapter, i further explore the ways 
in which mexx’ emphasis on global sourcing, coordination, and brand identity defines the 
relationship between design and manufacturing.
6.2 Global CoMpleXitY
of course, making it real, that is, designing, producing, and shipping twelve 
collections, four times a year to thirty different markets, isn’t exactly given. it 
isn’t given, even with a perfectly integrated structure in place. and that structure 
continues to evolve simply because change itself is such a constant. no, one 
needs the systems to execute it all. this means knowing exactly where to get the 
right fabric, at the right price in time to make once a month deliveries to over 
9000 stores world-wide.
Mexx (1991)
the history of mexx can be roughly divided into three different organizational phases: from 
private label in the 1970s, via two brands in the 1980s, to the mexx lifestyle brand since 1986. 
the foundations of the current mexx organization were laid in 1980, when amex fashion B.V. 
was established. since the launch of the mexx brand in 1986, the company has undergone 
two major changes that affected its organizational structure: its expansion into retail at the 
beginning of the 1990s, leading to a dual business model of both wholesale and retail, and 
the takeover by liz claiborne in 2001 that led to a restructuring of the entire organization 
of production. 
since mexx has never owned any manufacturing plants and has outsourced manufacturing 
to the far east since the beginning, distance plays an important role in the company’s 
organizational development. in this section, the spatiotemporal development of mexx’ 
global production network is reconstructed from 1980 onward, in order to understand how 
spatial and organizational distance is manifested in its organizational structure.
6.2.1 the ameX grouP
amex fashion B.V. was set up in 1980 as a wholesale business involved in the design, 
production and sales of two brands: moustache for menswear and emanuelle for 
womenswear.  it started in a small apartment in the hague, but quickly expanded to two 
separate offices in the early 1980s: a design office in Wassenaar and a sales office in an old 
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printer factory in leiden. Production was mainly coordinated through two buying offices 
– one in new delhi and one in hong Kong. these offices spread manufacturing to several 
independent plants in india, sri lanka, and the far east. the number of plants grew from 20 
in 1980 to 150 in 1985 (Bomers & Boudeguer, 1990). 
While the new delhi-based fabric and garment buying office was inherited from chadha’s 
1970s shäfferson shads business, the connection with hong Kong was made through a 
buying agency owned by esprit, for which chadha’s business was a distributor in the 1970s 
(interview 111213). during the early 1980s, manufacturing gradually shifted from india to 
hong Kong “until [they] had a dedicated team of twenty-five people at the buying agency, 
working solely for moustache and emanuelle” (chadha, 2006: 39). By 1984, chadha decided 
to make the business in hong Kong independent and to set up amex’s own production 
centre and sample factory (ibid.). the hong Kong production centre – amex hong Kong ltd. 
– became a wholly owned subsidiary in 1985 (Bomers & Boudeguer, 1990), and eventually 
expanded manufacturing to places like china, taiwan, and Korea (chadha, 2006).
Figure	6.2:	Amex	organization	1985.	Based	on	Bomers	&	Boudeguer	(1990)
amex was a branded producer (cf. faust, 2005) that subcontracted manufacturing to 
independent manufacturing plants in the far east. since amex controlled the entire value 
chain except manufacturing, the company’s organizational structure can be defined as a 
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head-and-tail type of firm. it was, however, not one single firm. the amex group consisted 
of a spatially fragmented collection of relatively independent ‘stand-alone’ sales and 
production operations. the lead firm – amex international B.V. – was primarily a wholesale 
organization that “acted – in a way – as a supplier to the sales companies and agents” 
(Bomers & Boudeguer, 1990: 8). in the different countries where emanuelle and moustache 
were marketed, locally embedded and autonomous sales organizations were responsible 
for marketing, distribution, sales, and financial transactions with customers. these sales 
organizations drew on amex international as a joint supplier/wholesaler of the two brands, 
which was set up to centralize design, production coordination, group image, and financial 
concerns (Bomers & Boudeguer, 1990; land, 1999). 
amex’ fragmented structure was presumably a way to spread financial risks and increase 
flexibility in terms of manufacturing and sales, but it also posed a challenge how to smoothly 
connect the design ideas at amex’ headquarters with the ways the independent sales 
organizations priced, advertised, and merchandised these designs within their specific 
markets (Boudeguer & Van leeuwen, 1994). one way to balance this fragmentation was 
explained in amex’ so-called Concept	Manual, which would continue to play an important 
role at mexx: 
[i]n all dimensions of the company: management, manpower, collections, advertising, 
point of sale material, offices, packaging material, promotion articles, etc. the style 
of amex was to remain one and the same: casual, young and fashionable. likewise, 
everywhere in the world amex’s facilities were to match this image […] beginning by 
its corporate headquarters in Voorschoten. […] to maintain amex corporate identity, 
an eye is kept on all aspects: from the buttons on a shirt to the office buildings (Bomers 
& Boudeguer, 1990: 8).
amex (and later mexx) can be considered one of the first dutch fashion brands that explicitly 
aimed at building a strong corporate identity by creating a concept. even though the amex 
group consisted of a collection of autonomous profit centres, great emphasis was laid on 
corporate image and the accompanying policy guidelines outlined by the concept manual. 
as the following excerpt of the manual illustrates:
By giving the rights of distribution of amex product lines to a company, it not only 
becomes the responsibility of such a company to strictly adhere to the amex ‘group 
image’, but also is an extension of faith by the amex principals, to the distributor, to 
safeguard and protect their concept and personality (Bomers & Boudeguer, 1990: 18).
considerable effort was put into building and maintaining one strong and recognizable 
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brand identity that would define the brand’s products and its organizational culture. in 
addition to the concept manual, a major element of amex’s corporate strategy was the 
concept cycle, which was aimed at coordinating all the different operations within the 
organization (Bomers & Boudeguer, 1990). the concept cycle would also be one of the main 
structuring principles for mexx’ future development and – as a way of guiding organizational 
practices – this principle is further elaborated on in section 6.3. in order to understand the 
main changes in the spatiotemporal organization of mexx’ global production network, i will 
now focus on its organizational structure from 1986 onward.
6.2.2 the meXX grouP
mexx was built on the foundations of amex, as discussed in the previous section. its main 
strategy of focusing on concept, brand identity, design, marketing, and sales – while 
outsourcing manufacturing to the far east – continued to be the main driver of the new 
organization. however, from the launch of the new brand name in 1986 to the latest 
takeover of the company by the gores group in 2011 (see timeline), the mexx organization 
has changed on several levels. i specifically address those organizational changes that 
concern the spatiotemporal organization of mexx’ global production network, which are 
important elements in understanding the relationship between design and manufacturing. 
in my analysis, i follow the process from design to the organization of production and the 
organization of distribution and sales.
PRODUCTION:	FROM	ASIA	TO	EUROPE
mexx international B.V. – the headquarters of the mexx group – has been responsible for 
design and product development since 1986. design in particular has always been and 
continues to be centralized: between 1986 and 2004 mexx’ corporate headquarters were 
situated in a renovated former silver factory in Voorschoten; since 2004, nissan europe’s 
former head office in amsterdam serves this purpose. also from the start, mexx owned two 
buying offices: one in new delhi and the production centre in hong Kong. these offices 
distributed orders from the head office in the netherlands to the factories abroad. mexx 
did not work with independent agencies. in the 1980s and early 1990s, the majority of 
the collections were manufactured in the far east, including china, Japan, taiwan and 
singapore:
Production is controlled from hong Kong where our staff of 250 work in a centralized 
office, co-ordinating production and quality. the business of actually producing the 
clothes is sub-contracted to some 95 factories all over the far east which gives us an 
enviable degree of flexibility. using our own basic raw materials we utilise factories 
that specialise in particular items which may vary from season to season, collection to 
collection (mexx international B.V., 1987: 33).
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the first major change in the way production was organized occurred at the beginning of 
the 1990s. as mentioned above, changing fashions in the 1990s led mexx to search for new 
suppliers that were able to produce high-quality formal wear. these suppliers were first 
and foremost to be found in europe. therefore, a third buying office was set up – mexx 
europroduction B.V. it was located within the head office of mexx international, but its 
function was similar to the buying offices in india and hong Kong. europroduction allocated 
orders to manufacturers first in the netherlands and Belgium, and later to Portugal, greece, 
italy, and eastern europe, accounting for approximately 30 per cent of mexx’ turnover 
(Boudeguer & Van leeuwen, 1994). 
depending on the country and type of supplier, mexx europroduction worked both with 
agents and through direct sourcing (interviews 110805; 120221; 120315). suppliers in 
the netherlands and Belgium were mainly the relics of a once flourishing dutch clothing 
industry, such as saB fashion and interface fashion, which were important manufacturers 
for large chain stores like c&a and foxy fashion in the 1960s. in the 1990s, these producers 
were outsourcing manufacturing to eastern european countries including Poland, ukraine, 
and romania. they continued production through a head-and-tail construction for brands 
like mexx, often keeping their own sample rooms in the netherlands (interviews 110427; 
111104; 111206; 120321). most of these firms went bankrupt between the late 1990s and the 
early 2000s as more and more manufacturers – especially in turkey, but also in other parts 
of europe – developed into more integrated suppliers that also offered pattern and sample 
making, and even design. this further enabled dutch retailers and brands like mexx to 
source directly from these manufacturers abroad, and cut out the middlemen (interviews 
111104; 111206; 120112). 
an exception to the rule is dutch manufacturer grosso moda, which specializes in the 
production of suits. this company started in the early 1990s by setting up a cmt based 
manufacturing business in eastern europe. initially investing in its own production 
facilities in lithuania, the company has now developed into a full-service business able 
to manage all aspects of the supply chain – the ‘fashion complex’ as the company calls 
it – with manufacturing in lithuania, Belarus, ukraine, macedonia, turkey, and china 
(interview 120321). for mexx, grosso moda was an important “co-maker” as defined by 
scheffer and duineveld (2004: 346): a firm that “start[s] with designs supplied by clients, 
but organize[s] all preparation and offshore subcontracting of manufacturing as well as 
logistics and custom clearance.” the advantage of such co-makership lies primarily in 
working with a dutch partner who not only literally speaks the same language, but is likely 
to better understand mexx’ design ideas as well, hence strengthening relational proximity. 
furthermore, an additional advantage of working with european suppliers is that it enables 
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transportation of hanging garments, due to its relative geographical closeness (interviews 
110802; 111012; 111213).
While europroduction initially was set up for constructed garments such as blazers and 
suits, mexx started to source more products from its european suppliers. this is because 
mexx found that, for instance, “Portugal excelled in producing quality knitwear, while 
suppliers in turkey were known for their innovative casual styles” (chadha, 2006: 16). this 
led to a diversified supplier base of approximately 150 factories, on average, working for 
mexx during the 1990s (interview 110802). 
although mexx in principle aimed at long-term partnerships (interview 111213), changing 
fashions and macroeconomic developments led to continuous shifts in supplier countries, 
moving to, for instance, Bangladesh, Vietnam, and Korea (interview 110802) and reducing 
european production in favour of asian suppliers. however, the overall organization of 
production remained the same until 2008. the only major change that occurred in this period 
was the gradual outsourcing of fabric buying to ready-made garment suppliers. While in the 
beginning, mexx purchased all fabrics and trimmings to keep control over its raw materials, 
the financial and inventory risks involved in fabric buying were gradually shifted toward 
garment suppliers. however, mexx remained largely in control over purchasing by deciding 
which materials to buy and where (interviews 110802; 111213; 120221). 
Probably the most far-reaching change in mexx’ organization of production occurred when 
liz claiborne decided to merge its own production operations with those of mexx after 
2008. ultimately, this resulted in the closure of mexx’ own production centres, leaving 
production coordination to hong Kong-based agency li & fung ltd. a leading multi-national 
corporation specializing in supply chain management for all kinds of consumer goods, li & 
fung has a network of manufacturing relationships with offices all over the world (lane & 
Probert, 2009) and can control and coordinate “all stages of the clothing supply chain, from 
design and production planning [...] to the final stages of quality control, testing, and the 
logistics of distribution (dicken, 2007: 262). By the end of 2008, li & fung and mexx europe 
announced that 
they have entered into a Buying agency agreement whereby li & fung will act as the 
primary global apparel sourcing agent for the mexx brand. mexx’s existing buying 
offices, which will be integrated into the li & fung organization, are located in hong 
Kong, Bangalore, shanghai and shenzen (“liz to outsource”, 2008).
While mexx could now draw on an immense global supplier base, this agreement resulted in 
mexx depending on one exclusive agency. the ‘destruction’ – as one of mexx’ founders called 
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it in an interview (111025) – of the production centre in hong Kong is considered by many 
(former) managers and employees as one of the main problems affecting the company ever 
since. this will be further elaborated on in the analysis of mexx’ organizational practices in 
section 6.3. 
thomas grote, ceo from 2009 until 2012, regarded the exclusive relationship with li & 
fung as an unhealthy situation, and started to rebuild a more diversified supplier network 
(“redding mexx nabij”, 2010; interview 120221). Working both with agencies and direct 
vendors – as ready-made garment suppliers are now called – the main focus is still asia, 
though less in china and more in places like Korea, indonesia, and Bangladesh (interview 
120221). furthermore, a substantial part of production has now gone ‘back’ to europe, and 
turkey in particular (Pels, 2010). for suits, mexx still draws on the dutch supplier grosso 
moda (interview 110106-ii). 
figure 6.3 visualizes the organizational structure of mexx in its geographical context, based 
on the situation before the takeover by liz claiborne. it shows – albeit in a simplified way – 
how mexx’ offshore sourcing strategies connect the firm to a globally dispersed network of 
subcontractors.  
Figure	6.3:	Mexx	organization	2000:	a	Dutch	firm	with	global	organizational	reach
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DISTRIBUTION:	WHOLESALE	AND	RETAIL
in 1986, mexx started as a branded producer and wholesaler with a rather fragmented 
supply chain. every country had its own independent sales office, and goods were delivered 
via several distribution centres throughout europe (interview 110802). this resulted in a 
complex organization of financial and commodity flows, intensified by the fact that mexx 
bought its own fabrics and transported them to the manufacturers. due to its integrated 
planning system, which i will further discuss in section 6.3, mexx succeeded in managing 
this logistical challenge. 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, mexx faced increased competition from big specialty 
chains such as P&c and m&s in the netherlands and Belgium, and Kookoi in france: “With 
their ‘own label’ garments, improved design and aggressive advertising and merchandising, 
they were winning the price race. and brand companies were now feeling the draught” 
(Boudeguer & Van leeuwen, 1994: 109). in addition to the prospect of a european single 
market policy, mexx implemented a number of changes in its organization of distribution 
from the 1990s onward.
first of all, with the establishment of the european union and its single market policy in 
1992, national barriers became less relevant. consequently, mexx started to centralize 
its distribution (interview 110802; cf. Boudeguer & Van leeuwen, 1994). this meant that 
several sales offices and related distribution centres were being closed one by one. By 2001, 
orders could be consolidated and shipped to one, fully-automated, central distribution 
centre in Voorschoten with a space of around 25,000 square metres (chadha, 2006; Van 
stijn, 1999; interview 110802). this involved more flexibility and service toward customers, 
as they no longer had to purchase so-called prepacks – predetermined assortments of 
product categories and sizes – but could order single items. the consolidation of purchase 
orders enabled customers to buy smaller quantities, since mexx could combine these orders 
to achieve the required minima for production. 
By centralizing its distribution, mexx became a more rational, efficient, and cost-effective 
organization. in the early 1990s, the demand for a centralized distribution centre became 
even more pertinent when mexx decided to set up its own retail organization.
By 1992, it could no longer be denied that the fashion landscape was undergoing 
another major evolution. more and more department stores were developing their 
own house brands and increasingly high rents were forcing independent boutiques 
to move out of the high streets. in their place came a host of new specialty stores 
which concentrated on selling their own brands (chadha, 2006: 218).
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Wholesale and retail orders were initially separated flows of goods, distributed through 
different distribution centres. With the building of the fully automated distribution centre, 
retail and wholesale became part of the same inventory system. this enabled the company 
to, for instance, exchange goods between wholesale and retail if required, and thus allowed 
for more flexibility (interview 110802).
mexx expanded its retail operations significantly from the late 1990s onward, after the 
opening of its first flagship store in antwerp in 1997:
We opened flagship stores in all of the major cities of europe, including amsterdam, 
arnhem, Breda, eindhoven, groningen, maastricht, the hague, rotterdam, utrecht, 
Brugge, Brussels, edinburgh, london, manchester, Berlin, Bonn, cologne, düsseldorf, 
frankfurt, hamburg, stuttgart, Vienna, cannes, Bordeaux, lyons, marseille, Paris, 
strasbourg, toulouse and oslo (chadha, 2006: 226).
in this way, mexx became a branded marketer (cf. lane & Probert, 2009) focusing on 
multiple channels of distribution. more recently, mexx has somewhat re-shifted its focus 
from retail to wholesale. according to thomas grote, between 2001 and 2006 mexx had 
opened too many stores that were too big for the brand’s collections, which is why he closed 
a considerable number of unprofitable retail businesses after he became ceo in 2009 (Van 
maurik, 2012). nevertheless, grote did not write off retail entirely; he continued mexx’ dual 
business model of both wholesale and retail (Voormolen, 2010).
this dual business model of wholesale and retail is important to take into account, as both 
systems rely on a different way of organizing the supply chain. By engaging in retail, mexx 
became more responsive to changing market demands, due to a more direct line from 
design and production to sales to the final consumer. at the same time, mexx could not 
operate as a pure retailer like Zara or mango; it would provoke unwanted competition 
between its own retail outlets and its wholesale customers if the collections in its own stores 
differed too much from what wholesale customers were able to order (interview 111213). 
the main reason why mexx chose this multiple channel distribution system is related to its 
global reach. retail landscapes differ from country to country, which means that a brand’s 
own retail is more suitable for one market, while wholesale is suitable for another (ibid.). 
mexx operated in different markets through different channels of distribution, which is why 
building and maintaining a strong recognizable brand image became even more important. 
mexx has therefore invested in centralizing its flows of goods, as well as its marketing 
operations. 
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With the aim of linking the activities of design and production with those of the local sales 
operations, a marketing department at mexx international’s headquarters was established 
in 1989, employing corporate brand managers for the women, men, and youth collections 
(Boudeguer & Van leeuwen, 1994). this system of brand management did more than 
centralize marketing activities; brand managers to some extent could also influence design 
and production by reporting input from local sales managers to design and production at 
mexx headquarters (Boudeguer & Van leeuwen, 1994). in this way, mexx introduced a new 
organizational structure to the dutch fashion industry in which design, production, and 
sales are strongly connected through a centralized system of information flows. 
6.2.3 the Production of one Brand in multiPle marKets
the organizational structure of mexx, as discussed above, reveals a complex and globally 
dispersed network of buying and production centres, manufacturers and subcontractors, 
and sales organizations, coordinated by the company’s headquarters in the netherlands. 
operating in the market of fast-changing fashions, this structure first and foremost poses 
logistical challenges to ensure that the right goods arrive at the right place at the right 
time. mexx was remarkably strong at synchronizing all operations from design to shop floor 
delivery, achieving one of the highest distribution efficiency in the industry: a “distribution 
rate of 97% of orders placed compared with an industry average of 80%” (Boudeguer & Van 
leeuwen, 1994: 125). 
considering the organizational development of mexx and its predecessors, three remarkable 
changes in the organization of production and distribution are important to consider within 
the analysis of the brand’s organizational practices and the relationship between design 
and manufacturing. the first change involves the expansion of manufacturing relationships 
from the far east to europe. continuous shifts in production locations are common practice 
within the globalized fashion industries. however, while most dutch fashion firms gradually 
moved from the netherlands and europe to the far east, mexx has moved in the opposite 
direction. the rationale for this locational shift is more informed by changing fashions – and 
thus changing manufacturing requirements – than by the search for lower costs. Particularly 
in its heyday, mexx was a design-driven company (interview 120221), and production was 
geared to the demands of design. india was chosen for its hippie styles, hong Kong for 
its casual-coordinates, and europe for its formal wear. likewise, certain countries within 
europe were selected on the basis of product specializations. in the words of one of mexx’ 
founders: “in mexx we used to say ‘the first hierarchy of decision-making is produce where 
it is best available’” (interview 111213). in the 1980s, manufacturing in the far east was 
driven by mexx’ aim to create a total, coordinated, casual look: “our goal was not to make 
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a better shirt, but to make something that matched: that was something you couldn’t do 
here [i.e. in the netherlands or europe]” (interview 111025) because every manufacturer 
was specialized in a certain product category. this means that for mexx, the relationship 
between design and manufacturing seems to define the structure of the organization of 
production. 
the second significant organizational change that affected mexx’ management of the 
relationship between design and manufacturing is the establishment and closure of the 
hong Kong production centre. the closure implied a further outsourcing of buying and 
production operations to an independent agency. Perhaps more importantly, it resulted 
in the loss of locally embedded technical knowledge and skills that had been built over 
decades. thus, as i will argue in the next section, the closure of the production centre 
required a new way of coordinating design and manufacturing, which affected mexx’ 
organizational practices that once relied heavily on the presence of this production centre.
thirdly, i argue that the mode of distribution is strongly connected to the organization of 
design and production. the concurrent diversification and centralization of distribution and 
sales, as discussed above, put additional emphasis on planning and control of the entire 
production network. the reason why specialty chains became such fierce competitors 
for mexx is because their operations cycle is shorter. since pure retailers do not have to 
make salesmen samples to sell their collections in showrooms before the garments can 
be produced for the shop floor, their lead times are shorter and their supply chains more 
responsive. hence retail and wholesale work according to different schedules. that is why 
mexx’ dual business model requires a more complex system of aligning the practices of 
design, production, and distribution in such a way that all customers receive their collections 
in time.
mexx’ way of coordinating its globally dispersed operations is crucial in understanding how 
design and manufacturing relate to each other. this requires a more detailed analysis of the 
company’s organizational practices, which is provided in the next section.
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6.3 oRGaniZational pRaCtiCes: dRiVen bY the    
 sChedUle
to back up a clever idea an equally intelligent system is required to make it 
work, so we formulated our ‘concept cycle’ – a sophisticated approach linking 
all aspects of the business, a chain reaction right across the company involving 
everyone and everything necessary to design, produce, market and sell our 
products successfully. every link in the chain is vital and each needs to succeed on 
its own for the company to succeed as a whole...and design is the first link in the 
chain.
Mexx international b.V. (1987: 19)
in my search for potential interviewees for the different case studies, i found numerous 
people who had at some point worked for mexx or moustache and emanuelle. considering 
the growth of the company since the 1980s, in a country as small as the netherlands and in 
a fashion industry that consists mainly of small and medium-sized enterprises, this is hardly 
surprising. from the interviews i conducted with both current and former mexx employees, 
i gather that mexx was an important training ground for many fashion professionals in the 
netherlands. these people often started at mexx in an early stage of their careers and were 
given the opportunity to learn the business through trial and error. this is similar to the 
experience of buyers at mac & maggie, as will be discussed in chapter 7. mexx was known 
for its horizontal organization and a culture based on “continuous development, taking up 
challenges, learn from each other, a positive attitude, mutual respect, joint achievements 
and individual responsibility/self-directed learning” (land, 1999: 235). 
although it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the impact of a single firm on an entire 
industry and vice versa, mexx is often considered a pioneering firm in the netherlands that 
set an important example for many of today’s fashion firms’ way of organizing (interviews 
110802; 120221; 120315; Boudeguer & Van leeuwen, 1994). Probably the best-known aspect 
of mexx’ business strategy involves its integrated way of planning the entire value chain, 
which i address in the first part of this section. in the second part, i provide a more detailed 
analysis of those organizational practices that enabled mexx to manage the relationship 
between design and manufacturing at a distance.
6.3.1 meXX, a deadline comPanY
one of mexx’ founders explained the company’s role in the history of the dutch fashion 
industry as follows: “We brought order to a chaotic industry” (interview 111025). While such 
a statement may sound somewhat vainglorious, overestimating the power of a single firm, 
it illustrates both an important aspect of mexx’ way of working and how this organization 
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relates to the industry as a whole. mexx is a ‘deadline company’ that puts great emphasis 
on discipline (Kosterman, 2005), but the complex ways in which buyers and suppliers in the 
fashion industry are interconnected means that all aspects of the entire value chain need to 
be aligned with each other. 
for mexx, working according to a tight schedule is only possible if suppliers follow the 
same schedule with the same discipline. moreover, once a growing fashion firm like mexx 
achieves on-time delivery rates of more than 98%, as several interviewees have claimed 
(e.g. interviews 110427; 110802), customers’ expectations are raised as well. While it may be 
difficult to substantiate the claim that mexx was the first fashion company with such a well-
organized chain – esprit, for instance, had a similar approach – it is safe to argue that mexx 
played a substantial role in ‘disciplining’ the often emotion-driven fashion business. in the 
words of rattan chadha:
one of the values was and is to leave behind the unbusiness-like approach in fashion. 
i wanted to lead mexx like a computer company. in fashion too you just have to deliver 
goods at the start of each month. We have twelve collections a year [and] turnover 
rates are extremely high, which is very demanding for an organization. mexx is a 
deadline company. everything is planned a year ahead. the factories know, everybody 
knows (Kosterman, 2005).
according to chadha, people in the fashion business were not used to strict deadlines and 
reliable deliveries, and were therefore shocked when mexx delivered ten thousand garments 
on-time, in the right colours and the right sizes (Kosterman, 2005). 
how was mexx able to create such a disciplined way of doing business? Which organizational 
practices did mexx employ and how did they differ from other businesses? as i mentioned 
above, a cornerstone of chadha’s strategy, which he had developed in the early 1980s when 
he started with amex, is the so-called concept cycle:
[...] a coordination system whereby the different disciplines of the company’s 
operational structure are intertwined in a continuous and self-perpetuating cycle. the 
underlying philosophy is that all elements of amex must operate like a clock; they 
must function synchronically. no element should run ahead nor stay behind (Bomers 
& Boudeguer, 1990: 7).
mexx developed an integrated planning tool from this concept cycle, partly out of necessity; 
amex worked with many independent sales units that needed to receive their salesmen 
samples and orders all at the same time (chadha, 2006). this tool – the so-called Annual	
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Schedule – contains non-negotiable deadlines for all operational activities “from the moment 
that designers should start sketching to when the garments should be delivered to [the] 
customers’ shop floors” (chadha, 2006: 50; see also land, 1999). 
during the company’s search for the most effective and efficient organization of production, 
the process from first idea to final shop delivery has been subject to several changes 
throughout the years. in principle, however, it encompasses the following basic steps:
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1. Planning Merchandisers draw up collection plan and line architecture 
2. Concept/Colours/Fabrics Designers draw inspiration (magazines, catwalk, travelling, 
shopping, Internet, et cetera), create moodboards and 
colour palettes;  
Buyers/product developers source fabrics 
3. Sketching and Artworks Designers draw first sketches and print designers make 
artworks  send information to Hong Kong 
4. Prototypes The production centre in Hong Kong makes first prototypes 
and sends them to Dutch headquarters 
5. Finalization of Designs Designers, pattern makers, and product developers 
evaluate the prototypes;  
Designers adjust style sheets and visit Hong Kong 
production centre together with product developers to 
discuss the changes and finalize the designs 
6. Sampling Hong Kong makes salesmen samples for showrooms 
7. Start Sales Customers visit Mexx showrooms to place orders 
8. Projections and Fabric Ordering Mexx orders/blocks fabrics and raw material based on 
estimated sales figures 
9. Close Sales Sales period ends 
10. Final Cut Final customer orders are fixed 
11. Purchase Orders Production centre legally commissions suppliers to produce 
garments under established terms and conditions 
12. Shipment and Delivery Garments are shipped to warehouse and then distributed to 
stores 
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it is important to note that this list of activities is a very basic description of the entire complex 
process from first idea to final in-store delivery. all steps contain various sub-processes, and 
many activities partly overlap in time, as they have to be executed simultaneously, instead 
of one after another. every step has in fact its own schedule of meetings, key dates, and 
responsible departments. i based this overview on production in hong Kong, as this was the 
most important part of mexx’ supplier base for a long time.
the entire production and sales process, as outlined by the annual schedule, is based on the 
so-called “pre-selling”, “sell-buy”, or “forward ordering” principle (Bomers & Boudeguer, 
1990: 7; interview 120315). mexx introduced this “method of forward ordering” with the 
aim of eliminating inventory risks: “[a]ll units to be produced were already sold” (Bomers 
& Boudeguer, 1990: 7). although this is now a common strategy in the apparel wholesale 
business, it was not so in the 1970s and 1980s; many wholesalers and fashion producers still 
produced first and tried to sell their stock afterward (interview 120315).
the mutually agreed-upon dates of the annual schedule are driven by the lead times of each 
activity and the dates of the sales periods: Start	 sales defines when product development 
needs to be finished, while close	 sales determines how much time is left to produce and 
deliver (interviews 110802; 120315). the schedule is thus based on the simple principle of 
backward planning (interviews 120221; 120315). an integrated, company-wide	planning, 
the annual schedule combines detailed schedules for each department (i.e. design, 
production, sales, et cetera) and	‘set in stone’ key dates that prescribe ‘handover deadlines’ 
between departments (interviews 110802; 120221). 
as the organization grew, the complexity of the annual schedule also increased. What had 
once started as a single sheet of paper had, by the twenty-first century, evolved into a book 
of more than 150 pages (chadha, 2006; interview 110805). such expansion is not only a 
result of the fact that the schedule itself became more detailed, but is also related to the 
number of annual collections mexx developed – from a two-cycle schedule, via four, to six, 
and very recently even a 12-cycle30 development schedule (interviews 120131; 120221).  
as an integrated planning tool, whether printed on paper or digitalized within the company’s 
erP system, mexx’ annual schedule can be considered an artefact in the way Pentland 
30  While nowadays many fashion brands have 10-12 deliveries per year, it is mostly based on a 6-cycle 
development, containing two deliveries per collection. in 2012, mexx has started to work in a 12-cycle 
rhythm, which means that designers have to create a new collection every month (interviews 120131; 
120221). 
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and feldman (2008a; 2008b) understand it: as both representing and guiding organizational 
routines and practices. although the schedule itself appears rather rigid and unchanging, 
it cannot be more than an indicator of actual organizational practices. in the case of mexx, 
this seems to be where the role of the annual schedule differs from any kind of planning in 
many other companies – the schedule sets dates to which the entire company commits itself, 
whereas in other companies, deadlines often appear to be constantly moving targets and 
people are constantly facilitating change (interview 120315). the success of mexx’ planning 
tool depends on people who are willing and able to work according to this schedule. What 
i gathered from most of my interviewees is that discipline is such an important corporate 
value that almost everyone meets the agreed-upon deadlines. 
the annual schedule codified the way we would do business for the next twenty years. 
it was consulted and followed down to the last detail by people all over the world (be 
they designers in the netherlands, sales people in germany or production people in 
hong Kong) (chadha, 2006: 50).
mexx’ annual schedule works through the alignment of different yet connected 
organizational practices. By focusing on key dates, the schedule particularly emphasizes 
these connections, as they define when one actor has to hand over its work to the next 
one in the chain. the question then is how such an integrated planning tool affects the 
organizational practices themselves. clearly, strict deadlines mean limited time to execute 
certain tasks. since this applies to production and shipment – as it does to design and 
product development – it implies obvious time constraints on the creative process. 
Yet even more than a temporal demarcation, the annual schedule is a manifestation of mexx’ 
division of labour and the relations between the practices to which this division pertains. 
the schedule both separates and connects different practices by defining the dates when 
the results of one practice need to be delivered to the next practice within the cycle. 
the annual schedule is an indicator of how different organizational practices relate to each 
other. however, in order to understand how these practices and their relations are affected 
by the schedule, we need to take a closer look at what these practices actually involve and 
how they work. one particular organizational practice in mexx’ concept cycle that needs 
further scrutiny aims at bridging the gap between design and manufacturing, and is 
therefore crucial to understanding how mexx managed this relationships at a distance: i.e. 
design-production coordination.
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6.3.2 design – Production coordination
the most evident moment when design and manufacturing ‘meet’, so to speak, is between 
step 3 and 4; that is, between the sketches and prototypes. the idea on paper becomes 
materialized in the first prototype, which is the first time designers have the opportunity to 
see and feel the physical garment. Yet, throughout the entire product development, from 
step 1 (planning) to step 6 (sampling), design and production are more or less connected 
in different ways.
design-Production coordination, or what mexx has called dPc, plays a crucial role in this 
relationship between design and manufacturing. to some extent, the design-production 
coordinator is comparable to what other fashion brands call buyers or product developers 
– they are responsible for translating designers’ ideas into producible and commercial 
products. 
however, when comparing the relationship between dPc and design in the early years 
of mexx to the relationship between buyers and designers at other fashion firms in the 
1970s-1980s, some distinguishing characteristics can be revealed. as one of mexx’ former 
design-production coordinators explains, buyers worked almost independently from 
designers; once designers had handed over their sketches to the buyers, “they did their 
own thing with it” (interview 150312). dPc, on the other hand, watches the product during 
the entire process, hence coordinating the relationship between design and production. 
the coordinators do not let go of the product until it reaches the shop floor. in a way, 
they are ‘translators’, but that does not mean that they act as some kind of spokesperson 
through which all communication flows between design and production (interviews 111213; 
120315). designers maintain direct contact with the production centre. But because design-
production coordinators oversee the entire process, they can advise designers at an early 
stage why things are possible or not, based on their knowledge and experience during the 
production stage. in this way, the dPc can be defined as an integrated product developer 
(interview 111213), as he or she is integrated into the entire process. 
the functioning of dPc within the entire organization of design, product development, and 
production cannot be fully understood without taking into account the role of the production 
centre in hong Kong. in the remainder of this section, i will argue that without the hong 
Kong production centre, dPc could no longer function in the way it was envisioned. mexx’ 
own production centre in the far east was an equally important element in the relationship 
between design and manufacturing. 
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HONG	KONG:	SITE-SPECIFIC	PRACTICES
instead of working with independent buying agents, mexx employed its own, local experts 
who had technical manufacturing knowledge and were in charge of fabric sourcing and 
production coordination (chadha, 2006). moreover, due to the production centre’s own 
small sample factory, 
they had the expertise to manufacture an entire sample collection, as well as create 
their own fabric patterns. this convenience made research and development as well 
as communication between the designers in the netherlands and the production 
people in hong Kong a lot smoother (chadha, 2006: 39).
in fact, the hong Kong production centre managed the entire sampling and manufacturing 
process. designers visited the centre every season to discuss the prototypes and finalize the 
collection. this facilitated direct communication between design and production during 
the product development phase. unsurprisingly, incorporating the production centre 
into the mexx organization was primarily motivated by the search for more dedication, 
control, and closer communication as opposed to working with an independent buying 
agency. the production centre incorporated valuable technical skills and knowledge of 
pattern making and manufacturing; it had grown with mexx, understood the brand’s ‘dna’ 
(interview 111025), and had developed a certain aesthetic signature as well. this enhanced 
the “seamless cooperation” (interview 110802) between mexx and the centre, which was 
considered one of mexx’ strengths as it played an important role for the brand’s consistency 
in terms of product quality and fit.
the significant role the hong Kong production centre played regarding how mexx managed 
the spatially distanciated relationship between design and manufacturing can be further 
explained by focusing on what happened once the production centre was closed. as we 
saw in section 6.2, liz claiborne announced in 2008 that it would outsource the majority of 
mexx’ production to the global buying agency li & fung. this involved a major change in the 
brand’s global production network – but more importantly, it changed the relationship with 
mexx’ suppliers and resulted in a different way of coordinating design and manufacturing. 
in other words, it required a change of organizational practices.
for a long time, mexx used to call its suppliers co-makers	(interviews 120112; 120221). today, 
buyers at mexx mostly refer to their suppliers as vendors. Vendors are independent ready-
made garment suppliers that arrange everything from purchasing fabrics to final assembly 
and trimmings. Based on my research, it is difficult to determine whether the relationship 
with co-makers was really different from the relationship with vendors; some interviewees 
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explicitly define the former as almost family-like partnerships (e.g. interview 110805) 
while others recall a strictly business and cost-driven relationship (e.g. interview 111104). 
however, the perhaps subtle change in terminology can be seen as an indicator of how 
mexx related to its suppliers in the past. “the relation with our co-makers was really based 
on partnership; [...] hence a very close and honest cooperation. [...] the arrangements with 
our vendors are much more tight and business-like” (interview 120221, my translation).
changing representations of organizational practices – from co-makers to vendors – in 
this case seem to assume a change in actual performances as well. What the shift from 
mexx’ own production centre and co-makers to independent agents and vendors means 
for the organization of design and production can be best understood as a change of 
interdependencies in terms of knowledge and skills. as we have seen above, the production 
centre incorporated valuable technical expertise; the people knew the ‘dna’ of the brand 
‘like the back of their hands’ (interview 111025). such understanding is obviously more 
difficult to achieve when working with independent agents or vendors. every translation 
from sketch into prototype entails a risk of ‘misinterpretation’, which the ownership of a 
production centre can reduce to some extent (interview 120130).
dPc was quite accustomed to working with this production centre and drew heavily on its 
knowledge and expertise – so much so that it appeared difficult to achieve the same results 
as before. as several recent newspaper articles reported (e.g. rolvink, 2011; Van maurik, 
2012), the main problem thomas grote noticed when he became ceo of mexx was that 
the company lacked decent product development. according to one of mexx’ former senior 
managers, this is due to the fact that mexx was left with ‘mere coordinators’ (interview 
120221). While dPc functioned well in cooperation with the hong Kong production centre, 
the ‘real product knowledge’ apparently had left together with the centre in hong Kong 
(interview 120221). grote therefore invested primarily in product development, which 
resulted in a different organization of design and production. 
changing design Practices – relational Practices
to understand how mexx’ organization of product development changed after the closure 
of the hong Kong production centre, we need to take a closer look at mexx’ design practice. 
as mentioned above, designers at mexx were in regular, direct contact with the production 
centre; they travelled there every season. the distance between design and manufacturing 
was narrowed both by frequent travelling and	the dedication of mexx’ own local workforce, 
albeit that the frequency of travelling also depended on the division. designers of the youth 
division, for instance, were the first to work with video-conferencing in order to diminish 
the number of trips to the production countries and save time for product development 
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(interview 120315). the mexx divisions thus show variations in how to achieve ‘temporary’ 
and relational proximity by way of travelling practices or communication technologies. 
By the end of 2002, something beyond mexx’ control occurred that would have an immense 
effect on its way of organizing product development: guangdong was struck by an outbreak 
of a virus causing a serious form of pneumonia called sars (severe acute respiratory 
syndrome). as the disease spread quickly to hong Kong and, due to increased world travel, 
towards other countries around the globe, mexx’ designers and product developers were 
no longer allowed to travel. they were therefore forced to find other ways of developing 
the collection (interview 120131). they had all the prototypes and samples sent to the 
netherlands, finalized the collections there, marked changes on the product itself and sent 
it back together with the style sheets and remarks, and set up video-conferencing when 
necessary (interview 120131). 
remarkably, the new process worked just as well; after a few seasons – once the sars-related 
travel restrictions were over – designers no longer wanted to travel that much (interviews 
120131; 120315). this factor, along with the obviously immense cost reductions, meant the 
end for mexx’ formerly highly-valued practice of frequent travelling. the outbreak of sars 
is a striking example of how an unexpected incident can cause a sudden change of taken-
for-granted practices. though caused by coincidence, it appears to facilitate a more recent 
change as well; since 2012, mexx has started to work according to a 12-cycle development 
schedule. as such, it would be logistically impossible to have designers visit hong Kong 
every season.  
this change in travelling practices is an illustration of a more fundamental change in the 
relationship between designers and the physical garments they create. new technologies 
such as computer-aided design and the internet contributed to mexx’ efficient organization, 
but have also minimized designers’ physical contact with the actual garments.
Whereas in the 1980s, designers had to physically handcraft, draw and paint their 
designs, today most sketches are made on the computer. meanwhile, the internet has 
vastly increased the amount of creative input into making a collection concept. While 
our designers still travel every season, the internet allows them to be in five different 
places at once. designers no longer have to physically attend every fair in Paris, london, 
milan, new York and tokyo. they can see videos, fashion shows and store openings, as 
well as read international colour and fabric trend forecasts, from their desks (chadha, 
2006: 76).
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initially, designers perceived the switch to computerized design as constraining their 
creativity (interviews 120120; 120221; 120420). to facilitate a smoother transition, so-
called data-administrators were employed to assist designers in translating their design 
ideas into the system (ibid.). While this enabled designers to primarily focus on their 
creative work, it also implied one more handover point, which once more involved the risk 
of misinterpretation and further constrained creativity and flexibility (interview 120221). 
today’s generation of designers is much more used to designing on a computer screen and 
to working with creative constraints – set by production as well as planning, merchandising, 
and marketing. several interviewees still consider the changing design practices to mean a 
loss of quality, as knowledge of the product and of pattern making seem to decrease both 
among individual designers and within the organization of the brand as a whole, due to 
increased outsourcing (e.g. interviews 120112; 120131; 120321; 120420).
to add nuance to this rather pessimistic view on the relationship between design and 
manufacturing, my research also shows that this relationship is now largely defined by the 
cooperation between designer and buyer. as such, it depends on individual performances 
that can vary considerably from designer to designer and from buyer to buyer. in the 
new organization, mexx works primarily with independent vendors, while designers are 
supported by buyers and technical designers. technical designers fulfil a similar role as 
mexx’ former pattern makers, and are involved in the making of so-called block	 patterns.	
these are the basic patterns on which all new designs are based. new designs are thus 
always variations of existing patterns. By keeping block pattern making in-house, fashion 
brands like mexx aim to maintain a certain consistency, quality, and distinctiveness in their 
designs (interviews 120112; 120120; 120130; 120131; 120221; 120315).  
every designer at mexx is now linked to a buyer who, in the end, should achieve the same 
result as the former product coordinators. the role of the current buyer is somewhat 
different, since the technical knowledge no longer resides in mexx’ own production centre 
but in independent vendors (interview 120221). more emphasis is thus laid on price 
negotiations and quality control than on mere coordination (ibid.). 
Working with a variety of independent vendors renders longer-term commitments or 
partnerships even more important, especially in a 12-cycle system in which designers no 
longer visit their vendors regularly. one of the buyers i interviewed confirmed that it is 
crucial to find a balance. on the one hand, she finds it important to build up relationships, 
while on the other hand probably 90% of her job involves negotiation:
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You always	have to negotiate a	lot.	Because if you don’t show that you’re hungry, they’ll 
just try and sneak prices in everywhere. so every	vendor, no matter how long you’ve 
been working with them, you push them. [...] i don’t think there’s a single vendor who 
comes with a price that hits target. or maybe one. [...] the name will remain secret 
(interview 120131).
But negotiation also involves relationship-building:
i negotiate hard, but if there’s a style where i know i really	need it, and there’s another 
style at that vendor where i’m not desperate for, then i say: ‘okay, don’t push on that 
one, i’m okay here. i need dollars here, not cents’. so it’s also just working together 
with them. the more you work with	them, and not against them, the better prices you 
get from them. (interview 120131)
Working with	 suppliers and building and maintaining strong relationships is now much 
more an individual achievement of buyers rather than being built in mexx’ organizational 
structure. drawing on the different interview accounts, i can conclude that the nature of 
the relationship with mexx’ vendors is very much determined by, and dependent on, the 
particular practice and mindset of individual buyers. the same refers to the relationship 
between design and manufacturing. in general, it might be the case that physical contact 
with the garments has declined since designers do no longer travel as much as they used to, 
which may also lead to designers having less understanding of the manufacturing process. 
the pair of designer-buyer i interviewed, however, found a way to continue working with 
the physical products and successfully combine their aesthetic, technical, and commercial 
knowledge in their cooperation. even though their official roles and responsibilities differ, 
they have almost developed a community of practice of their own. since they work so closely 
together throughout the entire process, they found it difficult to explain where design ends 
and buying starts. in this way, the potential gap between design and manufacturing almost 
disappears.
design at mexx is and always has been a team activity (Boudeguer & Van leeuwen, 1994), 
with a clear division of labour, responsibilities, and tight schedules. for a long time, mexx’ 
own production centre had facilitated a smooth translation from design ideas into patterns, 
prototypes, and samples. the closure of the hong Kong production centre resulted in 
the loss of site-specific, technical knowledge and skills, and required different ways of 
organizing the relationships between design and manufacturing. the connection between 
design and manufacturing now largely depends on the cooperation between designer and 
buyer. in other words, the nature of distance is now defined by relational practices. 
6
198
6.4 ConClUdinG ReMaRKs
this chapter explored the ways in which mexx – a dutch fashion brand with a globally 
dispersed production network that has never owned any manufacturing plants – manages 
the geographically distanciated relationship between design and manufacturing. in the 
previous case of oilily, the design practice proved to be the structuring principle for the entire 
organization. in contrast, in the case of mexx, i have identified planning and coordination to 
be leading organizational practices. since mexx outsourced manufacturing to the far east 
from the very beginning, the geographical distance between design and manufacturing 
made the role of coordination even more pertinent. in this chapter, i analysed the role of 
these organizational practices in overcoming the frictions of distance. 
the annual schedule, as an integrated planning tool that aims at an alignment of all 
corporate practices, takes a central position within mexx’ way of organizing. it can be 
understood as an artefact that can both represent and guide organizational practices. Based 
on my analysis, it can be argued that the particular strength of mexx’ annual schedule lies 
in the fact that it largely determines both	the way people talk about and understand their 
practices and	their actual performances – both the ostensive and the performative aspects 
of organizational routines and practices (Pentland & feldman, 2005). in other words, it 
determines both knowing and doing.  
the case also demonstrates that the relationship between design and manufacturing at 
mexx has been made explicit in dPc – design-production coordination. this practice, aimed 
at translating designers’ ideas into producible and marketable products by overseeing 
the entire process of product development, was facilitated by the presence of mexx’ own 
production centre in hong Kong. With the takeover of mexx by liz claiborne in 2001 and 
the eventual closure of the production centre some years later, the organization of mexx 
changed not only in terms of structure but especially in terms of organizing the relationships 
between designers and suppliers. although i have conceptualized knowledge as residing in 
practices (see chapter 3), knowledge can thus also become situated within a specific place 
– in this case, the hong Kong production centre.
in the new organization, dPc more or less lost its function. instead, every designer has 
a buyer who is responsible for sourcing the product at the right price. the designer-
buyer couple that i interviewed in this study is the exception that proves the rule. in their 
particularly seamless cooperation, there is no strict line between aesthetic, technical, or 
commercial knowledge. however, in general the changes in design, product development, 
and production discussed in this chapter reveal a certain dematerialization of the design 
199
practice. design is highly computerized, pattern making and sampling are outsourced to 
independent vendors, and designers visit manufacturers less frequently. this last point 
is also important because travelling practices proved essential in creating temporary and 
relational proximity.
this case demonstrates that the relationship between design and manufacturing can be 
partly structured through routinizing artefacts like the annual schedule, but is equally 
subject to individual practices and mindsets. despite its struggles in the last decade, 
mexx is an important case for the dutch fashion industry as it has been a pioneer in many 
aspects. mexx developed a remarkably strong brand concept, knew how to reap the benefits 
of spreading production geographically, introduced the method of forward ordering, and 
successfully met its logistical challenges through a meticulously executed annual schedule. 
By connecting every aspect of the value chain through this carefully designed annual 
schedule, mexx in a way codified fashion’s rhythm of change.
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tiMeline 
1869  establishment of peek & Cloppenburg in rotterdam by two german merchants
  custom-made and ready-made (second-hand) garments for men and children;  
  wholesale and retail
1969  merger with lampe B.V.: also womenswear
1976  new retail concept for fashionable youth: Mac & Maggie
1976 – 1980s cora Kemperman and co-buyers develop own collections and contribute to   
  growth of mac & maggie
1990s – 1996 success of mac & maggie comes to an end
  all shops sold in 1996
1994  cora Kemperman leaves mac & maggie
1995  cora Kemperman and gloria Kok start own retail brand ¯CoraKemperman
1998  takeover of dutch P&c group by german Peek & cloppenburg Kg düsseldorf
2012  saskia Kemperman and Brigitte de Wilde take over from cora Kemperman
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ChapteR 7 
|  cora KemPerman’s Personal    
 BuYing aPProach
 from Mac & Maggie to ¯CoraKemperman31
We want to dress women in a distinctive, unique, creative way. to achieve this, 
we translate the most outstanding fashion trends into reasonably priced fashion, 
while we bring in our own perspective on fashion. this results in an ‘individual 
style’.
Mission statement ¯CoraKemperman (2002, my translation)
31  to avoid confusion between cora Kemperman as an individual and as a brand/company, a 
macron is added when referring to the brand/company, resembling the company’s brand logo: 
¯coraKemperman.
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in the third case study, i focus on two dutch retail chains: mac & maggie (1976-1996) and 
¯coraKemperman (1995-present). Whereas oilily started as a manufacturer, and mexx 
can be defined as a branded producer, the focus on retailers in this chapter travels one 
step further away from production and manufacturing. traditionally, based on a narrow 
definition, retailers are more concerned with finding the right types and number of 
products for their shop floors than with designing and producing a collection. however, as 
we have seen in chapter 2, the boundaries between retailers, wholesalers, producers, and 
manufacturers have become increasingly blurred (e.g. dicken, 2007; lane & Probert, 2009; 
tyler, 2003). retailers have become brands that develop their own, exclusive collections, 
while producers have opened their own outlets. 
still, an important distinction remains between the retailers studied in this chapter and 
the brands of the previous two case studies. Whereas oilily and mexx design and develop 
collections that are then sold to wholesale customers such as independent retailers and 
department stores, retailers like mac & maggie and ¯coraKemperman design and produce 
exclusively for their own stores. as such, they work according to another time schedule 
in which they can avoid the (wholesale) sales period and can thus be more responsive to 
changing market demands.
in the history of dutch fashion, mac & maggie was one of the first retailers to design its own 
collections. the brand fulfilled an important role in bringing affordable designer fashion to 
youth in the 1970s and 1980s. cora Kemperman, its head buyer, played an essential role in 
the development of mac & maggie. her style and organizational approach continued within 
the retail brand ¯coraKemperman, and so both businesses are part of the same case study. 
the aim of this chapter is to explore the question of how distance affects the relationship 
between design and manufacturing from a retailer’s perspective. since retailers first and 
foremost buy collections to be sold in their shops, buying is a central organizational practice. 
this chapter seeks to understand to what extent the practice of buying enabled mac & 
maggie and ¯coraKemperman to connect design with manufacturing without owning any 
manufacturing facilities. 
the chapter is structured as follows. section 7.1 introduces the brand-specific characteristics 
of mac & maggie and ¯coraKemperman, and provides a brief history of the two retailers. 
section 7.2 addresses the retailers’ global production networks by focusing on their 
organizational structures in terms of supplier countries, buyer-supplier relations and the 
place of buying within the organization. the practice of buying is analysed in more detail 
in section 7.3, where the emphasis is on those organizational practices that connect 
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design and manufacturing at a distance. finally, section 7.4 re-evaluates the meaning of 
buying as an organizational practice, which in the case of ¯coraKemperman involves a 
form of collaborative design practice. i will argue that this specific organizational practice 
reveals a certain co-development between retailer and manufacturer. as such it allows for 
connecting the sites of design and manufacturing through close cooperation, mutual trust 
and understanding between buyer and supplier.   
7.1 eXClUsiVe Yet affoRdable desiGn
according to its mission statement, ¯ coraKemperman strives for a “distinguishing, original, 
personal, individual, innovative, anti-mainstream, and reasonably priced” product, in 
addition to which “responsible quality and affordability” are clear preconditions (¯cK, 
2002: 1, my translation). 
¯coraKemperman was founded by cora Kemperman and gloria Kok in 1995. it is a small-
scale womenswear retail business that operates at the higher end of the mid-market 
segment. the brand’s target group is defined as women between the age of 20 and 60 (¯cK, 
7
Figure	7.1:	Left:	Spring	2011;	Right:	Spring	2005.	From	¯Corakemperman,	Sleeuwijk.	Retrieved	
from	http://corakemperman.viewbook.com
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 2002), regardless of age or figure (Verheyen, 2002). especially in the first years of the brand’s 
existence, Kemperman’s preference for working with different layers attracted many plus-
size women, which, consequently, affected the brand’s image (Van rossum, 2000; interview 
110120). although her designs often suit different body shapes, Kemperman emphasizes 
that she wants to make fashion, which by definition is subject to change and can therefore 
go from tight to wide and vice versa (Van rossum, 2000). 
¯coraKemperman’s aesthetic signature is largely defined by Kemperman’s personal 
style; in her own words, she designs “for herself and her friends” (hahn, 2009; interview 
100303). she aims to be fashionable on the one hand, and tries to be unique and exclusive 
on the other, frustrated by the conservative attitude of many mainstream buyers (müller, 
2002; interview 110120). in the words of gloria Kok, ¯coraKemperman makes and sells 
“reasonably priced designer clothes” (müller, 2002, my translation). condemning throw-
away fashion – changing so fast that one can wear a particular garment for no longer than 
one season (interview 100303) – ¯coraKemperman claims to sell supplementary fashion, 
where a collection always supplements the previous one, instead of replacing old with new 
(gloria Kok in müller, 2002). 
Kemperman’s style has been defined as “feminine and elegant, containing ethnic elements, 
comfortable to wear, and responsibly produced” (“10 jaar cora”, 2006, my translation). 
it is influenced by her interest in high fashion designers such as Yohji Yamamoto, issey 
miyake, dries van noten, and Jean Paul gaultier (Van rossum, 2000; Verheyen, 2002). 
other important sources of inspiration have always been the bright colours, wide skirts, and 
various pieces of jewellery from rajasthan, india, as well as the colour black from gujarat 
and the lively atmosphere of tokyo (Verheyen, 2002). 
the ¯coraKemperman style finds its roots in another retail concept, which was established 
in 1976 by the dutch retail chain Peek & cloppenburg (P&c) and aimed at fashionable youth: 
mac & maggie. Kemperman was assigned head of buying womenswear and contributed 
largely to the success of the brand. mac & maggie has been described by dutch media as 
“accessible and exclusive at the same time” (Verbeek in Bakker, 2010, my translation), 
“daring, well-considered, and affordable” (schenk, 1995, my translation), “different, 
unique, alternative, and eye-catching […] clothes to stand out, and affordable too” (Bos in 
Bakker, 2010, my translation). the idea was simple: “translate designer fashion as shown in 
Paris and milan as quickly as possible into affordable, wearable, but highly unique clothes” 
(Van den Brand, 1995, my translation). frans ankoné, then-stylist at P&c and involved in 
the initial establishment of mac & maggie (Plas, 1986), even describes mac & maggie as 
“fast fashion avant la lettre” (interview 091208). shaped by Kemperman’s and ankoné’s 
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love for indian folklore, and especially the colourful dress from the region of rajasthan, 
it is no coincidence that bright blue and turquoise, curry yellow and olive green, together 
with red and bright pink, have become known as the “mac & maggie – colours”, always 
complemented by black (Kemperman in Plas, 1986: 4). 
Figure	7.2:	Mac	&	Maggie,	Spring	1979.	From	20	Seizoenen	
Mac	&	Maggie:	Van	1976	tot	1986	(p.	17),	by	R.	Plas,	1986,	
Rijswijk:	Mac	&	Maggie	B.V.
By translating designer fashion as fast as 
possible into affordable clothing, mac & maggie 
to some extent can be considered a precursor 
of today’s h&m, albeit its style was different 
and anti-mainstream, not for everyone, and in 
a way outspoken and modest at the same time 
(interview 110726).
the mac & maggie concept was initiated by 
P&c’s marketing director Paul matthesius. he 
was looking for a competitive answer to the 
younger fashion departments of other dutch 
chain stores, such as fooks and foxy fashion. 
But the way in which mac & maggie evolved 
into a unique phenomenon, with its own distinct style and signature aesthetics and its loyal 
customer base, was neither planned nor with precedent. its success was the combined 
product of changing consumer behaviour, an innovative retail concept, and the creative 
eye of Kemperman and her fellow buyers. mac & maggie’s success lasted until the 
late 1980s. it then rapidly declined during the early 1990s due to a range of interrelated 
factors32: increased competition, changing consumer preferences, and a loss of the brand’s 
exclusivity and distinctive style. once mac & maggie became successful, P&c attempted to 
reap the benefi ts from its growth as much as possible by opening more and more outlets. 
since these outlets were mainly based in the netherlands and Belgium, which are relatively 
small countries, eventually there were mac & maggie stores in almost every town. as a 
consequence, mac & maggie lost its exclusivity.
32  i have found varying and partly contradictory explanations of the factors that caused mac & maggie’s 
failure, which renders it diffi cult to draw a valid and comprehensive picture in retrospect. i present the 
most plausible accounts based on both interviews and press reports.
7
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Peek & cloppenburg then hoped to expand its target group in order to maintain sales 
figures. the expansion required a more mainstream collection incompatible with cora 
Kemperman’s distinctive style. to facilitate the company’s growth, Kemperman was 
appointed as buying	manager, leading a team of sub-buyers who did the actual ‘designing’. 
the role of Kemperman in defining the collections declined; the essence of the mac & 
maggie brand, based on a certain affordable exclusivity, was lost (interviews 110106-i; 
110106-ii; 110120). at the same time, the dutch P&c group was being gradually taken over 
by the german Peek & cloppenburg holding. this holding wanted an overall european P&c 
concept in which there was no place for the exclusive mac & maggie concept (interview 
110726).
opinions vary mostly on the role of cora Kemperman. did mac & maggie fail because 
Kemperman was not able to continue in the same way as before and had to leave, or did 
Kemperman have to leave because the concept of mac & maggie had to change? there is no 
straightforward answer to this question. it illustrates how a brand’s identity can rely heavily 
on one particular individual – including the resulting difficulty of finding a successor. 
eventually, these developments forced P&c to discontinue the mac & maggie stores, but 
Kemperman – together with one of mac & maggie’s suppliers, gloria Kok – started her own 
retail brand: ¯coraKemperman. in this way, Kemperman was able to demonstrate that 
there is always a niche market for a different type of clothing, in which exclusivity is key.
at the time of writing this dissertation, Kemperman was gradually transferring her business 
to the next generation. in 2012, her cousin saskia Kemperman became the new creative 
director and Brigitte de Wilde the new general manager. the analysis of ¯coraKemperman 
in the remainder of this chapter is based on the organization’s period up to 2008.
7.2 distant bUt stable
considering the organizational structures of retailers, we can expect that distance 
between design and manufacturing will be at least as present as in the case of branded 
producers that have outsourced manufacturing. one can even claim that for retailers, this 
distance plays an even more pertinent role, since their core competences in general lie 
more in sales than in production.
as i will demonstrate in this section, the organizational structures of mac & maggie and 
¯coraKemperman reveal rather similar buyer-supplier relations compared to what we 
have seen in the previous two case studies of oilily and mexx. the main difference is that 
in this case, buying and sourcing have always been based on ready-made garment or full-
package suppliers, as these retailers did and do not have manufacturing competences. 
furthermore, this section reveals ¯coraKemperman’s remarkably stable supplier base in 
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which long-term partnerships are key, regardless of geographical distance or proximity.
i have divided the analysis into two relatively stable periods: 1976-1996 for mac & maggie 
and 1995-2008 for ¯coraKemperman. for each of these periods, i have aimed to map the 
organization of a production network that can be considered as representative of the nature 
of the period in question, even though these networks have obviously changed within the 
period discussed. more precisely, in the case of ¯coraKemperman i have relied on internal 
documents that reflect the situation in 2008, complemented with personal interviews in 
2010 and 2011. in the case of mac & maggie, i had to deal with a lack of printed sources, 
which resulted in a much greater reliance on interviews with former buyers and sales staff 
and, therefore, on personal memories.33 
7.2.1  mac & maggie
mac & maggie started as a subsidiary company of the dutch Peek & cloppenburg group. 
P&c, once a subsidiary of a swiss holding company, has been gradually taken over by P&c 
germany (100% in 1998).34 the dutch P&c group – a clothing chain store business – ran 
three different retail concepts: Peek & cloppenburg, somebody, and mac & maggie. in 1994, 
the three businesses together consisted of 83 shops in the netherlands, 23 in Belgium, two 
in germany, and one in the united Kingdom (simons, Koning & Van dooren, 1995b). in 
the netherlands, Peek & cloppenburg and somebody together had a market share of 2.2% 
and mac & maggie had one of 0.5% (ibid.). With a turnover of 405 million dutch guilders in 
1993/1994 (approx. 184 million euro), the P&c group ranked fourth in the clothing business 
in the netherlands (ibid.).
mac & maggie operated relatively independently from its parent company as long as 
turnover targets were achieved (interviews 110106-i; 110106-ii). the brand reached the 
height of its success in the 1980s, with 42 shops (Van rossum, 2000; teunissen, 2006) and a 
turnoverof up to 60 million dutch guilders (approx. 27 million euro) (schenk, 1995).  
33  after having read a concept version of this chapter in 2013, cora Kemperman let me know that if she 
had more time during my research, she could have provided me with much more historical documents 
about mac & maggie. most of these documents had been thrown away in the meantime. 
34  Peek & cloppenburg today consists of two independent german holding companies, but has its 
origins in the netherlands: Johann theodor Peek and heinrich anton adolf cloppenburg opened the 
first P&c store in 1869, in rotterdam (nl). in 1901, James cloppenburg opened the first P&c store 
in germany, Berlin. in 1911, following the opening of a hamburg branch, anton cloppenburg set up 
the company Peek & cloppenburg gmbh, hamburg, which became today’s Peek & cloppenburg Kg 
hamburg in 1939. also in 1911, a second, legally and economically independent german P&c came 
into being: Peek & cloppenburg Kg düsseldorf. Both companies are still operational. since 1998, 
the dutch P&c group has been fully taken over by P&c düsseldorf (P&c Kg hamburg, 2011; P&c Kg 
düsseldorf, 2011).
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regarding the internal organization of mac & maggie, the buying department was the heart 
and soul of the company. it played a significant role in shaping the image and nature of the 
brand. it consisted of a small team of buyers divided into womenswear and menswear. the 
team of womenswear buyers was led by cora Kemperman and accounted for approximately 
60% of mac & maggie’s sales volume. the mac & maggie buyers were responsible for more 
than just the actual buying; they had to take care of everything from collection planning and 
styling to product development and sourcing (for a more detailed analysis of this process, 
see section 7.3). 
due to mac & maggie’s success and rapid growth in the 1970s and 1980s, it became more 
difficult to maintain a structure where a large part of the work came down to a small number 
of individuals, that is, the buyers. therefore, some tasks and responsibilities were shifted 
to different departments in the 1990s, eventually leading to the structure as shown in figure 
7.3. still, in terms of collection-building and sourcing, the buying department maintained 
its prominent function.
Figure	7.3:	Organization	chart	Mac	&	Maggie	1994
the main difference between the 1990s and the 1980s lies in the separate department for 
Visualizing,	which focused on presentation and communication – everything concerning 
the image and appearance of mac & maggie. due to the department’s focus on visual 
presentations to the final customer, it arguably functioned as a bridge between buying and 
sales.
regarding the location and nature of sourcing, i had to rely almost entirely on personal 
conversations with former buyers. since these interviews can only give a partial account 
of the supplier base at particular moments in time, it proved difficult to draw a complete 
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and accurate picture of the global production network of mac & maggie. Based on my 
interviewees’ accounts, i can present only a general picture of main supplier countries and 
buyers’ interpretations of their relationships with suppliers.
relationships with suppliers were mainly established and maintained through local agents 
who served as mac & maggie’s ‘eyes and ears’ abroad (interview 110106-i). there was some 
form of direct sourcing in india at the beginning, as well as with one of mac & maggie’s 
domestic suppliers, Konfektiebedrijf JurK (clothing firm ‘dress’), owned by gloria Kok 
(see also box 7.1). in the 1980s, mac & maggie worked with a relatively small and stable 
supplier base. suppliers were located partly in the far east and to a great extent in europe 
– especially italy but also Portugal, Belgium and the netherlands (interviews 110106-i; 
110120; 110527). 
india proved to be a rich source of inspiration, especially in terms of colours. it was one of 
the main supplier countries at the outset, first and foremost due to relatively low costs. the 
country remained important throughout the years because of its expertise in handcrafted 
embroidery and specific weaving techniques; one could not find the same quality in china. 
india was, however, not skilled in high-quality fabric dying techniques. this is one of the 
reasons why mac & maggie eventually started to produce in other countries as well, including 
hong Kong and thailand. the drawback of this geographical spread of production was that 
these countries demanded large orders, which did not match the brand’s philosophy of 
exclusivity. such large orders were more suited for basics than for special items (interviews 
110106-i; 110106-ii). 
former buyers describe the relationships between mac & maggie and its suppliers as 
partnerships. the most important criterion for selection – in addition to price and lead 
times – was suppliers’ ability to translate mac & maggie’s specific designs into the right 
end products. this focus on translation and partnerships is not unique in the dutch fashion 
industry, as we have seen in the previous case studies. as a pure retailer, mac & maggie 
depended on the capabilities of buying agencies and ready-made garment suppliers. the 
relationships between buyer and supplier and between design and manufacturing are, 
however, more complex and close than this organization of mac & maggie’s production 
network suggests. 
to understand these relationships, we need to take a closer look at the practice of buying, 
which i will further analyse in section 7.3. first, i discuss how cora Kemperman continued 
mac & maggie’s sourcing strategy in her own retail business.
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BOX 7.1: KOnfeKTieBedrijf jurK (clOThinG firM dreSS) 
Konfektiebedrijf JurK (clothing firm dress) holds a special place within the buyer-supplier 
relationships of both mac & maggie and ¯coraKemperman. JurK was a supplier for mac & maggie and 
continued to supply ¯coraKemperman until 2008. in 1975, the company was established by gloria Kok 
in noord-Brabant, a southern province of the netherlands. it was a head-and-tail firm, which means that 
the actual manufacturing of the garments was subcontracted, whereas everything else from design 
to distribution was kept in-house. JurK’s ‘head’, however, entailed much more of the preproduction 
phase than design alone, including pattern making, sampling, purchase of fabric and trimmings, 
quality control, and even cutting in the beginning (interviews 110120; 110503).
JurK’s main customers were noted chain stores in the netherlands and Belgium such as c&a and P&c 
and their more fashionable sections for younger people in particular (i.e. foxy fashion and somebody) 
(interview 110503). from the beginning, JurK has been working for mac & maggie, establishing a 
relation that was strengthened by a similar taste and sense of style that Kok and Kemperman shared. 
Whereas this relation with mac & maggie remained relatively successful, other chain store businesses 
started to look for cheaper alternatives abroad, which made JurK increasingly dependent on mac 
& maggie as its main customer. in order to increase turnover and profit margins, and to rely less on 
the short-term demands of one major customer, gloria Kok started her own label X’-as in 1985. this 
brand was more expensive than mac & maggie, sold mainly in boutiques, and was initially developed by 
designer caroline Krouwels (interviews 110503; 110826). 
When cora Kemperman left mac & maggie, she started her own retail business together with gloria 
Kok. in this way, Kok became co-owner of ¯coraKemperman while simultaneously running JurK. 
¯coraKemperman became JurK’s main (and later only) client leading to a complex organizational 
construction where Kok in fact became her own customer. this business relationship was thus one of 
mutual interests of both providing orders for JurK and exclusive designs for ¯coraKemperman.
in terms of the organization of production, JurK subcontracted manufacturing in the 1970s and 1980s 
to domestic cutters and assembly workshops mainly in noord-Brabant. When it became too expensive 
to rely on domestic suppliers alone, manufacturing was subcontracted to Poland first, followed by 
romania later on. manufacturers in the netherlands were only occasionally approached for items that 
required quick delivery.
after gloria Kok sold JurK to two of her employees in 2004, the company was unable to survive and 
went bankrupt in 2009. in 2010, Kok retired and withdrew from ¯coraKemperman as well.
BOX 7.2: cOrPOraTe SOcial reSPOnSiBiliTY 
corporate social responsibility (csr) plays a significant role within the organization of 
¯coraKemperman, although Kemperman and Kok considered it a ‘normal’ way of doing business, 
(Kniese, 2001). this self-evident aim to care for people and environment does not only refer to 
developing countries but is practiced throughout the entire organization from shop personnel to 
seamstresses. this is also one of the reasons why Kemperman and Kok did not want to expand their 
business: they considered it important to maintain a team spirit and to remain in close contact with 
everyone working for and with them (müller, 2002). 
“’responsible quality’ to us also means that we try to save the environment during our production 
processes as much as possible, in addition to take care of good working conditions in the factories” 
(Kok in müller, 2002, my translation). cora Kemperman had observed alarming working conditions in 
india during her work for mac & maggie. however in those days, she argues, Kemperman was not in 
the position to change anything. for Kemperman, it is due to gloria Kok and her time and effort that 
they could eventually improve the situation (müller, 2002). 
for the achievement of its social goals, the company has taken the terms of the fair Wear foundation 
(fWf) as a point of departure. gloria Kok further developed these codes of conduct to train their 
suppliers to meet the required conditions (müller, 2002). one of the main terms is a ban on child 
labour, although this turned out to be the easiest one to meet for ¯coraKemperman (Kok, 2006). 
the problem with child labour is mainly linked to the fact that many manufacturers work with 
subcontractors to meet the high demands of their western clients, which is why child labour remains 
a hidden phenomenon. in order to control this problem, ¯coraKemperman included in its General	
Conditions	of	Purchase that “the supplier shall not be permitted to transfer or contract out the order, 
in whole or in part, to third parties without express prior approval in writing by cora Kemperman” 
(¯cK, 1995: 8). furthermore, ¯coraKemperman cooperates with local ngo’s that pay weekly visits to 
the production plants to  control working conditions and track down child labour (Kok, 2006; müller, 
2002). 
in addition to controlling working conditions, ¯ coraKemperman has set up a foundation called amma, 
which supports local projects in india, providing for instance medical healthcare and education 
(müller, 2002). through the amma foundation, ¯coraKemperman donates 6% of its annual profit to 
local charity projects.
finally, Kemperman and Kok have always been upset by the fact that hardly anyone ever talks about 
the polluting production process of jeans (interview 110120). similarly, people tend to believe that 
natural fibres are better than synthetic fibres, ignoring the immense amount of pesticides and water 
used to produce cotton. many organizations are mainly focusing on organic cotton instead of looking 
for (synthetic) alternatives. ¯coraKemperman considers the environmental aspects of its used 
fabrics of paramount importance. this is shown by the general information on their website (www.
corakemperman.nl), but especially by the detailed information on the origin of particular fabrics or 
clothes and their specific qualities, which is provided by the retail outlets and available to all interested 
consumers (¯cK, 2011). 
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7.2.2  ¯coraKemPerman
A	SMALL	RETAILER…
until 2010, cora Kemperman and gloria Kok were equal shareholders of lafalda holding.35 
lafalda holding leads a private limited company – lafalda mode B.V. – which until today 
runs six shops under the name of ¯coraKemperman in the netherlands, and a public 
limited company – lafalda mode n.V. – which runs three shops in Belgium. lafalda’s head 
office is located in sleeuwijk (nl), accommodating administration, quality control and 
the company’s warehouse. from here, incoming goods are rearranged and distributed to 
the shops. a section of cora Kemperman’s private residence in amsterdam was utilized as 
design studio and buying office. the ¯coraKemperman stores are located in amsterdam 
(1995), antwerp (1995), ghent (1995), utrecht (1996), Breda (1996), maastricht (1996), 
arnhem (1997), Brussels (1998), and rotterdam (2004). 
Figure	7.4:	Organization	chart	Lafalda	Mode	2008
the general management of lafalda mode was divided into two sections: one director for 
finance, personnel, sales, and logistics (gloria Kok) and one director for design and buying 
(cora Kemperman) (see figure 7.4). the company is affiliated with the trade association 
cBW-mitex, which serves the interests of dutch retailers in the fields of home furnishing, 
fashion and shoes.
35  the following analysis of ¯coraKemperman’s organizational structure refers – unless stated 
otherwise – to the situation in 2008.
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…WITH	A	SMALL	NUMBER	OF	PERMANENT	SUPPLIERS
from the beginning, Kok and Kemperman deliberately chose to open just enough shops 
as would be necessary to manage their own production. this reticence toward expansion 
contributed to the exclusivity of the brand, which can be considered an important part of its 
identity. moreover, the limited size of the corporation enabled ¯coraKemperman to maintain 
a profitable, yet close and enduring relationship with its suppliers.
Kemperman worked with 9 permanent suppliers in india, Portugal, Belgium and the 
netherlands, with whom she had relationships for 20 to 30 years (see table 7.1 for an overview). 
india, followed by Portugal, can be regarded as ¯coraKemperman’s most important supplier 
country, not only in terms of volume but also in terms of the type and quality of the products. 
as mentioned above, india was also an important source of inspiration.
Table	7.1:	Supplier	base	¯Corakemperman	2008
the selection of suppliers largely drew on experience with former mac & maggie suppliers, 
and was based on requirements regarding price, type of product, small production runs, and 
corporate social responsibility (interview 110120).
the relationship between ¯ coraKemperman and JurK/X’-as has been the most privileged one 
(see box 7.1), but generally relationships with suppliers had a durable and close character. 
there were no official buying agreements with the suppliers, and the strong relationships 
were built upon mutual trust and reciprocity. 
7
 
                                                                
* JURK 
† After 2008, ¯CoraKemperman’s most important supplier India-I, whose owner had passed away, is replaced by India-III. 
Supplier 
country  
First year of 
cooperation 
with ¯CK 
Type of product Supplier’s share in 
¯CK’s total purchase 
(% in pieces) 
Netherlands-I 
/Romania* 
1995 Fashionable, novel fabrics, and complicated items 14 % 
India-I 1995 Organic cotton tricot 29 % 
Portugal 1996 Basics and trendy t-shirts, dresses, skirts, and trousers 28% 
Belgium/Poland  1996 Classic blazers, trousers and skirts 3 % 
Italy-I 1996 Exclusive knitwear 7 % 
India-II 1997 Indian fabrics and complicated, detailed, woven items 10 % 
Italy-II 1997 (hand)knitted sweaters and cardigans 3 % 
Italy-III 2000 Winter accessories 3 % 
Netherlands-II 2002 Leather belts 3 % 
India-III† 2008 Organic cotton tricot 29 % 
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figure 7.5 gives a schematic representation of the connections within lafalda’s production 
network in 2008. 
Figure	7.5:	Production	network	Lafalda	Mode	B.V.	2008
the supplying companies lie outside the legal structure of lafalda mode and are legally 
independent from this buyer. the buyer-supplier relations were maintained either directly 
with the manufacturers or through an intermediary buying agent. regarding the indian 
suppliers, ¯coraKemperman worked with a buying agent who – in his own words – 
functioned as the company’s “ears, eyes, and brain in india” (interview 110309). in practice, 
Kemperman also worked directly with the indian manufacturers. the dutch company JurK 
and the Belgian supplier were producers that subcontracted the actual manufacturing – i.e. 
cutting and sewing – to suppliers in eastern europe. in italy, ¯coraKemperman also worked 
with an agent.
this stylized representation of the structure of lafalda’s production network reveals a 
similar, albeit on a different and smaller scale, role of geographical and organizational 
distance between design and manufacturing as in the previous case studies of oilily and 
mexx. lafalda/¯coraKemperman outsources production to geographically distant and 
legally independent ready-made garment suppliers. in the literature on fashion retailers 
and their global sourcing strategies, much emphasis is laid on the powerful positions of 
retailers in buyer-driven value chains (e.g. gereffi, 1994; see also chapter 2). at the same 
A’dam 
Arnhem 
Utrecht 
R’dam 
Breda 
Maas-
tricht 
Antwerp 
Brussels 
Ghent 
¯CK Shops NL 
¯CK Shops B 
Amsterdam (NL) 
Sleeuwijk (NL) 
Lead firm 
Lafalda Mode Suppliers Subcontractors 
India (agent) 
NL (JURK) 
Belgium 
Italy (agent) 
Portugal 
Netherlands 
India-I 
India-II 
Romania 
Poland 
Italy-I 
Italy-II 
Italy-III 
215
time, some scholars have observed a shift of both competences and responsibilities 
from buyers to suppliers (e.g. crewe & davenport, 1992), which may or may not involve 
closer cooperation and knowledge sharing (e.g. tokatli, Wrigley & Kizilgün, 2008). Within 
this diversity of studies that focus on buyer-supplier relationships in globalized fashion 
industries, the actual practice of buying remains relatively under-researched terrain (see 
entwistle, 2006; 2009 for an exception). as argued at the beginning of this chapter, buying 
is a central organizational practice in the organization of retailers. in the next section, i 
will analyse mac & maggie’s and ¯coraKemperman’s particular way of organizing the 
practice of buying. this analysis serves to provide a more nuanced understanding of buyer-
supplier relationships and to demonstrate how this organizational practice plays a key role 
in connecting design with manufacturing at a distance. 
7.3 oRGaniZational pRaCtiCes: CReatiVe bUYinG
i discovered that being a buyer gives you more power than a designer who can 
only wait and see whether his creations will sell or not.
Cora Kemperman (Van Veen, 2011: 13, my translation)
¯coraKemperman is a typical case of blurring boundaries between retailers, producers, 
and manufacturers. By developing its own collections, this brand in many ways resembles 
branded producers that have outsourced all manufacturing to ready-made garment 
suppliers. due to the brand’s ‘retailing roots,’ its primary focus is not on design, branding, 
or manufacturing; it is on buying. in this section, i analyse how the practice of buying and 
the role of the buyer have evolved from mac & maggie in the 1970s to ¯coraKemperman 
in the twenty-first century. moreover, i will show how a specific way of buying can enhance 
relational proximity between design and manufacturing without owning any manufacturing 
facilities.
7.3.1 from design...
mac & maggie’s success, and particularly cora Kemperman’s contribution to it, has been 
rewarded with the grand seigneur in 1987 – the highest award for the fashion industry in the 
netherlands (costin & grotenhuis, 1989; see also box 4.1). Kemperman’s acceptance speech 
started with her now much-quoted statement: “Before you stands a failed designer” (Verheyen, 
2002: 43, my translation). that statement raises questions about the meaning of design for 
a fashion brand. considering her leading role in the successful development of collections 
for mac & maggie, and later for ¯coraKemperman, how can a professionally trained fashion 
designer, graduated from the gerrit rietveld academy in 1967, be considered a failure? how 
is the design practice defined, and how does design relate to other organizational practices 
within the corporation?
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Kemperman explained her statement in relation to her way of working at mac & maggie’s 
in a lecture called “commerce versus creativity?” it was conducted in 1988 at a seminar in 
amsterdam about the role of styling in fashion buying (Kanteman, Kemperman, lamaker 
& mertz, 1988). she argued that twenty years earlier (i.e. in the late 1960s), design was 
an isolated process driven by a vaguely defined task of inventing	 new	 clothes. garment 
manufacturers were not used to thinking in terms of collections, and only rarely hired 
trained fashion designers. once they did – as Kemperman had experienced herself – there 
was no vision about trends or a sense of fashion. the designer had to work without any 
contact with other parts of the organization, neither with production nor with the customer. 
apparently, design as a discipline was not considered a core value of the company, nor 
something that needed to relate to other disciplines. moreover, Kemperman was trained 
to design based on her own creativity, not driven by a target group. this personal design 
mentality did not match with the commercial mentality of buyers.
gradually, a growing awareness of international influences, the multi-faceted and ephemeral 
nature of fashion, and the resulting importance of distinctive signature aesthetics, gave rise 
to an increasing role of styling within garment manufacturing and retailing in the netherlands 
(e.g. KWW, 1972; Kanteman et al., 1988). designers or stylists were increasingly hired to 
develop collections for dutch clothing manufacturers and retailers. however, even when 
retailers had a separate design department, buyers often maintained their leading role in 
determining the next collection, whereas designers – often young women – were supposed 
to merely draw what buyers demanded (interview 110106-i). it would take some time before 
design or styling became acknowledged as an expertise and added value of its own (ibid.).
from her early experience as an (assistant) buyer at the dutch department store Vroom 
& dreesman (Verheyen, 2002), Kemperman came to realize how powerful buyers actually 
were in determining which garments would get into the shops (Kanteman et al., 1988). she 
also recognized that the buyers’ double responsibility – both creative and commercial – 
led to a rather conservative buying practice (interview 110120). Buyers in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s tended to buy the same products that had sold well in the previous season, with 
only minor stylistic variations to present something ‘new’. this experience subsequently 
informed Kemperman’s buying practice at mac & maggie.
7.3.2 ...Via BuYing...
as a small team of buyers, cora Kemperman and her colleagues were not satisfied with 
the traditional way of buying ‘off the shelves’ – that is choosing from manufacturers’ and 
wholesalers’ stock. the buying team at mac & maggie’s, which was divided into one team 
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for menswear and one for womenswear instead of different product groups (i.e. shirts, 
trousers, knits), developed a more integrated approach to buying. 
how did this buying practice work?36 the main principle entailed that the buyer be 
responsible for the entire process from first idea to final shop floor delivery. in fact, by 
getting more and more involved in the design process (hahn, 2009) – e.g. adding a pocket 
or changing a sleeve – mac & maggie-buyers gradually transformed mere buying into a 
more comprehensive form of product development. in aiming to define mac & maggie’s 
practice of buying, an internal document from 1988 called Buying	for	Mac	&	Maggie	explains 
how this practice differed from the way product development was understood by other 
retail chain stores. at the time, most retail chains that developed private label collections 
understood product development as three separate activities, executed by different people 
(according to schippers, 1988):
1. styling: defining an image well in advance without taking into account   
consequences for the actual buying;
2. logistics: financial plans and coordination of commodity flows;
3. buying: actual buying divided by product type, such as jackets, dresses, and shirts.
this means that aesthetic, technical, and commercial knowledge and skills resided in 
separate practices performed by separate persons: 
the main difference between mac & maggie and other retailers and chain stores is 
that these three functions form a triad within one person. With mac & maggie these 
three units are not separate entities, because they have to be geared to one another, 
and must therefore be fused to a whole (schippers, 1988, my translation). 
Buying at mac & maggie’s involved planning, styling and the actual buying. the mac & 
maggie-buyer was responsible for design, product development, buying, price negotiations, 
finance, maintaining supplier relations, quality control and control of commodity flows 
(supported by the import and logistics department of P&c), markdowns and stock control 
(interviews 110106-i; 110106-ii; 110826).  
36  the following is primarily based on interviews with five former buyers, an internal corporate 
document from 1988 called “Buying	for	Mac	&	Maggie” (schippers, 1988), and several personal notes by 
cora Kemperman on the buying practice in the early 1990s.
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in practice, this entailed frequent and long travelling; three to three and a half weeks a 
time was not uncommon. trips to the far east, for instance, started with four to five days 
of shopping in tokyo. the obtained clothes served as a basis for new mac & maggie items; 
originals were nearly copied, but with a different pocket or hood. in the words of a former 
buyer “you put it in a blender and something different came out of it” (interview 110106-i, 
my translation). 
With the ‘new’ designs, the buyers moved on to hong Kong to decide where certain items 
could be manufactured, and likewise to Bangkok, and india. upon return to the netherlands, 
the buyers had to check the prototypes, comment on style and fit, and eventually send 
orders for production. such ‘far east trips’ were complemented with trips to Portugal, italy, 
and fairs in london and Paris.
collection planning was based on the information from the ongoing and previous season, 
international fashion trends, competitors’ behaviours, and the buyers’ own gut feelings. 
four to six themes per season – e.g. russia, india, or marine – complemented the traditional 
styling aspects of colour and shape. inspiration for these styling aspects was mainly drawn 
from shopping at competitors in tokyo, Paris, london, italy, and amsterdam. fashion 
magazines, fashion institutes, fairs, other cultural events, and frans ankoné, who worked as 
a stylist for P&c and for the dutch style magazine avenue, were also sources of inspiration 
for mac & maggie-buyers. 
the final mac & maggie designs were the result of a process that lies somewhere between 
‘copying’ and ‘translating’: “We often use samples. for example, we make use of originals 
with a good make to develop our own designs. similarly, we sometimes use a part, such 
as a collar or a sleeve, to develop a new item” (schippers, 1988, my translation). actual 
garments, or samples, were thus a crucial starting point for mac & maggie buyers in the 
product development process. “We check whether we have any suitable samples left to use 
(a sample will always be ‘used’ and hardly ever ‘copied’), or if we can transform old models 
into new samples” (Kemperman, personal notes, no date). 
Buying at mac & maggie’s was a continuous process of drawing inspiration from different 
sources, and translating these into mac & maggie items. this involved sketching and 
personally visiting suppliers. face-to-face contact with suppliers was considered important 
because the designs were often so complex that they required further explanation. 
this illustrates the increasing role of styling in retail and buying practices. instead of setting 
up a separate styling department subservient to buying, mac & maggie buyers combined 
the functions of styling and buying into the purview of one person. that obviously requires 
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personnel competent in both creative and commercial skills. this practice of buying 
contains several interrelated organizational practices that – supported by the buyers’ 
travelling practices – virtually connects the geographically distanciated sites of sales and 
production. the integration of different types of knowledge and skills within the practice 
of buying would be even more pronounced in the way cora Kemperman organized her own 
titular retail brand.
7.3.3 ...to the Whole PacKage
By starting her own retail business together with gloria Kok, Kemperman has been able to 
continue her personal style and integrated approach to buying, which eventually no longer 
corresponded with Peek & cloppenburg’s commercial strategy. drawing on her experience 
at mac & maggie’s, cora Kemperman can be described as a mixture of designer, stylist, 
buyer, retailer, and producer; she does not, explicitly, consider herself as just any one of 
those (interview 110120).
i do not consider myself a designer like romeo gigli or Jean Paul gaultier or mcQueen 
[...] who makes a collection that is based purely on his own creativity. i am a designer 
with own stores and i observe my favourite designers and then try to re-create that 
kind of image. i try to translate it and put in a piece of my own creativity [...]. then it 
becomes ¯coraKemperman (interview 100303). 
the question, then, is how this integrated buying practice guided the organization of 
¯coraKemperman and how it defined the relationship between design and manufacturing. 
What role did the practice of buying play in establishing connections between design and 
manufacturing at a distance? as i will elaborate on in the remainder of this chapter, buying 
at ¯coraKemperman drew on a certain co-development between buyer and supplier, which 
both contributed to and was facilitated by the specific organization of the company’s 
production network as discussed above. 
the design and buying practices at ¯coraKemperman did not consist of well-defined, 
successive steps. due to almost weekly deliveries to the stores, it was an on-going process 
of parallel activities, starting with calculating buying budgets based on sales figures from 
previous seasons. these calculations were largely dependent upon a sense of fashion; one 
had to be able to predict whether, for instance, more trousers instead of skirts would be 
sold. throughout the season, Kemperman personally developed new styles, controlled 
the allocation of product styles to the company’s suppliers, and adjusted orders based on 
weekly sales figures.
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to a large extent, Kemperman kept track of orders, prices, and sales figures herself through 
a relatively simple electronic planning and budgeting system. drawing on more than 30 
years of experience, Kemperman applied a way of working in which buying and design is 
integrated in one and the same person. 
the creative process resembled, in many ways, the design and buying practices at mac & 
maggie. orientation toward new trends happened throughout the year (interview 110120). 
this was supported by Kok and Kemperman travelling to tokyo, getting inspired by other 
fashion designers, buying appealing samples, shopping in Paris, endlessly studying fashion 
magazines, and making numerous sketches. drawing on these ideas, cora Kemperman 
created a colour palette that guided her and Kok in their search for the right fabrics. some 
garment suppliers sourced for fabrics in compliance with ¯coraKemperman’s wishes and 
requirements. others, such as clothing firm JurK, offered a large range of fabric samples 
from which Kok and Kemperman could choose. 
the actual designing involved making so-called size	specifications.	as we have also seen in 
the previous case studies, size specs are technical drawings with a scale of 1:10 that indicate 
the measurements and other details of the different garments, which the suppliers use for 
pattern and sample making. Kemperman would have preferred to do the pattern making 
as well, since that would enable her to completely define her own fits. however, due to 
the small size of the company, this was impossible to accomplish all by herself (interview 
110120). 
the significance of pattern making for the creative process is also underlined by former 
designers of X’-as, who described the privileged situation of working closely together with 
pattern makers and seamstresses:
once you had made your sketches and selected your fabrics, you took them to the 
pattern maker and let him draw the patterns. [...] then i could cut the fabric, give it 
to the seamstress, and within one hour i had my first prototype. [...] it was a rather 
natural way of working; quite intense but fantastic [...]. that is highly unusual; 
right now, at this day and age, it doesn’t happen anymore. or at least very rarely so 
(interview 110826, my translation).
this close cooperation between designer, pattern maker, and seamstress was facilitated by 
the inherent connection between the brand X’-as and the producer JurK.
You have to imagine; it is just one big space. here are two people making patterns, 
there is a table where a woman manages everything related to production, and here 
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are two seamstresses. so it is very open, and you are constantly communicating and 
exchanging ideas (interview 110503, my translation).
the drawback of this connection was that the brand X’-as relied on the capabilities of one 
producer, which limited the variety of styles and product types the designers could create 
(interview 110826). for mac & maggie and ¯coraKemperman, JurK was one of several 
suppliers, thus granting them more flexibility. By working closely with her suppliers during 
the creative process, Kemperman was able to gain as much as possible from the knowledge 
and skills of producers such as JurK, without owning any manufacturing facilities.
for the translation of her drawings into actual samples, Kemperman visited her indian and 
italian suppliers twice a year. in india, where she went at the end of may and the beginning 
of december, Kemperman stayed for around three weeks. here, she created a “library of 
styles” (interview 110309), a process that involved a back-and-forth exchange of ideas and 
drawings as well as prototypes. By the time Kemperman left india, almost 90 percent of the 
developed styles had been brought into “a nice shape” (interview 110309). every sample 
then still had to be shipped to lafalda’s headquarters, because the final fitting would be 
done in-house on a live model (ibid.). Kemperman subsequently decided whether or not the 
item would be purchased. a positive decision was followed by negotiating lead times, price, 
colour options and washing instructions (ibid.). 
the suppliers in Belgium and the netherlands, which were smaller and required less 
travelling time, were visited more regularly throughout the year. this enabled Kemperman 
to keep designing new items throughout the season, instead of developing one collection 
for the entire season at once. Kemperman had to develop all items for the entire season 
in india and italy, because those suppliers used the same fabrics for several products 
throughout one season; these fabrics have to be ordered and dyed in advance. Portugal 
– where Kemperman mainly sourced basics – is the only supplier that was visited less 
frequently and communication was primarily maintained through e-mail and parcel post. 
from this description of the design and development process, it becomes clear why cora 
Kemperman worked with only a limited number of permanent suppliers. instead of sending 
her sketches to a wide range of suppliers, waiting for the prototypes and deciding from 
where to order which styles afterward, the translation from design to product mostly took 
place at the production site – in close interaction with Kemperman herself. even though 
¯coraKemperman worked with a buying agent in india – who founded his agency after 
mac & maggie consulted him in a garment factory – Kemperman communicated with the 
manufacturers directly. according to her agent, she “believes in working like a family” 
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(interview 110309). the close relationships based on mutual trust and interdependency 
enabled Kemperman to control the whole process without actually owning any factory.
let me now return to the question regarding why cora Kemperman has called herself 
a failed designer. it can be explained by reconsidering the definition of design. if the 
definition of design is limited to working like an artist and creating something entirely new, 
then the design practice of Kemperman would not be reckoned as such. Kemperman drew 
inspiration from her favourite designers, using their ideas and adding something personal 
(schoots, 1995); her designs were the result of what can be called styling. But where does 
styling end and design begin? Particularly in fashion, where novelty and recycling go hand 
in hand, it is often problematic to claim that a certain design has never been created before. 
something new, more often than not, is the result of the combination of existing things. 
moreover, there is only a fine line between drawing inspiration and copying. no designer 
works within an isolated space, which makes influences from outside inevitable. 
Whether we call cora Kemperman a designer or a stylist, her way of creating fashion was 
facilitated by the limited size of the company and the close relationship with her suppliers. 
from her indian supplier’s perspective, Kemperman is regarded a great designer who “does 
not need any fashion input” from her suppliers (interview 110309). she “does her own 
research” and “only needs a good maker” (ibid.). Kemperman’s specific way of buying thus 
reveals how a retailer can achieve relational proximity between design and manufacturing 
by integrating aesthetic, commercial, and technical knowledge within the organizational 
practice of buying.
7.4 ConneCtinG distant pRaCtiCes
she has never called herself a fashion designer. she is buyer, stylist, and yes, 
actually she is an entrepreneur as well. even though she had never desired to 
open more than those nine stores.
interview with Kemperman (Van Veen, 2011: 12, my translation)
in aiming to understand how the practice of buying enabled the retailers mac & maggie and 
¯coraKemperman to connect the distanciated practices of design and manufacturing, the 
previous section has revealed how the boundaries between buying and design are rather 
fluid here. it therefore raises questions about how to actually define design in the case of 
retailing. Based on my analysis, i would argue that there are different dimensions of design. 
they range from high fashion designers such as Viktor & rolf or alexander van slobbe to mere 
executors of buyers’ assignments. for the former end of the spectrum, design is an artistic 
activity, aimed at creating something unique and born out of a largely individual practice. it 
refers to Kemperman’s professional education as a fashion designer. the latter is found in 
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retail organizations in which buyers are leading the process; designers have to simply draw 
what buyers demand, usually based on previous sales figures. the way Kemperman worked 
at mac & maggie and continued to work at ¯coraKemperman falls somewhere in between 
these two ends of the spectrum, and is generally referred to as styling.
the role of this particular way of designing or styling in establishing distant connections can 
be made more explicit by recalling the organization of production. cora Kemperman has 
never owned a production centre or a manufacturing plant – except in the sense that JurK 
was owned by her business partner Kok – hence she had to rely on the manufacturing skills 
and knowledge of her suppliers. roughly speaking, Kemperman worked with two types 
of suppliers. the first type is represented by ¯coraKemperman’s indian suppliers, which 
have been described as capable makers able to translate design ideas into products. as 
stylist, cora Kemperman gave the creative input and the supplier used its manufacturing 
knowledge to translate this input into material output. in this case, aesthetic design 
knowledge resides entirely within the buyer. 
the second type of suppliers, of which JurK is the primary example, consisted of producers 
that design their own collections. this means that these suppliers possess knowhow of both 
production and	design, and can therefore also contribute aesthetic content.
Based on the suppliers’ differences in terms of knowledge and capabilities, one may expect 
that the relations with the buyer ¯coraKemperman also differ from supplier to supplier. 
irrespective of these different supplier types, Kemperman maintained remarkably close and 
durable relationships with all of them. her Portuguese supplier was the only one she did 
not visit regularly, although there was regular contact via e-mail and express deliveries of 
samples throughout the entire year.
Kemperman’s regular and frequent visits to most of her suppliers are key to understanding 
how her specific practice of buying established connections between design and 
manufacturing. By visiting the sites of manufacturing, both for inspiration and for 
developing her collections, Kemperman engaged in an almost collaborative design practice 
between buyer and supplier (cf. tokatli & Kizilgün, 2009). in the words of Kemperman’s 
indian agent:
in india we have a god, which has ten pair of hands. and cora is that. Because she’s 
got knowledge in styling, in fashion, she is technically good, she’s all-rounder, and 
you know she had dedicated her life to garments. [...] and it is more enjoyable working 
for her than working for anybody else. [...] With her we learn a lot. [...] You cannot get 
this multi-knowledgeable person. so, one factory works only for her. for me, after 
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working for cora it’s also difficult to work with others. [...] she is able to give us ideas 
andguidance. [...] With other companies, the buyers may know only how to buy, but 
they have no knowledge of technicality (interview 110309).
this quote clearly speaks of mutual commitment, which is not only manifested in 
Kemperman’s relationship with suppliers but also with her customers (Von maltzahn, 2013). 
through frequent travelling and face-to-face interactions, Kemperman’s buying practice 
creates temporal proximity, which further enhances mutual trust and knowledge exchange 
resulting in relational proximity as well. for Kemperman, the practice of buying combines 
different aesthetic, technical, and commercial skills, forms of knowledge, and practices. 
in this way, the practice of buying facilitates a way to translate abstract design ideas into 
concrete garments. cora Kemperman may therefore be represented as the personification 
of the translation process in fashion design. 
the question remains whether geographical distance between design and manufacturing, 
which is inherent in the organizational and spatial structure of the two retailers’ production 
networks, in any way affects this buying practice – and vice versa. 
if design is an isolated process, subordinate to buying, then geographical distance between 
design and manufacturing will, arguably, only have a minor impact on the creative process. 
if design is confined to drawing what buyers demand, then innovation and creativity will 
naturally be limited. after all, in that case design is not leading but a rather codified and 
simplistic process. designers only draw what buyers argue will sell, and which they already 
know where to source. 
design as an integrated part of the buying practice, however, works only if the designer-buyer 
is not confined to one particular place and time in the development process. in that case 
the designer-buyer personally has to make the connection between creating and making. 
By travelling both for inspiration and for sample making and production, Kemperman was 
able to make these necessary connections at a distance. a great amount of trust and close 
cooperation further facilitated this way of working; strong interdependencies were both 
cause and prerequisite of this buying practice.
7.5 ConClUdinG ReMaRKs
if fashion production is conceptualized as a process of knowledge translation from idea 
to product, and geographical distance between creating and making is evident in the 
organizational structure of the brand and its production network, then designers and makers 
need to be connected in some way. one can have the best designers and the best makers, 
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but if they do not see each other, do not speak the same language, or do not understand 
each other’s work, it is unlikely that the cooperation will result in a successful translation. 
in the case of cora Kemperman, she made the connection herself by combining aesthetic, 
creative, technical, and commercial knowledge and skills in the practice of buying, and by 
literally moving between sites of both creation and manufacturing. in this way, the potential 
disadvantage of geographical distance can be compensated for by a particular buying 
practice that creates both temporary and relational proximity. since this buying practice 
relied largely on Kemperman’s specific way of working and her (tacit) knowledge about this 
practice, this particular organizational practice can be a competitive advantage in itself. at 
the same time, organizational practices that strongly rely on the knowledge and skills of one 
individual are vulnerable because they are harder to maintain once the individual resigns. 
Kemperman’s specific way of buying was the result of her education in fashion design, 
her buying experience at V&d, and the rather contingent establishment of mac & maggie 
by Peek & cloppenburg. the outcome of Kemperman’s buying practice was a successful 
brand, but this success and the growth of the firm led to a need for the structure of the 
organization to change. 
it is difficult to determine, in retrospect, whether it was the way of organizing or the 
aesthetics of the end product that made mac & maggie fail. however, it can be argued that 
the organizational structure of mac & maggie was no longer compatible with Kemperman’s 
practice of buying. Within the development from mac & maggie to ¯coraKemperman, the 
practice of buying in essence did not change. however, the organizational structure had to 
change in order to continue with this particular practice. Kemperman’s way of buying as a 
collaborative design practice was facilitated by the limited size of the company, the strong 
and durable relationships with her suppliers, and the integration of aesthetic, commercial, 
and technical knowledge within the practice of buying.
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tiMeline 
1944  Brothers miel and Janus van gils start clothing manufacturing in dinteloord (nl)  
  for war victims
1946  move to larger facility in oud-gastel (nl)
1950s  from children’s wear to menswear
  
open plants in:
1955 – ’78 roosendaal (nl)
1961 – ’78 Bergen op Zoom (nl)
1963 – ‘84 aarschot (B)
1965 – ‘68 Brecht and Berlaar (B)
1969  move hQ from oud gastel to essen (B)
  
open plants in:
1969 – ’73 Portugal
1970 – ’78 malta
1971 – ’78 athens (gr)
1973 – 2011 casablanca (ma)
1976  tangier (ma)
1979 – ’83 ciudad Juarez (mex)
1980  launch brand Van Gils
July 17, 1992 bankruptcy Van Gils intercontinental (essen)
1992  Centaur Clothes netherlands b.V. acquires brand Van gils
1994  Brothers alwin, Jacques, and Ben van gils start the Makers (Breda, nl)
2001  Vilenzo takes over Van gils brand
november 8, 2004 bankruptcy Vilenzo
2004  Waalwear Men takes over Van gils brand
2010  Waalwear men re-named Van Gils fashion b.V.
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ChapteR 8 
|  Van gils’ crafted method
 between branding and manufacturing
Brand-owners of high-end suits differentiate themselves from others, claiming 
that they combine traditional skilled craftsmanship with the latest technology for 
excellence. on the one hand, cutting machines need to be computer-controlled 
for perfect precision. on the other, many details require the skills of craftsmen, 
as buttons are supported by small buttons on the reverse, side pockets are 
reinforced, and protective inserts are sewn under the arms.
nebahat tokatli (2007: 81-82)
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in this final case study, i analyse Van gils – a dutch menswear brand that emerged from 
a product-driven manufacturing organization run by the Van gils family in the 1970s and 
1980s, and became detached from its manufacturing legacy in the 1990s. the case of Van 
gils complements the previous three case studies of oilily, mexx, and ¯coraKemperman in 
two respects: 1) by focusing explicitly on the still-underexposed product group of tailored 
garments, and 2) by shifting the attention from brand to manufacturer. By approaching the 
issue of distance between design and manufacturing from the manufacturer’s perspective, 
the case of Van gils provides more insight into the interdependencies between creative 
and industrial practices and can give us a better understanding of how the apparent gap 
between these practices is perceived and dealt with by manufacturers.
the story of Van gils comprises two parallel developments. in 1992, the branded 
manufacturer Van gils went bankrupt, after which manufacturer and brand went separate 
ways. the brand name was first taken over by a British firm (William Baird) and later by two 
dutch companies (Vilenzo and We international), subsequently, while the manufacturer 
(i.e. the Van gils family) set up a new company called the makers and continued making 
garments for other brands. there are thus two organizational developments that run parallel 
in time and comprise different organizational strategies:
1. a brand that withdraws from manufacturing as much as possible in favour of 
design, marketing, and sales;
2. a manufacturer that had once become successful through design and branding, 
but now withdraws from branding and marketing and refocuses on manufacturing 
for others.
By analysing the concurrent organizational developments of both brand and manufacturer, 
this chapter aims to understand the relationships between the organizational practices of 
both actors. to what extent does the performance of the brand depend on its manufacturing 
heritage? and how do organizational practices change once this manufacturing heritage is 
‘lost’? furthermore, by drawing explicit attention to the changing role of the manufacturer 
in menswear in general and Van gils in particular, the case of Van gils allows us to approach 
the question of how design and manufacturing practices relate to each other from a 
manufacturing point of view. this chapter thus aims to explore the organizational practices 
that manufacturers pursue to overcome the frictions of distance.
conceptually, this case also contributes to the international literature on the globalization 
of apparel industries. as discussed in chapter 2, many scholars who address the globalized 
and fragmented organization of fashion and apparel industries focus primarily on the 
229
role of brands, marketers, and retailers, based on the assumption that these lead firms 
control increasingly buyer-driven value chains (e.g. gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994; gereffi 
& memedovic, 2003). as an exception to this rule, tokatli (2007) provides an interesting 
account of the changing relationship between german menswear brand hugo Boss and one 
of its turkish manufacturing contractors, sarar. her research shows that some organizational 
changes in the globalization of fashion industries can only be properly explained when 
taking into account the distinction between “marketers and retailers with no manufacturing 
facilities” and “brand owners with past or current manufacturing competencies”, such as 
levi strauss and hugo Boss (tokatli, 2007: 71). 
in this chapter, i intend to follow up on tokatli’s argument by acknowledging the 
particularities of brands with and without manufacturing competences, and focus on the 
organizational practices that could account for such a distinction. due to the concurrent 
development of the brand Van gils and its former manufacturer, Van gils provides an 
excellent case to explore this assumed role of manufacturing experience in organizing 
the relationship between design and manufacturing. as will become clear in the following 
sections, this case reveals an apparently more prominent role of manufacturing in formal 
wear and suits compared to casual (women’s) wear.
in order to understand how manufacturing and design practices relate to each other in 
the case of Van gils, and how these relationships both shape and are being shaped by the 
organization of production, this chapter consists of three parts.  first, a description of Van 
gils’ brand history in section 8.1 aims at understanding the brand’s positioning within the 
dutch fashion industry. as such, it provides the general context for the following analysis. in 
section 8.2, i analyse Van gils’ organizational change by unravelling its different production 
networks, including the companies that are or were related to the brand. the focus is on 
reconstructing different outsourcing strategies in order to understand how brand and 
manufacturer have become organizationally distanciated. 
Van gils as a brand serves as the focal point in the analysis; the fashion firms Vilenzo and 
We are included in this analysis insofar as they are part of Van gils’ development. in order 
to understand the role of manufacturing in this case, i have also concentrated on the 
development of the Van gils family in addition to the Van gils brand; they have continued 
their manufacturing business in a new organizational set-up through the makers holding 
B.V. there are thus two lines of research that run parallel in time but are more or less 
unrelated organizationally, as the makers no longer produces Van gils suits. finally, in 
section 8.3 i analyse the organizational practices that pertain to the relationship between 
design and manufacturing, revealing a central role of	pattern	making	 in the production of 
tailored garments. 
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i conducted semi-structured interviews with managers and employees of both the ‘old’ Van 
gils (before 1992) and the ‘new’ Van gils (since 2004). additionally, i spent one week in 
tangier to visit one of the makers’ production units and obtain on-site data by observing 
organizational practices of the factory. By comparing practices of the current brand Van 
gils with those of the manufacturer that founded the original Van gils brand, section 
8.3 demonstrates how the different types of knowledge involved in these organizational 
practices result in a certain tension between brand and manufacturer – one that is marked 
by mutual interdependencies. 
8.1 stRiCtlY foR Men
We’re no role models. We’re real men modelling our own life. We hunt for 
rich experiences. amazing stories and unforgettable events. We count stitches 
and collect scars. they are the trophies of life. the souvenirs that remind us of 
our acts. sometimes we go off the rails and over the edge. sometimes we fall 
and sometimes we crash. But always in style. always surprising. always with 
pride. and with a smile. feeling surprisingly confident. these stories shape our 
personality. they make us interesting. they make us who we are.
“no stitch no story” (Van Gils fashion, 2012)
Van gils is a dutch menswear brand focusing mainly on formal wear and suits. the brand 
name Van gils was launched in 1980, but its origin goes back to 1937, when adrianus van 
gils established a tailor’s business in dinteloord in the southern part of the netherlands37. 
shortly after World War ii, his sons miel and Janus Van gils turned from tailoring to clothing 
manufacturing; they started to make clothes for war victims. this shift to the manufacturing 
industry marked the beginning of a growing and successful business in the next decades. 
run by miel van gils, the company evolved from a subcontractor making children’s clothes 
for dutch chain store Bervoets in the 1950s, to an independent manufacturing firm making 
men’s jackets and suits for independent retailers, department stores and chain stores in the 
netherlands (e.g. c&a, Kreymborg, hij) and abroad, starting in the 1960s. 
Whereas the post-war period was marked by scarcity, from the 1960s onward miel van 
gils became aware of the fact that clothing supply increasingly exceeded demand. 
this development required a different approach to clothing manufacturing, based on 
distinctiveness. as early as the 1960s, miel van gils was one of the first to understand the 
importance of thinking in terms of target groups. he decided to focus on the younger 
37  for a reconstruction of the early history of Van gils, i draw mainly on the oral memory of Ben and 
Jacques van gils, an anecdotal story written by the company’s attorney gaston mens sr for the 
company’s staff magazine, and a number of newspaper articles (Van meurs, 1987; Joosten, 2004; “Van 
gils: lief en leed”, 2011).
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generation of men, who no longer wished to dress like their fathers (Joosten, 2004; 
Kuitenbrouwer, 1985). he understood that fashion was made on the street and – inspired 
by his frequent visits to europe’s capitals – he made affordable suits with innovative fabrics 
and designs that appealed to young men. he sent his three sons alwin, Jacques, and Ben to 
the fashion institute of technology in new York to learn the business; they gradually took 
over the company in the 1970s. 
the new Van gils generation further developed their father’s successful strategy by focusing 
on marketing and branding. Whereas miel van gils thought mainly in terms of product 
quality, his sons invested in establishing Van gils as a brand. the reasons for this brand-
driven strategy were twofold: 1) a changing retail landscape, and 2) a growing supply of 
fashionable menswear. retailers in the 1960s were accustomed to buying from wholesalers, 
but the role of the wholesaler diminished as retailers increasingly sourced directly from 
manufacturers. furthermore, Van gils came to realize that Van gils no longer was the only 
company that made fashionable suits. until the 1970s, Van gils was known to retailers as 
a manufacturing firm, but it was unknown to consumers (Joosten, 2004). Brands gained 
the function of distinction and enabled retailers to communicate the difference between 
product a and product B to their consumers. Born out of a defensive strategy to compete 
with other brands specializing in formal menswear such as hugo Boss, the new Van gils 
generation therefore added emotional	content	to their brand.  
Jacques van gils, the creative mind of the three brothers, is considered to be one of the 
founders of the lifestyle	 concept in the netherlands. early on, he realized that men’s 
fashion needed to be more than just a suit, a jacket, or a pair of trousers (Buitenhuis, 1986; 
moorman, n.d.). following the advice of marketing expert giep franzen, Van gils developed 
advertisements that were no longer about the product, but about experiences, a lifestyle, 
and the environment in which Van gils suits could be worn (moorman, n.d.; interview 
110909). this was a unique and innovative approach to men’s fashion at the time in the 
netherlands, and was further developed by the launch of the Van gils fragrance for men in 
1985. 
the marketing of Van gils was not directed toward a particular consumer group in terms of 
income and age, but in terms of mentality and aspirations. Van gils wanted to be the best 
affordable top brand. to communicate this accessible	glamour, Van gils’ photography never 
showed private jets or ferraris (Buitenhuis, 1986; Kuitenbrouwer, 1985; interview 110909). 
instead, its advertising was based on what Van gils calls human	values. for instance, one 
ad showed a father sitting with his son on a sidewalk eating fries (interview 110909), and 
a certain tension between the sexes was displayed in Van gils’ Strictly	for	Men campaigns. 
232
Van gils became known for its formal wear with 
an informal appeal, which Jacques van gils has 
termed ‘disciplined nonchalance’ (e.g. “de visie 
van”, 1986; Joosten, 2004). according to him, 
the main elements of Van gils’ brand identity 
are humour, style, and eroticism (Joosten, 
2004). it promotes a somewhat “laidback dress 
behaviour”, explicitly positioning itself against 
the “power dressing” of hugo Boss (interview 
110909). Van gils became a renowned brand for 
fashionable formal wear with points of sales in 
the netherlands, Belgium, united Kingdom, 
scandinavia (sweden and denmark), france, and 
germany (“Van gils kon”, 1982; Kuitenbrouwer, 
1985; Van grinsven, 1988). marked by increasing 
brand recognition, the 1980s can be considered 
Van gils’ heyday. Jacques van gils was rewarded 
for this success with a grand seigneur in 1986 
(Buitenhuis, 1986; “de visie van”, 1986; see also 
box 4.1).
Figure	8.1:	Van	Gils	Strictly	for	Men	advertisement	(1990).	From	collection	ReclameArsenaal,	
Hilversum.	Retrieved	from	http://www.geheugenvannederland.nl/?/nl/items/NAGO02:RA-JCD10465
due to a number of problems including financial mismanagement, Van gils went bankrupt 
in 1992. Jacques van gils – together with Van gils’ former marketing manager ronald de 
Vree – then searched for a financial partner to re-launch the brand (interview 110909). such 
a partner was found in centaur clothes, a wholly-owned subsidiary of london based holding 
company William Baird Plc. in 2001, dutch holding company Vilenzo international n.V. 
acquired Van gils as part of its multi-brand growth strategy. however, for various reasons, 
Vilenzo was unable to bring Van gils back to its former glory. Vilenzo’s overall performance 
rapidly deteriorated from 2002 onward, leading to the company’s bankruptcy in 2004. 
the reasons for this failure are manifold; to understand the complexity of Vilenzo’s 
bankruptcy would require a research project of its own that goes beyond the scope of this 
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dissertation (cf. fermont, 2009; Vriezen, 2009).38 after Vilenzo’s bankruptcy, another dutch 
company acquired most of Vilenzo’s children’s and menswear brands, including Van gils. 
apparently, despite its ups and downs, Van gils was still an appealing brand in which to 
invest. Waalwear men B.V., a subsidiary of dutch holding company We international B.V., 
acquired Van gils in the same year. in 2010, Waalwear men changed its name to Van gils 
fashion B.V., as Van gils had become the most important brand of the company39. 
in terms of brand identity, Van gils continues to be recognized as a brand for men’s suits. 
according to one of Van gils’ (product) managers, an important reason why Van gils was 
able to survive and is gaining market share since 2010 is because of its move beyond formal 
wear toward other, more informal product groups, such as knitwear and shirts, “in order to 
complete the formal look” (interview 120314). the market for suits in general is declining, 
while the number of brands and firms that sell suits in different price ranges has increased 
(ibid.). Van gils has therefore invested in brand extensions to offer a “‘total look’ within 
their formal heritage” (ibid.). 
throughout the different ownerships described above, Van gils has been marketed with 
varying success by different ceos, who have put substantial effort into (re-)defining 
the brand’s ‘dna’ (cf. Bosman, 2012; mirande, 2008). although the company’s current 
organization is no longer related to the Van gils family who had established the brand in the 
1980s, both Van gils’ current ceo robert meijer and his predecessors explicitly refer to the 
brand’s heritage (cf. mirande, 2008; “Van gils wil weer”, 2009; “We willen het merk”, 2010). 
this heritage is defined by the craftsmanship that goes into constructing a high quality 
suit and the rebellious image of Van gils’ advertisements in the 1980s, as the following two 
quotations by robert meijer illustrate:
We want to restore the brand’s strength. We reload its history of craftsmanship, 
tailoring, and style in a contemporary way. in the last years, Van gils has become too 
scandinavian and clean. With the new collection we have taken a step back towards 
the original Van gils. this also means an important role for quality again. the designs 
again evoke many experiences: we bring male luxury with crossed buttonhole stitches, 
multi-coloured linings, the comeback of the tongue pocket and many more beautiful 
details (“We willen het merk”, 2010, my translation).
38  at the moment of writing this dissertation, the bankruptcy case is still pending.
39  for a more detailed analysis of the organizations of Vilenzo and Waalwear see section 8.2.
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i believe in evolution, not in revolution. the core of the brand, the dna, is something 
you should not tinker with. instead, you must further develop its strengths. for 
example, one of our brand values is ‘never too serious’. the brand has always been a 
little bit rebellious. think of the old advertisements in which a woman stands urinating 
next to a couple of men in a public lavatory and the accompanying slogan ‘strictly for 
gentlemen’. that is Van gils. that kind of humour is currently reflected in details, such 
as a short text near the zipper stating ‘take your time’ or one at the care label saying 
‘hundred degrees: this is gonna hurt’ (Bosman, 2012: 6, my translation).
likewise, Van gils’ latest slogan, ‘no stitch no story’, is part of a manifesto that describes 
the mentality of the Van gils man. developed by advertising agency ssss & orchestra (smit, 
2011; Van nierop, 2011), it refers to how a suit is ‘made’. tangible and technical elements of 
suits seem to play an important role in defining the brand’s identity, which is why Van gils 
continues to communicate its manufacturing legacy of craftsmanship. as we will see in the 
following sections of this chapter, however, telling a story of craftsmanship involves more 
than just marketing jargon. the design and aesthetic elements of tailored garments are 
highly connected to their actual manufacturing, which gives rise to important challenges 
for a brand without manufacturing competences. 
8.2 tWo sepaRate Yet Related tRaJeCtoRies
for the most part, we have lost the manufacturing process. nowadays, it is 
impossible to set up large scale clothing firms in europe. Western european 
clothing firms that have settled in eastern european countries such as Yugoslavia, 
romania, Poland and czechoslovakia have to deal with the same problems as 
we [...]. Production costs increase there as well and cheaper products are being 
made in countries like taiwan and china.
ben van Gils (cited in Kerkwijk, 1983, my translation)
8.2.1  hoW the manufacturer Becomes a Brand 
from the 1950s to the 1970s, Van gils was a manufacturer that made menswear for 
wholesalers, chain stores, and some independent retailers. as can be seen in the timeline, 
Van gils set up a considerable number of manufacturing plants in the netherlands and 
abroad during the 1960s and 1970s. the international expansion to Belgium, malta, greece, 
Portugal, morocco, and mexico was primarily cost-driven – a direct consequence of both 
rising wages and lack of personnel in the netherlands. since Van gils was located in the 
southern part of the netherlands, its first international move into Belgium was only a small 
step in terms of geographical distance – but it made a great difference in terms of wage levels 
and unemployment rates. interestingly, the company’s southern location already gave Van 
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gils a competitive advantage; labour costs were lower in the dutch periphery, and Van gils 
could offer better prices than established companies in amsterdam and groningen. once 
these established firms considered the up-and-coming Van gils as a threat to their own 
businesses, they made a deal with dutch fabric suppliers that resulted in a boycott of Van 
gils. as a consequence, Van gils was forced to go abroad and found more fashionable and 
even better-priced fabrics in Prato, italy.
most of Van gils’ manufacturing plants were opportunity-driven joint ventures with local 
manufacturers, except for tangier and mexico; the latter was built from scratch with the aim 
of taking a share of the american market. in all production units, the Van gils family had a 
controlling interest to retain control over profit margins and quality.
up until the 1970s, the company’s development was primarily driven by international growth 
and manufacturing. But the end of the decade heralded a new era for Van gils, marked by 
reorganizations in terms of manufacturing and a reorientation in terms of brand strategy. 
as explained at the beginning of this chapter, miel van gils’ sons alwin, Jacques, and Ben 
gradually took over the business and developed Van gils as a lifestyle brand. this new 
strategy of branding and marketing required a different organizational approach than did 
manufacturing. as a manufacturer, Van gils had always produced for others. as a brand, Van 
gils needed to refocus further downstream in the value chain. this resulted in a constant 
identity struggle: “do we produce what we can sell or do we sell what we can produce?” 
(interview 120109, my translation). 
Van gils had transformed from a pure manufacturer into a brand with its own manufacturing 
plants. this means that the company had full control over the manufacturing process. at 
the same time, it complicated the organization, because running an efficient factory can 
conflict with developing marketable collections that are increasingly subject to seasonal 
fluctuations. as a brand, Van gils needed most of its products to be delivered twice a year, 
to present its new collections at the beginning of the season. as a manufacturer, however, 
it preferred more constant flows of production throughout the year. to keep the factories 
going, Van gils therefore combined production for its own brand with making collections 
for other (private) labels.
although the 1980s can be considered Van gils’ heyday, they were also marked by a number 
of reorganizations that involved the closure of most of its factories. Production units in 
roosendaal, Bergen op Zoom, malta, athens, and Portugal were closed or sold by 1978. 
mexico, which was never successful due to u.s. import quotas, was sold in 1983 (Kerkwijk, 
1983). oud-gastel, the last dutch production unit with 137 employees in 1980, was eventually 
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closed in 1981. de demer in aarschot, the last Belgian production unit with 300 employees 
in 1980, went bankrupt in 1984, after it had become independent (“Van gils confectie”, 
1980; “textielgigant”, 1980; “ook Van gils ontkomt”, 1980; “Van gils in oud-gastel”, 1981). 
While these reorganizations were necessary to survive a difficult period in which the company 
suffered negative net incomes40, these were also turbulent times for Van gils as it had to deal 
with trade unions, the Belgian tax authorities and the Belgian government (cf. Beusekamp, 
1986; Van meurs, 1987; garschagen, 1987a; 1987b; 1987c). While the brand flourished, 
and production costs had been cut down considerably by concentrating manufacturing in 
morocco, the Van gils family says it was primarily financial mismanagement that caused the 
company’s bankruptcy in 1992. 
Van gils’ organizational development from the 1950s to the 1980s is visualized in figure 8.2. 
it shows the company’s transformation from a domestic manufacturer, to a manufacturing 
firm with factories abroad, to a branded manufacturer with its own manufacturing plants. 
this transformation involved an increasing role of design and branding, in combination with 
a reduction of manufacturing costs through relocation – but not outsourcing. We can thus 
see that while geographical distance between design and manufacturing had increased, it 
was less a matter of relational and organizational distance; brand and manufacturer were 
still part of one and the same company. this would change after its bankruptcy.
Figure	8.2:	Development	of	production	network	Van	Gils	1950s	–	1980s
40  1980: 9 million guilders loss (approx.. 4 million euro); 1981: 11 million guilders loss (approx. 5 million 
euro) (“Van gils kon”, 1982)
Branded 
Manufacturer with 
plants abroad 
plant plant plant plant 
1980s 
Increasing role of fashion design content and branding 
Manufacturer with 
plants abroad 
plant plant plant plant 
1960s—1970s 
Domestic 
manufacturer 
1950s 
Cost reductions through relocation of manufacturing plants 
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8.2.2 hoW the Brand Becomes detached from the    
 manufacturer
When a company goes bankrupt, brands can survive if investors see potential. acquiring a 
brand involves the right to market products under the brand name and its associated logos. 
unlike patent and copyright, the property rights that fall under trademark law have no 
fixed time limits; as such, they implicate “potential longevity” (lury, 2004: 101). however, 
the entire organization of design, manufacturing, and sales can change every time a new 
company takes over. 
in the case of Van gils, the brand was taken over consecutively by three companies that 
differed in terms of branding and sourcing strategies. What they all have in common – and 
what largely determines the brand’s ‘second life’ in terms of its organizational structure – 
is that none of these companies continued to produce Van gils products using in-house 
manufacturing plants. from 1992 onward, the main focus was on design, marketing, and 
sales, while manufacturing was outsourced to different (types of ) suppliers. 
1992	–	2001:	CENTAUR	CLOTHES
after Van gils’ bankruptcy in 1992, centaur clothes – a wholly-owned subsidiary of the 
British holding company William Baird – acquired the brand name. centaur clothes then 
opened its international headquarters in Breda – centaur clothes netherlands B.V. – which 
was led by Jacques van gils and ronald de Vree. from here, centaur organized its continental 
design, marketing, and sales activities for Van gils and a number of other brands (“Van gils 
komt”, 1992; “neues leben”, 1993; tulp, 1996). manufacturing was primarily subcontracted 
to icomail, Van gils’ production unit in casablanca that was led by alwin van gils. 
While the ‘new’ Van gils could still draw on its former creative management and production 
facilities, it no longer owned any manufacturing plants. moreover, it was now part of a listed 
company. as such, it had to deal with a different approach in terms of financial aims. as 
Jacques van gils explained in an interview with Textilia:
it is a big company that is driven by financial goals. i have been growing up in an 
atmosphere of craftsmanship in which the focus was on the product. We have a different 
way of thinking. a listed company, like Baird, cannot live with surprises. it needs a steady 
course. this is difficult within fashion. for financial people, turnover drops in october 
and november are an unpleasant surprise. Baird has other clothing brands as well, but 
they are less experienced in more fashionable lines (tulp, 1996: 5, my translation).
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notwithstanding these different approaches, William Baird provided the necessary financial 
means to rebuild Van gils as a fashionable and affordable menswear brand, which led to 
an annual turnover of approximately 50 million dutch guilders (approx. 23 million euro) 
in 1995 (tulp, 1996). although this was only fifty per cent of Van gils’ turnover before the 
bankruptcy, it seemed that the brand was slowly on its way to regaining market share in 
scandinavia, the united Kingdom, and Belgium. due to managerial disagreements between 
Jacques van gils and de Vree, Van gils left the company in the second half of the 1990s and 
was no longer involved in the marketing of ‘his’ brand. at the end of the century, William 
Baird was confronted with major financial problems and Van gils/centaur clothes went up 
for sale again. two dutch companies, both located in the south of the netherlands, were 
interested in the brand. it would result in one of the biggest acquisitions in dutch fashion 
history.
2001	–	2004:	VILENZO
two dutch fashion firms were interested in taking over Van gils in 2001: united fashion 
makers (ufm) in Waalwijk and Vilenzo in tilburg. ufm was a so-called head-and-tail firm that 
produced and marketed the menswear brands Jaguar, obvious, Peter van holland, frans 
molenaar and Van Kollem. ufm used to subcontract manufacturing on a cmt basis partly 
to trojaco, Van gils’ production unit in tangier. But now it was relocating manufacturing 
to factories in eastern europe. Vilenzo, a large fashion firm founded by Willem Vilé in the 
1960s, started as a manufacturer of private label children’s clothes, transformed into a 
multi-brand holding company in the 1990s, and went public in 1991. 
Vilenzo owned factories in tunisia, sri lanka, Pakistan, and madagascar, in addition to a 
recently acquired dutch knitwear manufacturer. as Vilenzo searched for lucrative brands to 
acquire and attempted to transition from being a manufacturing business to a marketing- 
and sales-oriented firm, these production units were to be decommissioned. furthermore, 
Vilé had been leading the company for more than 40 years and was looking for a successor. 
an agreement was eventually reached that included Vilenzo acquiring ufm and	Van gils/
centaur clothes. theo van loon, managing director of ufm, and ronald de Vree, director 
of Van gils, obtained positions in Vilenzo’s board of directors; Van loon being Vilenzo’s 
intended ceo. By taking over ufm and Van gils, Vilenzo increased its annual turnover by 
nearly 70% to 180 million euro (43 million euro ufm and 27 million euro Van gils) (Kers, 
2001; thijssen, 2001; “Vilenzo verkrijgt”, 2001; Vilenzo international n.V., 2002).41 
41  interestingly, Vilé had already tried to take over Van gils after its bankruptcy in 1992, but did not 
reach an agreement with Jacques van gils at the time.
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Vilenzo had a decentralized organization and functioned as a holding company for more than 
20 independent, wholly-owned subsidiaries. this was also the case for the organization of 
the new menswear division, which in practice consisted of two separate companies: Van gils 
in Breda and ufm in Waalwijk. ufm was said to be more production- and trade-oriented, 
as it was accustomed to marketing a variety of labels, whereas Van gils was more brand-
minded and focused much more on marketing campaigns and image-building. according 
to ufm general director frank akkermans and Van gils’ sales director Jan van herwijnen, 
this was the reason why a merger between these two companies – which technically made 
the same product – was deemed valuable (Van driel, 2002a; 2002b). this could mean 
the combination of the best of two worlds: “the business instinct of ufm and the brand 
experience of Van gils” (ibid.). 
Vilenzo’s management, under the direction of theo van loon, strategically aimed at 
centralizing the men’s division, including its logistics and administration. however, several 
former managers and employees (interviews 090519; 090522; 090609-ii; 120522) claim that 
a real merger between Van gils and ufm was never realized (e.g. “Vilenzo heeft meer”, 
2004). cultural and organizational differences between the two companies were apparently 
too big to overcome.  
as mentioned in section 8.1, the reasons for Vilenzo’s failure in 2004 were manifold and a 
detailed analysis would go beyond the scope of this dissertation. nevertheless, a majority 
of the factors cited by interviewees and documented in bankruptcy reports and newspaper 
articles – including too much stock, late deliveries, managerial conflicts, and a lack of focus 
– do not only explain Vilenzo’s problems but were important issues within the menswear 
division in particular (e.g. interviews 090519; 090522; 090604; 090605; 090609-i; 100106). 
these issues were partly related to the already-mentioned difficulties of integrating two 
different organizational cultures, but were also the result of incompatible planning systems 
(interview 090522). Van gils’ brand identity seems to have suffered from the lack of a 
‘spiritual leader’ with a clear focus (interviews 090605; 110909). Vilenzo’s last ceo Bernard 
doorenbos even consulted Jacques van gils to rebuild and watch over Van gils’ brand 
concept (Zetteler, 2004; “Van gils keert terug”, 2004). however, this could not prevent the 
company’s demise. 
manufacturing was another important factor that suffered from efficiency-oriented 
reorganizations. manufacturing of Van gils’ formal collections was relocated from morocco 
to ufm’s eastern european cmt suppliers, in countries like serbia, croatia, slovenia, and 
Bulgaria (“Vilenzo verkrijgt”, 2001; interviews 090519; 120522). these manufacturers were 
selected primarily with the aim of cost reductions and changed several times throughout 
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the years. according to one of Vilenzo’s former production managers, these changes were 
problematic; the moroccan supplier understood the requirements of a Van gils suit, while it 
took a few seasons for a new supplier to become acquainted with the brand and deliver the 
right quality (interview 090519). the company was unable to find the right balance between 
cost reduction, consistent quality, and brand strategy. Vilenzo went bankrupt in 2004. 
2004	–	PRESENT:	WAALWEAR	MEN/VAN	GILS	FASHION
We international, run by ronald de Waal, is a dutch holding company that until 2004 had 
specialized in fashion retail. established in 1917, the firm is primarily known for its fashion 
retail chain We. after Vilenzo’s bankruptcy in 2004, de Waal acquired the company’s 
menswear and children’s wear brands, including Van gils, Peter van holland, Jaguar, frans 
molenaar, cakewalk, and Jottum. after several reorganizations, these brands were distributed 
amongst two wholly-owned subsidiaries – Waalwear men and Waalwear Kids – that were part 
of logo international, the fashion group of We international (cf. Willems, 2008). through 
these acquisitions, logo international expanded its business from retail to a combination of 
retail and wholesale activities. further acquisitions included dutch multi-brand men’s fashion 
chain setpoint and sportswear brand o’neill. 
in recent years, Waalwear men and Waalwear Kids have shrunk the number of brands in 
their portfolio by gradually discontinuing or selling less lucrative brands. the men’s division, 
which changed its name to Van gils fashion in 2010, focuses on Van gils as the main brand 
and Peter van holland and Van Kollem as so-called branded	private	labels. for branded private 
labels, Van gils fashion develops collections, including brand names and logos, but without 
investing in marketing and advertising. retailers can purchase these collections under the 
same conditions as private labels – i.e. with the same profit margins – but without having to 
deal with its design (interview 120314).
under the umbrella of logo international, Van gils has had several ceos achieving varying 
levels of success in terms of sales. according to the current ceo robert meijer, Van gils’ 
market share is growing: after several difficult years, in 2012 Van gils’ turnover had doubled 
since 2010 (Bosman, 2012). Van gils is primarily sold by independent retailers and some shop-
in-shops. distribution is organized via its own sales offices or agencies in primarily the Benelux 
countries, denmark, sweden, canada, and germany (Vermuyten, 2012; interviews 120314; 
120330). there are around 600 points of sales in 20 countries. in the netherlands, this number 
has increased from 80 in 2010 to 200 in 2012 (Bosman, 2012; Vermuyten, 2012). setpoint is an 
important client of Van gils in the netherlands, although its relevance for Van gils is declining; 
the number of stores has been reduced from 37 to 27 (including 10 franchisers) (mirande, 
2008; interview 120314).
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in terms of manufacturing, Van gils’ brand extensions into more informal product types (see 
section 8.1) required a diversification of its supplier base, which has resulted in a total of 
approximately 20-25 ready-made garment suppliers in europe and china (interview 120314). 
While the number and composition of suppliers of informal garments may slightly vary from 
season to season, Van gils’ formal collections are made by one supplier in Bulgaria and 
two suppliers in china – all based on mutual long-term commitments (interviews 120314; 
120330). Peter van holland and Van Kollem are entirely made in china. the production of 
Van gils is being subcontracted to both Bulgaria and china (ibid.). 
Van gils’ chinese partners have always been ready-made garment suppliers, while Bulgaria 
used to be a cmt manufacturer. during the last four to five years, Van gils and its Bulgarian 
partner have been transitioning from cmt into full-package production (interviews 120314; 
120330). this means that purchasing of trimmings is gradually being outsourced to Van gils’ 
Bulgarian supplier and Van gils no longer has to ship fabrics and trims via its own warehouse 
in helmond. it also involves a gradual shift of financial and organizational responsibilities 
to the supplier. in terms of pattern making, Van gils keeps in-house technical designers to 
develop the basic block patterns that are used by both its european and chinese suppliers. 
consequently, Van gils has outsourced the entire manufacturing process, except for fabric 
sourcing, block pattern making, and quality control, while retaining a close relationship 
with its suppliers based on mutual trust and long-term commitments. furthermore, Van 
gils fashion provides technical support to its suppliers by employing its own on-site quality 
controllers and technical managers who pay regular visits to the factories (interview 120314). 
Van gils combines manufacturing in the far east with european products in order to offer 
more luxurious signature suits, made with italian fabrics, alongside more affordable suits 
made in china. from the 1990s onward, Van gils thus gradually moved from cmt-based 
subcontracting to full-package production. 
Yet, it would be simplistic to argue that the brand has completely withdrawn from all 
aspects related to manufacturing. the brand still sources its own fabrics, determines where 
its suppliers should purchase which materials, and maintains relatively strong control over 
the production process through its quality control and technical support. it can be argued 
that the brand has become organizationally detached from its original manufacturing 
legacy and the focus has shifted from ‘how to brand a manufactured product’ to ‘how to 
organize manufacturing behind the brand’. this implies that the relationship between the 
creative side of the brand and the technological side of manufacturing its products has 
changed as well, because certain knowledge and skills related to manufacturing are no 
longer ‘owned’ by the brand. this eventually leads to greater interdependencies between 
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brand and manufacturer, which i will further explore in section 8.3 by analysing the different 
organizational practices that pertain to the relationship between design and manufacturing. 
But before that, i will briefly discuss the organizational structure of the makers, which will 
play an important role in understanding manufacturing practices in the final part of this 
chapter.
8.2.3 manufacturing continued 
after Van gils’ bankruptcy in 1992, the Van gils brothers alwin, Jacques and Ben rethought 
their business and decided to continue manufacturing of formal menswear. they founded 
the makers, “a network of business units that produce top quality tailored clothing” (the 
makers, 2011). the makers holding B.V. is located in Breda (nl). it includes the makers’ 
styling department, dutch fashion services B.V. (dfs), which is involved in purchasing, 
logistics, and distribution, and divare B.V., which takes care of the makers’ sales 
organization. trojaco and icomail (until 2011), the two most important production units 
of the Van gils brand until 1992, are also part of the makers. in addition, through a joint 
venture set up in Belgium called fapai europe Bvba, the makers started manufacturing in 
china in 2004. 
through this network, the makers specializes in producing formal wear for different types of 
customers, ranging from high fashion designers to mid-market chain stores. the structure 
of the makers’ network of companies is based on a decentralized business model in which 
every company is legally and financially independent. the manufacturing plants in morocco 
could be continued after Van gils’ bankruptcy through an agreement between the makers, 
the aBn amro bank, and the company’s moroccan partners. icomail – the production unit 
in casablanca – worked for Van gils/centaur clothes, but gradually started to specialize in 
competitively priced mass production. in 2011, icomail did not survive the departure of one 
of its main clients – marks and spencer – and went bankrupt. trojaco in tangier started with 
private label production for ufm and – realizing that it would be unable to compete with 
china based on price and volume – gradually specialized in customer-oriented flexibility 
and quality (interview 120110). trojaco has become the primary manufacturing unit of the 
makers.
trojaco serves two types of customers that demand different types of manufacturing 
processes: customers that contact trojaco directly and customers that work with trojaco 
through the makers in Breda. direct customers are primarily those that subcontract 
manufacturing on a cm(t) basis, because trojaco does not purchase fabrics. most indirect 
customers have outsourced fabric buying as well: full business, private label, and mass 
customization. the makers/trojaco thus works for a great variety of customers and accepts 
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orders ranging from 1 to 5000 items.
the makers considers mass customization an important growth market, which is also why 
trojaco has invested more in flexibility than in efficiency. the next Van gils generation also 
breaks into this new market; it has set up a new business concept called café costume that 
offers made-to-measure suits in a number of stores in Belgium. consumers can ‘build’ their 
own suits based on a ‘menu’ of cuts, fabrics, and trims, which are then manufactured by 
the makers.  
Figure	8.3:	Development	of	production	networks	Van	Gils	(upper	half )	and	the	Makers	(lower	half )	1990s	–	2000s
regarding the concurrent organizational developments of the Van gils brand on the one 
hand and the manufacturing organization of the makers on the other, an increasing 
organizational distance can be observed between design and manufacturing. Brand 
and manufacturer have gone separate ways, which apparently leads to organizationally 
distanciated creative and industrial practices, visualized in figure 8.3. in the next section, i 
will analyse these organizational practices in order to understand the consequences of this 
separation for both brand and manufacturer. 
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8.3 oRGaniZational pRaCtiCes: fRoM MaKinG   
 sUits to CReatinG Van Gils
We ‘make’ your entire collection, working closely with you. We give your 
collection shape, with extensive creative input from our cutters and stylists. 
models, measuring standards, finishing guidelines, in short the entire manual to 
process your idea. then we suggest a blend of fabrics and suitable haberdashery 
that are perfectly in line with the idea you had in mind. so that you can 
concentrate on your commercial activities. [...] the makers is the perfect ‘missing 
link’.
the Makers (2012)
in the previous sections, i analysed the development of Van gils’ global production 
networks. as we have seen, Van gils’ development started with relocation of manufacturing 
in the 1960s and 1970s, followed by the transformation from manufacturer to branded 
manufacturer and an increasing organizational distance between brand and manufacturer 
after its bankruptcy in 1992. though the direct cause for Van gils’ bankruptcy may indeed 
have been financial mismanagement, what makes its further development an interesting 
case for this study is that brand and manufacturer went their separate ways. 
in this section, i further explore the apparent distance between brand and manufacturer 
and the consequences of such a geographical and organizational separation. i will do 
so by analysing the relationships between two separated organizational practices: the 
creative practices of developing and marketing a brand and the more technical practices of 
making suits. the question, then, is to what extent these now organizationally distanciated 
practices depend on and inform each other, and why – despite such dependencies – they are 
difficult to combine within one organization. Based on these insights, we can then evaluate 
the consequences of such distanciation for both brand and manufacturer. separating the 
analysis of ‘creating Van gils’ from ‘making suits’ is a somewhat artificial distinction, as 
they involve interrelated and partly overlapping practices. however, it provides a way to 
understand organizational developments both from the perspective of the brand and the 
perspective of the manufacturer.
8.3.1 the Brand’s PersPectiVe: creating Van gils… 
the organizational development of Van gils as a brand involves the gradual separation of 
the brand from its manufacturing roots. creative practices have thus become distanciated 
from their origin – i.e. the Van gils family and their manufacturing heritage – but also in 
organizational terms from the manufacturing business as such. considering the different 
aims and orientations of fashion brands and manufacturers, both business models 
require different types of expertise, which partly explains why Van gils as a brand and the 
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manufacturer have gone separate ways. according to the Van gils family, the seasonal 
character of developing and marketing fashion collections are difficult to synchronize with 
the more efficiency-driven manufacturing business that demands continuous, regular 
orders:
actually, those are two conflicting things – two businesses that might be incompatible. 
Because, if you look at brands, they focus on marketing, develop collections, run 
flagship stores. all their resources and attention go into these aspects. the fact that 
the product also needs to be made is of subordinate importance for those brands, 
because it requires a completely different way of thinking, [it is] a different discipline, 
completely different. Well, if you intend to control both, you need a strong foundation 
(interview 110909, my translation).
the reason why brand and manufacturer have gone separate ways is not only due 
to cost reductions, but is also a consequence of the fact that their [different ways of 
working] are no longer attuned to one another. if you let a factory decide, it will always 
make just one suit, one jacket, in one type of fabric [...], because that is the most 
efficient (interview 120109, my translation).
the tension between fashion brands’ and manufacturers’ business orientations does 
not mean that outsourcing the entire manufacturing part is a straightforward decision. 
especially in formal wear, aesthetic and technological practices are highly intertwined, 
which complicates organizational separation. this results in a continuous re-evaluation of 
which aspects of the value chain are of such importance for the brand’s identity that they 
need to be kept in-house, and which aspects can be managed from a distance without the 
control of ownership. the factors that influence these decisions become clearly visible when 
looking at the way Van gils fashion organizes the creative process in combination with its 
outsourcing practices.
as we have seen from the previous sections, Van gils fashion aims to focus on brand 
management and collection development, while outsourcing the manufacturing process as 
much as possible. in doing so, Van gils fashion aims at a full-package approach for all of its 
suppliers. at the same time, the company is encountering the boundaries of outsourcing. 
concerning the manufacturing of its formal wear, Van gils fashion explicitly strives for long-
term partnerships with only a small number of suppliers. formal wear apparently involves 
a specific type of product that needs a consistent quality and fit that would not benefit 
from frequent change. While Van gils fashion no longer owns any production facilities, 
it has invested in a stable manufacturing base through these long-term commitments. 
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furthermore, the company has not withdrawn from manufacturing entirely (yet). in order to 
maintain the expertise to develop a unique product, the actions of purchasing fabrics and 
trims, developing basic block patterns, and maintaining on-site quality control and technical 
support are kept in-house; they are considered too important for Van gils’ signature and fit 
to outsource, even in a full-package-driven policy (interview 120314). 
if we look at the way in which Van gils fashion manages manufacturing in Bulgaria and 
china, it becomes evident that the company has not (yet) transformed completely into a 
branded producer without any manufacturing competences. manufacturing in china is 
different from manufacturing in eastern europe – not only in terms of distance, but also 
in terms of outsourcing strategies (interview 120330). although Van gils fashion aims at 
organizing production in Bulgaria in the same way as in china, it arguably takes some 
years for a manufacturer to transform its business completely from cmt to full-package. 
in europe, Van gils works together with nominated suppliers for fabrics as well as for 
trimmings. this means that Van gils performs price negotiations with these suppliers and 
tells its Bulgarian manufacturer exactly which ‘ingredients’ it should purchase from which 
supplier and at which price. 
for its chinese manufacturers, Van gils only controls the choice of fabrics. for trimmings, 
Van gils provides quality requirements and demands a certain profit margin. it is then up 
to the manufacturer to attain the right price. this means that production in china is more 
driven by costs; manufacturers need to manoeuvre within a fixed price target. in Bulgaria, it 
works the other way around: the process starts with fabrics, styles, and raw materials driven 
by quality, after which Van gils’ product managers visit the manufacturer to discuss the 
styles and their price. 
in terms of face-to-face contact, this also means that china is only visited once to negotiate 
price targets, while Bulgaria is also visited during the sampling process to discuss product 
development. to some extent, the different approaches to organizing manufacturing 
in eastern europe as compared to the far east can be explained by eastern europe’s 
relative geographical proximity. it is easier and less time-consuming to travel to Bulgaria 
than to china. another reason why most eastern european factories are not used to offer 
full-package manufacturing is related to the strong presence of german fashion firms 
outsourcing to these countries. as several researchers have demonstrated, among german 
fashion firms, cmt manufacturing is more pronounced than full-package outsourcing (e.g. 
lane & Probert, 2006). as a result, eastern europe’s industrial culture is primarily built 
on subcontracting relationships, highly driven by the expertise of Western european lead 
fashion firms.
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the company’s decision to keep in-house technical designers in charge of developing basic 
block patterns and providing technical support to the factories is also related to the different 
ways of organizing production in Bulgaria and china. in principle, chinese suppliers are 
used to develop patterns on the basis of their clients’ size specifications. more and more 
european brands are outsourcing the costly pattern making process, while chinese suppliers 
have acquired this expertise. Yet, as one of Van gils’ product managers explains, there is 
more than one way to develop patterns from one and the same size specification, resulting 
in different fits (interview 120330). outsourcing the development of basic block patterns 
therefore involves the risk of losing control over the translation of size specifications into 
patterns. this could eventually lead to a change of fit, without knowing exactly what has 
changed in the process. Particularly in formal wear, it is important to maintain a consistent 
fit and to guarantee that the fit of Bulgarian style a does not differ from the fit of chinese 
style a (interview 120330). this is one of the reasons why Van gils fashion retains (costly) in-
house technical designers. as one of Van gils’ (product) managers explains:
for me—i consider it the basic building blocks of the product. and if you lack a 
decent foundation, the rest just will collapse like a house of cards. i thus prefer more 
investment and effort at the start of the development process to make sure that the 
product is right, instead of finding out later at the production stage that the end 
product is not at all what you expected. hence, it is a kind of quality warranty. that is 
how i see it (interview 120314, my translation).
in all of my interviews, the role of technical designers or pattern makers manifested itself 
in the great emphasis that respondents put on the importance of fit	 in formal wear and 
suits. compared to, for instance, women’s shirts and dresses, variations in men’s suits are 
only marginal. Variations are found in details such as stitching, pockets, linings, buttons, 
buttonholes, and jacket lapels. Yet, the distinctive features of the design of a tailored garment 
are its fit and its fabric. apart from branding and marketing, the fit is what distinguishes 
a Van gils suit from a hugo Boss suit, which is why design and technical design/pattern 
making are closely related.
the central role of pattern making is further reflected in Van gils’ current design practices. 
generally speaking, the entire process from first idea to sampling and production is similar 
to other men’s and womenswear fashion brands, as we have seen in the previous case 
studies. it always starts with a phase of orientation in which designers draw inspiration 
from different media, fairs, shopping, and travelling, which is then translated into themes, 
colour palettes, and sketches, followed by phases of sampling, sales, and final production 
(interviews 120314; 120330). three interrelated teams are involved within the creative 
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process: designers, technical designers (i.e. block pattern making), and product managers 
(i.e. buying). Within this process, designers develop new styles based on their creativity, 
trends, the Van gils ‘dna’ and a commercial framework that defines the number of styles 
and their price categories. technical designers are concerned with the actual construction 
of the suit and translate the styles into patterns. Product managers, then, are in charge 
of organizing the sampling and production process, including price negotiations and 
purchasing materials (interviews 120314; 120330; 120522).
since fit is such an important element of formal wear, a crucial moment in the creative 
process described above is the translation of styles into patterns. in the past, pattern makers 
had an even more powerful position within the manufacturing of tailored garments, though 
their role changed with the influence of fashion. in the 1960s, Van gils was one of the first to 
approach formal wear from a fashion point of view. the pattern maker remained important, 
but was no longer the only decisive factor in the process. design became, and continues to 
be, the product of a discussion between a creative person – the designer or stylist – and a 
more technical person – the pattern maker (interview 120110). furthermore, in the case of 
the ‘old’ Van gils, the creative process was largely defined by a close collaboration between 
designer and fabric buyer (Van grinsven, 1988). fashion trips to new York were followed 
by visiting (primarily italian) fabric suppliers to translate new trends and ideas directly 
into fabric designs (ibid.), which further underlines the importance of fabrics in tailored 
garments. explains Van gils’ fabric buyer in the 1980s: “together, designer Jacques van gils 
and i form a unity. he is more concerned with creating styles and i select fabrics and fabric 
designs. Yet, there is no clear boundary between our practices” (Van grinsven, 1988).
considering these interconnections between design, fabric buying, and pattern making, 
we can conclude that design in this case is very much a relational product of both creative/
aesthetic and technological practices. the relations between design and manufacturing 
thus play an important role in the performance of the brand, which partly explains why Van 
gils fashion preserves a close relationship with its small selection of suppliers. 
What it cannot so far explain is to what extent these relationships have changed due to 
increased outsourcing and organizational distance. Van gils fashion is strongly convinced 
of the value of technical design, but the company has never owned any manufacturing 
plants and thus has not experienced the change from own manufacturing to outsourcing. 
to understand what own manufacturing means and how it affects the design practice, in the 
next section i address the relationship between design and manufacturing from the latter’s 
point of view. We will see how the distance between brands and manufacturers can also 
lead to a shift of creative practices in the direction of the manufacturer. complementing 
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the previous case studies, it presents another example of blurring boundaries between 
retailers, wholesalers, and manufacturers.
8.3.2 the manufacturer’s PersPectiVe: ... or maKing suits?
the makers developed partly out of doubt regarding whether brand and manufacturer 
were compatible businesses (interview 110909). fashion brands are marked by seasonal 
fluctuations and diversity, while manufacturers focus on continuity and efficiency. in Van 
gils´ view, their conflicting aims thus indicate two business models that are incompatible, 
or at least hard to unite. When focusing on organizational practices, however, the 
separation of brand and manufacturer is not without problems. in this section, i will discuss 
the distanciation between design and manufacturing from a manufacturer’s perspective. 
Based on interviews with (former) managers of the ‘old’ Van gils and the makers, and 
my observational fieldwork at trojaco in tangier, i will explore how this manufacturer 
experiences and deals with changing relations with its customers.
a recurrent theme in both interviews and observations is an apparently widening gap 
between designers/stylists and manufacturers. this gap is regarded as problematic to the 
degree that it complicates practices of translation: the translation of an abstract idea into a 
physical garment. What does this translation incorporate? according to one of the makers’ 
managers, the simultaneously interesting and difficult issue of making men’s suits is that 
one has to work with at least three layers: 1) the 3-dimensional, abstract idea of the designer, 
2) two-dimensional patterns, and 3) ‘living’ materials, that move, shrink, or stretch during 
and after the manufacturing process (interview 120110). on top of that, manufacturers of 
tailored garments have to deal with manual labour and craftsmanship (ibid.). 
a successful translation then means that for one thing, the manufacturer is able to perform 
the necessary processes, while for another, the end product corresponds to the designers’ 
expectations in terms of style and price. Pattern makers are crucial in this practice of 
translation. Yet, due to fashion’s deindustrialization, in combination with a decreasing 
number of dutch fashion and textile students who chose to specialize in pattern making, 
and the consequent disappearance of knowledge and expertise in this field of work, brands 
increasingly depend on the knowledge and skills of (distant) manufacturers in this regard 
(interviews 120109; 120112; 120330). as one of the makers’ directors explains, the main 
problem of deindustrialization is that students no longer have opportunities to learn on-site 
and gain first-hand experiences through internships (interview 120109). eventually, with 
the disappearance of industry, organizational practices and thus knowledge and skills will 
probably disappear as well. 
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in the case of trojaco and the makers, the resulting lack of knowledge manifests itself in 
the ways in which certain customers approach the manufacturer. in particular, the type 
of information customers present to the manufacturer indicates an increasing shift of 
knowledge and responsibilities to the manufacturer. many fashion brands no longer provide 
their own patterns; they provide sketches and/or size specifications, or even just a picture, 
a bought sample, or an abstract idea that materializes in discussion with the manufacturer 
(interviews 120110; 120112). the consequences of this shift are that customers, be they 
retailers, brands, buyers, or stylists, become increasingly dependent on the knowledge 
and expertise of their suppliers. for instance, in the makers’ experience, more and more 
customers do not understand the consequences of their design ideas for manufacturing. 
this does not mean, of course, that dutch fashion brands and designers would no longer be 
able to develop high-quality and innovative collections. When there is a close relationship 
with suppliers, such as for instance Van gils fashion strives for, in the discussion between 
designer/stylist/retailer on the one hand and manufacturer on the other, knowledge can be 
shared, created, and translated at a distance (cf. allen, 2000; amin & cohendet, 2004). that 
is, if customers actually visit manufacturers and seek out a productive discussion with their 
manufacturers. however, when i asked one of trojaco’s managers whether most customers 
visit the factory, he responded: “You have to say that in the past tense. most customers came	
here, but they no longer have the knowledge” (interview 120109). 
it seems to be a general tendency within the fashion industry to travel less frequently, despite 
increasing globalization. on top of competitive pressures and financial crises, some fashion 
professionals attribute this reluctance to travel to the disaster of 9/11 (interview 120112), 
others to the outbreak of sars (interviews mexx). irrespective of the reasons, less face-to-
face contact threatens to further weaken mutual understanding between designers and 
manufacturers, thereby complicating practices of translation. Whereas a recurrent theme 
in the previous case studies pertained to the capabilities of manufacturers that brands or 
designers were looking for, in the case of the makers the focus shifts to the (apparent lack 
of ) knowledge and skills of designers, stylists, and buyers. 
regarding the development of private label collections for retailers, the makers responds 
to these developments by applying a proactive approach, which simply means that market 
research, fabric sourcing, and style development are done prior to the sales meetings with 
retailers’ buyers. in this way, when a buyer approaches the makers, the latter can somewhat 
steer the conversation by anticipating the retailer’s profile and potential consumer groups. 
for example, they can show a pre-selection of fabrics and styles that match the customer’s 
profile (interview 120202). 
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this way of working is quite remarkable, because it raises questions about where and how 
new designs actually originate. it demonstrates that there is no clear boundary between 
the company that creates new designs and the company that executes its manufacturing. 
the designs develop within the discussion and, in this case, they seem to be highly 
influenced by the manufacturer. this means that the manufacturer has to be more than just 
a manufacturer; it needs creative and commercial expertise as well. 
it also means that designers, buyers, and retailers are able to develop innovative styles 
without virtually any knowledge of the garment’s construction (interview 120202). What 
happens is that buyers are often capable of evaluating a certain garment and deciding that 
style B is better than style a, while they often cannot deduce what exactly has been changed 
based on the garment alone. the makers has to explain which parts have been lengthened, 
shortened, widened, et cetera. many designers and buyers seem to miss an understanding 
of how certain technical changes of the product affect the aesthetics and overall design of 
the garment, and vice versa. it thus further increases the interdependencies between these 
designers and their manufacturers. 
to understand what these interdependencies mean from a manufacturing perspective, 
we need to take a closer look at how trojaco has responded to the changing demands of 
customers and how this manifests itself in the organization of the manufacturing plant. 
as mentioned, the makers responded to this development by applying a proactive and 
customer-oriented approach. this customer-orientation was already reflected in trojaco’s 
reformulated mission shortly after Van gils’ 1992 bankruptcy: it aims to produce suits 
according to the customer’s technical specifications, raw materials, and patterns. as we 
have seen in the previous discussion, customers no longer provide these specifications, 
which is why trojaco and the makers invested in these specific services to meet their clients’ 
requirements. 
as tangier cannot compete with china in terms of price, trojaco focuses on quality and 
flexibility. When designers and stylists present new ideas, trojaco’s employees’ initial 
response is often: “We cannot make that” (interview 120109). on second thought, as 
one of trojaco’s managers explains, it often takes a few adjustments in terms of price, 
fabric, methods, and/or machines to be able to make a style that the factory has never 
made before (ibid.). trojaco’s willingness to place flexibility and customer orientation 
above costs – in addition to the clients’ willingness to pay the price – can thus lead to 
innovation and development on both sides. such willingness is far from common among 
garment manufacturers; one of Van gils’ current product managers describes the sampling 
process as ‘giving headaches to manufacturers’ (interview 120330), because it disrupts the 
continuous flow of manufacturing processes.  
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it needs to be emphasized that although increasing lack of knowledge of designers and 
buyers appears to be a general trend, it does not apply to all of the makers’ customers. 
the makers serves a variety of customers ranging from cm(t) to full-business, and from 
high fashion designers to mass customized orders. moreover, the issues concerning the 
distanciation of design from manufacturing reflect developments in the fashion industry in 
general (cf. interviews 111221; 120404), but to some extent are more prominent in formal 
menswear. 
While relocation of manufacturing units is always driven by cost savings, such relocation 
turned out to be more difficult in the case of tailored garments, because of the craftsmanship, 
knowledge, and skills that are required to construct a suit. on the one hand, men’s fashion 
is less volatile and ephemeral than women’s fashion and variations lie primarily in the 
details. on the other hand, it is precisely this emphasis on detail that is reflected in more 
specific technologies – and a presumably greater focus on quality. attention to technology, 
detail, and quality manifests itself both downstream the value chain – in the ways designers 
and buyers talk about a suit – and upstream in the way manufacturing plants are organized. 
regarding the former, according to Jacques van gils: “to match the quality of his father’s 
work, [...] you need to be able to talk at least half an hour about one single buttonhole” 
(Joosten, 2004: 203, my translation). sales meetings with womenswear buyers appear 
to take only a fraction of the time a menswear buyer needs to discuss the new collection 
(interview 120202). according to the makers, womenswear buyers focus primarily on 
the overall appearance in terms of colour and shape, while menswear buyers are more 
interested in details, construction, fabric, and quality (ibid.).
although designers’ lack of knowledge can be frustrating to manufacturers, it has also led 
to a situation in which trojaco generally prefers to take care of pattern making, because 
patterns provided by customers always need to be adjusted to trojaco’s own system 
(interview 120112). for example, customers may present paper patterns while trojaco only 
works with digitalized patterns. or the submitted patterns are incomplete, either because 
the customer lacks the right expertise or because the patterns are taken (i.e. copied or 
stolen) from other manufacturers. other clients send new patterns every season without 
marking what has changed from the previous season (ibid.). it is thus more efficient and 
often qualitatively better for trojaco to develop the patterns on the clients’ behalf. 
since we have seen in the previous section that pattern making is considered a crucial part 
of tailored garments’ aesthetic signatures, this shift toward the manufacturer indicates 
a certain tension. if pattern making is completely outsourced to the manufacturer, 
an important part of the brand’s identity will rely on the manufacturer’s knowledge 
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and expertise as well. maybe even more important is the increasing role of trust in the 
relationship between brand and manufacturer. outsourcing pattern making means not only 
relying on the manufacturer’s capabilities, but trusting that these patterns will not be used 
for collections of other clients. since ‘copying’ and ‘stealing’ is a widespread practice in the 
fashion business (interviews 120109; 120112; 120202), many brands are reluctant to leave 
pattern making to the manufacturer.
if we further concentrate on the actual organization of the manufacturing process, 
trojaco is balancing between standardization and industrialization versus manual labour 
and craftsmanship. for Van gils, standardization of methods gained relevance with the 
opening of more than one production unit in the 1960s and 1970s and the need to manage 
manufacturing from a distance (interview 120109). the company developed its own 
manuals and handbooks that provided the basis for its iso-9002 certification in the 1990s. 
in other words, Van gils and trojaco invested in method-driven standardizations, but with 
the explicit aim to retain flexibility in terms of product types. Quality improvements of new 
machines are therefore always assessed against the flexibility of human labour (interview 
120110). a machine might work more accurately and efficiently, but is often built to perform 
only one particular process, which often means compromising flexibility. 
the combination of low-tech and high-tech tools is clearly visible when observing the 
processes within trojaco’s factory. an interesting example of such technology is a large 
number of plastic templates, used to make different types of besom pockets.42 these are 
part of Van gils’ own technological heritage that enables the company to preserve its 
techniques and, in principle, allows for relocating the business and using the acquired 
knowledge and skills elsewhere. another example of combining standardized methods with 
flexible outcomes is the makers/trojaco’s ‘cust’ programme. made-to-measure suits are 
developed like a car configurator (interview 090605). the process is based on a selection 
of standard suits with numerous variations in terms of length, width, fabrics, materials, 
trims, and other (visual) details that enable consumers to buy highly personalized suits at 
reasonable prices. 
But not all knowledge is captured in procedures, methods, or physical artefacts like machines 
and templates. a striking example is a woman who has been working for the factory for 
several years and is highly skilled in repairing small holes and defects in garments. although 
she is ready to retire, her work consists of such an embodied and tacit skill that she has been 
asked to continue her work because the company has not found a capable successor yet.
42  flapless pockets trimmed with welting or reinforced stitching.
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What these examples demonstrate is that manufacturers have an identity of their own 
that is the product of a combination of their location, past experience, technologies, 
organizational structure and	their organizational practices. such technologies and practices 
enable manufacturers to differentiate themselves from each other and further strengthen 
the relationship between brands/designers and suppliers. 
8.4 ConClUdinG ReMaRKs
the current organizational structures and business models of Van gils fashion and the 
makers can be seen as the outcomes of a certain tension between the organizational 
practices of brands and manufacturers. although cost savings have always been the main 
driving force behind physically relocating manufacturing overseas, the organizational 
separation of brand and manufacturer is also due to their distinct positions within the 
fashion industry’s value chain. on the one hand, fashion’s seasonal fluctuations complicate 
a continuous workflow, which is often preferred by manufacturers. on the other hand, 
design and manufacturing are so much intertwined in the production of formal wear and 
suits that too much distanciation from manufacturing comes with certain challenges.
in the case of tailored garments in general and Van gils in particular, distance between 
design and manufacturing is primarily the product of knowledge discrepancies and 
associated issues in terms of knowledge translation. the translation from abstract ideas 
into physical garments is not a straightforward process, which means that even when 
production is organized through arm’s length relationships, manufacturing continues to 
play an important role in brands’ signature aesthetics.
the case study clearly demonstrates how knowledge resides in organizational practices. 
design is explained as the outcome of a discussion and interaction between designer/stylist/
buyer, pattern maker/technical designer, and manufacturer. the translation of a design 
into a garment thus relies on the combination of different types of knowledge pertaining 
to aesthetics and construction. although most professionals working within the men’s 
fashion business acknowledge that the construction of a garment is highly related to its 
aesthetics, it seems that for many designers – at least from the manufacturer’s perspective 
– the manufacturing process has become a kind of ‘black box’ instead of being integrated 
within the creative process. 
this case study enabled me to approach the question of how distance affects the relation 
between design and manufacturing from the manufacturer’s perspective. the branded 
manufacturer Van gils experienced a certain tension between branding and manufacturing. 
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the makers then withdrew from branding, but due its ‘Van gils heritage,’ this manufacturer 
understands both types of organizing, that is both branding and manufacturing. through 
its customer-oriented and flexibility-driven approach, the company is now able to combine 
that knowledge in such a way that – although it problematizes designers’ apparent lack 
of knowledge – it can bridge the distance between design and manufacturing itself. the 
branded producer Van gils fashion, in turn, deals with this tension by building strong and 
durable relationships with its suppliers and not withdrawing from manufacturing entirely 
by maintaining in-house quality control and technical support.
Van gils´ experienced tension between branding and manufacturing is thus a paradoxical 
one, as aesthetics and technical construction of formal menswear appear inextricably linked 
and highly interdependent. the main challenge for brands without (past) manufacturing 
competences, is therefore to develop organizational practices that allow for mutual 
engagement between brand and manufacturer, as well as for an understanding of design as 
a ‘joint accomplishment’ rather than separated from manufacturing.
8
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ChapteR 9 
|  the maKing of
[a]s commodities travel greater distances (institutional, spatial, temporal), 
knowledge about them tends to become partial, contradictory, and 
differentiated.
 arjun appadurai (1986: 56)
as the distance between producers and consumers increases when the value 
chain stretches across the globe, the fashion business provides more jobs that 
involve mediation of fashion. the large majority of these people, however, have 
never been able to acquire the status of artist.
 patrik aspers & lise skov (2006: 806)
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Mind	The	Gap.	Balancing	design	and	global	manufacturing	in	Dutch	fashion is about the making of 
dutch fashion within a globalized market. my aim was to bring the	making	of back into our 
minds by exploring the relationship between design and manufacturing in the production of 
dutch fashion. in the first chapter, i used the words of dutch fashion designer alexander van 
slobbe in this respect: my research focuses on the role of the material and materialization 
in fashion design; on how fashion is made.  The	making	of	 involves more than a made	in	 ... 
label. it is also more than a list of supplying firms or a list of ingredients. By combining 
theoretical insights from cultural and economic geography, i have aimed to provide a 
different perspective on how dutch fashion is made – a perspective that takes into account 
both fashion’s creative, intangible components and its material, technological side. 
as i have shown in the first chapter, the majority of dutch fashion is designed in the 
netherlands, but manufactured abroad. this gap raises questions like: does it matter 
where	dutch fashion is being made? does it affect dutch design aesthetics when it is no 
longer being made in the netherlands? throughout my dissertation i have argued that it 
is less important where	 something is produced, than how	manufacturing and design are 
connected.  the central aim of my study was to explore the role of distance between design 
and manufacturing in the emergence of dutch fashion. my research was thus centred on 
the question: How	is	Dutch	fashion	production	affected	by	growing	distance	between	design	and	
manufacturing?	
i have approached this question by first offering an extensive review of the literature on 
fashion and fashion industries. i have come to understand the production of fashion as the 
relationship between design and manufacturing and have sought to understand how spatial 
separation affects this relationship. unlike existing studies of dutch fashion and fashion 
industries that often focus on the sources of globalization, i have drawn attention to some 
of its effects:	i have addressed the question of how dutch fashion production is affected by 
distance between design and manufacturing.
a combination of evolutionary and relational economic geography then allowed me to argue 
that knowledge resides in organizational routines and practices. Based on the assumption 
that organizational	practices can enhance knowledge (trans)formation at a distance, i have 
studied such practices so as to explore how dutch fashion brands deal with distance, and 
to what extent organizational practices provide strategies to overcome the frictions of 
distance. in order to gain an in-depth understanding of the mechanisms that constitute the 
distanciated relations between design and manufacturing, i have chosen a case study design 
and examined the organizational practices of four dutch renowned fashion brands: oilily, 
mexx, ¯coraKemperman, and Van gils. in this concluding chapter, i will bring together the 
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results of my theoretical underpinnings and of my case studies, but let me first, once again, 
contextualize my study within the multidisciplinary field of fashion research.
in this dissertation i have discussed fashion as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon by 
arguing that dutch fashion is the product of cultural, socio-economic, spatial, and industrial 
practices. such a conceptualization of fashion has epistemological consequences. it means 
that fashion is made in several interdependent places simultaneously, and it can be observed 
in different forms such as pieces of clothing, dress behaviour, retail landscapes, visual 
representations, abstract ideas, and discursive formations. depending on the researcher’s 
focus, fashion is thus produced differently and ‘looks’ different. several scholars (e.g. 
aspers & skov, 2006; fine  & leopold, 1993; leslie & reimer, 1999; Pratt, 2008; skov & 
melchior, 2008) have argued that understanding fashion and other creative industries 
requires studying these sites	of	production	in relation to each other, so as to prevent lopsided 
accounts, i.e. focusing too much on consumption at the expense of production, and vice 
versa. as leopold puts it:
loosely defined as the inter-relationship between highly fragmented forms of 
production and equally diverse and often volatile patterns of demand, the fashion 
system is a hybrid subject; it incorporates dual concepts of fashion: as a cultural 
phenomenon, and as an aspect of manufacturing with the accent on production 
technology. this dual aspect has made it difficult to accommodate within a tradition 
in which the histories of consumption and production plough largely separate furrows 
(leopold, 1992: 101).
leopold (1992) points to disciplinary traditions in academia, which have often led to separate 
studies on either consumption or production that do not inform or draw on each other. in 
addition to these disciplinary divisions in academic fashion research, the organization of 
the global fashion industry is also marked by spatially separated sites of production and 
consumption. to some extent, academic distance in fashion studies thus mirrors spatial 
and organizational distance in the fashion business. 
such distance especially manifests itself in the ways in which sites of production are often 
subject to concealment (cf. skoggard, 1998). Whether deliberately or not, by “striving 
to distance their brand identities from both component raw materials and production 
conditions” (Weller, 2004: 155), fashion brands often provide either obscured or 
romanticised representations of	the making	of.	
unsurprisingly, the goal of both public and academic interest in garment manufacturing 
frequently is to reveal exploitative working conditions and issues related to uneven 
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economic development. as the global economy seems far from becoming a completely 
sustainable and socially responsible organization anywhere or anytime soon, addressing 
these undeniably serious problems remains mandatory. however, while acknowledging 
the persistent relevance of studying labour conditions and socio-economic development 
within global garment manufacturing, i have addressed the production of fashion from a 
somewhat different stance. 
i opted for a practice-oriented approach to analyse how dutch fashion brands organize 
the relationship between design and manufacturing at a distance, and how this distance 
affects the making of dutch fashion. in this final chapter, i present the results from both my 
theoretical explorations and my case study analyses. first, i return in section 9.1 to my main 
research question and compare the organizational practices pursued by the different brands 
in this study: oilily, mexx, ¯coraKemperman, and Van gils. By drawing on a combination 
of evolutionary, institutional, and relational economic geographies, i have proposed the 
concept of organizational	 practices as my main unit of analysis, to complement chain and 
network concepts. my analysis has revealed a variety of strategies to overcome the frictions 
of distance within the globally dispersed organization of dutch fashion production. it also 
sharpens our understanding of the roles that different types of distance play within dutch 
fashion production. 
section 9.2 further elaborates on these insights and proposes a reconceptualization 
of the production of fashion as a collaborative achievement to transcend traditional 
understandings of buyer-supplier relationships. finally, my research is mostly explorative in 
nature; i studied a selection of dutch fashion brands that offer a variety of insights while not 
claiming to be representative of the dutch fashion industry as a whole. as my study touches 
on issues that have presumably more wide-ranging implications than these specific brands, 
i further discuss these implications in section 9.3 and provide a number of suggestions for 
future research.
9.1 dUtCh fashion fRoM desiGn to ManUfaCtURinG
i started my study with the observation of two apparently contradicting developments 
in the recent history of dutch fashion. on the one hand, the second half of the twentieth 
century saw the successful emergence of a diversity of dutch fashion brands and designers. 
on the other hand, the same period saw a massive breakdown of garment manufacturing 
in the netherlands. dutch fashion paradoxically seems to thrive on the industry’s de-
industrialization.
to understand how dutch fashion is affected by such industrial changes, i sought to analyse 
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how fashion design and clothing manufacturing relate to and depend on each other. to 
do so, i approached fashion as a process and drew on the theories of entwistle (2009), 
lipovetsky (1987/1994; 2005), and Weller (2004; 2007), among others, to define fashion 
production as a complex system of interrelated creative and industrial practices that are 
guided by principles of ephemerality, seduction, and marginal differentiation. in other 
words, i aimed at an integrated understanding of the dutch fashion industry by taking into 
account the entire process from first idea to final delivery; my analyses were thus aimed at 
understanding both design and manufacturing practices. 
9.1.1 the sPaces of dutch fashion Production
like in so many north-european countries, the spatial organization of the dutch fashion 
industry is marked by globalized production networks and fragmented value chains. 
distance between design and manufacturing is almost taken for granted. Yet, while 
globalization of the fashion industry as such is not unique to the netherlands, ways of 
organizing and coping with distance vary considerably among types of brands and firms. 
the most common organizational structure in the netherlands is called the head-and-tail	
firm, which applies not only to the four cases studied in this research but to the majority of 
dutch fashion firms in the twenty-first century. this type of organization resembles danish 
concept	houses	(melchior, 2010) and german branded	producers	(faust, 2005). it is typified by a 
primary focus on design (i.e. the head) and marketing and sales (i.e. the tail), while the in-
between processes of assembly are outsourced. all four brands in this study – oilily, mexx, 
¯coraKemperman, and Van gils – outsource manufacturing, and to a certain extent all 
share characteristics of head-and-tail type organizations.
Variations become visible when focusing on the brands’ specific sourcing strategies. 
drawing on the conceptual insights from global value chains (gVc) and global production 
networks (gPn) as explored in chapter 2 (e.g. gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994; gereffi et al., 
2005; henderson et al., 2002; hess & Yeung, 2006; lane & Probert, 2009), i focused on the 
following four dimensions to analyse the brands’ spatial organization of production: 
1)	 Degree	of	outsourcing
commonly known as the make-or-buy	decision. it basically refers to which parts of 
the value chain are being outsourced and which parts are being kept in-house. i have 
differentiated between own manufacturing, cut-make-trim (cmt) suppliers, full-
package or ready-made garment suppliers, full-service suppliers, and licensing 
contracts; 
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2)	 Locations	of	suppliers
as a measurement for geographical distance between design and manufacturing; 
3)	 Number	and	diversity	of	suppliers
as an indication of the size and fragmentation of the production network; and
4)	 Buyer-supplier	relationships
in terms of sourcing strategies, i differentiated between direct sourcing and agencies, 
which tells us nothing about the quality of relationships but is an indicator of the 
nature of contact between the makers and the designers.
these four dimensions refer to the structure of the global production networks of oilily, 
mexx, ¯coraKemperman, and Van gils and provide a general framework for identifying 
geographical and organizational distance, as summarized in table 9.1. in the cases of oilily 
and Van gils, geographical distance increased considerably due to the transition from own 
manufacturing in the netherlands to eventually outsourcing manufacturing abroad. mexx 
and mac & maggie, in contrast, sourced from distant suppliers right from the start.
Table	9.1:	Sourcing	strategies
 Degree of 
outsourcing 
Locations of 
suppliers 
Number and 
diversity of 
suppliers‡ 
Relations with 
suppliers 
Oilily Increased 
from own 
manufacturing to 
licensing 
NL  Europe and 
India  Far East 
High [>50] Both direct sourcing 
and via agencies 
Mexx Increased 
from own pattern 
making and sampling 
to FP suppliers 
India and Far East  
include Europe 
High [>50] Own production centre 
 via agency Li & Fung 
 mainly direct 
sourcing 
Mac&Maggie / 
¯CoraKemperman 
Sourcing from FP 
suppliers 
NL, Europe, India, Far 
East  NL, Europe 
and India 
Low [<10] Both direct sourcing 
and via agencies 
Van Gils Increased 
from own 
manufacturing to 
CMT and FP suppliers 
NL  Belgium  ... 
 Morocco  
Eastern Europe and 
China 
Low [<10] Direct sourcing 
 
                                                                
‡ The data of the case studies did not provide exact numbers of suppliers. Number and diversity of suppliers are positively related, which is 
why I have presented them in the same column: in each case, an increase of the number of suppliers was aimed to gain flexibility in terms 
of price and product type. 
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the number and diversity of suppliers is directly related to the brands’ product types. the 
more diversified the collections of the brand – e.g. mexx compared to Van gils – and the 
more these collections are subject to frequently changing fashions, the greater and more 
diverse, usually, the supplier base. Vanilia, which was not extensively discussed in this 
study but is covered by Von maltzahn’s (2013) research, would be an exception to this rule; 
this brand strives to produce a high variety of garments in one factory. in general, though, 
manufacturers tend to specialize in certain product types. thus the type and quality of the 
product are important selection criteria for brands and retailers. 
the size and fragmentation of a brand’s production network are not only indications of 
geographical distance, but can also affect organizational distance through the nature 
of buyer-supplier relationships. a more spatially dispersed supplier base complicates 
sourcing strategies that are entirely based on direct sourcing and require frequent 
travelling, communication, and negotiation. the highly personal buying approach of cora 
Kemperman, for instance, is facilitated by a relatively low number of permanent suppliers. 
in contrast, the much larger mexx has long relied on its own production centre to coordinate 
the one hundred-plus subcontractors in the far east.
Buyer-supplier relations have a central position within the literature on global value chains 
and production networks. the nature of these relationships is primarily explained in 
terms of governance structures (e.g. gereffi, 1994) and the dominance of large retailers 
and marketers, resulting in (unequal) power relations and suppliers’ limited prospects 
for upgrading and knowledge formation (e.g. gereffi & memedovic, 2003). at the same 
time, critical responses to such often u.s.-based and global buyer-oriented perspectives 
have argued for more relational understandings of asymmetrical and multidirectional 
power relations within global production networks; these arguably do more justice to 
the particularities derived from national, regional, organizational, or product-related 
differences (cf. gereffi et al., 2005; henderson et al., 2002; lane & Probert, 2009; tokatli, 
2007). 
Buyer-supplier relationships remain an important point of departure to analyse the 
relationship between design and manufacturing as proposed in this study. it is generally 
assumed that design-related practices are controlled by the buyer, while suppliers are 
concerned with manufacturing. my own research is largely consistent with findings of the 
international literature on fashion’s global production networks; i found that lead firms 
apply a mixture of sourcing strategies, often relying on both cmt and full-package suppliers 
as well as hybrid forms (lane & Probert 2006; 2009; faust, 2005; faust et al., 2004) – in 
addition to an increasing tendency to shift risks and responsibilities to suppliers and the 
resulting interdependencies between brand-owners and manufacturers (ibid.) furthermore, 
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in line with the international literature, dutch fashion brands select suppliers based on their 
reliability, product quality, and lead times, while cost considerations continue to guide their 
sourcing strategies. 
these conclusions remain rather general. however, it remains striking that buyer-supplier 
relationships within international fashion industries are primarily “managed by ‘contact not 
contract’” (tokatli, 2007: 81), considering the fragmentation and complexity of the brands’ 
production networks and the consequent geographical and organizational distance. at 
best, according to tokatli (2007: 87), contracts are ‘relational’, which means that they are 
“open to reinterpretation and updating by the parties without any guarantee of flawless 
coordination or control. such contracts represent a more binding tie than simple market 
exchange, but they do not entail high levels of commitment and control.” dutch fashion 
firms are no different in this regard. says one of oilily’s and mexx’ former production 
managers (interview 110427, my translation): “honestly, within this business, i have never 
come across any contract or whatsoever. unless you call a specific order for production a 
contract, but [the cooperation as such] – no that was never established in a contract.”
despite this lack of contracts, all interviewees without exception claim to strive for durable, 
long-term commitments. the question, then, is to what extent the duration explains 
anything about the nature of the relationship. as crewe and davenport (1992: 196) already 
demonstrated in the early 1990s: “the long term, obligational relationships which are 
emerging between buyers and suppliers must not be confused with the notions of mutual 
trust, partnership or alliance.” in other words, closer relationships do not necessarily mean 
equality. moreover, tokatli (2007) points to the difficulties researchers face when aiming to 
find empirical evidence of the changing nature of power relations, because indicators such 
as the length of contracts can only provide partial understandings. to gain more insights 
into how such buyer-supplier relationships work, alternative methodologies are thus 
required, which is why i aimed for a practice-oriented approach. 
9.1.2 a Practice lens on gloBal Production netWorKs
Based on my analysis of the global production networks and sourcing strategies of oilily, 
mexx, ¯coraKemperman, and Van gils, i can conclude that there is a general tendency 
toward increased outsourcing abroad – and thus increasing geographical and organizational 
distance – while simultaneously all brands strive for durable relationships. While this 
result is derived from more or less objectively quantifiable measures of geographical and 
organizational distance, it remains a question to what extent such long-term relationships 
also lead to more relational proximity. in order to answer that question, i sought to provide 
a more relational understanding of the distances between design and manufacturing by 
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focusing on organizational practices. 
my conceptualization of organizational practices represents the product of a dialogue 
between two related concepts – organizational	 routines	 and	 social	 practices	 –	 and thus 
combines elements and insights from both strands of literature. more precisely, the 
concept of organizational practices serves as an alternative analytical lens to understand 
distant relationships within global production networks. due to their collective nature, 
organizational practices can transcend firm boundaries and provide an observable – and 
above all, flexible – unit of analysis. such a unit of analysis can complement gPn analyses 
by aiming for a more in-depth understanding of inter- and intra-firm relations. 
in chapter 3 i defined organizational practices as certain ‘ways of doing things’ within 
organizations and industries that guide, though not determine, organizational behaviour. 
Based on the assumption that knowledge resides in these practices, i argued that 
organizational practices may have the capacity to overcome the frictions of distance by 
providing a form of relational proximity. this ‘practised knowledge’ (amin & cohendet, 
2004) is of a collective and shared nature in which knowing is not separate from doing. 
By analysing organizational practices of dutch fashion brands, i aimed to reveal how 
different types of knowledge that are geographically and/or organizationally separated 
– e.g. aesthetic and manufacturing knowledge – relate to each other, how they manifest 
themselves in creative and industrial practices, and how distance affects these relationships.
although the main principle of outsourcing manufacturing applies to all four cases, my focus 
on organizational practices revealed a diverse and more complex picture of how design and 
manufacturing relate to each other at a distance. i found the most remarkable differences 
between the case studies in the types of practices that were crucial to understanding how 
design and manufacturing are connected. i expected to find different ways to organize 
manufacturing at a distance, but i did not know which types of organizational practices would 
be most prominent. in all four cases, my analysis therefore started with the entire process, from 
first idea to final delivery, and gradually shifted toward particular organizational practices that 
played a leading role in connecting design and manufacturing. 
the results of my analyses reveal that in the case of oilily, the focus was on design; mexx was 
built around planning	and	coordination; buying practices guided the case of ¯coraKemperman; 
and pattern	making turned out crucial for the making of Van gils. to be clear, design, planning, 
buying, and pattern making were discussed as important organizational practices for all case 
studies. But in each case, certain organizational practices gradually became the focal point of 
my analysis, due to their central role that interviewees described in defining the relationship 
between design and manufacturing. 
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OILILY’S	(UN)LIMITED	CREATIVITY
in the case of oilily, the design	practice played a leading role in the brand’s spatial organization 
of production – so much so that i argued that this specific organizational practice explains 
how the brand was able to overcome the frictions of distance. oilily – and in particular 
head designer marieke olsthoorn – established and maintained the connection between 
design and manufacturing by way of a highly tangible and personalized design practice. 
this involved not only handcrafted drawing and sketching but also pattern making, which 
means that both aesthetic and technical knowledge and skills resided in this practice. 
the presence of oilily’s own sample room facilitated designers in physically translating 
their ideas into garments, and the connection between design and manufacturing was 
virtually made within the design practice itself – even though the actual manufacturing was 
outsourced abroad. 
	
MExx’	COORDINATED	STYLE
the focus on planning	 and	 coordination in the case of mexx derives from the brand’s 
sophisticated alignment of all corporate practices. unlike oilily, mexx was confronted with 
spatial distance from the beginning and developed a system to connect all organizational 
processes accordingly. mexx codified and institutionalized the connections between design 
and manufacturing by way of an integrated planning tool, the so-called annual schedule. 
this artefact holds a central position within the brand’s organization; it both represents and 
guides organizational practices. at the same time, this case study also demonstrates that 
organizational practices may be guided by such artefacts such as the annual schedule, but 
are not entirely determined by them. the schedule remains important to this day, but the 
specific ways in which mexx organized the relationship between design and manufacturing 
were influenced by other factors as well. these include technological developments that led 
to a certain de-materialization of the design practice, travelling practices that facilitate both 
temporary and relational proximity, and the ways in which individual designers and buyers 
cooperate and share aesthetic, technical, and commercial knowledge. moreover, the closure 
of mexx’ production centre in hong Kong revealed strong interdependencies between 
design and manufacturing; it was perceived as not only a loss of technical knowledge and 
skills, but also as a loss of an important part of mexx’ ‘dna’. the case of mexx therefore also 
shows how organizational practices can be strongly site-specific. 
	
CORA	KEMPERMAN’S	PERSONAL	BUYING	APPROACH
Buying, for cora Kemperman, involves much more than just purchasing the right clothes. 
thus this organizational practice became the focal point of this particular case study. 
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Buying, in this case, is both creative and commercial, both aesthetic and technical. in fact, 
the boundaries between design, styling, buying, and production are fluid and integrated 
within one person. Kemperman maintained close and durable relationships with her 
suppliers, and frequently visited the sites of manufacturing both for inspiration and	 for 
product development. in that way, Kemperman established an almost collaborative design 
practice between buyer and supplier without owning any production facility. facilitated 
by a relatively small production network, Kemperman personally made the connections 
between design and manufacturing by literally moving between the sites of creation and 
production and by integrating aesthetic, technical, and commercial knowledge and skills 
within the practice of buying.  
VAN	GILS’	CRAFTED	METHOD
the history of Van gils contains two parallel developments in which the formerly integrated 
brand and manufacturer went separate ways after a bankruptcy. the analysis of how both 
brand and manufacturer organize production offers an alternative perspective on how 
design and manufacturing are connected, as seen through the eyes of the manufacturer. 
this case study demonstrates that manufacturing – even if it is outsourced to independent 
suppliers abroad – continues to play a significant role in defining fashion brands’ 
signature aesthetics. in the previous case studies, the main emphasis was on how brands 
establish the connections with manufacturing; in this case, i also focused on the role of 
manufacturers. Pattern making, which is increasingly outsourced as well, emerged as 
a crucial organizational practice to understand how and where aesthetic and technical 
knowledge come together. furthermore, the case of Van gils suggests a somewhat distinct 
position of formal menswear within the fashion industry, where technical aspects are more 
explicitly considered to be an inherent part of design aesthetics; design is explained as 
a relational product of a discussion between the stylist/designer and the pattern maker. 
this means that too much distanciation between designers and manufacturers can lead to 
knowledge discrepancies, hence complicating the translation of design ideas into physical 
garments. this case study demonstrated that manufacturers have an (aesthetic) identity of 
their own, which further illustrates the multidirectional relationship between buyers and 
suppliers in the production of fashion.
	
RELATIONAL	ORGANIZATIONAL	PRACTICES?
in this dissertation, i took the practices of design, planning, buying, and pattern making 
highlighted in the four case studies as my empirical focal point. this approach allowed me to 
unravel the ways in which different dutch fashion brands organize the relationship between 
design and manufacturing at a distance. from these analyses of organizational practices, 
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Table	9.2:	O
rganizational	practices	of	O
ilily,	M
exx,	¯CoraKem
perm
an,	and	Van	Gils
 
Role of the individual 
Inter-personal elem
ents 
Tangible design 
Role of organizational artefacts 
Design  
[Oilily] 
Oilily w
as purely creative [...] an 
organization driven by the 
creativity of M
arieke Olsthoorn.  
(production m
anager 110427) 
 
In m
y view
, if you can m
ake the pattern [...] you are also m
ore 
capable of designing. 
(M
arieke Olsthoorn 120314) 
 
Planning and 
coordination  
[M
exx] 
 
Buyer: But that’s w
hy w
e w
ork 
together. I say: ‘okay, design w
hat you 
w
ant, but then m
aybe w
e have to say, 
okay, the button can’t be solid silver... 
 Designer: W
ell, I think w
e actually, in a 
positive w
ay, w
e challenge each other. 
(120131) 
M
ost people do [i.e. draw
ing], it is in the com
puter, but I actually 
like to w
ork w
ith the product. So I often w
ork—
I don’t even m
ake 
the patterns or anything. I really w
ork w
ith the product. And that 
helps to transfer into an idea w
hich eventually appears as a 
sketch on paper. 
(Buyer 120131) 
Everything w
as scheduled and 
there w
ere dates for everything [...] 
w
hich I guess brought discipline 
internally but also externally. [...] It 
brought a lot of discipline to all the 
stakeholders, w
hoever they m
ight 
be; the shop keepers as w
ell as the 
factories as w
ell as everybody.  
(Founder 111213) 
Buying  
[M
ac&M
aggie / 
CoraKem
perm
an] 
I really consider m
yself a m
ixture 
[of designer, buyer, and producer]. I 
am
 definitely not just a designer 
[...] neither do I consider m
yself just 
a buyer. [...] I am
 a m
ixture of both. 
(Cora Kem
perm
an 110120) 
Cora believes in w
orking like a fam
ily 
and together. So she w
ill contact the 
factory directly. 
(agent 110330) 
W
e bought a lot of sam
ples. [...]Design then involved alm
ost 
copying the originals by taking the pocket from
 one jacket and 
the hood from
 another [...] put it in a blender and som
ething 
different cam
e out of it. 
(M
&M
 buyer 110106-I) 
 
Pattern m
aking  
[Van Gils] 
 
The designs w
ere alw
ays and continue 
to be the product of a collaboration 
betw
een a stylist and a pattern m
aker. 
(production m
anager/director 120110) 
A m
en’s suit is a m
arriage betw
een the m
aterial, the pattern, 
and the m
ethod. Those need to be w
ell tuned. And to enter into 
a good m
arriage, you need to know
 all parties very w
ell. 
(production m
anager/director 120110) 
 I can im
agine that it is w
onderful for a designer to w
ork w
ith a 
factory:  if you have an idea, you test it and w
ithin one day you 
know
 w
hether it w
orks or not. [...] In our case, w
e send draw
ings 
to the factory and three w
eeks later w
e receive the prototypes. 
That is quite a long process. And you have to be very specific in 
your expectations at a distance. If you literally stand next to the 
m
achines – the real creation – then you can achieve your goal 
m
uch faster. 
(product m
anager 120314) 
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i extracted four elements that can contribute to more relational proximity: 1) the strong 
role of highly influential individuals, 2) the emphasis on inter-personal interaction and 
cooperation, 3) tangible components of design, and 4) codification and institutionalization 
of organizational practices. 
marieke olsthoorn and cora Kemperman, former head designers of oilily and 
¯coraKemperman respectively, represent strong creative individuals who arguably 
integrated different types of knowledge and skills within their personal ways of working. 
since such an individual approach has its limitations, other kinds of organizational practices 
show an emphasis on inter-personal interaction and cooperation. this is reflected in, for 
instance, Van gils’ discussion between designer and pattern maker, and in the seamless 
cooperation between designer and buyer at mexx. 
in addition to design as collaborative practice, tangible elements of design have also 
been put forward as a way to connect design with manufacturing. all cases emphasize 
the importance of pattern making, and all brands except ¯coraKemperman are or were 
actually involved in pattern making. But even if pattern making is outsourced to ready-
made garment suppliers, physically working with the product and materials is considered 
an important way to successfully materialize otherwise abstract design ideas into garments. 
finally, the case of mexx in particular demonstrated a way of codifying and institutionalizing 
relations between geographically distanciated organizational practices by way of an 
organizational artefact – the annual schedule. this does not imply that no such artefacts 
exist in the other three cases, but my interview-guided study of organizational practices did 
not reveal a prominent role for such artefacts. other methodologies, such as participant 
observation, may provide additional insights in this regard.
table 9.2 lists a number of excerpts from my interview transcripts to illustrate how different 
elements of organizational practices emerged from the narratives of my respondents. the 
different combinations of practices indicate how design and manufacturing are connected 
at a distance, how relational proximity is established, and where knowledge is shared and 
created. 
some organizational practices are explicitly related to a specific organizational structure 
and to the configuration of the global production network. Pattern and sample making, 
for instance, require specific expertise that is often facilitated by keeping certain elements 
of the production process in-house. however, the variety of case studies shows that while 
ownership may help, it is not indispensable to achieve relational proximity. relational 
proximity is not directly derived from geographical proximity, which is consistent with the 
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theoretical insights from gertler (2003; 2004; 2008) and amin and cohendet (2004), among 
others, as discussed in chapter 3. What this study explicitly shows is why relational proximity 
matters in globally dispersed fashion industries and that a practice-oriented approach may 
contribute to understanding how.
in conclusion, by focusing on the configurations of the global production networks and 
the sourcing strategies of four dutch fashion brands, i was able to determine dimensions 
of distance that are related to the firms’ organizational structures (see table 9.1). By 
analysing organizational practices, i addressed the issue of more relational understandings 
of distance and proximity (see table 9.2). i focused on those organizational practices that 
proved specifically relevant to understand how design and manufacturing are connected at a 
distance. the practices of design, pattern making, buying, and planning that were explored 
in the four case studies have one important element in common: they are all concerned 
with the transformation or translation of knowledge – and, in particular, the translation of 
aesthetic knowledge into technical knowledge. the elements summarized in table 9.2 can 
facilitate such knowledge translation and relational proximity. 
drawing on my case study results, the main argument that i will further develop in the 
remainder of this chapter is that these organizational	practices	of	 translation	are decisive in 
determining the effects of distance for the production of dutch fashion. the relationship 
between design and manufacturing cannot be explained by geographical distance alone. 
the effects of distance are instead largely defined by how	and where	organizational practices 
of translation are established.
9.2 Mind the Gap? dUtCh fashion pRodUCtion   
 ReVisited
organizational practices concerned with translation, or with all actions necessary to 
transform an abstract, visually and textually specified idea into a producible garment in the 
right shape, colour, quality, price, and time, involve a variety of interdependent actions. 
these actions range from pattern making and selecting materials, to calculating margins 
and negotiating price and lead times. When the supply chain of the fashion industry 
becomes increasingly fragmented due to outsourcing and offshoring, such practices of 
translation can change from being an integrated part of either design or manufacturing into 
a separate discipline that can be outsourced as well. it can be part of the design practice 
itself, as seen in the case of marieke olsthoorn at oilily; she preferred a highly tangible 
design practice that incorporated both drawing and pattern making. once manufacturing 
is outsourced, the translation can be outsourced to manufacturers as well, as demonstrated 
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by the organization of the makers in the case of Van gils. translation can also be something 
in-between, which means that translation becomes a practice in itself, like the function of 
dPc (design-Production-coordination) in the case of mexx. Practices of translation can in 
fact be established at different sites throughout the production network, and are concerned 
with both the moment and place where different types of knowledge ‘meet’.
Knowledge, indeed, resides in such organizational practices, but my case studies show that 
knowledge can also be highly individualized. especially in the cases of cora Kemperman and 
marieke olsthoorn, different practices, types of knowledge and skills merged within one 
person. in fact, all four case studies demonstrate a decisive role of influential individuals. 
Both the strength and vulnerability of such an individual approach are manifested in the 
ways in which these persons’ departures or retirements is recurrently perceived as a loss of 
‘the soul’ or ‘the dna’ of the brand (cf. oilily’s marieke olsthoorn, mexx’ rattan chadha, Van 
gils’ Jacques van gils). in The	Craftsman,	sennett explained this type of problem in terms of 
tacit knowledge – and the difficulties of transferring such knowledge to a genius’ successor:
to put this observation abstractly: in a workshop where the master’s individuality 
and distinctiveness dominates, tacit knowledge is also likely to dominate. once the 
master dies, all the clues, moves, and insights he or she has gathered into the totality 
of the work cannot be reconstructed (sennett, 2008: 78).
especially in the industry of fashion, where emotions, gut feeling, and other hard-to-
verbalize types of knowledge prevail, finding successors to head designers or brand founders 
can pose a recurrent challenge (cf. manlow, 2007 discussing lagerfeld’s reinvigoration of 
chanel). 
in addition to the role of individual performances, my case studies show that organizational 
practices can also be strongly site-specific; they are “constituted by the places, spaces, and 
material contexts where they are performed and which they link together in relationships” 
(Jones & murphy, 2011: 384). this means that knowledge resides in practices and individuals, 
but also in specific places. especially in the case of mexx, organizational practices were 
highly situated and dependent on the hong Kong production centre, which had developed 
an important base of knowledge and skills that contributed strongly to the brand’s ‘dna’.
irrespective of their spatial situatedness, the practices of design, pattern making, buying, 
and planning, as analysed in my case studies, often reveal highly interwoven design and 
manufacturing practices. this is quite remarkable, because it suggests a certain co-
development or co-design between brand/designer/buyer on the one hand, and supplier/
manufacturer on the other. at the same time, it underlines inevitable interdependencies; 
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apparently, design and manufacturing cannot be entirely separated. the cases where these 
practices are separated show certain struggles with translation, which are attributed to 
apparent knowledge discrepancies. 
to be more precise, manufacturers and production managers argue that many designers 
lack knowledge of production, which leads to a kind of disconnection between designers and 
manufacturers; they misunderstand each other or do not interact at all. many professionals 
attribute this problem to the lack of domestic manufacturing facilities in the netherlands. 
one may indeed argue that, as a consequence of the netherlands’ early deindustrialization, 
manufacturing capacities and	knowledge and skills gradually have disappeared. 
however, it would be an overgeneralization to argue that struggles in the process of 
translation within the dutch fashion industry are entirely due to the fact that designers 
are less knowledgeable or skilled. designers in the twenty-first century offer a different	
way of creation that may be less inspired by manual labour but is also less constrained by 
physical and technological limitations. the new generation of designers has grown up in a 
digitalized environment, indeed detached from industrial manufacturing. that is why their 
creative practices do not draw naturally – or at least not only – on the physical construction 
of a garment. the current situation, in which spatial and organizational distance between 
design and manufacturing has become the standard, does not, by definition, strengthen or 
weaken creativity. What it demands is an advanced way of organizing the translation from 
an abstract, creative design idea into a physical (and commercial) garment. to understand 
how organizational practices can both widen and bridge the gap between design and 
manufacturing, we need to take a closer look at how such practices are defined.
my research is primarily based on interview accounts. this means that i mainly focused on 
interviewees’ understandings and verbal interpretations of their organizational practices 
and less on actual observed behaviour. the interviewees’ narratives and physical artefacts 
such as the annual schedule brought me closer to what Pentland and feldman called the 
ostensive	aspect of organizational practices and routines (2005; 2008b): practices’ abstract, 
generalized, or schematic forms; the organizational practice in	 principle. this emphasis 
on the representations of organizational practices can partly explain and add nuance to 
observed differences between the case studies. 
drawing on my theoretical explorations in chapters 2 and 3, the fashion system can be 
understood as a set of fairly routinized institutions defined by seasonal rhythms of change, 
and led by fairs and fashion weeks. the netherlands is a relatively small country; dutch 
fashion firms consequently draw on a rather small labour market, in which many people share 
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a similar cultural and educational background. as i illustrated in chapter 4, large companies 
such as mexx provided an important learning environment for many professionals in the 
dutch fashion business, leading to a shared professional background as well.
dutch fashion firms thus operate in fairly similar institutional environments in which 
geographical distance between design and manufacturing is practically a given. the 
question then is: how different are these firms’ organizational practices? drawing on 
my interview accounts, it is plausible to argue that organizational practices, to a certain 
extent, may differ in terminology but not necessarily in their performance. in other words, 
different terms are attributed to fairly similar practices. Brands, firms, and industries partly 
define themselves by way of their practices, and terminologies and representations form a 
substantial part of that. 
By way of illustration, men’s fashion is considered a completely different business than 
children’s wear. to a certain extent, making suits indeed seems to require different expertise 
than creating clothes for children. however, i would argue that the essence of translating 
aesthetic ideas into wearable and marketable garments in regular temporal rhythms 
of designing, buying, producing, and selling, is practically the same. the way fashion 
professionals verbalize, account for and explain their business is often an ingrained and 
taken-for-granted part of their practices. it can thus take an (academic) outsider to unravel 
some of this taken-for-grantedness, as i have done in this dissertation. 
acknowledging the distinction between the ostensive	and performative	aspects (Pentland & 
feldman, 2005; 2008b) of organizational practices is also important for providing a more 
nuanced understanding of the perceived knowledge discrepancies between designers 
and manufacturers. it is not only brands and industries that define themselves through 
their (organizational) practices; professionals define themselves through their job titles. 
‘i am a designer’ can then lead to distanciation from manufacturing as an effect of how 
organizational practices are defined. narratives and representations of organizational 
practices are not independent from how practices are performed. the literature explored 
in chapter 3 emphasizes that representations (the ostensive aspects) and performances 
(the performative aspects) influence and guide each other. this may open the possibility to 
change organizational practices by way of changing narratives. 
the case of ¯coraKemperman can help to explain this argument. many interviewees recall a 
certain overvaluation of the design practice and an undervaluation of pattern making among 
students of fashion and textiles. Being the artist, creator, or designer is more appealing, 
because the design of the garment supposedly creates the most value and prestige. this 
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results not only in cognitive and relational distanciation, but also in uneven power relations, 
as pattern making is considered of lower value than design. distance is thus made through 
(understandings of ) organizational practices. cora Kemperman seems to acknowledge 
the interdependencies between different aspects of the process of fashion production and 
perceives fashion as a joint accomplishment instead of an individual creation. her approach, 
i would argue, makes durable and sustainable relationships between buyer and suppliers 
to emerge more natural as relational proximity is established through practice. specific 
(understandings of ) organizational practices can thus either widen or shrink different types 
of distances, depending on how relationships are defined by such practices. 
the central aim of my dissertation was to explore the role of distance between design and 
manufacturing in the emergence of dutch fashion. i can now conclude that the effects of 
distance between design and manufacturing largely depend on the conception of fashion 
production. i have come to understand the production of fashion as a form of knowledge 
translation in which design knowledge is transformed into technical knowledge. the more 
design and manufacturing become physically separated – as in the case of relocation 
and outsourcing – the more urgent becomes the need to organize these processes of 
translation and to establish the right connections between design and manufacturing. as 
i have explained in much more detail above, my study of organizational practices revealed 
different ways in which dutch fashion firms connect design and manufacturing at a 
distance. to some extent, we may argue that the organizational practices of design, buying, 
pattern making, and coordination as analysed in my study are the results of geographical 
and organizational distance between design and manufacturing. at the same time, these 
specific organizational practices can both make and overcome the frictions of distance. 
While within dutch fashion firms’ sourcing strategies distance seems to be perceived as 
an external and independent variable – as an inevitable given that one has to deal with 
– these firms’ (understandings of ) organizational practices also show how distance is 
made through practice. the organizational practices that i have studied largely define the 
relationship between design and manufacturing; as such they can both widen or shrink a 
potential gap between the two. it remains an empirical and theoretical challenge to validate 
the idea of distance as a relational effect, but what i have hopefully shown is that a re-
conception of dutch fashion production is required to understand how dutch fashion is 
made. By conceptualizing dutch fashion production as a form of knowledge translation 
and as a product of relations between design and manufacturing, we can move from the 
question of where	it	is	made	to how	it	is	produced. only then can we start to understand the 
balancing act between design and global manufacturing in dutch fashion.
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9.3 Mind the Gap! dUtCh fashion pRodUCtion and   
 beYond...
near the end of my research, the Dutch	 Design	 Fashion	 Architecture	programme has been 
completed, its follow-up – the Creative	Industries	Fund	NL	– started, and, following the uK 
and the us, the netherlands established its own national fashion council. dutch fashion 
has gained a significant role in national cultural and economic policy concerns; that 
is, as a creative	 industry,	 geographically and organizationally distanciated from clothing 
manufacturing. 
in the history of dutch fashion, geographical distance as a consequence of the industry’s 
deindustrialization since the 1960s has been more or less accepted as an inevitable 
given – despite attempts to protect domestic manufacturing in the 1970s and 1980s. this 
acceptation went hand in hand with a gradual sense of fashion	as immaterial value creation. 
spatial or geographical distance between design and manufacturing thus contributed to a 
new approach to fashion as a creative industry, while simultaneously bringing about new 
challenges concerning the translation of design ideas into physical garments. 
due to the labour-intensive nature of garment manufacturing and persisting wage differences 
around the globe, it is highly unlikely that a substantial part of manufacturing will ‘return’ 
to the netherlands. distance between design and manufacturing in a geographical sense 
will continue to play a role in the industry’s spatial organization of production.
Practically the entire dutch fashion industry has confronted geographical distance between 
design and manufacturing, and dutch brands have developed different sets of organizational 
practices to manage production at a distance. my study shows that certain organizational 
practices can indeed help to successfully create and produce fashion without owning any 
manufacturing facilities. at the same time, my analyses have shown the vulnerability of 
practices that strongly rely on individuals or that are highly site-specific. 
throughout this study, organizational practices were understood as shared, collective, 
and partly routinized ways of doing and	 understanding within and across organizations. 
theoretically and methodologically, the analytical focus on organizational practices helps to 
understand distance in a relational sense – distance as made through practice, instead of as 
a given. my focus on interviews shows the specific role of understanding in this regard. more 
in-depth ethnographic methodologies, such as participant observation, may be helpful to 
further explore how exactly doings	and understandings	of organizational practices relate to each 
other. While my study found that ways	of	doing	seem to be fairly similar among different types 
of brands and organizations, it is often in ways	of	understanding, defining and representing 
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practices like design, styling, and production that distance is produced or connections are 
made.
the relevance of understanding how distance is created through organizational practices 
goes beyond the specific developments of the four dutch fashion brands as discussed 
above. the wider implications of my conclusions can be further explored in at least three 
directions, addressing industry professionals, policymakers, and	consumers.
first, i want to argue that stimulating an understanding of fashion production as mutually 
dependent and inextricably linked aesthetic and industrial practices can also contribute to 
more sustainable and more responsible supply chains. the relative valuation of garment 
manufacturing can increase if fashion production is conceived as a collaborative achievement 
between designers, buyers, pattern makers, and manufacturers. While it obviously takes 
much more than a change of definition, i think that a comprehensive understanding of 
dutch fashion design in relation to global garment manufacturing can make sustainable 
and responsible cooperation to come more natural. 
second, understanding the relationship between design and manufacturing may also 
provide an alternative perspective regarding what the dutch fashion industry needs to 
remain competitive in the future. the industry does not need domestic manufacturing to 
be successful in fashion, but it has to focus on the connections and interdependencies 
between design and manufacturing. While own manufacturing is not required to make these 
connections, some form of physical presence may support a more integrated understanding 
of fashion production as a combination of aesthetic and industrial practices – especially for 
contemporary and future generations of designers who are no longer directly exposed to the 
industry of clothing manufacturing. investing in local production facilities – which are often 
viewed primarily in terms of facilitating small and flexible production runs for (upcoming) 
fashion designers who lack size and capital to source abroad – may therefore provide more 
direct interactions between design and manufacturing. 
an example of such a local initiative was still in a pioneering stage of defining its main 
function during my research period: the Arnhem	Fashion	Factory. this production facility is 
located in the Klarendal neighbourhood in arnhem, where fashion is utilized by public and 
private actors to socially, economically, and physically revitalize the neighbourhood. such 
facilities can make manufacturing more visible again, and as such may contribute to both 
preserving and creating the knowledge and skills that go into fashion production. 
third and finally, the recent disasters in Bangladesh abruptly brought manufacturing closer 
into our worldview, albeit in a mediated form. nevertheless, a study by ncdo (the dutch 
277
expertise and advisory centre for citizenship and international cooperation) and tns niPo 
(a renowned dutch market research centre) reveals a persisting knowledge gap among 
dutch consumers concerning the production of clothing (Boonstoppel & carabain, 2013). 
consumers state that they do not know how to identify responsibly produced clothing, 
due to the lack of transparency and the complexity of the supply chain. a comprehensive 
understanding of fashion design and clothing manufacturing is therefore not only required 
for professionals in the fashion business, but also for consumers. a potentially interesting 
addition to this dissertation would be to study brand narratives, and analyse to what extent 
such narratives further distanciate consumers from the practice of clothing manufacturing 
by concealing or romanticising garments’ origins. 
in conclusion, i want to argue that the effects of distance between design and manufacturing 
in dutch fashion production are largely a matter of mindset.	distance per se is not the issue, 
but the ways in which the relations between design and manufacturing are understood and 
valued. in view of this conclusion, my study can be read as an appeal to literally ‘mind	the	gap’.
9
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samenvatting (in dutch)
Mind the Gap: afsteMMinG Van ontWeRp en 
WeReldWiJde pRodUCtie in de nedeRlandse Mode
de laatste twintig jaar hebben wetenschappers en beleidsmakers een groeiende 
belangstelling voor de creatieve industrie. Zij hanteren daarbij verschillende definities, maar 
de onderliggende gedachte is vrijwel altijd dat binnen de creatieve industrie ideeën meer 
waard zijn dan machines (howkins, 2001). met dit proefschrift wil ik een bijdrage leveren 
aan inzicht in de relatie tussen de creatieve industrie en de maakindustrie, in het bijzonder 
binnen de nederlandse mode-industrie. de mode-industrie is bij uitstek een sector 
waar een ruimtelijke en organisatorische scheiding heeft plaatsgevonden tussen idee en 
machine, tussen ontwerp en productie, en tussen immateriële en materiële waardecreatie. 
dit proefschrift werpt een kritische blik op de rol van het maakproces in het creatieve proces 
van de nederlandse mode-industrie. 
DE	NEDERLANDSE	MODE-INDUSTRIE	IN	EEN	GLOBALISERENDE	WERELD
het begrip nederlandse mode is een relatief nieuw fenomeen. tot de jaren zestig kwam 
mode uit Parijs. de geschiedenis van de nederlandse mode in de afgelopen vijftig jaar kan 
worden gelezen als een combinatie van culturele en industriële emancipatie. aan de ene 
kant heeft nederland zich geleidelijk los gemaakt van het Parijse modedictaat en hebben 
nederlandse modeontwerpers een eigen stijl ontwikkeld. aan de andere kant hebben 
productieverplaatsing en –uitbesteding geresulteerd in een nederlandse mode-industrie 
die zich grotendeels heeft losgemaakt van de kledingproductie. door een combinatie van 
stijgende loonkosten, een groeiend tekort aan (goedkoop) personeel, een geconcentreerde 
detailhandel, de nadruk op rationalisering van het productieproces, een prijsbewuste 
nederlandse consument en het liberale handelsbeleid van de nederlandse overheid is de 
productie van kleding in nederland sinds de jaren zestig in snel tempo verdwenen.
de vraag rijst dan in hoeverre de opkomst van nederlandse mode en het ontwikkelen van 
een eigen stijl gerelateerd is aan – of zelfs gedreven wordt door – de vroege afbouw van de 
nederlandse kledingindustrie. met andere woorden: wat zijn de relaties tussen de ontwerp- 
en de maakpraktijk in de mode? 
het doel van dit onderzoek is om de opkomst van de nederlandse mode te relateren 
aan en mogelijk te verklaren vanuit processen van globalisering en de-industrialisatie. 
doordat nederlandse kledingbedrijven reeds in de jaren zestig van de twintigste eeuw zijn 
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begonnen met het verplaatsen en uitbesteden van productie naar lagelonenlanden, heeft 
de nederlandse mode-industrie zich relatief vroeg ontwikkeld tot een creatieve industrie 
die drijft op creativiteit en handel, maar minder op de maakindustrie. dit heeft geleid tot 
een groeiende afstand tussen de ontwerp- en de maakpraktijk. de centrale vraag van dit 
onderzoek luidt:
Welke	invloed	heeft	de	groeiende	afstand	tussen	de	ontwerp-	en	de	maakpraktijk	op	de	productie	van	
Nederlandse	mode?
deze vraag valt uiteen in drie deelvragen:
# Hoe	verhouden	de	ontwerp-	en	maakpraktijk	zich	tot	elkaar	in	de	productie	van	mode?
# Op	welke	manier	beïnvloedt	afstand	de	relatie	tussen	de	ontwerp-	en	de	maakpraktijk?
# Hoe	 organiseren	 Nederlandse	 modemerken	 de	 relatie	 tussen	 ontwerp	 en	 productie	 op	
afstand?
de eerste twee deelvragen zijn ingebed in een theoretisch en conceptueel kader in de 
hoofdstukken 2 en 3. ik ga op zoek naar manieren om relaties tussen verschillende 
economische praktijken op afstand te analyseren en om verschillende facetten van de mode-
industrie met elkaar te verbinden. het empirische deel van dit onderzoek wordt gevormd 
door vier case studies over de nederlandse modemerken oilily, mexx, ¯coraKemperman 
en Van gils. deze case studies worden gepresenteerd in de hoofdstukken 5 tot en met 8.
de vier geselecteerde merken hebben een opvallende rol gespeeld in de ontwikkeling van 
de nederlandse mode-industrie vanaf 1970. Ze opereren allen in het middensegment en 
zijn op verschillende manieren geconfronteerd met een (groeiende) afstand tussen de 
ontwerp- en de maakpraktijk. de manier waarop deze merken omgaan met die afstand staat 
centraal in de analyse van zogenaamde organisatiepraktijken; dit zijn deels vanzelfsprekende 
wijzen van organiseren die zowel invloed hebben op, als beïnvloed worden door, de 
sociale, materiële, en institutionele context waarin bedrijven opereren. deze praktijken 
heb ik onderzocht door middel van een combinatie van semi-gestructureerde interviews, 
gedeeltelijke observatie en documentanalyse (hoofdstuk 4).
MODEGEOGRAFIE
Binnen het interdisciplinaire onderzoeksproject Dutch	Fashion	Identity	 in	a	Globalized	World	
benader ik de ontwikkeling van de nederlandse mode vanuit een sociaal-geografisch 
perspectief. mode is een relatief onderbelicht terrein binnen de geografie in nederland 
met de proefschriften van scheffer (1992), raes (2000), Wenting (2008) en levelt (2010). in 
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deze onderzoeken staat de ruimtelijke organisatie van de productieketen centraal en wordt 
gezocht naar mogelijke verklaringen van bepaalde geografische of sociaal-economische 
veranderingen in deze organisatie. de nadruk ligt dan meestal op industriële dynamiek, 
internationale handel en economische globalisering van de kleding- en textielindustrie. 
minder aandacht lijkt daarentegen uit te gaan naar de culturele en creatieve kanten van de 
mode-industrie, wat het domein vormt van cultuurwetenschappers en kunsthistorici. 
de theoretische verkenning in hoofdstuk 2 benadert mode vanuit disciplineoverschrijdende 
verbindingen met een sociaal-geografisch fundament. dit leidt tot een integrale 
conceptualisering van mode als een (productie)systeem. Puttend uit de inzichten van 
modetheoretici die benadrukken dat mode moet worden onderzocht als zowel een cultureel 
fenomeen als een commerciële industrie (bv. aspers, 2010; entwistle, 2009; Kawamura, 
2005; lipovetsky, 1987/1994), vat ik mode op als een systeem dat drijft op de principes van 
verleiding, vluchtigheid en marginale differentiatie (lipovetsky, 1987/1994). mode is een 
mondiaal systeem met een inherente dynamiek van constante vernieuwing (al dan niet 
marginaal) en opererend binnen een vaste stuctuur van seizoenen met stoffenbeurzen en 
fashion	weeks. nationale en regionale verschillen komen tot uiting in het product van het 
modesysteem en de manier waarop de productie wordt georganiseerd. de productie	 van 
mode wordt in dit onderzoek gedefinieerd als een vorm van kennistransformatie, waarbij 
esthetische, creatieve kennis wordt omgezet in productiegerelateerde, technische kennis. 
mode is daarom een product waarin materiële en immateriële waarden onlosmakelijk met 
elkaar verbonden zijn.
in ruimtelijke en organisatorische zin zijn de creatieve en technische aspecten van 
modeproductie echter meestal van elkaar gescheiden. de waardeketen van de mode-
industrie kent een aantal processen – van ontwerp en patroonmaken tot snijden, naaien 
en distributie – die door verplaatsing en uitbesteding zowel geografisch als organisatorisch 
van elkaar gescheiden kunnen worden. de vertaling van creatieve naar technische kennis 
moet dan op afstand worden gerealiseerd.
in hoofdstuk 2 bespreek ik theorieën van mondiale waardeketens en productienetwerken 
die handvatten bieden om de ruimtelijke structuren van de (nederlandse) mode-industrie 
in kaart te brengen en verschillende uitbestedingsrelaties en sourcingstrategieën te 
analyseren (bv. coe, dicken & hess, 2008; faust, 2005; gereffi, humphrey & sturgeon, 2005; 
gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994; hess & Yeung, 2006; lane & Probert, 2009). daarbij valt op 
dat typologieën van soorten bedrijven slechts in beperkte mate bruikbare definities kunnen 
bieden, omdat grenzen tussen verschillende bedrijfstypen vervagen: merken openen 
hun eigen winkels, detailhandelaren organiseren hun eigen productie, en fabrikanten 
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ontwikkelen hun eigen merken. een zeer gangbaar bedrijfsmodel binnen de nederlandse 
mode-industrie is het zogenaamde kop-staartbedrijf, waarbij het ontwerp (de kop) en 
marketing en verkoop (de staart) in huis blijven, terwijl de productie (de romp) wordt 
uitbesteed. Binnen dit model zijn echter vele varianten mogelijk en de meeste bedrijven 
hanteren een combinatie van productie- en sourcingstrategieën.
ORGANISATIEPRAKTIJKEN:	RELATIES	OP	AFSTAND
het gebruikelijke kop-staartmodel binnen de nederlandse mode-industrie impliceert 
afstand	 tussen ontwerp en productie. Binnen de economische geografie wordt op 
verschillende manieren aandacht besteed aan de rol van afstand of nabijheid in 
clustervorming van economische bedrijvigheid en in het faciliteren van kennisdeling en 
innovatie. Zo kan een zekere mate van nabijheid zorgen voor vertrouwen en interactie en 
daarmee bepaalde leerprocessen faciliteren; omgekeerd kan afstand zorgen voor fricties 
in kennisoverdracht en -vertaling. tegelijkertijd bestaat het gevaar van zogenaamde ‘lock-
ins’ als gevolg van te weinig afstand. op welke manier afstand daadwerkelijk een rol speelt 
in het stimuleren van kennisdeling en innovatie, hangt in sterke mate af van de manier 
waarop afstand wordt gedefinieerd (vgl. Boschma, 2005; gertler, 2003; 2004; grabher, 
1993; schoenberger, 1997). hoofdstuk 3 behandelt een aantal theorieën die economische 
relaties op afstand trachten te verklaren aan de hand van niet-fysieke vormen van nabijheid, 
zoals relationele, organisatorische, culturele, of cognitieve nabijheid. hieruit kunnen 
twee belangrijke conclusies worden getrokken: 1) dat een bepaalde mate van relationele 
nabijheid van belang is om kennisdeling op afstand te realiseren; en 2) dat relationele 
nabijheid een gedeeld referentiekader vereist. hoe een dergelijk gedeeld referentiekader 
eruit ziet en hoe dit tot stand kan komen op (fysieke) afstand is een cruciale vraag voor dit 
onderzoek.
in hoofdstuk 3 ga ik daarom op zoek naar een analyse-eenheid die hier inzicht in kan bieden 
en die het mogelijk maakt om afstandsrelaties in de mode-industrie beter te begrijpen. 
geïnspireerd door inzichten vanuit de evolutionaire en de relationele economische 
geografie ga ik een conceptuele dialoog aan tussen de begrippen organisatieroutines	 en 
sociale	praktijken. 
de evolutionaire economische geografie maakt gebruik van evolutionaire metaforen om 
veranderingen van de economische ruimte te analyseren en te verklaren in termen van 
variatie, selectie en overdracht van (succesvolle) organisatieroutines (Boschma, frenken & 
lambooy, 2002; nelson & Winter, 1982). routines worden hierbij opgevat als relatief rigide 
bedrijfs- of industrie-eigen manieren van werken en organiseren, die als het ware dienen 
als het ‘geheugen’ van het bedrijf. door de nadruk op mechanismen van variatie, selectie en 
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overdracht, blijven organisatieroutines binnen de economische geografie echter een ‘black 
box’. inzichten vanuit de organisatiekunde bieden mogelijkheden om deze ‘black box’ te 
openen. 
een essentiële bijdrage leveren de studies van Pentland & feldman (2005; 2008): door 
een conceptueel onderscheid te maken tussen cognitieve, gedragsmatige en materiële 
dimensies van organisatieroutines, hebben zij empirisch aannemelijk gemaakt dat de 
mogelijkheid tot verandering inherent is aan de routine en niet alleen plaatsvindt door 
middel van spreidings- en selectiemechanismen. representaties van routines (hoe de 
routine wordt verwoord) zijn niet per definitie gelijk aan de manier waarop routines 
daadwerkelijk worden uitgevoerd (het te observeren gedrag); beide dimensies beïnvloeden 
elkaar, waarbij de één meer rigiditeit kan vertonen dan de ander.
tevens benadrukken Pentland & feldman het collectieve karakter van organisatieroutines 
(anders dan individuele gewoonten): organisatieroutines creëren verbindingen tussen 
actoren en faciliteren gedeelde inzichten. deze meer relationele, praktijkgeoriënteerde 
benadering van organisatieroutines biedt een ingang om het begrip een ruimtelijke 
dimensie te geven; immers, het verbinden van actoren en gedeelde inzichten is een 
voorwaarde voor het creëren van relationele nabijheid. 
om deze praktijkgeoriënteerde benadering nader uit te werken ben ik te rade gegaan 
bij verschillende wetenschapsdisciplines die (sociale)	 praktijken	 op zeer uiteenlopende 
manieren hebben geconceptualiseerd (bv. amin & cohendet, 2004; reckwitz, 2002; rouse, 
2007; schatzki, 1996; 2005). relationele benaderingen binnen de economische geografie 
zijn daarbij een vruchtbare bron van inspiratie gebleken: zij gaan er vanuit dat economische 
structuren en entiteiten de producten zijn van socio-economische praktijken (Jones, 2008). 
dit betekent dat afstand niet enkel moet worden gezien als een statisch gegeven, maar 
ook als een relationeel product van praktijken. Bovendien worden (sociale) praktijken 
geconceptualiseerd als een samenspel van zowel mentale als lichamelijke (routinematige) 
activiteiten. denken en doen zijn met andere woorden nauw met elkaar verbonden; dit 
biedt wederom inzichten in hoe kennis zit ingebed in routines en praktijken. 
in dit proefschrift heb ik gekozen om  de begrippen organisatieroutines en sociale praktijken 
binnen het concept organisatiepraktijken	met elkaar te verbinden, en daarin te focussen op 
de aspecten kennis,	ruimte	en tijd – de manier waarop kennis wordt gecreëerd en gedeeld, 
hoe afstand wordt overbrugd of gecreëerd, en hoe verandering tot stand wordt gebracht 
of juist wordt voorkomen. de hoofdstukken 2 en 3 resulteren in een conceptueel kader 
dat is gebaseerd op de volgende theoretische assumpties: de ruimtelijke organisatie van 
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de nederlandse mode-industrie vereist een vertaling van verschillende soorten kennis op 
afstand; deze kennis zit ingebed in organisatiepraktijken; organisatiepraktijken gaan door 
hun collectieve karakter voorbij aan organisatorische en fysieke grenzen; en deze praktijken 
faciliteren relationele nabijheid en kunnen daarmee afstand overbruggen. deze aannames 
heb ik nader onderzocht in de case studies.
MODEPRAKTIJKEN	IN	KAART	GEBRACHT
in de vier case studies staat de vraag centraal in hoeverre kennisdeling en –vertaling 
een rol spelen in de manier waarop nederlandse modemerken de productie op afstand 
organiseren en welke organisatiepraktijken daarvoor zijn ontwikkeld. Binnen elke case 
study heb ik een andere organisatiepraktijk ontrafeld die centraal staat in de relatie tussen 
ontwerp en productie. Voor oilily is dit de ontwerppraktijk,	voor mexx planning	en	coördinatie, 
bij ¯coraKemperman staat de inkooppraktijk centraal en bij Van gils ligt de nadruk op 
patroonmaken. 
oilily, opgericht door de familie olsthoorn, heeft een transformatie gemaakt van fabrikant 
van kinderkleren in de jaren zestig tot een lifestylemerk in de jaren tachtig en negentig. sinds 
2009 gaat oilily door als licentieverlener. de ontwikkeling van de organisatiestructuur kent 
verschillende stadia van uitbesteding – van eigen productie in nederland naar uitbesteding 
in het buitenland – en is onderbroken door twee faillissementen (1980 en 2009). eén van de 
meest cruciale veranderingen was het sluiten van het eigen monsteratelier, wat tot gevolg 
had dat patroonmaken en monstering verder werden uitbesteed. de impact van deze 
verandering van de organisatiestructuur was groot, omdat hiermee ook de ontwerppraktijk 
moest veranderen – en daar lag het hart van de organisatie. in hoogtijdagen werd onder 
creatieve leiding van marieke olsthoorn de (fysieke) afstand tussen ontwerp en productie 
overbrugd door middel van een ontwerppraktijk die een sterke materiële component 
had. ontwerpen werden met de hand getekend en het patroonmaken was ingebed in de 
ontwerppraktijk. esthetische en technische kennis waren daarmee beide onderdeel van 
deze organisatiepraktijk. deze manier van werken werd gefaciliteerd door oilily’s eigen 
monsteratelier, waardoor ontwerpers hun ideeën letterlijk zelf konden vertalen naar een 
fysiek product. ondanks dat de daadwerkelijke productie werd uitbesteed aan leveranciers 
in het buitenland, kon binnen de ontwerppraktijk de verbinding tussen ontwerp en 
productie succesvol tot stand worden gebracht. de ontwerppraktijk van oilily is daarmee 
een voorbeeld van hoe een organisatiepraktijk door middel van het integreren van 
verschillende typen kennis verbindingen kan maken tussen ruimtelijk en organisatorisch 
gescheiden actoren. afstand wordt hier overbrugd binnen de ontwerppraktijk.
in tegenstelling tot oilily is mexx nooit een fabrikant geweest en heeft van begin af aan 
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gewerkt met leveranciers in het Verre oosten. de nadruk op planning en coördinatie 
binnen deze case study vloeit voort uit de manier waarop het merk erin slaagt om alle 
organisatiepraktijken op elkaar af te stemmen. mexx heeft de verbindingen tussen de 
ontwerp- en de maakpraktijk als het ware gecodificeerd en geïnstitutionaliseerd door 
middel van een integraal planningsinstrument: het zogenaamde Annual	Schedule. het annual 
schedule is een artefact (Pentland & feldman (2005; 2008) dat mexx’ organisatiepraktijken 
representeert en in bepaalde mate stuurt. andere factoren die van invloed zijn geweest op 
de manier waarop mexx de afstand tussen ontwerp en productie overbrugt zijn: een de-
materialisatie van de ontwerppraktijk als gevolg van technologische ontwikkelingen; het 
reisgedrag van ontwerpers dat zowel tijdelijke fysieke als relationele nabijheid faciliteert; 
en de manier waarop ontwerpers en inkopers met elkaar samenwerken en daarbij creatieve, 
technische en commerciële kennis delen. daarnaast laat de sluiting van mexx’ eigen 
productiekantoor in hong Kong na 2008 zien hoe sterk ontwerp en productie met elkaar 
samenhangen en van elkaar afhankelijk zijn. de sluiting werd ervaren als een verlies van 
technologische kennis en expertise, maar bovenal als een verlies van een belangrijk deel 
van mexx’ ‘dna’. deze case study laat dan ook zien dat organisatiepraktijken niet alleen 
persoonsgebonden, maar ook sterk plaatsgebonden kunnen zijn. tevens geeft deze case 
study inzichten in de rol die artefacten kunnen spelen in het op elkaar afstemmen van 
organisatiepraktijken op zowel representatie- als gedragsniveau.
¯coraKemperman is een retail-merk dat is opgericht in de jaren negentig als een spin-out 
van mac & maggie (1976-1996). Binnen deze case study staat de inkooppraktijk centraal, 
als één van de kerncompetenties van retailers. Voor ontwerpster en inkoopster cora 
Kemperman betekende inkopen veel meer dan alleen het vinden van de juiste kleding voor 
de winkelvloer. inkopen bij mac & maggie en ¯coraKemperman heeft zowel creatieve als 
commerciële aspecten, zowel esthetische als technische elementen. in feite zijn de grenzen 
tussen ontwerp, styling, inkoop en productie vervaagd en samengebracht binnen de 
praktijk van één persoon: de inkoper. Kemperman onderhield hechte en duurzame relaties 
met haar leveranciers en bezocht de productieplaatsen veelvuldig, zowel voor inspiratie als 
voor productontwikkeling. op deze manier ontwikkelde Kemperman een ontwerppraktijk 
die praktisch dreef op de samenwerking en co-creatie tussen inkoper en leverancier. 
een relatief kleinschalig productienetwerk maakte het voor Kemperman mogelijk om de 
verbindingen tussen ontwerp en productie persoonlijk tot stand te brengen door zichzelf 
letterlijk te bewegen tussen de plaatsen van creatie en productie en door esthetische, 
technische en commerciële kennis te integreren in de inkooppraktijk. deze case study 
benadrukt wederom de rol van verschillende typen kennis binnen één organisatiepraktijk 
– en in dit geval ook binnen één persoon – in het creëren van verbindingen en relaties 
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op afstand. Bovendien laat deze case study zien hoe organisatiepraktijken vaak nauw 
samenhangen met een bepaalde organisatiestructuur. 
de geschiedenis van Van gils begint vlak na de tweede Wereldoorlog bij een kledingfabrikant 
die zich in de jaren tachtig heeft ontwikkeld tot een herenmodemerk met eigen fabrieken 
in nederland en daarbuiten. nadat dit familiebedrijf in 1992 failliet is gegaan, krijgt het 
merk enkele malen een nieuwe eigenaar – achtereenvolgens centaur clothes, Vilenzo en 
Waalwear – en gaat de familie Van gils door met produceren van herenkostuums voor 
derden onder de naam the makers. de nieuwe eigenaren van het merk Van gils hebben 
de productie uitbesteed, waardoor merk en fabrikant na het faillissement gescheiden zijn. 
in deze case study worden de parallelle ontwikkelingen van merk en fabrikant bestudeerd. 
de case study laat zien dat – zelfs als de productie wordt uitbesteed naar onafhankelijke 
leveranciers in het buitenland – de maakpraktijk een significante rol blijft spelen in het 
bepalen van het ‘handschrift’ van een merk. Patroonmaken blijkt hierbij een cruciale rol te 
spelen als het gaat om de verbinding tussen esthetische en technische kennis. technische 
aspecten van een ontwerp blijken met name binnen de formele herenmode een expliciete 
rol te vervullen: het ontwerp wordt gezien als een relationeel product van een discussie en 
interactie tussen de stylist/ontwerper en de patroonmaker. mijn analyse laat zien dat te veel 
afstand tussen ontwerper en maker – bijvoorbeeld door het uitbesteden van patroonmaken 
– kan leiden tot kennisverlies en het bemoeilijken van de vertaling van ontwerpideeën naar 
fysieke producten. de ontwerp- en maakpraktijk zijn met andere woorden sterk met elkaar 
verweven en vertonen een grote onderlinge afhankelijkheid. 
alle vier merken in de case studies hebben kenmerken van kop-staartbedrijven. meestal 
is er sprake van een mix van sourcingstrategieën en een toenemende tendens naar meer 
uitbesteding. het valt op dat ondanks de grote (fysieke) afstanden langetermijnrelaties 
worden nagestreefd zonder dat er sprake is van contracten. de onderzochte 
organisatiepraktijken geven inzicht in hoe deze relaties werken en hoe de afstand tussen 
ontwerp en productie kan worden overbrugd. opvallend daarbij zijn de rol van het 
individu bij oilily en ¯coraKemperman, de focus op interactie en samenwerking bij mexx, 
¯coraKemperman en Van gils, de tactiele aspecten van de ontwerppraktijk bij alle vier 
merken, en het codificeren en institutionaliseren van organisatiepraktijken bij mexx. uit mijn 
case studies blijkt dat deze vier elementen een belangrijke bijdrage kunnen leveren aan 
relationele nabijheid en het overbruggen van afstand tussen de ontwerp- en de maakpraktijk. 
de mate waarin deze elementen zichtbaar zijn in de onderzochte praktijken van ontwerp, 
planning, inkoop, en patroonmaken verschilt per case. alle vier organisatiepraktijken 
hebben echter één eigenschap gemeen: ze belichamen de vertaling of transformatie van 
esthetische ontwerpkennis naar technische productkennis. 
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het belang van vertaling staat centraal in alle organisatiepraktijken die ingezet worden 
om de afstand tussen ontwerp en productie te overbruggen. dit sluit goed aan bij mijn 
conceptualisering van modeproductie als een vorm van kennistransformatie. in hoofdstuk 
9 kom ik terug op de vraag welke invloed afstand tussen de ontwerp- en de maakpraktijk 
heeft op de productie van mode. tevens ga ik dieper in op het belang en de betekenis van 
kennisvertaling en –transformatie voor de toekomst van de nederlandse mode-industrie. 
MIND	THE	GAP
de laatste jaren wordt mode nationaal en regionaal gestimuleerd als een creatieve industrie 
en minder als een maakindustrie. fysieke afstand tussen ontwerp en productie wordt min of 
meer gezien als een gegeven en er zijn geen signalen die wijzen op het verdwijnen van die 
afstand (relokalisatie). dit proefschrift laat zien dat er manieren zijn om ontwerp en productie 
succesvol met elkaar te verbinden zonder eigen productiefaciliteiten. tegelijkertijd wijst dit 
onderzoek op de kwetsbaarheid van een model dat volledig drijft op productie door derden.
alle vier organisatiepraktijken die in dit proefschrift zijn onderzocht, vertonen een sterke 
verwevenheid van de ontwerp- en de maakpraktijk. het wekt dan ook geen verbazing dat 
er problemen rijzen als gevolg van het uit elkaar halen van deze praktijken. Problemen 
ontstaan met name in de vertaling van een ontwerp naar een product. dit is deels te wijten 
aan een tekort aan productiekennis onder ontwerpers en dit kennistekort kan wellicht 
worden verklaard door het wegvallen van de nederlandse kledingindustrie. tegelijkertijd 
is de ontwerppraktijk an	sich	veranderd; minder geïnspireerd door de maakpraktijk, maar 
ook minder beperkt door productiefactoren. deze ontwikkeling is niet per definitie positief 
of negatief, maar vereist wel een sterkere aandacht voor de manieren waarop ontwerp en 
productie met elkaar – op afstand – kunnen worden verbonden.
terugkomend op de vraag hoe de opkomst van de nederlandse mode samenhangt 
met processen van globalisering en de-industrialisatie, concludeer ik dat de opkomst 
van de nederlandse mode in zekere mate heeft kunnen profiteren van de vroege 
uitbestedingspraktijken van kledingfabrikanten. tegelijkertijd wijs ik op het groeiende 
belang voor de nederlandse mode-industrie om actief op zoek te (blijven) gaan naar 
manieren om ook in de toekomst duurzame verbindingen te maken tussen ontwerp en 
productie.
mijn onderzoek laat zien dat bepaalde organisatiepraktijken kunnen bijdragen aan 
het actief verbinden van de ontwerp- en de maakpraktijk, zelfs als deze fysiek en 
organisatorisch  van elkaar gescheiden zijn. op methodologisch gebied biedt het concept 
organisatiepraktijken daarnaast een flexibele analyse-eenheid om afstandsrelaties binnen 
mondiale organisatiestructuren te begrijpen en te analyseren. 
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Voortbordurend op het onderscheid tussen cognitieve, gedragsmatige, en materiële 
dimensies van organisatiepraktijken en routines (Pentland & feldman, 2005; 2008), stel 
ik dat het effect van afstand op de productie van nederlandse mode mede afhangt van 
de manier waarop de productie van mode en de daarbij horende organisatiepraktijken 
worden gedefinieerd, begrepen, en gerepresenteerd. het overbruggen van afstand 
wordt daarmee niet zozeer een fysieke maar een cognitieve en relationele uitdaging. hoe 
organisatiepraktijken worden gedefinieerd en gerepresenteerd bepaalt namelijk mede 
hoe ontwerp en productie samenhangen. Wanneer afstand niet wordt beperkt tot een 
fysiek gegeven, maar wordt gezien als een relationele dimensie, ontstaat vervolgens de 
mogelijkheid dat organisatiepraktijken afstand kunnen vergroten en verkleinen. op basis 
van het conceptuele onderscheid tussen representaties van organisatiepraktijken en het 
daadwerkelijk te observeren gedrag, sluit ik dit onderzoek af met een drietal aanbevelingen 
en suggesties voor verder onderzoek.
ten eerste stel ik dat duurzame en maatschappelijk verantwoorde organisatievormen 
makkelijker te realiseren zijn als mode wordt gezien als een gezamenlijk product 
van de ontwerp- en de maakpraktijk. Voor de industrie is het daarom van belang om 
organisatiepraktijken te ontwikkelen die zich expliciet richten op de vertaling van 
esthetische naar technologische kennis en die de productie van mode definiëren als een 
gezamenlijk product van materiële en immateriële waarden. 
ten tweede kan het begrijpen en waarderen van deze relaties tussen de ontwerp- en de 
maakpraktijk mogelijkerwijs verder worden gestimuleerd door lokale productiefaciliteiten. 
specifiek voor beleidsmakers is het hierbij van belang dat deze veelal kleinschalige 
productiemogelijkheden niet tot doel zouden moeten hebben om te concurreren op de 
wereldmarkt – er zijn vooralsnog geen tekenen die erop wijzen dat de maakindustrie van 
kledingproductie weer naar nederland verplaatst zal worden – maar om de zichtbaarheid 
van de maakindustrie in nederland te vergroten – specifiek voor nieuwe generaties 
ontwerpers – en daarmee kennisverlies tegen te gaan. 
ten derde is een beter begrip van de relaties tussen ontwerp en productie niet alleen van 
belang voor de industrie en voor beleidsmakers, maar ook voor de consument. mede door 
een gebrek aan transparantie hebben consumenten nog steeds weinig kennis over de 
oorsprong van hun kleding. deze kenniskloof maakt het moeilijk om verantwoorde keuzes 
te maken. in dit kader zou het een interessant vervolgonderzoek kunnen zijn om te kijken 
hoe merkverhalen deze kloof in stand houden, dan wel vergroten.
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dit proefschrift laat zien dat afstand tussen ontwerp en productie voor een groot deel een 
kwestie is van mindset.	het succesvol verbinden van ontwerp- en maakpraktijk op afstand 
vereist praktijken die gericht zijn op vertaling, en die de productie van mode begrijpen als 
een combinatie van materiële en immateriële waarden. om een kloof te overbruggen moet 
deze eerst worden benoemd en erkend. dit proefschrift sluit daarom af met de oproep Mind	
the	Gap!
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